The Communist Party of China recently issued an important new document called Measures for Assessing the Effectiveness of Building a Beautiful China. The document outlines the responsibilities of local-level governments, officials, and cadres to achieve the goals of Beautiful China. It is, in effect, an accountability framework that ties environmental performance to the career prospects of officials across the system. The signal from Beijing is that the environmental agenda is not rhetorical. Rather, it is being hardwired into the incentive structure of the Party-state.
Beautiful China, as a guiding principle, was first introduced at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Since then, this concept has grown into a key policy agenda item under Xi Jinping. The objective that it underpins is the pursuit of sustainable development by transforming China’s industrial structure and lifestyle to conserve resources, restore ecosystems, and ensure ecological security. In other words, balancing high-quality economic growth with high-level environmental protection is the overarching agenda, with the goal of building a Beautiful China by 2035. In January 2024, the Chinese government announced key targets for 2027, covering improvements in air and water quality, an increase in the share of new energy vehicles and the proportion of ‘zero-waste cities’, and improvements in the rural living environment.
On several fronts, China’s progress in terms of its environmental agenda has been striking. It is significantly outperforming its green transportation targets, with Electric Vehicles reaching a 51% share of new vehicles in 2025, already surpassing the 45% goal set for 2027. The rapid adoption of EVs, renewable energy, and industry transformation also supports a broader energy & carbon trajectory in which emissions have remainedflat or fallen for nearly two years, suggesting a potential carbon peak well ahead of the 2030 deadline. Surface water quality is also nearly at its 2027 milestone. Currently 88% of surface water bodies are rated Grade I to III—excellent or good in China’s five-grade system—against a target of 90%. The Ministry of Ecology and Environment plans to expand the number of designated zero-waste cities from 113 to 200 during the 15th Five-Year Plan period.
Air quality targets, on the other hand, face regional hurdles. With average PM2.5 concentrations in 17 of the 31 provincial capitals still exceeding 30 µg/m³, the 2027 goal of 28 µg/m³ remains a challenge. Owing to differences in weather and economic activity, cities located in southern or coastal regions and at high altitudes recorded lower pollution levels. In contrast, provincial capitals with higher concentrations of particulate matter were clustered in the Northeast and Northwest regions.
Lastly, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment in China plans to expandthe number of designated zero-waste cities from 113 to 200 during the 15th Five-Year Plan. Overall, China’s progress is uneven across the targets set for Beautiful China, with technology-driven sectors like NEVs and renewables outperforming, while air quality in its industrial regions recovers more slowly.
It is in this context that the new assessment document matters.
First, it is an important document because it outlines a clear process by which the central leadership will oversee local-level actions on the environmental agenda and key targets. It tells us that the intention to address environmental challenges remains a key part of Beijing’s agenda. This is not a case of targets being announced and then forgotten. The central leadership is building a monitoring and evaluation architecture around them.
Second, there is an explicit threat of punitive actions against individuals and groups in the new assessment mechanisms that have been outlined. For instance, the document states that assessment results will provide an “important reference for the comprehensive evaluation, rewards, punishments, appointments, and removals of the leadership teams and relevant leading cadres of the Party committees and governments of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government”, and serve as “a reference basis for the allocation of fiscal funds related to ecological and environmental protection.” The incentive structure is fairly clear for cadres across the system: environmental performance will affect careers and budgets. Of course, as with all information in the Chinese system, data can be selectively leveraged with the motive to take down someone who is politically problematic. The assessment framework is simultaneously an accountability tool and a potential instrument of political discipline.
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, there is the question of the extent to which such central control can alter the local political economy. What weightage does the Beautiful China agenda get in comparison to keeping people on payrolls, ensuring resource security, maintaining electricity supply, or meeting growth targets? Those are all trade-offs that officials confront at local and central levels. There is a range of objectives and targets that pull in different directions, making what sounds rather straightforward complex in practice. A provincial leader in a coal-dependent northeastern city faces a fundamentally different calculus than one in a coastal tech hub. It is easier to invest in green industrial capacity and EVs; those actions align with broader economic and social objectives. But it is far more difficult to control affluents from polluting rivers and soil or dramatically shift away from coal to improve air quality, as those can constrict the growth, employment and livability agenda.
In sum, it is clear that Beijing takes its environmental agenda seriously enough to attach career consequences to them. But tighter central control is insufficient to alter China’s environmental challenges. In other words, while the document provides the framework for change through a methodical performance assessment, the political economy will determine actual outcomes.