One potential consequence of the ongoing war is an Iranian dash for the nuclear bomb. While Iran previously seemed content to use its uranium enrichment programme as diplomatic leverage, it may now seek to get a bomb and get it fast.
The Nuclear Development Process
The process of nuclear development is complex. It consists of three steps. First, the development of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. In the case of Iran, uranium seems to be the natural choice, and enriching it till about 90% needs hundreds of high-speed centrifuges. Secondly, they will need to build a device that can trigger a nuclear detonation using the highly enriched uranium. The last piece of the puzzle is to have viable delivery systems — such as ballistic missiles — that can carry a nuclear warhead.
Before Operation Epic Fury, Iran had approximately 450 kgs of 60% enriched uranium — which if enriched further, could be enough for as many as nine weapons according to some reports. The initial enrichment takes significantly longer, and the process speeds up with an increase in enriched uranium. As a result, in Iran’s case, the timeline from 60% to 90% is significantly faster than the initial leg of the process, and theoretically they could finish the job within weeks according to some estimates. Attacks on Iranian facilities (Natanz and Fordow) and the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists may have set back the process considerably. However, Iran has an underground facility that is reportedly near Natanz, and is too deep even for most conventional bunker-busters to penetrate.
Detection and the IAEA Problem
Normally, if Iran were to choose to make a dash for the bomb, there would be multiple signs. However, after the strikes in 2025 and the ongoing war, IAEA has lost ‘continuity of knowledge’ and no longer has access to live nuclear monitoring cameras. In early March, the IAEA reported that Iranian nuclear authorities did not respond to their efforts to regain contact.
The ‘breakout’ to 90% enriched uranium could be completed in as little as a month. Traces of highly enriched uranium would be a cause for concern since there are no civilian utilities for it, barring specific types of medical research. The major issue with detection is that the lack of camera access and inspectors on the ground makes it incredibly hard to detect enrichment. Additionally, it is also worth considering that given the strikes on Fordow and Natanz recently, enrichment may move to other underground sites.
If inspections were in place, Krypton-85 monitoring and environmental monitoring offer multiple methods to detect enriched uranium gas.
Iran uses the IR-6 and IR-9 centrifuges. According to the Arms Control Association, a ‘cascade’ of IR-6 machines can take 60% enriched uranium to weapons grade in under 25 days. The IR-9 centrifuges are exponentially faster. Even assuming that Iran’s current crop of centrifuges has been destroyed, according to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, Iran could manufacture them with their indigenous knowledge — if they wanted to, it would be a matter of time.
Indicators of Weaponisation
The second step is for uranium to be converted into a metal (from its gaseous form). Any detections of uranium disks being produced would cement suspicions that Iran is preparing a warhead core.
This would be easier to detect if IAEA inspections were in place, because all enriched uranium gas must be accounted for — any sudden removal from the logs would ring alarm bells.
After enrichment and metallurgy, a few months in, signs like hydrodynamic tests are likely to be an indicator that a country is testing the explosive capabilities of a system, or testing potential delivery systems.
Finally, cold tests (if they have not already been conducted) or unusual activities detected at missile silos could be indicative of the integration of the warhead with missile systems.
The mere act of racing to the bomb could push other countries in the region to reconsider their own policies and could trigger rapid new enrichment programmes across West Asia.
Three Scenarios
There are three scenarios that could arise if Iran made a dash for the bomb:
1. The Nuclear Brink
Iran enriches its uranium and somehow completes much of the race to the bomb despite Israel’s and the US’ best attempts, but stops just short of actually building a bomb and conducting a nuclear test. It does not develop the bomb but stays weeks away from building it, and uses this as leverage to negotiate for sanctions relief. It is worth noting, however, that Iran tried to do this with 60% enrichment. This approach failed, giving Tehran little diplomatic leverage, while subjecting it to economic sanctions, isolation, and war.
2. A Nuclear Test
Iran conducts an underground nuclear test. This has the potential to unambiguously signal Iran’s adversaries to back down.
3. A Re-negotiated Deal
Iran attempts to develop a bomb. However, there is significant international economic and military pressure. As a result, Iran is forced to re-negotiate a new deal that pushes the breakout clock back from weeks to a much longer timeframe, in exchange for sanctions relief. It could also fail to make a dash for the bomb despite its intentions, because of internal instability.
Scenario Assessment
| Scenario | Benefits for Iran | Risks for Iran | Likelihood |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. The Nuclear Brink | High — Restores Iran’s bargaining power | High — Israel will evidently strike even based on suspicion, and this may not bring Iran the diplomatic leverage it needs | Medium — High risks, could trigger another drawn-out war |
| 2. A Surprise Test | Medium — Gives Iran the protection of a deterrent, but could invite international isolation, and could trigger nuclear proliferation in the region | High — Israel could perceive this as an existential threat, and declare all-out war just short of nuclear escalation | Low — Given the high economic costs, and almost certain attack from Israel |
| 3. A Re-negotiated Deal | Medium — Iran desperately needs economic relief, but may have to compromise on various fronts and agree to an unfair deal | Low — The IRGC may try to block such a deal, considering that it could leave Iran in a relatively worse position, even compared to the JCPOA | High — Likely, given that Iran may be skeptical of inviting more military and economic costs |