Takshashila Issue Brief - Killing of al-Zawahiri Raises More Questions than Provides Answers

Strategic Studies
Written By Shrikrishna Upadhyaya

Ayman al-Zawahiri, the 71-year-old Salafist jihadist was reportedly killed in a CIA drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan on Sunday, July 31, 2022. Born into a prosperous and well-connected family with distant ties to the al Sauds of Saudi Arabia, al-Zawahiri had briefly served in the Egyptian army as a surgeon between 1974 and 1977.

He was a prominent member of the al Qaeda and had acted as Osama bin Laden’s personal physician for many years. When the latter was killed by an American Navy SEALs team in May 2011, al-Zawahiri assumed charge of al Qaeda as its second Emir, seven years after being formally anointed as bin Laden’s heir.

The Cairo University trained surgeon was initially associated with the Egyptian Islamic Jehad and was one of the five signatories, along with Osama bin Laden, in the World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders.

Al-Zawahiri was placed in the United Nations’ sanctions list in 1999. In 2001, the FBI put himin its list of 22 most wanted terrorists, and announced a reward of up to $25 million for his whereabouts. Following the death of bin Laden in 2011, he emerged as the terror group’s leader, though some serious watchers said that al Qaeda was a shadow of its original self at that point and that Pakistan had disrupted its functioning even earlier.

He made news in India recently when in a video message, he weighed in on the hijab controversy and called upon Indian Muslims to fight the battle of jihad. This message was perceived as yet another attempt to recruit in India in order to revive al-Qaeda in the subcontinent.

Taliban’s Promise and Expected Betrayal

The Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan or commonly known as the Doha Agreement signed in February 2020 between the United States and Taliban paved the way for withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021. The eventual hasty evacuation of United States’ troops from Afghanistan was poorly executed and the optics were terrible.

One of the critical conditions of the Doha Agreement required Taliban to honour its counter-terrorism commitments, including its pledge to prevent al-Qaeda from operating in territories governed by the Taliban. After it came to power in August 2021 by defeating the erstwhile Afghanistan government forces, the Taliban was expected to honour its commitments to not allow terror outfits like the al-Qaeda to function and grow under its nose. Despite this promise, it has not come as a surprise that the top leader of al-Qaeda was killed in the capital city of Kabul, currentlycontrolled by the Taliban.

Before the signing of the Doha Agreement, we had written that giving “any serious consideration to guarantees by a terrorist group that it would not support other terrorist groups indicates incompetence, short-sightedness, or both.” The Taliban has a long history of sponsoring and engaging in terrorism and it is impractical and futile to expect it to mend ways especially after seizing political power in Afghanistan.

In fact, participation of the Haqqani Network whose close ties with al-Qaeda and other terror groups is well established, has grown in prominence within the Taliban government. Sirajuddin Haqqani, who continues to be listed as a most wanted terrorist by the FBI with a $10 million bounty on his head, is the de facto first deputy head of state and interior minister of Afghanistan today and enjoys considerable power in security matters.

Certain reports have indicated that the house in which al-Zawahiri was reportedly killed, located in  a prime area of Kabul, belongs to a close aide of Sirajuddin Haqqani and was guarded by armed security. Also, the details of disposal of al-Zawahiri’s mortal remains are unclear.

The Pakistani Angle

The Pakistan’s Military-Jihadi Complex, being a multi-dimensional entity comprising military, militant, intelligence, radical Islamists establishments, and politico-economic structures, has long pursued policies of cultivating, funding and training radical terror networks to serve its political and financial objectives.

In the past, the Americans have described the Haqqani Network as a veritable arm of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. During the transition period in Afghanistan after Taliban’ seizure of power last year, the ISI intervened successfully in quelling factional rivalry among the various groups forming part of the Taliban network. In the process, ISI secured prominent positions in the new regime for its Haqqani allies and Sirajuddin Haqqani himself is a prime beneficiary of this negotiation.

In return, among other things, Pakistan sought Haqqanis’ help in reining in Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which has waged jihad against the Pakistani state. Sirajuddin Haqqani even brokered a month-long ceasefire between TTP and Pakistani forces in November, 2021, which later fell apart. 

Given the deep ties amongst the Haqqani Network and the ISI, the interdependency between them and the political imperatives in Afghanistan, it is likely that Haqqanis toe the ISI’s line. We also know that Pakistan has in the past and continues to provide shelter to international terrorists, as was in the case of bin Laden. Within this overarching context, the killing of al-Zawahiri merits serious consideration.

There has long been suspicion that al-Zawahiri was likely under some sort of curbs or even sequestered somewhere in the fashion that bin Laden was. The possibility that al-Zawahiri may have been neutralised in some other location, maybe across the border, and the death shown in Kabul, relatively the last place to secure refuge in, cannot be ruled out. 

In such an eventuality, the exact nature of ISI and Haqqanis’ role in al-Zawahiri’s killing comes into question. There are distinct possibilities. The move against al-Zawahiri could be the handiwork of ISI acting in concert with the Haqqanis, possibly in expectations of favourable trade-offs from the Americans, the nature of which is not ascertainable as of now.

In any case, there is reason to suspect that some of al-Zawahiri’s comments as the Emir of al-Qaeda about India, including on issues like jihad in Kashmir and hijab controversy, are thus likely to be propagandist. If he were living out his final days under restraint, it is likely that he acted and spoke at the behest of vested interests against India. Al-Qaeda has failed to take off in India and al-Zawahiri’s words did not result in anything substantial for the terror outfit.

Compiled by Shrikrishna Upadhyaya, with inputs from Anand Arni and Pranay Kotasthane. August 5, 2022.

Selected Works for Further Reading:

Shrikrishna Upadhyaya
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