Approaches to Indo-Pacific: India and US

The US Department of Defence (DOD) released its first-ever Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) in the first week of June. The report outlines Washington’s approach in dealing with various stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region. It identifies China as one of the most important challenges to the US, noting that great-power competition has returned and threatens the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. The report emphasises the need for alliances and partnerships to maintain peace and security in this region.The IPSR identifies India as an important partner of the US. It takes a cue from a speech in 2017 by Rex Tillerson, then the US secretary of state, in which he identified India’s role in the United States’ vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP). India too believes in the principles of FOIP. There are a few parallels between the two countries’ visions for the Indo-Pacific region.The article was originally published in Asia Times

Reading into India’s draft e-commerce policy

Bottom line is that it would now be misleading to say that the Indian government does not have a vision in tech policy. It is one step forward from our late 2017 vision.

Up until 2018, one would have been hard-pressed to identify whether India had any coherent intent regarding its technology policy. There were question marks on where the government stood with respect to a range of issues — data protection, cross-border data flows, AI, encryption, fintech, and e-commerce. With the coming of the draft e-commerce policy, the good news halfway through 2019 is that India does seem to have a definite plan for all of these pillars of technology. The broader question is: what does this mean for stakeholders across the ecosystem and for India’s digital aspirations?The draft policy has a lot to say about consumer/citizen data. A lot of which has been mentioned in policies before this one. Data is a national asset, but does that mean it has to be controlled by the state? This question is more relevant now than ever. India does not currently have a data protection law in place. There also isn't a due process of law for data disclosure. The policy says that data should be stored locally. This is in line with the personal data protection bill and RBI’s directive.

Maybe the plan is that localisation will help transform our digital infrastructure. Across the three policies, there is no roadmap to suggest how localisation will be achieved or why it’s needed (apart from unfettered supervisory access, as stated in the RBI notification). Let’s say that the directive does help build digital infrastructure in India. It will not make India a data centre hub, because of our electricity, bandwidth, and water deficiencies. If the plan is to overcome these deficiencies, there is no course of action attached to it. Storage is not the same as access. People own data. Fiduciaries get access to it by consent. Just because a data centre is located in India may not mean the data belongs to the state. So, the rights to insights generated will stay with fiduciaries as well. If the policy’s plan is to take us to a Digital India, it is unclear how these directives shape the road to it.Another condition from previous policies is the requirement that operating e-commerce platforms must have a registered business entity in India. The amendments to the intermediary liability guidelines followed the same tone. There are two broad concerns stemming from this. Firstly, implementation. How do you track that every e-commerce vendor has a business entity in India? The policy suggests nothing in terms of implementation. Second, how do you punish platforms violating the rule? Do you have them removed from the app/play store? What if Google and Apple don’t comply? In which place, why do it in the first place?Secondly, who are the winners and losers of this measure? The broad answer to this is foreign e-commerce platforms — specifically, medium to small e-commerce platforms that might not be able to afford to set up registered business entities. At the same time, it is a win for small and medium enterprises at home. They now have lesser competition. They are also enabled through the simplification of export regulation and the raised ceiling on export goods. This makes it relatively easier to look for markets abroad by reducing costs. At the same time, it closes the gifting route for foreign companies to export to India. Bigger foreign companies have the means to comply with the directive, even though it might take a while to adjust organisational structure. This likely means lack of competition for domestic Indian firms. Making it harder for foreign e-commerce firms to compete is somewhat of a theme here.Ultimately, the draft e-commerce policy leaves us with more questions than answers. Firstly, is there a direct link between localisation and the quest for access to data? Why localise in the first place? If there are objectives behind it, how is localisation part of the roadmap to getting there? Also, how does the government plan to crack down on platforms that do not have the financial resources to have an office in India? Will the administration identify and penalise every foreign player on the app/play stores? While answers to these questions remain unclear, one thing that the draft e-commerce policy does resolve is the perceived absence of cohesive intent. The list of questions and regulations discussed above is by no means exhaustive. There are other components — marketplace models, anti-counterfeiting measures, source code for advertisements, and so on. The bottom line, however, is that it would now be misleading to say that the Indian government does not have a vision in tech policy. It is one step forward from our late 2017 vision.This article was first published in The Hindu. Views are personal. 

India must make Intelligence Bureau responsible for countering terrorism, not RAW

India’s counter-terrorism efforts have improved significantly since 2008, but the dynamic nature of the threat requires streamlining of intelligence and law enforcement operations. As the lead internal intelligence agency, the IB should be the nodal agency for counter-terrorism initiatives and intelligence sharing.Read more

Need to Protect Soldiers from False FIRs

At the heart of the matter is the urgent necessity of protecting the soldiers from harassment to which they are subjected from the prolonged investigative procedures that ensue. The investigative process itself, for a soldier acting in good faith and in accordance with the orders of his superiors, is a form of punishment that could also entail financial costs through legal fees, disruption of normal life, and deep psychological strain of the proverbial legal sword hanging over their heads.Read more

How Can India Combine Data and Regional Power?

The stakes concerning jurisdiction over data have never been higher. There is a global discourse today on the future of data that was recently brought into the news cycle by the U.S. government. The Trump administration was mulling over capping H-1B visas to deter India’s rules on data centers. There is a sense perhaps that data has become a variable in regional and global geopolitics today. Owing to its immense population, India unsurprisingly generates a lot of data. The question for New Delhi is how to translate this into a geopolitical advantage.China has a robust approach to its data — one that has been conducive to its digital goals. It needs countries to store their data locally. Companies might store their data in China but can resist sharing user information with the government. Apple has a data center in China but refuses to share encryption keys with the government. By closing off its data from the world, China lies on an extreme end of the data geopolitical spectrum.Other countries, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia differentiate their data, some of which is deemed fit to be shared with the world. Critical data, however, is not allowed to cross borders. In cases with a middle ground, data can be shared, but a working copy of it must be maintained at home.This brings us to India. As data regulation changes from bills to laws, Indian data policy is still officially in flux. Looking at current global trends, India could broadly either go the American or the Chinese way. Maybe New Delhi could pursue the best of both approaches. What these broad approaches might be missing, however, is a geopolitical opportunity. Here India could use its data and that of its neighbors’ (BIMSTEC) to their collective advantage.BIMSTEC is a group comprised of Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal, and Bhutan. The group made headlines recently when India invited its members to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s swearing-in ceremony. This is a good indicator for the relevance of regional groupings, as the SAARC leaders were invited for the same event last time around, in 2014. Combining BIMSTEC with data is a huge opportunity for India. Taking the lead in this regard has a set of technological and geopolitical advantages. This could mean having a common set of data processing laws, common security standards, a common market for data, and a larger region and resources to build data centres in.Doing all or any one of the above could add importance to BIMSTEC in the region and the world too. The only similar project to exist in the data space is that of the European Union and the Council of Europe. Having a standard of data processing laws and shared space for localisation for seven countries would add significant bargaining power against warnings like caps on H-1B visas. Convention 108+ in the EU does something similar. By having common adequacy standards, data can only flow across borders for processing when the receiver/processor meets the standards set for it.So not only can a combined BIMSTEC approach to data can increase the region’s bargaining power globally, but it can also help better security standards. It is also likely to bring down the costs of storing and maintaining data. Data centers are resource-intensive in terms of electricity, water, and bandwidth. Pooling resources to build and maintain them is likely to bring down costs. Should the BIMSTEC area become a cheap option for data centers, it would give the region an increased say in the global technological debate.Pooling national data can also help the faster development of AI in the region. More importantly, any advancements in AI-based on regional data would help develop the technology in the context of developing countries and not just Silicon Valley. It can become hard to relate to AI that can open garage doors for Teslas in South Asia. It would be more useful to have self-driving cars that can deal with potholes, for instance. This would also be good for BIMSTEC enterprises as they use data to solve local problems.BIMSTEC pooling of data would be tailor-made for AI to solve regional problems across borders. Also developing new standards for data processing presents a new opportunity. It would bring the privacy debate back into the discourse in these countries. Having a multinational approach to data jurisdictions is not something the world is familiar with—certainly not South Asia. Developing laws that address these issues would be a remarkable achievement considering the unique challenges each country faces.The bottom line is that in a world of high-tech geopolitics, BIMSTEC might be a better approach than India alone. It would undoubtedly provide more power to India and the region. The icing on the cake is that it presents wonderful possibilities for the future of big data and AI in the region. Having a regional approach to local problems, splitting costs of data centers, and the possibility of better processing laws is wonderful. All that remains for India to do is take the lead and add data as a component of foreign policy.This article was first published in The Diplomat. Views are personal.  

Budgetary allocations reveal real priorities of NDA 3

The Union budget speech invites a lot of attention in India. However, it is far more useful to look at the budget statements that get released on the day the speech is read out in Parliament. Comparing the vision articulated in the budget speech with the promised allocations in these statements separate the wheat from the chaff.Read more on Deccan Herald Online

Need to Update Competition Law

There are other major deficiencies in the competition law when it comes to understanding internet companies, Manur said. “Without establishing that a company is dominant, the CCI cannot take any action. But we haven’t clearly defined what the relevant markets are for internet companies. Are Ola and Uber the two largest cab companies? Or are they small players in a very large transportation market that included cabs, metros, trains, etc?" This is one of the defences used by internet companies—that their relevant market isn’t restricted to the internet space. For instance, Google and Facebook argue that they are small players in the larger advertising market, online and offline.As it stands, the competition law is not even equipped to detect some of the antitrust issues in the internet space, added Manur, an antitrust regulation researcher.Manur said it was imperative to add the data footprint of an internet firm as one of the metrics in considering the impact on competition. “The consumer data owned by an internet company is one of the most important indicators of its dominance and impact. In gauging M&As in the internet space this factor needs to be added to the list of considerations."Read more

India’s Chandrayaan-2 matters, but don’t dream about moon picnics with friends just as yet

The prospect of permanent stations on the moon makes the Chandrayaan-2 mission of strategic interest. Although its launch has been postponed for now, when it eventually lands on the moon, India will have taken a substantial step towards extra-terrestrial settlement. “Settlement” might appear to be too strong a word to use for the initial stations that humans will set up on the moon, but they will put us on that path.Read more

India’s policy on data must focus on access, not physical location

In recent times, India, Japan, and the United States have found themselves on the same side of the table, more often than not. So, when India declined to participate in the Osaka Track, the Japanese prime minister’s favourite initiative at the G-20 summit last month, it was something of an aberration.

Shinzo Abe wants to create a group of countries that will allow the free flow of data across international borders. India declined, taking the view that such a conversation ought to take place under the WTO.  The real stumbling block was the Indian government’s seriousness on data localisation. Staying out of the Osaka Track was a prudent decision, but the Narendra Modi government’s presumption that data localisation is in the national interest requires a thorough reconsideration.

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Fiscal constraint prevents stimulus

The interim budget in February gave a substantial stimulus to the taxpayer. Almost three crore taxpayers moved out of the net, as the minimum threshold was raised. Further, the cash transfer to households led to some consumption push, not to forget the electoral gains.Read more 

Like Swachh Bharat, Modi wants mission Save Water. Stop free water first

Modi has called for a mass movement — like Swachh Bharat — to save water. Since the new government took office, it has created a water ministry by folding up two older ones, set itself a goal of delivering piped water to all households by 2024, created a water management index that ranks states, and is set to roll out a whole host of measures to conserve water.But, contrary to popular belief and experience, we are not running out of water — 71 per cent of the earth’s surface is covered by water. The problem does not lie in nature, but in the fact that Indian society is unable to cooperate in a manner that ensures each one of us has adequate water.Read more

To let data roam free or coop it up at home?

Cross-border flow is the basic life-blood of data. When information is isolated, it loses its potential to become knowledge and becomes increasingly vulnerable to breaches. Moreover, India might currently not even have the infrastructure to store its own data. More often than not, data is jeopardised by inadequate supporting infrastructure rather than malevolent threats.

A key issue on which India needs to make a decision is the approach to cross-border data flows. The ability to share and process data at lightning speeds is almost as important as the existence of the data itself.It is remarkable what information can achieve when collected and processed at a large scale. With the growth of 21st-Century technology, these possibilities have grown. For instance, because data can flow at unprecedented speeds, centres can analyse trends in real-time and provide insights that guide behaviour. Consider Google Maps, a software that collects information on a global scale, through remote sensors and can instantly count for changing directions, congestion, and solve to the minute for how much longer it will take from point A to point B. The sheer utility of Google Maps has made it essential to how we function on a daily basis.Just like Google Maps impacts the individual, sets of big data drive behaviours of industry and, indeed, entire sectors. A key reason why this model is able to function so efficiently is the nature of data. As a commodity, data can be shared at lightning speeds while managing costs. In the contemporary world, collecting and sharing information has become easier and more effective than at any point in history. It is a result of this that we have made our progress into “Industry 4.0”, and it is the driver that will help us bring about this revolution.However, this progress cannot be achieved without the freedom of accessibility that data aggregation requires. Pieces of information kept in isolation are not nearly as useful or efficient in comparison to what they can do together when combined and consolidated — the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When data is allowed to exist without borders, it has the added benefit of keeping costs down and allowing companies to spread out globally. Any curbs on this ability can have negative side effects for industry and the billions it benefits around the world.Unfortunately, that is a possibility India has been considering over recent years. Data localisation is the idea that data should be ‘localised’ or confined to national borders. Measures to achieve this can vary in their degree of severity. If considered in its most stringent form, localisation can prohibit data to leave national borders (generally there is a provision to make exceptions for special circumstances). When relaxed, localisation requirements might ask for companies to meet security adequacy standards when keeping an updated copy of the data domestically.This brings us to the broader question of why localisation measures in India are on the rise. The Reserve Bank of India released a circular early last year that called for localisation in the payments sector while a special committee, formed for designing recommendations on data protection, suggested localisation methods.Localisation is a trending topic in the Indian data space. So let us take a moment to examine why the government is taking the stance it is. The arguments presented in the central bank’s circular and the White Paper released by the Srikrishna Committee essentially boil down to the need for access rather than storage of data. Unfettered access to data is supposed to translate into more effective law enforcement. Localisation then is a method to enable this need for access. In addition, it would also protect India’s data from malicious foreign entities.While ensuring security and ease of access for Indian data is paramount, localisation might not be the best means to achieve that end. Because of the very nature of data, the physical location of where it may be stored does not govern who has access to it. There are different zones of jurisdiction depending on who the data belongs to. For instance, just because Facebook’s data centre might be located in Bangalore or Hyderabad, does not make it a property of the state or federal government(s). Moreover, even if placing the centres in India would somehow protect them from foreign surveillance (the fears are justified after Edward Snowden’s leak), it would render them more vulnerable to domestic threats. Moreover, more often than not, data is jeopardised by inadequate supporting infrastructure rather than malevolent threats. For example, a study by the Leviathan Security Group stated that in 2011 data was compromised because of a slow water drip in a nondescript office building in the Canadian city of Calgary. The lack of adequate infrastructure set off an explosion that caused days of computer outages for hospitals, ambulances, radio stations, taxis, and criminal justice facilities around the province. It is not easy to source and maintains the infrastructural requirements of data centres. Not only do they need to be completely free of even seemingly minor dysfunctions such as water drips, but data centres also need massive amounts of resources — electricity and water — to function. India might not have the infrastructural capacity to meet the requirements of setting up and maintaining data centres. A large percentage of Indians do not have access to electricity and there is an impending crisis for water.So, India still has a long way to go before it can meet the infrastructural requirements for setting up data centres of its own. Ultimately, for India, and for the sake of the larger narrative, localisation is not a means to achieve better data security. What it will do, instead, is increase costs for the industry while making global organisation tougher to manage. Curbing freedom of movement for data will impact the ability to progress, innovate, and allocate resources while sullying the experience for the end-user, the people.It should be noted that localisation was a key mandate of the BJP government before the elections. There is a widespread belief in the government that localising Indian data is the way to go. It complements the current administration’s ‘India First’ message. However, as far as cross-border data flows are concerned, localisation might not be the tool that helps India in the long or short term. With the reelection of the BJP, there is no reason to believe that the approach to cross-border data flows is likely to change. We can presume that the draft e-commerce policy, data protection bill, and the RBI circular will all enforce their version of localisation.The question is whether it will actually help keep data secure while harnessing the potential we know it possesses. As most experts on big data and AI will tell you, when it comes to data, it is always better to let it roam free.

The article was first published in The Hindu. Views are personal.

Bihar encephalitis to lynchings to #MeToo – why Indians don’t take issues to the finish line

The Supreme Court Monday “came down heavily on the Centre and Bihar government” for the rising number of Acute Encephalitis Syndrome deaths in Nitish Kumar’s Bihar. Chances are that in 10 days, we won’t remember that over 150 children had died in Muzaffarpur as the news cycle would have turned three or four times by then and we would all be outraging about some entirely different issue. It appears that in India at least, outrage cycles have failed to create change. Even the #MeToo movement has run aground.Read more

SCO 2019: hits and misses for India

After winning re-election, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi chose the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for his first multilateral engagement. India has used the 2019 Bishkek summit to balance its approach between conflicting interests of the US and China. It stands to gain from the SCO’s peace process in Afghanistan, the decision to use local currencies for trade and the organization’s stand on terrorism.However, India missed out on energy and connectivity opportunities emanating from the SCO, along with a chance to break ice with Pakistan.The June 14-15 event was Modi’s third SCO summit. Having begun as the Shanghai Five in 1996, and renamed as the SCO in 2001, this organization has become a pivot to security and geopolitical issues of the Eurasian region. India’s participation in the organization is marked by its interest in energy and connectivity projects in Eurasia.

This article was originally published in Asia Times. Click to read the full article

Can Hong Kong protect its 'freedom'?

"One country, two systems”, the brilliant formulation that allowed Britain to transfer Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China in 1997, allowed a lot of people to believe that the two systems would converge over time. That while the mainland would adopt free markets and democracy, Hong Kong would become better integrated with its motherland.Read more

India and Brexit: How New Delhi Can Position Itself to Maximize Benefit

The United Kingdom’s planned exit from the European Union, Brexit, keeps getting messier by the month. It led Theresa May to resign, just like David Cameron before her. It may end up making Boris Johnson the U.K.’s next prime minister, or be the cause of him facing judicial consequences. Brexit also led to the creation of the Brexit party, which got the largest vote share in recent European elections. So we now have British representatives in the EU who don’t want to be there. As of now, it shows no signs of getting better for the U.K.

What does this mean for India and why does it matter? The short answer is that Brexit may end up being good for India’s relations with the U.K. and the EU. The long answer, however, is a bit more complex. To get there, let’s put Brexit into context for India.India and the U.K. share strong trade relations. There is a sizable Indian diaspora in Britain, which means India receives a lot of remittances from the U.K. As per previous estimations, the U.K. sends approximately $4 billion to India through formal and informal channels. Indians are among the most common non-British nationalities in the U.K., with 832,000 residents. India sees the U.K. as a lucrative market in itself and a gateway to the European Union. Between 2000 and 2018, total foreign direct investment (FDI) that flowed into India from all channels from the U.K. is estimated at $50.57 billion. Of this, the U.K. directly invested $26.09 billion in India – increasing its investment by $847 million between 2017 and 2018 – representing 7 percent of all FDI coming into the country. India also shares strong relations with the EU that could be developed further. The EU is India’s largest trading partner and India was the EU’s ninth largest trading partner in 2015. The EU accounted for 92 billion euros worth of trade in goods in 2018 or 12.9 percent of total Indian trade, ahead of China (10.9 percent) and the United States (10.1 percent). The EU is also a leading destination of choice for Indian exports. Eighteen percent of total Indian exports are to the EU. The relationship is set to become stronger as both parties have been considering entering into a free trade agreement, which would reduce tariffs and barriers to bilateral trade.How is Brexit likely to affect India’s economic relations with both these parties? A lot of it depends on whether there is a “soft” Brexit or a “hard” Brexit. In simpler terms, it depends on whether or not the U.K. leaves the single market. The EU imported around 44 percent of U.K. exports in goods and services in 2017 — 274 billion British pounds’ worth, out of 616 billion pounds of total exports. Should the U.K. leave the single market, it may have to look for other buyers for its goods and services. In a post-Brexit world, India could benefit from this. South Korea did exactly that recently, by agreeing to sign a free trade deal with the U.K. The timing is no coincidence. The U.K. needs trading partners and leaving the single market will give London strong incentive to expand in markets elsewhere, particularly the Commonwealth.India is one of the biggest economies in the bloc and has strong trade relations with the U.K. Moreover, Brexit may devalue the pound, which could be a boost to trade volumes between India in the U.K., providing a strong base to build upon. The timing is also ripe for India, with a new government coming in. A flagship trade deal with the U.K. would serve as great news in times where trade wars dominate the news. This is not to say that an FTA is the only way to go. Another feature of Brexit may be that European labor workers might need to leave the EU or stay on different visa requirements should Brexit turn out this way. India could also take advantage of this to incentivize movement of labor between the two countries.A hard/soft Brexit could also mean stronger ties between India and the EU. With the U.K.’s departure, the EU is likely to want to fill that economic gap. As far as trade with India is concerned, the first order of business might be to work toward finalizing the free trade agreement. If the U.K. can no longer serve as a gateway to Europe, Indian companies might also consider diversifying their current investments in London. An attractive destination could be Ireland, because of its close proximity to the U.K. and membership to the EU. This could also mean investments in other EU trade capitals, such as Frankfurt and Paris. Doing so would benefit the EU as a bloc in a post-Brexit world.While the full impact of Brexit spans across sectors, the changing nature of the U.K.’s involvement in the single market is what India should be concerned with. While trade relations between India and the EU/U.K. have been strong historically, Brexit could be the catalyst that makes them stronger. As the EU and the U.K. both look for new trade opportunities elsewhere, India could emerge as a beneficiary of this new arrangement. The reshuffle that Brexit brings with it is something the Indian economy should welcome, soft Brexit or otherwise.This article was first published by The Diplomat. Views are personal. 

How the world is dealing with China’s military modernisation drive

China’s military modernisation is advancing rapidly, requiring stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region to adapt with the changing realities. China’s Defence minister Wei Fenghe made a speech on June 2 at the Shangri-La Dialogue forum in Singapore. Shangri-La Dialogue is one of the biggest track-one diplomacy security fora of Asia. Mr. Fenghe’s speech was monitored closely for three reasons. One, the Defence minister has not attended this forum since 2011. Two, his speech was a response to the statement made by Patrick Shanahan, the acting secretary of defence for the United States. Mr. Shanahan revealed details of the ‘new phase’ in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. Third and most importantly, the speech came a month after the Chinese military report published by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).The DOD report cautioned the U.S. Congress about the rapid modernisation of the Chinese armed forces. The report claims that the Chinese leadership aims to achieve informatisation of the People’s Liberation Army by 2020 and modernisation by 2035, with the broader goal of developing the PLA into a world-class force by 2050. The report gives considerable attention to the advancement of the PLA Navy (PLAN). There has been an evolution in the approach of the PLAN from ‘off-shore water defence’ to ‘open sea protection’ due to its increased military capabilities. The report says that China’s second aircraft carrier, Type 001 A, would likely be commissioned by the end of this year. This would be followed by the induction of another carrier, Type 002, in a short span of time.The Type 002 carrier is expected to be equipped with advanced launch capabilities in the form of an electromagnetic catapult. Currently, this technology is available only with the single aircraft carrier of the U.S. Navy, the USS Gerald R. Ford. The report also states that the PLAN currently operates four nuclear-powered ballistic missile–carrying submarines (SSBNs) and six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), predicting that this number would increase in the near future. The DOD report further cautions the U.S. Congress to expect the establishment of more overseas PLA bases, like the one in Djibouti, in the Indo-Pacific region in the near future.

What does this mean for regional stakeholders..

This article was originally published in the Hindu thread. Click to read the full article

The gene of prejudice in gender determination

From impeding track stars like Caster Semenya and Dutee Chand to laws restricting bathroom access and a proposal in the US for genetic determination of sex, the issue of gender identity remains mired in controversy.Can there be a sensible and humane resolution to this debate? Or does this debate represent an unwarranted imposition of societal perception of gender on the scientific determinants of sex? If that is the case, the resolution definitely does not lie in force-fitting science to societal concepts. In a landmark decree, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that it was shifting gender incongruence (i.e., being transgender, when your gender identity is different from the one assigned at birth) from its mental disorders chapter to the sexual health chapter. It basically means that the WHO recognises that being transgender is not a mental health problem as was initially thought, but is probably normal biology. (read more)

Three changes that can be introduced in the performance review process in R&AW

There is an acute staff shortage in India’s RAW with about 40 per cent of the posts at the level of joint secretaries, directors and deputy secretaries lying vacant. And then, it became worse nearly six months ago when more than 70 senior and mid-level RAW officials were marked for compulsory retirement by the Narendra Modi government. Of these, four were holding the joint secretary rank, while the rest were of the level of deputy superintendent of police or other subordinate ranks.The whole episode calls into question the suitability of a colonial-era performance appraisal process called ACR (or Annual Confidential Report) for an intelligence-gathering organisation like the Research & Analysis Wing.Read more

Delhi must wake up and smell the opportunity

Deepening competition between the US and China over trade and technology is bringing forth a new set of economic and strategic challenges for India. Navigating these successfully requires New Delhi to mitigate and manage the threats, while leveraging the opportunities that arise. Doing so, however, requires the Indian government to undertake key reforms and adopt a strategic outlook with regard to certain domestic policies.A protracted Sino-US tech war could limit India’s room to maneuver, with the possibility that the global cyberspace and technology and innovation ecosystems could splinter into spheres of influence. This necessitates the adoption of a strategic outlook towards domestic policies.Read more at: https://www.deccanherald.com/specials/sunday-spotlight/delhi-must-wake-up-and-smell-the-opportunity-739059.html