Modi-Xi Meet Again, But Not Much Changes
| AUTHOR | Anushka Saxena |
| DATE | September 14, 2026 |
| CATEGORIES | China Indian Foreign Policy Geostrategy |
After seven years, Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in India for the 2026 BRICS Summit, and held the bilateral with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that the world was watching with baited breath. Reflected in readouts from both sides, is a meeting with similar conversations, but slightly different outcomes.
To begin with, China’s opening line contends that the two leaders “reached an important consensus that China and India should be partners.” The phrase “important consensus” (重要共识) in Chinese diplomatic practice is typically used when Beijing seeks to establish a settled precedent. This precedent can subsequently be invoked in both bilateral meetings and official commentary, till it begins carrying the weight of a unilaterally legitimised agreement.
The Ministry of External Affairs speaks of no such consensus on the matter, even though the language about taking a “strategic and long-term perspective” on the relationship remains exactly the same. Further, as always, the main issue of divergence remains the border. The last few years have seen intense back-and-forth over the language on the issue – especially at Delhi’s end – and with this meeting, there is a return to peace and tranquillity on the border “remaining an essential basis for the continued development of bilateral relations.”
On the other hand, Xi’s four-point proposal, per China’s readout, encourages viewing the border issue as parallel to the rest of the relationship, rather than preceding it. Interestingly, this assertion comes under the header of “removing interference through political wisdom.” This likely means one or both of two things in Beijing’s mind – that India’s insistence on resolving the border first, over and above anything else, is being pushed for behind-the-scenes by interference from the US, and/ or that Delhi’s decision to place the border issue upfront is politically unwise.
What also helps to contextualise Chinese thinking, is assessing what Beijing says Modi told Xi, even as the MEA’s readout mentions virtually nothing on these fronts. One is that India adheres to an independent foreign policy, and the development of its relations with China “is not affected by third parties.” Second, is that India’s policies and positions on Taiwan- and Tibet-related issues “have not changed,” and India does not permit any forces to engage in anti-China activities on its territory. Third, India will “fully support” China’s BRICS chairship next year.
Each of these reflects some demand or insecurity on Beijing’s side, and the MEA readout has not reiterated any of these three assertions. The issue of Taiwan or Tibet has not been mentioned, but the Chinese articulation around stances on those being “non-changed” are relatively acceptable to Delhi. The bit about anti-China activities, again, is interesting, especially considering 2026 has witnessed intensive activity to reprioritise the issue of Tibetans-in-exile in the wake of the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday in July. And the chairship pledge is a rather awkward insertion – it is noteworthy that the MEA readout notes that Xi congratulated India on its successful chairship of BRICS, and the window to congratulate China, if there was willingness, would be right here. At the same time, publicising such statements that Delhi does not deny, may, to some extent, grant a linguistic upper hand to Beijing with partners who want to believe.
Overall, the meeting remains consequential and interesting, but left much to be desired. Yet, at the same time, it must be acknowledged that not every meeting between Indian and Chinese officials can end at the same high as Kazan 2024 or the last two rounds of the SR talks. So yes, the two leaders may have taken away different things from the meeting, aligned on some language and the pathways forward, and left conversations on, say, de-escalation, trade asymmetry, or visas to lower-level talks. But the broader picture is as clear as can be – India and China will not be friends in the near future.