The Backstory to the Mecca Agreement: Saudi Arabia’s De-risking from the United States
| AUTHOR | Anil Raman |
| DATE | August 10, 2026 |
| CATEGORIES | Geostrategy United States West Asia |
The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan is the result of a gradual process of strategic diversification that began long before the current Middle Eastern crisis. Its origins lie in a period when Saudi Arabia started reassessing its reliance on the United States, Türkiye sought capital and strategic rehabilitation, and Pakistan manoeuvred to gain from both.
The US-Saudi Relationship Begins to Change
The murder of Jamal Khashoggi on 2 October 2018 in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul marked the first major rupture in the political relationship. By then, Mohammed bin Salman, who became Crown Prince in June 2017, was already leading Saudi decision-making. The killing damaged Saudi-Turkish relations and raised political pressure in Washington. President Donald Trump, however, continued to treat MBS as a strategic partner.
Joe Biden took a different approach. During the 2020 campaign, he pledged to make Saudi Arabia “pay the price” for Khashoggi’s murder and to treat the Kingdom as a “pariah.” After taking office, his administration released a US intelligence assessment in February 2021 concluding that MBS had approved an operation to capture or kill Khashoggi. Washington sanctioned Saudi individuals, ended support for Saudi offensive operations in Yemen, and limited direct engagement with MBS. The intention was recalibration. Washington wanted new political terms and meant to keep the relationship. MBS was the hereditary absolute ruler of Saudi Arabia. Thus, Washington’s stern message was understood in Riyadh differently. It conveyed that a change of administration in Washington could change the political terms of the relationship overnight.
Abqaiq and Afghanistan: Questions About American Reliability
The attack on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019 raised a harder question. On 14 September 2019, missiles and drones struck the Abqaiq oil-processing facility and the Khurais oil field, halting roughly half of Saudi production for several days. Washington and Riyadh attributed the attack to Iran. The United States strengthened Saudi air defences and tightened sanctions. It stopped short of military retaliation. Riyadh learnt the lesson that American military superiority and American willingness to use it on Saudi Arabia’s behalf were separate issues.
The American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 intensified doubts about American reliability. The Trump administration had negotiated the withdrawal agreement in February 2020 and Biden completed it. The Afghan government collapsed within days and the Taliban entered Kabul while the evacuation was still under way. American partners in the Gulf drew a conclusion about the durability of an American commitment once Washington reassessed its own interests.
These developments made diversification attractive. Saudi Arabia retained the American security relationship and began building additional partnerships for military capability, technology, diplomatic leverage and economic support.
Ukraine Exposes the Changing Balance
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 reversed the direction of pressure. Oil prices rose, Western sanctions threatened Russian supply, and inflation became a domestic political problem in the United States. Washington wanted more production from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf producers. Biden travelled to Saudi Arabia in July 2022 and met MBS, having campaigned against treating him as a normal partner.
The relationship had become transactional in both directions. In October 2022, OPEC+ announced a cut of two million barrels per day in production targets against strong American opposition. Riyadh backed the decision and dismissed the criticism that followed. Washington still needed Riyadh. Riyadh could now set its own price for that need.
From this point Saudi Arabia began building a portfolio of relationships. The Kingdom maintained its American relationship, expanded economic and diplomatic ties with China, reduced tensions with Iran, repaired relations with Türkiye, and deepened its military partnership with Pakistan.
Türkiye: From Regional Isolation to Saudi Partnership
A separate set of interests drove the Saudi-Turkish rapprochement. By 2021 and 2022, Türkiye faced an economic crisis. Inflation was high, the lira was falling, and Ankara needed foreign investment. Ankara had also accumulated difficult relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Israel. Erdoğan therefore embarked on a broad regional reset.
The Al-Ula agreement of January 2021, which ended the Saudi-led blockade of Qatar, removed one obstacle to Saudi-Turkish reconciliation. Erdoğan visited Riyadh in April 2022 and opened a new phase in the relationship. The interests of the two countries were complementary. Saudi Arabia had money and wanted defence technology. Türkiye had defence technology and needed money, markets and regional acceptance.
The relationship moved quickly from political reconciliation to defence industry. In July 2023, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye signed agreements covering defence and defence industry. Saudi entities entered into arrangements with Turkish defence companies, including Baykar, and the two sides began examining the localisation of Turkish defence production in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia Also Moves to Manage Iran
At the same time, Saudi Arabia worked to reduce the risk of permanent confrontation with Iran. Saudi-Iranian talks began in 2021, and in March 2023 China brokered an agreement restoring diplomatic relations. The purpose was focused. Riyadh was reducing the number of situations in which Saudi Arabia could become dependent on Washington or trapped in a regional confrontation. Diversification was an expansive strategy for lowering vulnerability across the board, with Iran one part of it.
Pakistan Joins the Emerging Architecture
Pakistan fitted into this emerging system through its longstanding military ties with Saudi Arabia, its large and experienced armed forces and its nuclear capability. Türkiye contributed defence-industrial technology and growing production capacity for advanced systems. Saudi Arabia provided the financial resources that connected the two.
The first visible trilateral step occurred in August 2023, when Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan held a defence meeting in Riyadh. Discussions reportedly covered defence industry, technology transfer and localisation. The agenda had moved from political solidarity to the practical business of combining capabilities.
October 7 Changes the Strategic Environment
The Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 changed the regional environment. Until then Saudi Arabia was conducting diplomacy along two tracks simultaneously, diversifying its security relationships while negotiating a possible US-Saudi-Israeli normalisation. The Gaza war demonstrated the limits of relying on the United States to manage a regional crisis in accordance with Saudi preferences. For Türkiye, October 7 ended the rapprochement with Israel that Erdoğan had spent several years constructing.
The trilateral defence relationship was already in progress by then. The Gaza war strengthened its strategic rationale and added urgency to the case for security ties outside a US-centred regional framework.
The Strategic Logic by 2023
By the end of 2023 the foundation was in place. Saudi Arabia wanted to retain the United States and reduce its dependence on it. Türkiye needed Saudi capital and markets and could supply the defence capabilities Riyadh wanted. Pakistan offered military experience, manpower and nuclear depth, and gained access to Saudi money and Turkish technology.
The Mecca Agreement of 2026 belongs in this longer sequence. It is the institutional culmination of a process that began with Saudi Arabia’s reassessment of its dependence on the United States and that gradually joined three countries with complementary interests. The origin is important because it explains the nature of this partnership.
Saudi Arabia’s calculation was straightforward. America would remain indispensable. Others would become indispensable alongside it. The Mecca Agreement is one expression of that calculation.