The Sea Heats Up
| AUTHOR | Anushka Saxena |
| DATE | July 27, 2026 |
| CATEGORIES | China Defence Geostrategy |
July 2026 marks ten years since a landmark ruling was passed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague on July 12, 2016. It held that China’s 9-dash-line policy towards the South China Sea (SCS) had no legal basis under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Beijing has been irked by the anniversary since the start of 2026. Naturally, because of the milestone being celebrated with Peace walks and joint statements of support in and beyond Manila, it was only a matter of time before China escalated tensions in the SCS. Three developments from the past few days are noteworthy in this regard.
The first major clash occurred on July 20, when a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel and two Philippine Navy rubber dinghies collided at Ayungin/ Second Thomas Shoal. Subsequently, Beijing protested for three days over what it called the Philippines’ “aggressive act of ramming a Chinese law enforcement vessel.” It continued into the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila on July 21, where Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned his Filipino counterpart, Theresa Lazaro, that Manila would “bear the bitter consequences” if it provoked Beijing with outside backing.
A day later, the China Coast Guard “expelled” two Philippine government vessels near Scarborough Shoal. These were vessels that, as the Philippines Coast Guard spokesperson Jay Tarriela argued, were distributing fuel and food to Filipino fishermen when a water cannon blasted a Bureau of Fisheries ship for over two minutes. That manoeuvre was repeated on July 24. Most recently, on July 26, the People’s Liberation Army Southern Theater Command announced a “routine patrol,” accusing Manila of having “co-opted countries outside the region” to conduct joint patrols.
In January 2025, I had assessed China’s escalation and de-escalation strategies toward the Philippines as resting on four D’s – de-legitimisation of Manila’s claims through official narratives, dealing in ‘carrots’ via platforms such as the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM), deterrence through coercive naval deployment, and drawing of ‘red lines’ the Philippines must not cross. The most important red line Beijing expressed was the non-involvement of a third party in the dispute.
The toolkit China has so far deployed in 2026 is not far removed from that assessment. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian’s charge that Manila “arranged for journalists to participate in the infringement” to “hype things up” is de-legitimisation, while Wang’s threat to Lazaro and the PLA-STC’s counter to “joint patrols” are all rungs of escalation seen emerging from Beijing. Conspicuously absent, for now, are the carrots. Yet, with any hint of a need for dialogue expressed in Manila, or any debilitating moves made by the US towards its alliance with the Philippines, they may just turn up.
Manila has indicated in the recent past that its Mutual Defence Treaty with Washington would be invoked only if a Filipino were to die from Chinese aggression. This is a threshold Beijing understands, and actively exploits. Hence, it is likely that both the tempo and the toolkit will continue, wherein Filipino coast guard personnel or fishermen are injured with a sustained use of water cannons, laser lights and collision manoeuvres. A quiet revival of the BCM once Beijing judges that the coercion has made its mark, cannot be ruled out as well.