Creating Diplomatic Space for a Democratic Island
The European Parliament’s decision to pass a text affirming support for Taiwan’s inclusion in multilateral arrangements as a member or observer, is a laudable victory for the island’s diplomatic standing. The text, passed on October 24 with an overwhelming majority of 432-60 votes in favour, critiques the People’s Republic of China’s attempts to manipulate the meaning and context of United Nations Resolution 2758 of 1971. It further expresses, in 31 preambulatory and 22 operative clauses, the EU’s commitment to push back against Beijing’s distortion of history and international law, as well as its aggressive attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. This is the third such legislative text pegged to the misinterpretation of UN Res. 2758 passed globally, with both the Australian and Dutch parliaments approving similar resolutions in August and September 2024, respectively.
A Divided Nations’ UN Resolution
At the multilateral level, the Taiwan question has remained unaddressed in that the status of Taiwan as a sovereign nation-state is undetermined. UN General Assembly Res. 2758 of 1971 explicitly restored the PRC to the seat representing ‘China’ at the UN, while expelling representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek government in Taiwan It has often been cited by Beijing as a fundamental pillar of an “international agreement” that Taiwan is non-independent and an inalienable part of China.
In September 2023, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning said during one of her regular press briefings, “Taiwan is part of China. Despite that fact and legal basis, the DPP authorities have been distorting UNGA Resolution 2758, openly challenging the internationally recognized one-China principle, and spinning lies to pursue Taiwan independence”. These are extremely dangerous separatist provocations.” However, legal opinion on the subject has contended with evidence that this is a misreading of the provisions of Res. 2758, in that even though the Resolution effectively truncates Taiwan’s independent membership in the UN, it does not determine the status of Taiwan as a part of China in international law.
With the EU text in place, political support, too, is shifting gears and taking cognizance of the reality that the Resolution creates a legal loophole for the PRC to capitalise on. And such an attempt at narrative distortion is a part and parcel of China’s overall response toolkit vis-à-vis Taiwan. Various other texts that create diplomatic space for Taiwan, are similarly contorted by China to effectively legitimise its control over Taiwan.
A prime example, in this regard, is the United States’ ‘Taiwan Relations Act’ (TRA) of 1979, which does not grant Taiwan official diplomatic recognition. But it does provide for arms support of a defensive nature from the US to Taiwan, and for “robust unofficial relations” to flourish between the two sides. From the Chinese perspective, the TRA limits the scope of US intervention in a cross-strait conflict and favours the PRC’s narrative on reunification by acknowledging the termination of official relations between the US and Taiwan. However, significant provisions of the law provide for the same guarantees to Taiwan as for any other nation-state. For example, in one of its articles, the TRA states, “Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.” Similarly, the TRA also guarantees that the US will not support the settling of the Taiwan question by any means other than peaceful ones, and will consider a scenario otherwise a threat to US and international interests.
Nonetheless, for Beijing, legal vacuums or deliberate misinterpretations, the room for which may have been created by Res. 2758 or the TRA, become armour to subsequently justify military provocation in the Taiwan Strait. Most recently, in the wake of President Lai Ching-te’s speech at the October 10 National Day gathering in Taipei, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched comprehensive, large-scale military drills. It did so, in PLA Spokesperson Li Xi’s words, to “foil attempts” at separatism and independence in Taiwan. Due to the grave escalation such drills have caused in the past few years, the EU text also deemed it necessary to condemn Chinese military provocations in the Taiwan Strait. Further, it expressed support for both sustained US presence in the Indo-Pacific, as well as regular exchanges on security issues between the EU and Taiwan.
What Else Does the EU Text Discuss?
EU-China relations have witnessed many crests and troughs in the past few years, even beyond the latter’s military provocations in the Taiwan Strait. For example, the EU has regularly condemned China’s implicit support to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, through exports of ‘dual-use’ military components. In this regard, the October 24 resolution applauds EU countries’ decisions to sanction Chinese companies engaged in Russia’s war, and even appreciates Taiwan for its alignment with the EU and the US on countering Russia.
From Taipei’s perspective, in the business of sanctions and counter-sanctions, the EU’s support is welcome and crucial. This is because even though the PRC opposes unilateral sanctions, it has often deployed coercive economic measures against Taiwanese firms, businessmen, and lawmakers, to extract concessions. It is not ironic in Beijing’s view because it considers Taiwan a ‘special administrative region’ of the PRC itself, and therefore any arm-twisting becomes a domestic matter. However, if the EU continues to counter-sanction China for its distortive market practices as well as its military provocations, it bolsters Taiwan’s confidence internationally, even if it fails to act as a requisite deterrent for the mainland.
Importantly, the EU text also calls on multilateral institutions such as the World Health Organisation, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and Interpol, to allow Taiwan’s participation. These are institutions where statehood is not a criterion for engagement, and where China has firmly opposed the island’s participation.
Taiwan does not need to sign on to the UNFCCC, for example, to be able to discuss its role in global emissions at the various Conference of Parties (COP) meetings. China, however, has consistently blocked Taiwan from engaging with the COPs, even though per capita CO2 emissions on the island are higher than twice the global average. In the World Health Assembly, China has refused to let Taiwan even act as an observer, underplaying its Pandemic mitigation model.
China has similarly exerted political pressure on and cultivated economic influence in the ICAO. In 2016, the PRC forced a Taiwanese delegation out of an ICAO meeting. Taiwan’s subsequent exclusion continued between 2016 and 2021, during the tenure of PRC representative Fang Liu, ICAO’s 12th Secretary-General. And why Taiwan’s inclusion in the ICAO is more pertinent than ever today, is because China’s fly-by and aerial sortie activities in the island’s Air-Defence Identification Zone have become a cause of international concern. They disrupt aerial routes not just for the Taiwanese military, but also for global commercial flights. Recognising China’s heightened activity in Taiwan’s ADIZ, the EU text backs Taipei’s representation in the ICAO, and deems it vital to regional security.
A Global Campaign?
While not many nations grant Taiwan statehood, there is an understanding among the majority that the status quo is the most ideal state of cross-Strait relations. Further, Taiwan’s economic and technological progress, as well as the achievements of its democratic institutions, make it an appealing partner for many countries. And even though realistically, not many of them will be willing to switch diplomatic recognition from China to Taiwan, they will see it beneficial for their national interest to collaborate with Taiwan, and enable its participation in various multilateral frameworks. The EU Resolution attempts to do just that, while also pointing to the legal loopholes that the PRC cannot be allowed to exploit.
On a broader level, the uncertainty surrounding Taiwan’s status in international law, as well as the disputed nature of opinions between powerful stakeholders on Taiwan’s rights as a contested State, create both hurdles and opportunities for any country. In this regard, texts such as the October 24 EU Resolution commit to remedy an otherwise flawed international legal and political architecture. They further de-legitimise China’s unilateral attempts at changing the cross-Strait status quo, thereby creating a framework of narratives and actions other countries can follow in providing diplomatic support to a democratic island.
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