If India is in crisis, it is because good guys like ex-IAS Kannan Gopinathan rather quit

Ex-IAS Kannan Gopinathan’s resignation would have captured public attention even if it had not been in protest against the Narendra Modi-Amit Shah government’s clampdown in Jammu & Kashmir. In his ethical calculus, the benefit of fighting from the inside was lower than the costs of suppressing the voice of his conscience. So, he rightly quit. Yet, a different person in his shoes could have done the right thing by staying in service. Consider.Read more

Neither is Russia a reliable friend nor is US a fickle one. Nation-states have semi-permanent interests.

The Print’s daily roundtable TalkPoint posed a question connected to the Indian PM's France visit: Modi-Macron embrace: Does India have permanent friends or is every alliance strategic?My response:There are no friends, let alone permanent friends when it comes to international relations. Anthropomorphism in international conduct can lead us to incorrect assumptions and solutions. So, Russia is neither a reliable friend of India nor is the United States a fickle one. However, what can be said is that nation-states do have semi-permanent interests.It is in India’s interest to have a better relationship with France for two reasons. First, it ensures that the European Union’s policy towards India remains favourable. It is far more advantageous to deal with individual European states than with the European Union. Second, strategic engagement with France — inclusive of defence purchases — is a way to secure its support for Indian positions at the United Nations Security Council.Going ahead, diversification of the trade relationship with a key defence supplier like France is critical for India. A diverse partnership provides levers to hedge against changing geopolitical equations. Maritime co-operation, the International Solar Alliance, and nuclear energy trade illustrate this overlap of French and Indian interests.Read the entire discussion here.

India's Upcoming Digital Tax: How Will Big Tech Cope?

Taxation and regulation is slowly catching up with technology: India is now preparing a framework to tax Big Tech companies. India’s desire to do so is part of a global pattern. Earlier this year, France came up with a proposition to tax Google, Facebook, and Amazon. India following suit will lead to broader international consequences with a combination of factors determining how Big Tech is taxed.Digital taxation has been on the government’s mind for some time. June 2016 saw India come up with a “Google Tax,” an equalization levy that taxed digital advertising. In 2018, the revenue from the tax surpassed 10 billion rupees ($139 million). Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government is also keeping an eye on the tech ecosystem. Modi himself has pushed for Digital India, Startup India, and called for digital payments post demonetization. As India grows as a market for digital technologies, the scope for the government to tax big tech firms such as Facebook and Google grows.India is a huge market for companies. As of April 2019, Facebook had 300 million users in India. You can expect to see a significantly higher number from Google. The idea is that India is a big source of revenue for tech companies. However, because these companies do not have a significant economic presence (SEP) in India, they might not pay their fair share of taxes. This is where India’s new proposed framework comes in. Multinational tech companies achieve scale without volume; they are structured in a way to pay less taxes. The proposal currently in the works will change that and make companies liable to be taxed.The complication here is that we live in a world where technology is a variable in international relations. Most giant tech companies are American and operate from Silicon Valley. The Trump administration might not like Big Tech but it will retaliate against other countries taxing Silicon Valley. The Americans have already postured against this seriously before. When faced with the prospect of data localization by India, Trump’s White House considered capping H-1B visas. The United States has already announced an inquiry into France’s proposal to tax Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple. There is a good chance that the matter might end in tariffs for France. This is something India has to consider as it goes ahead with taxing American Big Tech. Trump himself has been aggravated by the tariffs India places on the United States. He called out Modi and called the tariffs “no longer acceptable” during the G-20 summit. India’s push for digital taxation will likely provoke a similar reaction from the White House.The other stakeholder here is Silicon Valley itself. It is unclear how firms will react to thinner profit margins in India. There is a possibility that they could acknowledge market leverage while lobbying through third parties. The other end of the spectrum is that they could threaten to pull out of the market, leaving India with no direct substitutes. One possible outcome of a proposed Indian tax could also be the loss of future possible investment in India. If the government decided to tax Facebook and Google on revenue generated in India, they could see it as a sign to invest more in other markets. At the moment, India could be too big of a market to ignore. However, the imposition of taxes going forward might take away the incentive to innovate for the Indian consumer. It would also translate into the slower deployment of new AI-based technologies by large tech corporations, potentially slowing down India’s advancement in the AI race.All of the options above are highly unlikely, though. What is most likely to happen is the revision of a new framework with Big Tech at the table. Because both parties, the Modi government, and Big Tech, have a lot at stake, a compromise seems like the rational outcome. This way Google and Facebook can have a say in deciding how they are taxed and how much they should have to pay. A mutually consented tax rate could be beneficial for all stakeholders. It would keep investment flowing while not forcing India to look for domestic substitutes. It would also ensure that India does not rely on Chinese substitutes, doubling the scale of Chinese digital companies. However, just because this seems like the rational way forward does not mean that it is the one that will be taken. There are so many ways that an Indian digital tax could play out; we can only hope that policymakers will have carefully considered its impact on India’s foreign relations.Modi, Trump, China, and Silicon Valley — it is all a fascinating mess. It also goes to show how technology has inserted itself into foreign policy and geopolitics. As the Modi government might consider taking France’s lead, it is a step toward taxation coming to terms with the digital economy. How this ends globally will determine profit margins in Silicon Valley and development budgets in New Delhi.This article was first published in The Diplomat. 

On Trump's Kashmir comment

ThePrint's daily roundtable Talkpoint posed a question related to PM Modi's conversation with US President Trump on the latter's offer to mediate on the Kashmir issue. The question was: Is PM Modi allowing Trump to play policeman in India-Pakistan tensions over Kashmir?My response:Policeman is an incorrect metaphor to use. The act of policing involves ensuring compliance with an underlying rule of law. No such enforceable force of law exists in the domain of international relations. Instead, power is the currency in international relations. It is precisely for this reason that Trump’s stance and actions on India-Pakistan tensions are important following the Narendra Modi government’s move to abrogate Article 370.The real issue then is how the Modi government can deal with a powerful stakeholder like Trump now. While India needs the US in order to increase its own economic and military power, the US-China structural rivalry makes India a very important player in the US strategic calculation. Pakistan doesn’t feature in any of these forces driving the India-US equation.For its part, Pakistan will try to use the Kashmir issue to drive a wedge between the US and India. From Pakistan’s standpoint, returning to the India-Pakistan hyphenation era in the eyes of the US is desirable. And given Pakistan’s role in the ongoing talks between the US and the Taliban, Pakistan’s case is likely to carry more weight than it otherwise would. India’s challenge will be to continue isolating the US-India relationship from the ongoing India-Pakistan dynamic. This task will become more challenging if the security situation in Kashmir worsens.Read other views on ThePrint here. 

India’s No First Use is badass enough. Modi govt needn’t change it to be more muscular

A day after India’s 73rd Independence Day, the Narendra Modi government threatened Pakistan with the possibility of a nuclear attack if it scales up cross-border terrorism and militancy against India. The Modi government appears to have calculated that the fear of an Indian nuclear strike will raise Pakistan’s costs of cross-border terrorism, thus deterring its use. The biggest problem with this bold new approach is that it will work only to the extent that the Pakistanis believe India’s threats are credible.Read more

Kashmir Decision Could be Distracting India From Its National Security Priorities

The recent Indian political manoeuvre involved deeper integration of Jammu and Kashmir by watering down Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution as also the strengthening of the control by the Centre through the change of the statehood status of Jammu and Kashmir and its simultaneous bifurcation into the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. An elected assembly, on the lines of the existing arrangement for the Union Territory of Delhi, is envisaged only for Jammu and Kashmir.Read more

Why Xi won’t be sending the PLA to quell Hong Kong protests

The eleven-week-long protest movement in Hong Kong has reached a critical phase. Earlier this week, thousands of protesters converged on the city’s airport, paralysing operations and disrupting nearly 1,000 flights. The airport was finally cleared on Thursday after clashes between riot police and the protesters. The scenes of chaos played out as the top leadership of the Communist Party of China met for its annual conclave at the beachside town of Beidaihe.The situation in Hong Kong undoubtedly must have been on top of the agenda. The protests, which initially focussed on an extradition bill put forward by the city’s government, have now evolved into a larger battle for autonomy from Beijing’s tightening grip. In the process, peaceful demonstrations have given way to anger and violence.These turns of events indicate an increasing sense of unease that Beijing is now seriously contemplating the use of force. This, of course, remains a possibility. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region empowers local authorities to request Beijing for such assistance. The PLA, in fact, already has troops stationed at a garrison in Hong Kong. However, given the current scenario, it is highly unlikely that Xi will deploy the armed forces to quell the protests.Read the full article published in The Hindu

From AFSPA to street protests, Modi govt needs new thinking in J&K with Article 370 gone

While the constitutionality of the government’s actions, with respect to scrapping Article 370, has been challenged in the Supreme Court, we should not expect the judiciary to overrule the decision entirely. What ought to be of utmost concern now is: Where do we go from here? How do we try to make India — including Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh — a better place than it was before 5 August 2019? What are the necessary policies that the Modi government must adopt to prevent the situation from deteriorating further?

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Finance Commission's New Problem: A Separate Defence Fund

The original terms of references for the FFC themselves were contentious. Based on the wrong assumption that the last Finance Commission was overly generous towards the states, the terms were designed to nudge the FFC towards reducing the tax devolution to the states in order to meet the requirements of central schemes of the Union government. If that wasn’t enough, an additional term of reference has now been recommended by the Union cabinet tasking the FFC “to ensure an assured allocation of resources towards defence and internal security imperatives.”Allocating adequate, secure, and non-lapsable funds for the security of India is indeed an urgent priority. There can be no quarrel about that objective. But the move to provide for these funds through the FFC is problematic for several important reasons.Read the full article on Deccan Herald here.

Where will big data take platforms like Netflix?

Streaming services are cataloguing the entire world’s audiovisual content onto their platforms. If you had told someone ten years ago that most of the world’s movies and TV shows would be available on-demand in their pocket they would have given you a patronising look of disbelief. If at present of the streaming industry is pathbreaking, the future promises to build even further on it.Streaming is funded by subscriptions and guided by big data analytics. Knowledge of how consumers behave on platforms such as Netflix and Prime Video lets the services gauge what else they might be willing to pay for. It is hard to say which way streaming is likely to go over the next decade. However, it is possible to make an educated guess based on the frameworks of information economics.Three main areas are likely to be affected by the continued usage of big data to improve streaming, user experience, security, and pricing.When the news broke that Netflix customises individual thumbnails for each user, it was another endorsement of how the platform was using big data to keep customers hooked. Netflix doesn’t just use a film or show’s original art; it employs an algorithm to source high-quality images from the content. Then it does more testing to determine what individual subscribers are most likely to click on. Based on that, each user’s Netflix homepage looks different, even if they have similar tastes. The idea is to have users spend as much time on Netflix as possible, and personalised thumbnails are a small cog in the working of this big machine. Data on who binge-watches which shows and how long each visit on the website lasts is also crucial when it comes to deciding what to invest in. This is not a new phenomenon. The TV show House of Cards is a case study to understand this.Big data tells Netflix (and Prime Video and Hulu and Hotstar) what users want even before they themselves know it. The data-based knowledge that David Fincher’s movies were in high demand — this insight was based on the number of times people played and paused them and how long they watched for — was a powerful resource for the TV decision-makers. Combining Fincher with a star-studded cast was not a shot in the dark. Netflix bet $100 million on two seasons (26 episodes) of the show at first, without watching a single episode. They even went as far as to make different trailers and filtered their distribution according to user preferences. This just shows that the information about our tastes and tendencies, as exhibited by big data, is empirically reliable.Going forward, big data analytics will continue to tell companies what the users want. This will have a significant impact on how funds are distributed across genres. For instance, the success of Narcos and Stranger Things will drive investments in more original content in their particular genres. This also means evolving content markets all over the world to keep users hooked and get new users to subscribe (think about the success of Sacred Games in India).

No free-loading

The increasing use of big data analytics will also mean tighter security for accounts. So, no chance of four people pooling their money together to get one streaming account. Also, no mooching off your friend’s account. The free-rider problem means streaming giants lose money on every individual that watches content without paying for it. Because Netflix has data on usage patterns — laptop model, user location over time — it can identify when someone other than the paying customer is watching. So, it is no wonder that the company is now planning on using AI to keep off account-moochers. Though such algorithms have not taken mass effect, there is reason to believe that this might change soon.Lastly, big data will be transformative when it comes to pricing streaming services. As companies compete for a higher share of users’ e-wallets, data on how much the consumers are willing to pay will be transformative in determining how the service is priced. The marginal cost of adding an additional user to a streaming service is negligible, which means that the price they can be charged is relatively flexible as compared to traditional industries such as cars. This is exactly what Netflix has been trying to leverage in India. In July, the company unveiled a mobile-only plan for the price-sensitive market. It is a novel move that might help Netflix compete with Prime Video, Jio TV, and Hotstar in India, all of which are cheaper options. The same could hold true for markets where the consumer is willing to pay more for premium services. Data will decide.User experience, security, and pricing are three key areas where big data analytics could be transformational for the streaming industry. This is by no means an exhaustive list. It would have taken a mental leap ten years ago to conceive of the current streaming scenario, and we might find the same a decade from now. New applications of insights from big data will continue to come to light. And the interesting thing is that, for us who are now aware of the speed at which data engineering and digital ecosystems can evolve, none of these developments are situated too far off in the future to be imagined. In big data analytics, the enabler of the present is also the driver of the future.This article was first published in The Hindu. Views are personal.

Article 370 and the rough ride ahead

The analogy of a hornet’s nest fits here. A nest in our backyard is a nuisance and an occasional sting is a minor inconvenience compared to what could be in store now that we have stirred the proverbial nest. Should we batten down the hatches in anticipation of the worst or is there another way?Read more

China's syndromes in India's ocean

Bertil Lintner’s book The Costliest Pearl is perhaps the most comprehensive account of the contemporary geopolitics of the maritime Eastern Hemisphere. It covers the ground from Djibouti to Vanuatu and the water from the South China Sea to the Southern Indian Ocean.And although it covers the actions and reactions of the powers from within and without the region, it is China that lies at the heart of the plot.Read more

India needs to urgently address its investment problem

Things are looking bleak for the Indian economy. GDP growth in the latest quarter was a subdued 5.8 per cent, unemployment levels are at record highs, the fiscal deficit numbers projected in the Budget are suspect and presumed to be larger, export growth hit a 41-month low in June this year, and growth in the eight core sectors of the economy remained sluggish at 0.2 per cent. On the demand side, passenger vehicle sales, tractor sales, two-wheeler sales, and domestic air traffic growth have all been declining for around six months. FMCG sales are slowing down as well. Further, the trade war and the prospect of a global growth slowdown should be giving our economic policy makers sleepless nights.

One of the core issues which lie at the heart of many of these problems has to do with India’s dwindling investment rate. In just under a decade, India’s Gross Capital Formation (investment rate) has fallen about 9 percentage points from a high of 40 per cent of GDP in 2010-11 to about 31 per cent in 2017-18. The situation has become worse in the preceding few months where announcements of new projects have drastically declined. According to the CMIE database, Indian companies announced new projects worth ₹43,400 crore in the June 2019 quarter for both the private sector and public sector combined. This translates to about 81 per cent lower than what was announced in the March quarter and a stunning 87 per cent lower than the same period a year ago.

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Explaining the Takshashila National Security Doctrine

Download the doctrine here.In the 21st century, India faces challenges of unprecedented scale and complexity that necessitate new ways of thinking about national security. We propose that yogakshema, an idea pioneered in the Arthashastra , should be the guiding light of India’s national security doctrine. Simply put, the State must provide security, kshema, and economic opportunities, yoga, to all its citizens. In June 2019, we proposed a doctrine to achieve this.1. To create and defend a conducive environment for yogakshema (well-being, prosperity, and happiness) of all Indians. At this stage of India’s development, national security is primarily focused on protecting and promoting India’s economic development.2. National security also includes protecting the constitutional order, individual liberty, territory, social cohesion, and national resources.3. Amass and project power across all domains.4. Reimagine national security capacity.This document aims to elaborate on these points and elucidate the strategic reasoning behind them. In the first section of this document, we address the question of how a national security doctrine can provide opportunities for prosperity. India has a special place in the global order thanks to its large, young population and its critical geopolitical position. Its status as a swing power should be leveraged to shape global debates in ways that benefit its citizens. This is a matter of critical national interest: India’s economy is deeply connected to the world, and citizens’ prosperity depends on them being able to import and export goods and services on favourable terms.The rest of the document addresses questions of kshema. Within India’s borders, the State must ensure that the rule of law is implemented within the bounds laid out by the Constitution. The Republic of India’s institutions must be kept effective and efficient. And citizens’ rights - no matter their caste, class, gender, or creed - must be defended.Beyond India’s borders, in an anarchic, multipolar world, we argue that India must amass and project power across all domains, so it can defend its citizens’ interests in all domains. This means thinking about India’s “territory” in new ways - it’s no longer just about land, but about maritime domains, air, space, and cyberspace.  It also means that India needs to think about power as something the State can leverage in many ways in the global order. India needs to use all the means at its disposal to shape the world’s diplomatic, economic, and technological order. In summary, the overriding imperative of a national security doctrine is to provide yogakshema.

[pdf-embedder url="https://takshashila.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Takshashila-Doctrine-Explanation-National-Security-Aug19.pdf"]

Download the doctrine here.

Privacy is dead. So, it’s time to turn data into a bargaining chip.

Tech firms offer services in exchange, but the government will argue it needs your data for national security. Why not trade it then.

This year, Google bought Nest. Why was the world’s biggest search engine acquiring a thermostat company? Because through Nest, Google will get to know what temperature you prefer in your home, or when you come in and go out during weekdays and weekends.Everyone wants data. It is why The Economist claimed that “(t)he world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data”.In today’s digital world, fighting for privacy is fighting a losing battle. What we can instead fight for is making privacy a bargaining chip. Giving up your data to different people only makes sense if you know what you get in return.Earlier last year, when US Senator Orrin Hatch asked Mark Zuckerberg how Facebook remained free, a mildly amused Zuckerberg replied, “Senator, we run ads”. The clip went viral and highlighted the need for regulators to get up to speed with technology.People who understand how Facebook and Google work may know how they get their revenue by selling ads. They monitor your clicks; how much time you spend on a website; and what webpages you visit to target what they should be showing/selling to you. So, if you spend some time viewing videos of cats or say, an iPad, Facebook and Google will make sure that the content targeted to you is based on cats or iPads. However, the workings behind targeted advertising mean that it makes sense to think about privacy as a bargaining chip rather than an absolute right.Debates in technology change fast. Over the past year, different aspects of tech policy have been highlighted. There was an argument on intermediary liability on whether platforms should be considered the same as information publishers. We also have the ongoing debate on data localisation and where they should be physically located. Facebook’s launch of Libra shifted conversations to cryptocurrency and whether Facebook needed to be broken up. In the middle of all this chaos, the argument for user privacy seems to have died down. The news attention cycle is partly to blame.An equally big, if not bigger, part of the blame should be put on how big tech (Facebook, Google, and Amazon) operates. The business models for a lot of platforms (including Facebook, Google, Reddit, and Twitter) are responsible for it. Let’s look at Google. The idea is to offer services in exchange for your data. You don’t pay when signing up, but instead, give money to the platform’s clients after the application has used your own habits against you. Remember searching for that specific shoe wishfully, only to desert it midway, but the ads popping up for several weeks?The bottom line you need to understand in case of big tech making claim to your data is that they will provide you services in return (think Google Drive, Google Photos, or Google Search).It is not just big tech that wants your data. The government wants it too. While big tech might offer you services in exchange for that data, the government is not obliged to make any such promises. Instead, the government’s argument is that it needs access to data to maintain law enforcement, ensure national security and have supervisory access. This is a global trend that spans across contexts.For instance, the Reserve Bank of India wants unfettered supervisory access to financial data. India’s updated Information Technology Intermediaries Guidelines (Amendment) Rules want data on the originator of content on platforms. The Australian government has exclusive access to its citizens’ healthcare data, which cannot be shared outside its borders. There is also a big sentiment for states, especially developing economies such as India and China, to view data as a form of national wealth that can be used for development. This, in addition to the argument for law enforcement, makes the state naturally take an opposing stance to Facebook and Google when it comes to data access.These conversations are bound to become more complex as technology advances and the state plays catch-up. We are already looking at years of discussion on Facebook’s Libra project, which will also be a defining battle for the short-term future of cryptocurrencies. There is also Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s proposal for a multilateral data-sharing framework, called the Osaka Track, which was proposed at the recent G20 summit. Over time, emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence and the internet of things are bound to raise the stakes as well, as both are closely linked to data.With so much happening in and around data and technology, it can be dizzying to keep up. The privacy debate gets left behind. The only big company making any noise about privacy seems to be Apple.So, it’s time for us to get the bargaining chip. I know how this is a controversial opinion, especially for people who consider privacy to be an absolute right, and rightly so. I am not implying that the battle on privacy is lost. I am implying that it is a losing battle. Quoting Shoshana Zuboff, the nature of the internet and ‘surveillance capitalism’ leaves us with little choice.In such times, thinking of privacy as a bargaining chip only seems to be a bi-product of a pragmatic assessment of the situation. You can use your privacy in a transaction to get goods and services. You pay with your privacy when you sign up for Google or Facebook and opt in to their services. Similarly, you lose your privacy when the government has sensitive data on you (which may or may not be optional). Giving up data about yourself only makes sense when you know what you get in return. ‘Privacy is a bargaining chip’ is one of the few phrases that are always central to the debates in tech policy and helps us make sense of the world around us.The article was first published in The Print. Views are personal.

What does China’s new defence strategy mean?

China on Wednesday published its first defence white paper in four years, outlining the strategic military guideline for what it terms as a new era. The document offers an insight into Beijing’s view of the changes in the international security situation. It discusses China’s defence policy objectives, along with the reform, missions and tasks that its armed forces are undertaking. Further, it elaborates on the role of the armed forces in the broader Chinese geopolitical objective of establishing a community with a shared future for mankind. Here are five key takeaways from the white paper. The line taken by the document indicates a generally positive outlook towards India. Nevertheless, there are certain potential points of impact to be noted from the perspective of Indian interests.Shifting Balance of PowerThe white paper begins with an assessment of the changes in the international security environment. It argues that the world is increasingly heading towards multipolarity. But, it isn't yet a “tranquil place,” with strategic competition on the rise. Beijing’s diagnosis is that “the configuration of strategic power is becoming more balanced,” with the strength of emerging markets and developing countries growing. The big threat to this is the change in American policy, i.e., “growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism”.This necessitates a reinforcement of the UN’s role in global security, strengthening new regional security arrangements, establishing security partnerships (with Russia, for instance), investments in better weapons and technological upgrades and bolstering arms control and non-proliferation regimes. For New Delhi, which has been working on getting Beijing to yield on its admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the white paper’s assessment of the international non-proliferation regime as “compromised by pragmatism and double standards” is likely to be troubling.The Asia-Pacific ContestThe document observes that while the Asia-Pacific region is “generally stable”, there is increased “major country competition”. Essentially, it perceives the dynamics in the region within the framework of U.S.-China. frictions. The U.S., it argues, “is strengthening its Asia-Pacific military alliances and reinforcing military deployment and intervention”. The key partners for Washington that it identifies are South Korea, Japan and Australia. Despite that, the document largely assesses Chinese neighbourhood policy as having been successful.“Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly aware that they are members of a community with shared destiny”, it reads, hinting at the rapid emergence of a China-led security architecture. The constituents of this Sinosphere are structures like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, CICA, China’s expanding dominance in the South China Sea, dialogues with ASEAN members, regional counter-terror action and increasing bilateral military-to-military diplomacy. Interestingly, China views South Asia also as “generally stable,” although “conflicts between India and Pakistan flare up from time to time.” This suggests that Beijing is rather confident about its ability to manage tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.BRI's Military ComponentEver since Xi Jinping launched, in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there has been much debate about the security implications of Chinese investments around the world. The white paper tells us that protecting China’s overseas interests is a strategic objective for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It states that “one of the missions of China’s armed forces is to effectively protect the security and legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese people, organisations and institutions”. In order to do so, the document says that the PLA is building “far seas forces”, “overseas logistical facilities”, and capabilities for “diversified military tasks”. That’s followed by a glowing evaluation of the PLA’s Logistics Support Base in Djibouti, which was set up in 2017. This is perhaps the clearest admission of the emerging military component of the BRI. But that’s not all. Beijing is also likely to continue to invest in and focus on participation in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief operations internationally. This is couched within the rhetoric of providing international public goods. But such activities allow for the enhancement of Chinese forces’ operational skills and experience and normalises their presence in far-flung regions of the world.Resilient ChinaThe 2015 Chinese defence white paper had argued that “China faces a formidable task to maintain political security and social stability” while discussing Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. In 2019, there’s a mention of “external separatist forces” with regard to Tibet and Xinjiang. But the forces seeking Taiwan’s “independence” are identified as the “gravest immediate threat”, with the use of force not being ruled out. Despite that, generally, the domestic security environment is assessed to have improved considerably. “China continues to enjoy political stability, ethnic unity and social stability. There has been a notable increase in China’s overall national strength, global influence, and resilience to risks,” the white paper says. However, it is also worth noting that “safeguarding national political security” and political work in the armed forces to uphold Xi Jinping’s status as the core of the Party-state system remain priorities.Quality and Efficiency

Arguably one of the most important components of the reforms that Xi has pursued has been the restructuring of the country’s armed forces. The white paper encapsulates this as the PLA striving to transform itself from a quantity-and-scale model to that of quality and efficiency. This entails a shift in focus from manpower to firepower and from personnel-intensive to science and technology-intensive forces, according to the white paper. The impact of this overarching shift in approach has meant organisational restructuring. That has involved a shift in the balance of different forces. Over the past few years, there has been a reduction in personnel numbers, particularly from the ground forces. The Second Artillery Force has been reconstituted as the PLA Rocket Force. New strategic support and logistics forces have been established. Greater attention has been paid to safeguarding interests in outer space, electromagnetic space and cyberspace. The white paper, in fact, identifies this as one of the nine fundamental goals of the PLA going forward. Its equipment-development policy and approach to combat, therefore, are evolving from mechanisation to “intelligentised warfare” and “informatisation”. That has led to a reassessment of training methods to ensure greater interoperability among forces. These are developments that New Delhi should be watching closely and factoring into its defence planning, given that they have a direct impact on India’s security interests.

This article was first published in The Hindu. Views are personal.

Why India needs to leverage and not localise data

If one were to chart the arc of geopolitical competition over the past 100 years, one can identify four primary sources of contention – land, people, natural resources, and now, the commanding heights of new technologies. At the heart of the current competition lies data – the fuel that will power future innovation.

We generate data just by existing. Every telephone call we make, every social media share, a journey from home to work, financial transactions, and even the beat of your heart is data. This is valuable to corporations big and small looking to create new products and offer new solutions. The more data you have and the better quality data you have, the greater your chances of tailoring products, out-innovating competitors, and achieving scale.

It’s little wonder then that access to data has become a point of geopolitical contention. This was evident at the recent G20 summit in Osaka. India boycotted a move by the world’s leading economies to establish a new regime for global data governance. The Osaka Track, as it is called, is a plurilateral initiative to establish a framework for cross-border data sharing, essentially aimed at limiting a states’ ability to hoard data generated within its borders.

This goes against India’s stated policy. India boycotted the Osaka Track preferring the conversation to be held at the WTO. Foreign Secretary, Vijay Gokhale, also underscored the significance of data as “national wealth.” India’s approach has been that of data localisation. Localisation essentially means storing domestic data on domestic soil. India’s rationale for pursuing localisation comes from the notion of viewing data as a new form of wealth. Keeping this in mind, there is a strong sentiment across the government to internalise this wealth and use it for development. While the idea does seem to make sense on the surface, a deeper look shows that there are significant costs and benefits to it.

Perhaps the greatest benefits to localisation lie in security and ease of access. RBI emphasised the latter by being the first government entity to call for localisation. The BN Justice Shrikrishna Committee and E-commerce policy have also called for localisation, citing similar grounds. However, there are significant costs to localising data in India and incurring those costs might not make data more secure. Firstly, building and maintaining data centres is a capital intensive business. It requires a significant amount of water, electricity, and bandwidth. Electricity and water are both commodities that India does not have in abundance. As of 2017, an estimated 240 million (24 crore) people in India did not have access to electricity. NITI Aayog estimates that 600 million (60 crore) people face a severe water shortage in India, and the situation will only get worse with the water demand being twice the supply by 2030. The recent Chennai water crisis does a lot to place emphasis on this. It would just not be fair or ethical to allocate water reserves to cool down data centres when they should be diverted to Chennai.

Secondly, as far as benefits are concerned, having data centres in India is not likely to make data more secure. India currently ranks 23rd in the global cybersecurity index. There have also been multiple leaks on the Aadhar data India does store locally. So there is a historical precedent for data stored on Indian servers to not be adequately protected. Moreover, if the idea is that storing data here is likely to impose an Indian jurisdiction on it, it may not pan out that way. The physical location of data does not define who owns it or has access to it. If Facebook decided to store data in India, the data would still belong to Facebook.

Given this, it is important to shift the data policy conversation from a storage location to access. Moreover, in doing so, it is important to adopt a strategic outlook. From this perspective, data is a tool of leverage, along with the size of the Indian market. India ranks at the 57th position in the Global Innovation Index. Our technology and innovation ecosystem has a lot of catching up to do, in comparison to those in the US and China. Therefore, allowing foreign competitors free and easy access to Indian data could stymie the growth of future Indian enterprises.

It would instead be far more prudent to pursue a policy of conditional access. There are a number of potential benefits to this approach.

Conditional access could either take the form of requirements for localisation along with investments and collaborations with Indian enterprises. A similar approach was recently taken by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways which shared vehicle and DL data with Indian companies for a fee of ₹3 Crore. The Vahan and Sarthi databases brought in a revenue of ₹65 crores in total and were made available to 87 domestic companies. Apart from expanding state revenues, such an approach with foreign firms could lead to greater capital investments in India along with the diffusion of technology and managerial and operational best practices. In the long run, this could aid India’s start-up and tech ecosystems.

However, going down this road requires clear domestic legislation and regulations. There are three broad areas regulation should be aimed at addressing. Firstly, defining domestic jurisdiction of data. There is a need to define laws on who owns data, the citizen or the state. Calling data national wealth sets a precedent in favour of state ownership of personal data. Once defined, procedures for judicial safeguards and parliamentary oversight should be put in place to determine who can access public data. That can be followed by discussions over the finer points on what kinds of data should be classified as sensitive and personal. The data protection bill addresses this to some extent. However, the bill is not law yet. Even if it were to become law, it is unclear what aspects of the bill will be changed.

Secondly, in case foreign players are to collaborate with the Indian ecosystem to use data, there needs to be a regulation providing for foreign access. This is likely to be a huge part of conditional localisation. Having a framework that facilitates domestic and foreign collaborations between companies as well as states could be helpful in leveraging data for Indian development. Thirdly, regulation needs to address standards in public data. If data collected by states is to be made accessible to private parties, there need to be national standards in how data is collected, sorted, and opened for access. This would help in processing data and deriving insights from it. Standards would also make it easier to maintain clean datasets.

Considering the above, making the argument for localisation might be a sound short-term negotiating strategy. But in order to strengthen one’s hand at the global table, in the long run, it’s important to focus on putting in place domestic rules and regulations and then negotiating conditional access.

The views expressed above are the authors' own. The article was first published in Deccan Herald.

Does the arrival of AI mean the end of data privacy?

In recent years, there has been a great buzz around the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and what that might mean for the Indian economy. On the government’s side, Niti Aayog has come up with a national strategy on AI; the Ministry of Commerce has set up an AI task force. A ‘National Centre of AI’ is also planned. All of these initiatives have a scope to define where AI can contribute to the Indian industry and how to best achieve adoption at scale. But there’s a flip side to AI and that impacts data privacy.

The relation between AI and data privacy is a complex one. Broadly speaking, the growth of AI may spell the end of data privacy if we don’t proactively try to embed privacy by design.

Algorithms in AI learn from big datasets. For example, let us take a huge dataset, say India’s Aadhaar database. To the human eye and mind, it would be almost impossible to discern any insight from looking into this huge database/spreadsheet. However, to an AI algorithm, it could serve as fuel. AI learns from big data and identifies patterns in numbers that may draw unlikely correlations.

The catch here is in the fact that the more data an AI programme is fed, the harder it becomes to de-identify people. Because the programme can compare two or more datasets, it may not need your name to identify you. Data containing ‘location stamps’ — information with geographical coordinates and time stamps — could be used to easily track the mobility trajectories of, say, where and how people live and work. Supplement this with datasets about your UPI payments, and it might also know where and what you spend your money on.

So, the more data AI is fed, the better it might get to know you. Because of this, if AI is the future, then privacy may be a thing of the past. Still, can AI be, instead, leveraged to enhance privacy for individuals and companies?

There is a bit of a silver lining. Applications of AI have immense potential when it comes to enhancing security and privacy. It can help better understand how much of your data is being collected and how it may be used. A good use case is the AI, ‘Polisis’ which stands for Privacy Policy Analysis.

The algorithm uses deep learning and can read privacy policy documents to develop insights such as an executive summary and a flow chart of what kind of data is collected and who it will be sent to. In addition, it also outlines whether or not the consumer can opt-out of the collection or sharing of the data.

As rosy as leveraging AI for privacy might sound, data is going to drive the economies of the future, and in a data-driven regime, the idea of privacy takes centre stage to protect the interest of consumers and citizens alike.

This brings us to another question: if AI is fundamentally opposed to privacy, is there a way to get around the problem? There are two aspects to how privacy can be maintained not at the cost of development in AI. The first is that of consumer action. There is a need to modify the bridge between AI and data protection.

Terms and conditions

With rising data collection and storage, doctrinal notions around ‘consent’ and ‘privacy notices’ should be reconsidered. For instance, we may need to revisit the model of ‘clickwrap’ contracts (which allows the user to click on the “I accept” button without reading long, verbose, and unintelligible privacy terms and conditions).

What consumers are not aware of is that often, they can decline the contract and still get unfettered access to the content. While this is a practice that should not be encouraged, it is still a step better than accepting terms and conditions without reading them.

The best practice would be to find out whether the following T&Cs are a part of the agreement: (1) Can the website use your content? (2) Does everything you upload become open source? (3) Can your name and likeness appear in ads? (4) Do you pay the company’s legal costs to cover late payments? (5) Is the company responsible for your data loss?

Of course, you shouldn’t have to read legalities before you want to read an article. To that extent, a possible workaround could be using tools such as ‘Polisis’.

The second solution is to change the nature of AI development. This means including privacy by design in AI algorithms. While there can be no strict set of rules or policy guidelines that can bind an algorithm designer, best practices following constitutional standards jurisdiction-wise can be developed as a benchmark.

A few techniques that could be deployed to enhance privacy when data is being processed by an AI algorithm are differential privacy, homomorphic encryptions, and generative adversarial networks. Along with these, another privacy enhancing and data protection measure which should be taken is of certification schemes and privacy seals to help demonstrate compliance by organisations.

The development of AI might spell the end of privacy as we know it. There have been examples of AI enhancing privacy, but those are the exceptions, not the norm. AI is proliferating, so it is necessary to embed privacy and appropriate technical and organisational measures for it into the process that leads to positive outcomes. The opportunity for AI today is, therefore, not just solving for corporations and nations, but instead, to do so in a manner that is sustainable in terms of user privacy.

This article was first published in Deccan Herald. Views expressed are personal.

GMO: let's take a balanced view

At least 12 farmers have been booked in Maharashtra for planting banned genetically modified (GM) cotton and brinjal seeds. Undeterred by this, farmers have been protesting the blockade of new technologies that could aid farming. This movement has elicited mixed responses from farmer groups — some support the idea; others oppose the introduction of GM technologies in Indian agriculture.The anti-GMO argument rests on three pillars: first, that GMOs are controlled by large companies and are essentially anti-farmer; second, they are harmful to biological diversity and third, they are harmful to human health. They also argue that the Maharashtra farmers have been paid by large companies to pressure the government into accepting the technology.On the other hand, pro-GMO groups such as the Shetkari Sanghtana backing the Maharashtra protest argue that farmers need to adopt more GMOs to get better yields and more income. This is by no means a new argument. In 2001, farmers were accused of illegally planting GM cotton, much prior to India permitting the commercialisation of Monsanto’s Bt cotton. So, as these two groups tussle it out, who will blink first? Read more

Indian govt can make taxes look good – by taxing bad behaviour, like honking

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