A Potential Strategy to Navigate a Fractured RISC-V Ecosystem
In the rapidly evolving world of semiconductor geopolitics, a new fault line is emerging, one that could have far-reaching implications for countries like India. The United States, in its strategic tussle with China, could be contemplating imposing export controls on (Reduced Instruction Set Computer or RISC-V technology.
Developed at the University of California, Berkeley, RISC-V is an open-source instruction set architecture (ISA), a set of basic instructions and functions that allows companies to develop microprocessors based on this specification.
Unlike proprietary ISAs like those developed by ARM or Intel (x86), RISC-V is freely available, allowing anyone to design chips without licensing fees or intellectual property restrictions. Consequently, it’s become the go-to technology for nations aspiring to reduce dependency on costly chip technologies and foster homegrown semiconductor industries.
There is a downside, though. As geopolitical currents shift, India and some other countries find themselves at a crossroads, navigating a potentially fractured RISC-V ecosystem.
In its current form, RISC-V has contributors from over 70 countries collaborating on its development and is managed by a non-profit, RISC-V International. It moved its headquarters to Switzerland to signal its neutrality and pre-empt potential geopolitical disruptions amidst the US-China tech war. However, US export controls regulate not only the export of goods and technologies from its mainland but also their subsequent re-export, including know-how, data, and blueprints, if they involve US-origin technology or equipment.
Imposing export controls on open-source technology like RISC-V is a complex endeavour, and it is unclear how US policymakers would achieve that. RISC-V International relies on its members (including US-based Google and Nvidia) to contribute to the ISA and develop software. This provides a potential pathway for the US to control RISC-V's proliferation by imposing controls on these companies.
Effective export or technology controls are possible at different layers from the core architectural standards. For example, the extensions to the RISC-V ISA may depend on underlying patent pools and could be subjected to restriction depending on the use case. Similarly, imposing export controls on the actual manufacturing value chain for chips, such as fabrication technology, may be an effective way to control the dissemination of the technology.
Such a move by the US, driven by national security and technological supremacy concerns, will target yet another facet of China's burgeoning semiconductor industry, which has increasingly turned to RISC-V in response to earlier American sanctions.
For India, the RISC-V landscape represents not just a technological pivot but a strategic opportunity to create its own space within the semiconductor global value chain and achieve a degree of digital sovereignty. The Indian government's Digital India RISC-V Microprocessor Program (DIR-V) exemplifies this, aiming to catalyse local semiconductor design and production based on the RISC-V architecture.
US export controls potentially threaten this vision. India's RISC-V aspirations are intertwined with global collaborations, drawing on partnerships and knowledge exchanges with entities and contributors worldwide, including those in the US and China. Restrictions on China and other blacklisted nations could stymie these collaborations, forcing India to recalibrate its RISC-V strategy as the development of the ISA and its ecosystem will also slow down when a chilling effect on contributors takes hold.
While aimed at China and its allies, such controls inadvertently risk creating a bifurcated technological world. The nature of the ISA is such that it allows for significant customisation of the chips being developed using RISC-V, potentially leading to fragmentation and inconsistency around different RISC-V-based processors.
At present, there are attempts to create common specifications and standards that allow for better interoperability, which are likely to be impacted if export controls or other ways of restricting access come into play. This will also adversely impact global investment and innovation in developing new RISC-V-based chips. It would mean split hardware and software ecosystems — one aligned with US regulations and another diverging under the influence of countries like China, which may develop their versions or interpretations of the architecture.
This bifurcation poses a significant challenge for India, which would have to navigate these parallel universes, potentially impacting the interoperability and global integration of its semiconductor initiatives and export markets for its nascent industry.
India's response to this fracturing should be multifaceted. First, it should intensify its investment in indigenous RISC-V research and development. While Indian entities like IIT Madras have made strides with projects like the Shakti processor, there's a need for a more concerted effort, potentially backed by substantial government funding and policy support for private investment.
Second, diversifying international partnerships will be crucial. Europe, for instance, has shown a keen interest in RISC-V, and India could forge stronger ties with European entities engaged in RISC-V development. Additionally, collaboration with other Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea, which are also exploring RISC-V, could foster a regional semiconductor bloc less reliant on US-controlled technologies. Furthermore, India should exercise the option of collaboration with the US within the Quad framework to enhance its integration into the global semiconductor value chain.
Third, India must advocate maintaining RISC-V’s open-source integrity. Open-source technologies have driven innovation and should remain unencumbered by geopolitical disputes. India must take a page out of China’s book and leverage the role of its semiconductor industry in RISC-V International to champion the cause of keeping the ISA open and accessible. It should highlight that it is better to consider RISC-V as a standard similar to Ethernet protocols (TCP/IP) or HTTP (which allows products like browsers, web servers and services like Google, Facebook etc to create global markets, allowing anyone, anywhere to participate in the digital economy today).
Concerns around technology proliferation are better solved at the layer of chip fabrication and development or by controlling specific patents related to the underlying technology, something the US is already doing.
Lastly, India should prepare for compliance challenges. Navigating the complexities of US export controls will require robust legal and regulatory frameworks, ensuring that Indian entities can engage with RISC-V without falling foul of international law.
An open RISC-V standard will enable the development of diversified supply chains and global end-use markets, helping India address its concerns around the strategic domination of critical technology by a few. As the RISC-V landscape potentially fragments under geopolitical pressures, India stands at a crucial juncture. Its response should be strategic, leveraging its growing prowess in technology and diplomacy to navigate a fractured high-tech ecosystem.
Authors
