Executive Summary
Four weeks into the West Asian conflict, India’s diplomacy has produced patterns indicating a tactic alignment with the US-Israel axis – perpetuated through selective statements and asymmetric diplomatic inclination. These are largely defined by Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Israel two days before the conflict, and immediate calls to Gulf leaders, relative to the muted condemnation against Iran. In the fourth week, India continues to pursue diplomatically to allow the passage of Indian-flagged commercial vessels stranded in the Strait of Hormuz as the energy crisis is felt domestically. New Delhi’s response demonstrates a decade-long diplomatic shift to pro-Western alignment.
1 Introduction
India’s position in the West Asian conflict is widely read as tilting toward the US–Israel axis, particularly in light of the conflict’s expanding geographic scope and its spillover effects across the Gulf. In a month, there appears to be little appetite or progress for a ceasefire between Iran and the US-Israel camp.1 At the same time, there has been no mediation offer from India, even as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has triggered a global energy panic.
Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz to its adversaries.2 Nearly twenty vessel incidents have been reported, hundreds of ships have been paralysed, and oil prices are surging. Even states that maintain relatively friendly ties with Tehran appear reluctant to risk transit, with uncertainty if commercial shipping would become collateral damage should hostilities intensify. US President Donald Trump has publicly called on America’s allies to deploy warships to secure maritime passage, but the response continues to be muted. Australia, Japan, and several European states have so far stayed away from direct participation.3 Iran’s foreign minister has since indicated that Tehran is open to discussions with countries seeking safe access through the strait. This effectively transforms Hormuz from a coercive instrument into a bargaining chip in the broader diplomatic contest surrounding the conflict.
India’s diplomatic position since the beginning of the conflict can be interpreted through a range of diplomatic actions and inactions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the Israeli Knesset on February 25-26, declaring that ‘India stands with Israel, firmly, with full conviction,’ and departed Tel Aviv two days before the conflict was triggered by a US-Israeli assassination on the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.4 India sent a junior official to sign the Iranian condolence book four days following Khamenei’s killing, five days after Bangladesh and Pakistan. New Delhi refrained from condemning the US-Israel strike.5 However, India cosponsored a UN Security Council resolution reprimanding Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Gulf states.
When a US-led attack sank IRIS Dena, an Iranian naval vessel that had just concluded exercises in Visakhapatnam, in international waters off Sri Lanka, no statement was issued from New Delhi.6 The Indian Navy provided deployed assets to assist the Sri Lankan navy with rescue operations within Sri Lanka’s Search and Rescue (SAR) zone. Under India’s BRICS chairmanship, the bloc has not yet issued a collective statement on the conflict.
As of March 31, at least 28 India-linked ships remain stranded with 18 India-flagged and 10 foreign-flagged vessels carrying energy supplies for the country including crude oil tankers, three LPG carriers, and three LNG carriers under foreign flags.7 LPG prices have domestically surged for commercial supplies, four state elections are slated for April, and Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian has called on India to play a role in ‘halting aggressions against Iran.’
As of March 31, 2026, at least 28 India-linked ships remain stranded — 18 Indian-flagged and 10 foreign-flagged vessels carrying energy supplies for India, including four crude oil tankers, three LPG carriers, and three LNG carriers under foreign flags.
2 India’s West Asia Architecture Pre-2014
India’s West Asian engagement was never devoid of ideological incompatibility. Iran was an energy supplier and a transit route to Central Asia; Gulf, a crucial employer of Indian labour and suppliers of crude; Israel was a discreet defence partner; and the Palestinian cause was India’s formal position in the UN – which helped India is gaining credibility in the Muslim countries and the post-colonial world. Jawaharlal Nehru-led Indian government’s Non-Alignment policy provided a political framework for holding diplomatically incompatible relationships; India became the first non-Arab country to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1974. 8Even Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) reinforced this diplomatic position, declaring in 1977 that Israel must “vacate Arab lands.”
This posturing shifted under P.V. Narasimha Rao, who formalised diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992, thereby initiating ‘dual-track’ diplomacy that enabled defence cooperation with Jerusalem while maintaining labour-based and energy dependencies with the Arab countries.9 During the prime ministerialship of Dr Manmohan Singh, New Delhi’s diplomatic ties with Riyadh transitioned from a transactional arrangement to a Strategic Partnership in the 2010 Riyadh Declaration.10 This occurred concurrent to a Persian energy trade against the structural pressures of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. When Prime Minister Modi assumed office in 2014, Iran was supplying 16.5 percent of crude imports, Chabahar port was under development as a counter-weight to Pakistan-controlled land routes, and Gulf remittances were anchoring the balance of payments.
3 India’s West Asia Architecture post-2014
India-Gulf relationship under Prime Minister Modi indicates a consequential foreign policy evolution. Previously, Indian governments had viewed Gulf Arab monarchs as managers of the labour market that absorbed Indian nationals as workers and returned remittances. However, the administration under Prime Minister Modi recast the region as strategic partners – he visited UAE multiple times and signed India’s first Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Abu Dhabi in 2022. India’s bilateral trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) reached 180 billion USD in 2024-25. The Indian government, notably,also secured Gulf neutrality on the Kashmir issue, reversing decades of Pakistani lobbying in the region against India grounded on Islamic solidarity argument. The Indian government also negotiated the release of eight former Indian naval officers from Qatari death row.11
Similarly, India’s relationship with Israel also became more public. Intelligence cooperation arms procurement were brought openly. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Tel Aviv visit in 2017 further decoupled from any obligation to the Palestinian cause.12 The defence partnership has evolved to joint missile development, drone acquisitions, and AI cooperation.
At the same time, India’s relationship with Iran gradually took a backseat. India and Iran ties carry civilisational depth - with Persian being the language of the Mughal court, and Shia Islam threading through approximately 15 percent of the Indian Muslim population.13 Additionally, Tehran-New Delhi shared a deep economic relationship built on crude supply from Iran, and the Chabahar Port, where New Delhi invested 120 million USD, was conceived as a strategic response to Pakistan’s ability to block Indian land access to Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. When US President Trump in his first administration withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, and reimposed pressure sanctions, India reduced its oil imports from Iran to near-zero.14 Chabahar funding was also wound down after the US declined sanction waivers to the port beyond April 2026. The current India-Iran ties can be pictured through events including sanction compliance, reduced oil imports, disengagement from Chabahar port, deepening relationship with Israel, silence on Khamenei’s assassination, and cosponsorship of a UN resolution condemning Iranian strikes on Gulf states without a similar statement for the original attack from the US-Israeli forces.
4 India’s Diplomatic Response to the Conflict
4.1 Early days of Operation Epic Fury
The diplomatic timeline of New Delhi’s response to the ongoing conflict is revealing of its position. Prime Minister Narendra Modi reportedly spoke with eight Gulf leaders including - King Abdullah II of Jordan, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, and others in the first 48 hours of the conflict.15 He condemned Iranian drone and missile strikes on the Gulf and expressed concern for Indian nationals in the region. He called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on March 2; this first call to Iranian President Pezeshkian was on March 12 and the second on March 21. In his second call he reiterated the importance of freedom of navigation and keeping shipping lanes open.
India’s position stood in contradiction to other countries in the region with Bangladesh and Pakistan issuing condolences within hours of Khamenei’s death. Meanwhile, the Maldives condemned both the US-Israeli attacks on Iran and Iran’s retaliatory strikes along, and foreign ministers of the ASEAN block condemned US and Israel for ‘initiating’ the conflict.
4.2 Hormuz Closure’s Impact on India
As of writing, eight Indian-flagged vessels have been permitted by Iran to exit the strait.
Iran allowed Two Shipping Corporation of India LPG carriers, carrying approximately 92,712 metric tonnes of LPG, to cross the strait on March 14-16 after the first phone call by Prime Minister Modi. In addition to this, MT Shivalik and MT Nanda Devi carried approximately 92,712 metric tonnes of LPG. Pine Gas and Jag Vasant subsequently brought 92,612 tonnes of LPG, reaching Indian ports on March 26–28. Two additional LPG carriers, BW TYR and BW ELM, carrying about 94,000 metric tonnes were en route, with BW TYR expected at Mumbai City on March 31 and BW ELM at New Mangalore on April 1. Crude oil tanker Jag Laadki carried 80,886 tonnes of UAE crude and reached Mundra on March 18.
The vessels were guided by Iranian naval authorities. At present, there remains no blanket arrangement about the passage of commercial vessels between India and Iran, every transit remains an individual case. The episode, though framed domestically as a diplomatic success, demonstrates the limits of India’s 12-day engagement with Iranian authorities since the conflict began, thus resulting in transit clearances granted only on a ship-by-ship basis. Prime Minister Modi’s statement of condemning attacks on ‘critical infrastructure’ presented a formulation purportedly applicable to both sides, thereby maintaining an ambiguous stance.
4.3 The IRIS Dena Episode
The sinking of IRIS Dena was another consequential episode amid the West Asia war, particularly for India’s diplomacy. The Iranian naval vessel that had recently completed joint exercises with the Indian Navy at Visakhapatna, was sunk by the US approximately 19 nautical miles off the coast of Galle, Sri Lanka.16 This region has long been described as India’s maritime sphere of influence. Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar told the Parliament that ‘the Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean,’ thereby contradicting India’s longstanding strategic doctrine. New Delhi did not issue a condemnation to the US for sinking a ship that had been India’s naval guests the day before the incident, despite criticism from political opponents at home.
5 Assessing India’s Diplomacy in the Conflict
India’s current foreign policy, defined as multi-alignment, which means the concurrent cultivation of strong relationships with all major power centers, preserving freedom to disagree with any of them, has been undermined with the current conflict. The balance-of-threat framework explains this position, suggesting that India’s inclination toward the US–Israel axis demonstrates a calculation that the economic and strategic costs of defying Washington would be significantly higher than compliance. Each act of deference is likely to raise the price of future defiance. The pattern was visible in the Russian crude incident where Washington previously imposed a 25% tariff on Indian refiners for purchasing Russian oil, then issued a 30-day waiver after the IRIS Dena incident.17
This position was also exhibited in India’s multilateral forums. India holds the BRICS presidency chair in 2016, with member states including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Under the Brazilian chairmanship of BRICS in June 2025, the block issued a joint statement days after the Israel-Iran conflict in June 2025, citing the incident as a violation of international law. India, currently occupying the position of a middle-power, has choices with higher costs but limited capacity to shape meaningful outcomes.
From what can be perceived from West Asian diplomacy is India’s two-track functionality. First, a public track of formal balance, involving calls for de-escalation and dialogue, concern for civilian lives. Meanwhile, the second, more visible track involves timing, omission in statements, and asymmetric distribution of diplomatic weight.
Footnotes
Al Jazeera. “Iran Denies Trump’s Claim Iranian President Requested Ceasefire.” April 1, 2026. Link↩︎
New York Times. “Why Is Iran Blocking the Strait of Hormuz?” March 12, 2026. Link↩︎
New York Times. “Europe and U.K. Push Back Against Trump’s Demands.” March 16, 2026. Link↩︎
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Prime Minister Addresses the Israeli Parliament - Knesset (February 25, 2026).” February 25, 2026. Link↩︎
The Wire. “After Four Days of Silence, India Sends Foreign Secretary to Iranian Embassy to Sign Condolence Book for Ayatollah Khamenei.” March 2026. Link↩︎
BBC News. “Torpedoed Iranian warship was offered sanctuary in India.” March 9, 2026. Link↩︎
NDTV. “Iran War Latest News: 18 India-Flagged Ships Carrying Crude Oil, LPG Stranded in Hormuz amid War.” March 2026. Link↩︎
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “India-Palestine Bilateral Relations.” Ministry of External Affairs website. Link↩︎
Deccan Chronicle. “PV Narasimha Rao Took Lead in Ties with Israel.” July 4, 2017. Link↩︎
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “Riyadh Declaration: A New Era of Strategic Partnership.” February 28, 2010. Link↩︎
BBC News. “India and Israel pledge to combat terrorism.” July 4, 2017. Link↩︎
LiveMint. “Modi Snub Helps Israel Decouple Ties from Palestinian Question.” July 6, 2017. Link↩︎
The Diplomat. “The Rise and Fall of the Persianate World in Central and South Asia.” March 2026. Link↩︎
Brookings Institution. “What Trump’s JCPOA Withdrawal Means for India.” May 10, 2018. Link↩︎
The Economic Times. “PM Modi Speaks to Leaders of 8 West Asian Countries over 48 Hours.” March 3, 2026. Link↩︎
BBC News. “Torpedoed Iranian Warship Offered Sanctuary in India.” March 2026. Link↩︎
The Hindu. “US Issues 30-Day Waiver to Allow India to Purchase Russian Oil amid West Asian Supply Woes.” March 6, 2026. Link↩︎