As Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te marks two years in office, his foreign policy agenda faces vital challenges. Two main events from the past few weeks – the rejection of the island’s World Health Assembly (WHA) bid (for observer status), and the passing of a cut down defence budget of ~US$ 25 billion in Taiwan’s parliament - shed light on shrinking political and diplomatic spaces for the island’s Executive Yuan.
On May 11, 2026, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said at a regular press conference:
In order to uphold the one-China principle and defend the seriousness and authority of the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the World Health Assembly, China has decided not to agree to Taiwan’s participation in this year’s World Health Assembly. Any attempt to violate the one-China principle, play the ‘Taiwan card,’ or engage in political manipulation is doomed to failure.
As the annual WHA opens up every year in May, China enacts hurdles for Taiwan’s participation. This year, in particular, Beijing’s opposition to the propagation of Taiwan’s “independence” by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is pitched as the reason behind it rejecting the island’s bid.
Taiwan was a WHA observer between 2009 and 2016. However, since 2016, its presidents have been elected from the pan-green Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Ideologically, the DPP is more sovereignty-minded than its primary opposition, the Kuomintang (KMT), which desires dialogue over deterrence with China.
From 2009-16, Taiwan’s President was KMT leader Ma Ying-Jeou, who made prominent economic and political overtures to China, and to date, continues to publicly instruct KMT cadres to seek cooperation with the mainland. In July 2024, for example, in an interview with Malaysian newspaper Sin Chew Daily, Ma said that the KMT stands firm on its pro-unification stance, and believes President Lai Ching-te of the DPP to be “naive.”
Why It Matters
Taiwan’s Centers for Disease Control is at the forefront of epidemic prevention, and demonstrated capability and prowess in testing, tracking, and isolating the masses during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Even in 2020, when the world was fighting the Pandemic, the WHA created hurdles for Taiwan to gain data and cooperate in global mitigation efforts. Data published by the Taiwanese foreign ministry indicated that from 2009 to 2019, Taiwan applied to attend 187 WHO technical meetings, but was invited to to only 57 – a rejection rate of ~70%. Further, it indicated that while Taiwan shared pandemic data and best practices with the WHO under International Health Regulations (IHR), the WHA did not share any lessons learned from the island to other parts of the world, rejecting the channel’s amplification value.
As Chen Binhua carried on, he stated that Taiwan’s participation as a WHO observer under the name ‘Chinese Taipei’ was acceptable in the past only because the actions of its governments didn’t “violate” the “one-China Principle” and the “1992 consensus”. From Beijing’s perspective, that soured with the DPP.
Where It Matters
Where international efforts would matter, is the domain of interpreting Resolution WHA25.1, titled ‘Representation of China in the World Health Organization’, as the reason why it cannot invite Taiwan to participate in the WHA. As a specialised agency of the United Nations, the resolution text has drawn heavily from the contents of UN General Assembly Res. 2758 of 1971, titled ‘Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations’. Just like 2758, WHA25.1 also exploits the flawed idea that the granting of the UN’s China seat to the People’s Republic is co-terminous with Taiwan losing international representation.
In this regard, the international community must critique the legal loophole that is evident in the language of WHA25.1, and make bids to the WHO to amend relevant provisions allowing Taiwan an observer status in the organisation. Due to its multilateral nature, the WHO cannot be allowed to base this decision on political factors, given that legal and technical precedent indicates that Taiwan can indeed be an observer to the WHA (as it was between 2009-16).