What Taliban's victory means for Pakistan and therefore India

This article was first published in the Times of IndiaTaliban's takeover of Kabul is forcing India to reassess its aims and objectives concerning Afghanistan. Of primary interest is the impact of this development on Pakistan. On this question, two views have come to light over the last few days.The first view cautions against the increase in terrorism from Pakistan. The recommendation arising from this view is that India needs to coalesce anti-Pakistan factions in Afghanistan. The counter-view focuses on the inevitability of a split between the Taliban and Pakistan. The assumption being that once the Taliban assumes political control over Afghanistan, it is bound to take some stances that will go against the interests of its sponsor. The recommendation arising from this view is that India should sit back. It should let things unfold because Pakistan's victory is a Cadmean one β€” it comes with massive costs for Pakistan's economy, society, and politics.Which of these two divergent views is likely to play out?To understand what the Taliban's victory means for Pakistan β€” and hence India β€” it is useful to model Pakistan as two geopolitical entities, not one. The first entity is a seemingly normal Pakistani state, presumably concerned first and foremost with the peace and prosperity of its citizens. The second entity is what my colleague Nitin Pai has named the Pakistani military-jihadi complex (MJC). Comprising the military, militant, radical Islamist and political-economic nodes, the MJC pursues domestic and foreign policies to ensure its survival and dominance. For the MJC, positioning and defeating the existential enemy β€” India β€” is key to ensure its hold over the other Pakistan.Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan will be perceived differently by these two Pakistani entities. The non-MJC Pakistan would be worried about the Taliban's march to power. It would fear the spillover of terrorism inside its borders, orchestrated by groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Politically, a powerful Taliban would pose the threat of breathing new life in the Durand Line question. On the economic front, the prospect of a dependent Taliban government further draining Pakistan's dwindling resources would be another cause of concern. In short, if this entity were in charge of Pakistan's foreign policy, it wouldn't have doggedly invested in the Taliban.That's quite clearly not the case. Taliban's takeover, on the other hand, is a strategic victory for the MJC. Over the last two decades, it has played a risky game sheltering and guiding the Taliban's actions while also supporting the US in its Afghanistan campaign. When things went wrong, the MJC was able to pass the blame to the other, weaker Pakistan. Recently, it played a role in steering the Afghan Taliban to sign the Doha agreement. It worked over the last two decades to reduce the Indian economic and political footprint in Afghanistan. Given the efforts it has put in, the MJC is sure to perceive the Taliban's comeback as an indisputable victory. This success would bolster the MJC's strategy of long-term commitment to terrorist groups. More importantly, it consolidates its relative dominance over the other Pakistan.

How does this affect India?

As the MJC's domestic position strengthens, its anti-India aims will grow stronger. There is a possibility of the MJC moving its terror outfits to Loya Paktika in eastern Afghanistan, a hotbed of anti-India activities in the past. This scenario would allow the MJC to use terrorism against India while claiming it has no control over these elements.Many commentators have argued that the world in 2021 will not let off perpetrators of terrorism easily. But they seem to forget that the return of the Taliban illustrates that the opposite is true. As long as terrorism is portrayed as an instrument of a domestic insurgency, the world will continue to look away. For instance, the Taliban continued terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan even as it was negotiating with the US at Doha. And yet, the US, UK, Russia, and China chose to bring the group back in power.Second, to see the MJC threat from the issue of terrorism alone is to miss the bigger picture. By demonstrating the success of its policies in Afghanistan, the MJC would be energised to use other methods of asymmetric warfare against India. More than the means, the Taliban's victory is the reaffirmation of its objectives.

What should India do?

First and foremost, India must prepare for a reduced economic and diplomatic footprint in Afghanistan. Given the positive role India has played there over the last two decades, a sunk cost fallacy might drive India to make overtures to the Taliban. Such a policy is unlikely to pay dividends. The MJC will ensure that India's presence is severely restricted. In Afghanistan, it would be better to wait for the tide to change.Second, India would need to raise its guard on the Pakistan border. With the perceived threat of Indian presence close to Balochistan going away, the MJC is likely to be more adventurous in using conventional and non-conventional warfare against India. Domestically, it means returning Jammu & Kashmir to near-normalcy becomes all the more urgent. More the discontent there, the easier it would be for the MJC to exploit the situation.Third, strengthen the partnership with the US. The MJC has always been dependent on external benefactors for its survival. While China is playing that role today, it alone is insufficient to bear the burden. The MJC will be desperate to get the US to finance its ambitions based on its credentials to influence outcomes in Afghanistan. Hence, it's vital that India's relationship with the US must remain stronger than the relationship that MJC has with the US. Finally, amidst the current focus on US failures in Afghanistan, it shouldn't be forgotten that both India and the US need each other to confront the bigger strategic challenge: China.Regardless of the turn that Taliban-Pakistan relations take, an ideological victory for the MJC is bound to have repercussions in India. India must prepare to face the renewed challenge.

Previous
Previous

India’s domestic politics makes China-Pakistan nexus more potent in Taliban era

Next
Next

Case for an India-led Southeast Asian Solar Alliance