Starlink’s benefits to India should outweigh the risks
| AUTHOR | Ashwin Prasad Rao |
| DATE | October 12, 2026 |
| CATEGORIES | space |
On 8 October, Elon Musk accused Indian “oligarchs” of obstructing Starlink’s entry into India. The government issued a statement rejecting the allegation and clarifying that all satellite operators faced the same approval process. A day earlier, Starlink said it had established twenty gateway sites across India and introduced controls to keep Indian user data within the country. Its commercial launch still awaits final clearances.
The ensuing debate has largely been about competition with Jio and Airtel. The more important question about Indian national security and interests is seldom asked or answered: how much control will India actually have over the service once it starts operating?
Is Starlink really competing with Jio and Airtel? Fibre and mobile networks generally provide more economical, higher-capacity connectivity in densely populated areas. Starlink is particularly useful where building those networks is difficult: remote settlements, ships, aircraft, disaster zones and isolated industrial sites. There is some commercial overlap, and both Jio and Airtel have interests in satellite connectivity too. But treating Starlink as simply another mobile internet provider obscures its more consequential uses.
In April, my colleagues and I examined this question in a Takshashila discussion document, Starlink and Risks for India. We identified three risks: Starlink could remain operational where India wants it switched off; it could withdraw service where India needs it to remain available; and sensitive information from its users could be handled contrary to Indian interests.
These risks arise because SpaceX has full control over Starlink: it operates the satellites, controls the software and can decide which terminals where can connect to the internet. India can only license Starlink and penalise violations and not much else.
Starlink terminal is the user’s satellite antenna and associated equipment—the device that connects a home, vehicle or field unit to the satellites overhead. Starlink can recognise individual terminals and remotely allow or deny their access.
Regulation is hollow without the ability to enforce
India has set tight security conditions for satellite internet providers. Indian traffic must pass through gateways on Indian soil, rather than being carried between satellites using laser links. Providers must support government monitoring and obey orders to restrict service in sensitive areas. Rules also govern the handling of Indian telecom data.
Starlink’s gateways and promised data controls indicate an effort to comply with these conditions. But a government inspection of a gateway does not necessarily reveal the path a signal followed through space before reaching it. Many safeguards still depend on the operator’s systems and cooperation.
Gateway is a ground station that links satellites to the wider internet. Think of it as a doorway between a network in space and networks on Earth. India requires traffic from Indian Starlink users to pass through domestic gateways. The problem for India is how independently officials can check what happened before the traffic reached that doorway.
Taking notes from Iran and Ukraine
In July, the International Telecommunication Union’s Radio Regulations Board again examined Iran’s complaint about unauthorised Starlink connections. The dispute has remained unresolved since 2023. The Board recognised Starlink’s ability to disable terminals remotely and pressed the United States and Norway to secure compliance. It also acknowledged that it could not suspend Starlink’s international frequency assignments over this violation.
A few months earlier, Ukraine’s authorities worked with SpaceX to approve a list of Ukrainian terminals and block those used by Russian forces. Approved connections continued working. The operator could distinguish between users and cut off one group while serving the other.
Norway appears in this dispute because it submitted international satellite frequency filings used by Starlink. I found the ITU’s record of meetings very interesting. Iran kept returning with the same complaint as the Board’s language grew more severe. In 2025, the Board explicitly noted Norway’s unwillingness to enforce its earlier decisions without a clearer regulatory requirement. The US disputed the Board’s interpretation of its authority. By the July 2026 meeting, the Board recorded no response from either Norway or the US to that meeting, and still no progress. It had also noted Starlink’s demonstrated ability to disable thousands of terminals elsewhere. Reading the sequence, the gap between a recognised obligation and the ability to enforce it is hard to miss.
In Ukraine, cooperation helped defend a country at war. In Iran, the state sought to stop unauthorised service and could not secure the operator’s cooperation. SpaceX held the technical control in both cases. The two examples also how that Starlink is a military asset. It can connect soldiers, drones and emergency teams where towers or cables are absent or destroyed. Its use cases are on average, more critical, making dependence dangerous. SpaceX relies on US government licences and contracts, giving Washington leverage over it. A company decision, foreign government pressure or even a technical failure could disrupt an essential Indian connection.
Data security is yet another concern. Starlink’s privacy policy permits certain personal information to be shared for AI training.
What India should do
India should welcome foreign satellite services without allowing essential communications to depend on one foreign operator. The armed forces and emergency services need backup connections and tested plans for outages. The proposed national satellite monitoring facility should be capable of independently checking compliance, including whether service restrictions actually work. Rules must also keep pace with satellite services that connect directly to ordinary mobile phones.
Direct-to-device means an ordinary phone can connect to a satellite without a separate Starlink dish. It raises new licensing and monitoring questions. See the GSMA’s overview.
The rise of satellite internet makes investment in terrestrial connectivity all the more important. An August parliamentary review found that only 30 per cent of gram panchayats had a functional BharatNet connection as of February 2026. India needs to turn existing Digital Bharat Nidhi resources into working connections, so that satellite internet supplements terrestrial networks rather than becoming the default in these places.
But terrestrial networks cannot reach everywhere. In remote border regions, islands and at sea, satellite connectivity may be indispensable. Here, India should encourage multiple satellite internet providers, preferably operating under different national jurisdictions. If one provider withdraws service, users should be able to switch to another. Even this would only reduce dependence, since all the providers would remain subject to foreign governments and commercial interests.
India also needs satellite infrastructure of its own. Reliance Jio’s proposed 1,600-satellite constellation could eventually provide a domestic alternative. But the strategic value of such a system goes beyond Indian ownership. As discussed in a recent newsletter edition, megaconstellations create sustained demand for satellite manufacturing, launches and supporting industries. India should ensure that a substantial share of this demand is met domestically. That would help build the industrial capacity needed to maintain and replenish its own network, including during a crisis.
Starlink can bring many benefits to India’s economy and connectivity. The government should pursue those benefits while building alternatives that allow it to enforce its rules and keep essential communications working even when SpaceX’s interests diverge from India’s.