A Note on Recent Critical Mineral Policy Updates in India

Document Details
AUTHOR Shobhankita Reddy, Pranjal Srivastava
DATENovember 15, 2026
CATEGORIES HTG Emerging Technologies Rare Earths

Over the last few weeks, there have been a few updates in the critical mineral sector. Here’s an overview.

1. Critical Mineral Stockpiling Policy for India

Last month, the Ministry of Minesreportedly announced that a policy on stockpiling critical minerals would be finalised soon. “We are also looking at creating a stockpile of critical minerals and are making very, very elaborate plans for it,” the Mines Secretary said. “The protocol for this stockpile is very elaborate. When do you release, what quantities do you release, and who all do you release it to?

That statement is telling and offers a glimpse of many things that could go wrong with such a policy, should it go through. By referencing a state-guided release mechanism, it suggests the stockpile would be state-owned and financed, and it assumes more state capacity than is realistic.

The system could fail on three counts. The first is form. Stockpiling rare-earth oxides will not, by itself, protect manufacturers that need metals, alloys, or finished magnets, especially when domestic processing capacity is still limited. The second trap here is treating critical minerals like crude oil - one commodity with deep markets and a benchmark price. The 51 minerals identified as critical by India are vastly distinct, each with its own grades, chemistry, degree of domestic processing capability, storage needed, and demand. The quantities in which most of these minerals are currently consumed mean that their prices vary greatly between China’s domestic market and the prices at which several companies in the West may have paid for them in any given time period. Money is short, too: the National Critical Mineral Mission sets aside ₹500 crore for stockpiling. Spread thin, that only buys a token reserve of everything, making prioritisation unavoidable. This is likely to lend itself to small token quantities being stored and rationed when a crisis hits, which leads me to the third problem with the indicated policy. During times of shortage, the burden of deciding which minerals are released, who is eligible for the disbursal and at what price (if any) falls on a bureaucrat who needs to sign off on the decision. That’s plenty of room for predictable results - queues, lobbying, favouritism, and scandal, or potentially fodder for such allegations. The result is likely to be inventory that’s never released, defeating the purpose of the policy.

To be fair, stockpiling is a sound decision in the immediate term, given the lingering overhang of China’s export controls in the sector. And as our critical mineral dashboard indicates, for some minerals like terbium and the heavy rare earth group, stockpiling may be the only viable solution, save for technology substitution of these minerals in their most widespread application - permanent magnet motors.

The National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM) allocated Rs. 500 crore to stockpiling critical minerals. The money is better spent incentivising private firms to maintain their own inventories, lowering the administrative burden on the state while allowing inventories to be tailored to each firm’s risk exposure. Embedded within existing supply chains, decentralised reserves would also enable faster and more targeted stock releases. The same is true for PSUs operating in defence manufacturing supply chains. An intervention for loan receipts towards stockpiling, demand-side support for downstream companies and industries, or making stockpiling (in any form) a buffer condition for other government support conditions like the PLI scheme for manufacturers, may address the intent of the policy.

2. Capital support subsidy for critical mineral processing

This is an outlay of Rs. 2814 crore to support four processing plants - two lithium plants with at least 30 kt capacity each, and two nickel plants with at least 50 kt each. Support is capped at 30% of the project value, and at ₹500 crore per lithium plant and ₹900 crore per nickel plant. Earlier this year, a few reports suggested that a capital subsidy idea of 15% was due to be implemented, and if those are to be believed, the support percentage just doubled.

Increasingly in critical minerals, as my colleague Pranay Kotasthane pointed out, upfront capital support is becoming a policy of choice. This makes sense given the projects’ long-term gestation periods and massive risk capital necessary. Such capital support would help pad the IRR models for private investors and tip the balance towards their viability. However, China’s exports would still be more cost-competitive if Beijing chooses to play its card, and uncertainty around demand for these minerals would still require demand-side incentives, such as procurement guarantees at a set price floor as a backstop, given limited domestic demand.

3. India has banned the exports of waste, scrap or spent lithium-ion batteries, commonly called Black Mass

Evidently, this is to help secure feedstock for domestic refining and recycling facilities. What’s interesting though is that India recorded zero exports of these items in FY2026, so on paper the ban targets future exports. But industry reports seem to suggest that many companies were indeed exporting black mass, just under a different trade code. This points to the enforcement challenge the ban is likely to face. Refining the black mass just one step further, and exporting under a different HS code, is likely to happen. This is because foreign processing facilities pay higher prices.

A more effective policy intervention may lie with the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) rules. As pointed out inthis blog, EPR certificates are currently issued to whoever extracts the metal, which is the refiner, not the shredder who makes the black mass. In a competitive market, Indian refiners would bid up the price of black mass and still profit as long as the recovered metal plus the certificate is worth more than what they paid. Yet shredders report that domestic refiners pay less than foreign buyers. This suggests domestic refiners are too few in number, too inefficient, or both. The export ban only makes the situation worse.

Splitting the EPR certificate value between the shredding and refining stages could keep black mass at home without a ban.