On April 13, 2026, Xi Jinping addressed and met with some of the most senior, Major General-grade-and-above ranked PLA officers at a training course. His main argument was that the PLA derives its strength not from technological sophistication or organisational efficiency alone, but from unwavering ideological commitment to the Party. As he framed it, joining the military means “firmly believing in Marxism and being loyal to the Party’s beliefs, organization, and cause.” Below are three main takeaways from the discussions:
Firstly, the tone and tenor of the event as a whole clarified that ideological alignment remains a priority for the PLA; especially for senior officials who might take up the many posts that are now empty at the CMC or theater-commander levels because of political purges. Hence, sespite decades of military modernisation and professionalisation, the Party-state continues to treat ideological unity as essential to military effectiveness. The repeated references to “Party spirit” and “revolutionary predecessors” signal that even as the PLA becomes more technologically advanced, it must remain first and foremost a tool of the Party, not the state in a broader sense.
Secondly, leading to a discussion on “correct view of political achievements,” Xi asked them: “For whom to build achievements, what kind of achievements to build, and how to build achievements?” He eventually emphasised that it is the party, and the norms of self-rectification that they must adhere and look up to.
Finally, there was an important message that effectively tied the thread of discipline with efficacy - Xi’s idea that “If you can’t win on the battlefield, everything else is meaningless.” It suggests that all the emphasis on Party spirit and ideological alignment serves a practical military purpose. Of course, whether or not this is empirically true is another question, but as rhetoric, it’s effective because it appeals to professional military values like mission accomplishment while maintaining ideological control.