Commentary
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नवे पुस्तक: मुसलमानी मुलखांतली मुशाफरी (लेखक : श्रीपाद रामचंद्र टिकेकर)
हे पुस्तक वाचून असा कोणाचाही गैरसमज होऊ शकतो की, हे पुस्तक केवळ राजकारणाविषयीच असावे, पण तसे नाही. इराक व इराणमधल्या समाजजीवनाकडे टिकेकर अगदी विचक्षण दृष्टीने पाहत होते. त्यामुळेच ते लिहितात की, इराणमध्ये वाहने रस्त्याच्या उजव्या बाजूने चालवली जात असली, तरीही इराकमध्ये ब्रिटिश सत्तेचा पराभव असल्याने वाहने डाव्या बाजूने चालवावीत असा नियम आहे. इराकमध्ये खजुराशिवाय इतर कोणतेही झाड दिसत नाही. तसेच बसरा शहरात कोठेही गटारे नाहीत व अगदी मोठ्या कालव्यांतसुद्धा घाणेरडे पाणी असते. लोकांच्या स्वच्छतेच्या सवयीविषयी टिकेकर लिहितात की, ‘अरब म्हणजे अगोदरच गलिच्छ व अमंगळ लोक. त्यात इकडील थंडीचे निमित्त मिळाले की, सहा-सहा महिने त्यांना स्नान मिळत नाही’. इराणमध्येही असाच प्रकार होता. तिथे तर एकाच कालव्यात एकमेकांपासून काही फूट अंतरावरच कपडे धुणे, भांडी घासणे व पाणी पिणे असे तिन्ही उद्योग बिनदिक्कतपणे चालले असायचे.पूर्ण लेख वाचण्यासाठी इथे क्लिक करा.
Do informal summits with China work?
The hopes of a harmonious, balanced relationship between India and China post-Wuhan have not been realised. In fact, little has changed in the overall trajectory of the Indo-China bilateral relationship of limited co-operation and strategic competition. Therefore, the Mamallapuram summit will make for good optics for both Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi, but it is doubtful whether there will be a tangible outcome for the two countries.Read the full article here.
What can Modi-Xi agree on to call their Mamallapuram meeting a success?
The Print’s daily roundtable TalkPoint posed a question connected to the Narendra Modi-Xi Jinping informal summit in Mamallapuram: What can Modi-Xi agree on to call their Mamallapuram meeting a success?Manoj Kewalramani, Fellow-China Studies at The Takshashila Institution, was among the discussants. Manoj argued:My expectations from the Modi-Xi summit are very low for mainly two reasons. First, it is essentially an informal summit with no clearly-defined agenda, therefore, there will be only a few concrete outcomes from the meet. Second relates to the situation between the two countries on fundamental issues in the last 6-8 months.China has been very slow to move on issues important to India such as membership in the United Nations Security Council or the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And it also took the Kashmir issue to the UN where it has zero locus standi. Even trade relations between India and China have been strained. So, the current environment is not conducive to this summit. However, it is always a good idea to keep engaging in dialogue.To call this meeting a success, Modi and Xi must arrive at the conclusion that both India and China are rising powers and not let their differences turn into disputes. Regarding the border issue, the best-case scenario would be a discussion on new confidence-building measures between the militaries of both countries to maintain peace and tranquillity. I see no concrete direction on trade besides the broad rhetoric on the matter. What one can also expect is people-to-people contact and talk about fostering a cultural relationship between the two ancient civilisations to ensure that India-China relations are organic as opposed to only being diplomatically driven by leaders at the top.Read the entire discussion on ThePrint.in website here.
Modi-Xi Summit: Don't expect a major breakthrough
While India and China will hold the second informal summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping today and tomorrow, events over the past few weeks have dampened the prospects of forward movement on the boundary dispute. The first informal summit between Xi and Modi in Wuhan in 2018 had provided a tentative new template for first stabilising and then advancing the bilateral relationship, which had come under increasing strain.Read the full article in Deccan Herald here
India should seek ‘hawkish balance’ through Quad
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) received an upgrade last week when the foreign ministers of Australia, Japan, India and the US met at the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. The Quad was conceived in 2007 to address the unconventional threats in the Asia-Pacific region. But China viewed this grouping as a ganging-up of the US and its allies to contain its rise. It protested against this arrangement and asked each country to explain the grouping’s objectives.Read more...
On India-Pakistan sparring at the UNGA
The Print’s daily roundtable TalkPoint posed a question: Does India-Pakistan sparring at UNGA bring any diplomatic benefit for either country?India does not gain anything by sparring with Pakistan at the UNGA. In fact, for a major power like India engaging in a war of words with Pakistan actually diminishes its status, re-hyphenates it with Pakistan, and demonstrates a lack of diplomatic foresight. Pakistan is a lesser power and India might actually gain more by ignoring Pakistan’s rhetoric at the UNGA than by responding to it.However, India’s tough posturing and appearing to send a ‘message’ to Pakistan at an international forum will have short-term gains domestically.With assembly elections due in Maharashtra and Haryana, domestic imperatives and people’s perceived requirements of a ‘tough posture’ are likely to influence India’s position on Kashmir and Pakistan at the UNGA.For Pakistan, provoking India to respond to its aggressive rhetoric is actually a victory. Pakistan would want to get the world to discuss India’s actions in Kashmir. Pakistan is also looking to score brownie points at the UNGA. India can negate Pakistani efforts by ignoring its rhetoric and instead focusing on other major issues such as climate change. So, it is not a good idea for India to fight with Pakistan at the UNGA. Read the entire discussion on ThePrint.in website here.
China’s headache: Taiwan and not Tibet or Xinjiang
China’s defence white paper 2019 reiterates the importance of Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan for China. The white paper highlights China’s concerns about Taiwan. But it implies a certain lessening of its worries on Xinjiang and Tibet compared to the past.Read more...
Why Xi won’t be sending the PLA to quell Hong Kong protests
The eleven-week-long protest movement in Hong Kong has reached a critical phase. Earlier this week, thousands of protesters converged on the city’s airport, paralysing operations and disrupting nearly 1,000 flights. The airport was finally cleared on Thursday after clashes between riot police and the protesters. The scenes of chaos played out as the top leadership of the Communist Party of China met for its annual conclave at the beachside town of Beidaihe.The situation in Hong Kong undoubtedly must have been on top of the agenda. The protests, which initially focussed on an extradition bill put forward by the city’s government, have now evolved into a larger battle for autonomy from Beijing’s tightening grip. In the process, peaceful demonstrations have given way to anger and violence.These turns of events indicate an increasing sense of unease that Beijing is now seriously contemplating the use of force. This, of course, remains a possibility. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region empowers local authorities to request Beijing for such assistance. The PLA, in fact, already has troops stationed at a garrison in Hong Kong. However, given the current scenario, it is highly unlikely that Xi will deploy the armed forces to quell the protests.Read the full article published in The Hindu
China's syndromes in India's ocean
Bertil Lintner’s book The Costliest Pearl is perhaps the most comprehensive account of the contemporary geopolitics of the maritime Eastern Hemisphere. It covers the ground from Djibouti to Vanuatu and the water from the South China Sea to the Southern Indian Ocean.And although it covers the actions and reactions of the powers from within and without the region, it is China that lies at the heart of the plot.Read more
Explaining the Takshashila National Security Doctrine
Download the doctrine here.In the 21st century, India faces challenges of unprecedented scale and complexity that necessitate new ways of thinking about national security. We propose that yogakshema, an idea pioneered in the Arthashastra , should be the guiding light of India’s national security doctrine. Simply put, the State must provide security, kshema, and economic opportunities, yoga, to all its citizens. In June 2019, we proposed a doctrine to achieve this.1. To create and defend a conducive environment for yogakshema (well-being, prosperity, and happiness) of all Indians. At this stage of India’s development, national security is primarily focused on protecting and promoting India’s economic development.2. National security also includes protecting the constitutional order, individual liberty, territory, social cohesion, and national resources.3. Amass and project power across all domains.4. Reimagine national security capacity.This document aims to elaborate on these points and elucidate the strategic reasoning behind them. In the first section of this document, we address the question of how a national security doctrine can provide opportunities for prosperity. India has a special place in the global order thanks to its large, young population and its critical geopolitical position. Its status as a swing power should be leveraged to shape global debates in ways that benefit its citizens. This is a matter of critical national interest: India’s economy is deeply connected to the world, and citizens’ prosperity depends on them being able to import and export goods and services on favourable terms.The rest of the document addresses questions of kshema. Within India’s borders, the State must ensure that the rule of law is implemented within the bounds laid out by the Constitution. The Republic of India’s institutions must be kept effective and efficient. And citizens’ rights - no matter their caste, class, gender, or creed - must be defended.Beyond India’s borders, in an anarchic, multipolar world, we argue that India must amass and project power across all domains, so it can defend its citizens’ interests in all domains. This means thinking about India’s “territory” in new ways - it’s no longer just about land, but about maritime domains, air, space, and cyberspace. It also means that India needs to think about power as something the State can leverage in many ways in the global order. India needs to use all the means at its disposal to shape the world’s diplomatic, economic, and technological order. In summary, the overriding imperative of a national security doctrine is to provide yogakshema.
What does China’s new defence strategy mean?
China on Wednesday published its first defence white paper in four years, outlining the strategic military guideline for what it terms as a new era. The document offers an insight into Beijing’s view of the changes in the international security situation. It discusses China’s defence policy objectives, along with the reform, missions and tasks that its armed forces are undertaking. Further, it elaborates on the role of the armed forces in the broader Chinese geopolitical objective of establishing a community with a shared future for mankind. Here are five key takeaways from the white paper. The line taken by the document indicates a generally positive outlook towards India. Nevertheless, there are certain potential points of impact to be noted from the perspective of Indian interests.Shifting Balance of PowerThe white paper begins with an assessment of the changes in the international security environment. It argues that the world is increasingly heading towards multipolarity. But, it isn't yet a “tranquil place,” with strategic competition on the rise. Beijing’s diagnosis is that “the configuration of strategic power is becoming more balanced,” with the strength of emerging markets and developing countries growing. The big threat to this is the change in American policy, i.e., “growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism”.This necessitates a reinforcement of the UN’s role in global security, strengthening new regional security arrangements, establishing security partnerships (with Russia, for instance), investments in better weapons and technological upgrades and bolstering arms control and non-proliferation regimes. For New Delhi, which has been working on getting Beijing to yield on its admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the white paper’s assessment of the international non-proliferation regime as “compromised by pragmatism and double standards” is likely to be troubling.The Asia-Pacific ContestThe document observes that while the Asia-Pacific region is “generally stable”, there is increased “major country competition”. Essentially, it perceives the dynamics in the region within the framework of U.S.-China. frictions. The U.S., it argues, “is strengthening its Asia-Pacific military alliances and reinforcing military deployment and intervention”. The key partners for Washington that it identifies are South Korea, Japan and Australia. Despite that, the document largely assesses Chinese neighbourhood policy as having been successful.“Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly aware that they are members of a community with shared destiny”, it reads, hinting at the rapid emergence of a China-led security architecture. The constituents of this Sinosphere are structures like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, CICA, China’s expanding dominance in the South China Sea, dialogues with ASEAN members, regional counter-terror action and increasing bilateral military-to-military diplomacy. Interestingly, China views South Asia also as “generally stable,” although “conflicts between India and Pakistan flare up from time to time.” This suggests that Beijing is rather confident about its ability to manage tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.BRI's Military ComponentEver since Xi Jinping launched, in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there has been much debate about the security implications of Chinese investments around the world. The white paper tells us that protecting China’s overseas interests is a strategic objective for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It states that “one of the missions of China’s armed forces is to effectively protect the security and legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese people, organisations and institutions”. In order to do so, the document says that the PLA is building “far seas forces”, “overseas logistical facilities”, and capabilities for “diversified military tasks”. That’s followed by a glowing evaluation of the PLA’s Logistics Support Base in Djibouti, which was set up in 2017. This is perhaps the clearest admission of the emerging military component of the BRI. But that’s not all. Beijing is also likely to continue to invest in and focus on participation in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief operations internationally. This is couched within the rhetoric of providing international public goods. But such activities allow for the enhancement of Chinese forces’ operational skills and experience and normalises their presence in far-flung regions of the world.Resilient ChinaThe 2015 Chinese defence white paper had argued that “China faces a formidable task to maintain political security and social stability” while discussing Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. In 2019, there’s a mention of “external separatist forces” with regard to Tibet and Xinjiang. But the forces seeking Taiwan’s “independence” are identified as the “gravest immediate threat”, with the use of force not being ruled out. Despite that, generally, the domestic security environment is assessed to have improved considerably. “China continues to enjoy political stability, ethnic unity and social stability. There has been a notable increase in China’s overall national strength, global influence, and resilience to risks,” the white paper says. However, it is also worth noting that “safeguarding national political security” and political work in the armed forces to uphold Xi Jinping’s status as the core of the Party-state system remain priorities.Quality and Efficiency
Can Hong Kong protect its 'freedom'?
"One country, two systems”, the brilliant formulation that allowed Britain to transfer Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China in 1997, allowed a lot of people to believe that the two systems would converge over time. That while the mainland would adopt free markets and democracy, Hong Kong would become better integrated with its motherland.Read more
Delhi must wake up and smell the opportunity
Deepening competition between the US and China over trade and technology is bringing forth a new set of economic and strategic challenges for India. Navigating these successfully requires New Delhi to mitigate and manage the threats, while leveraging the opportunities that arise. Doing so, however, requires the Indian government to undertake key reforms and adopt a strategic outlook with regard to certain domestic policies.A protracted Sino-US tech war could limit India’s room to maneuver, with the possibility that the global cyberspace and technology and innovation ecosystems could splinter into spheres of influence. This necessitates the adoption of a strategic outlook towards domestic policies.Read more at: https://www.deccanherald.com/specials/sunday-spotlight/delhi-must-wake-up-and-smell-the-opportunity-739059.html
Misguided Talks With the Taliban Won’t Bring Peace to Afghanistan
Dark, bizarre, surreal: we are short of adjectives to accurately capture the current political situation in Afghanistan. On May 8, even as they were in talks with the US, the Taliban attacked the Kabul office of a US aid NGO, killing nine. On May 5, the Taliban mounted attacks on armed forces outposts in northern Afghanistan, killing more than a dozen servicemen.Earlier in March, the Taliban’s shadow police subjected women to public lashings evoking comparisons to their brutal medieval-era style rule between 1996 and 2001. This is to say nothing of the 75,000 plus Afghan civilians who have been killed in heinous acts of terrorism since 2001. And despite all this, the US seems determined to strike a deal with the Taliban through negotiations which erode the authority of the Afghan national unity government, a government midwifed by them and one that couldn’t have survived this long without them. On May 9, the US Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad tweeted that slow but steady progress was made on the framework to end the Afghan war and the Doha round of talks were now getting into the ‘nitty-gritty’.If we are to believe Khalilzad, the US remains hopeful of forming an interim government involving the Taliban on the basis of this quid pro quo: the US will scale down its presence in Afghanistan in return for security guarantees by the Taliban. Though the details are yet to be worked out, there appears to be an in-principle agreement on this broad arrangement between the US, the Taliban, and the Taliban’s minders – the ISI. If it works out, President Trump will appeal to the voters in the 2020 presidential elections that he has brought soldiers back from Afghanistan – from a war he now refers to as “ridiculous”.
This article first appeared in The Wire
Demoting India’s engagement with Pakistan from PM level to foreign secretary-level will be a good start
A response to The Print's TalkPoint question for 20th May: With Lok Sabha elections over, how can India and Pakistan now repair fractured ties?Pakistan is not one geopolitical entity, but two. The first is a putative state; represented by civilian governments and a civilian de-facto head of state. The competing entity is a dynamic syndicate of military, militant, radical Islamist and political-economic structures. It pursues a set of domestic and foreign policies to ensure its own survival and relative dominance: the military-jihadi complex (MJC). This latter entity is an irreconcilable adversary and must be delegitimised, contained and dismantled.Any Indian action towards Pakistan is met with a response by both these entities. For example, every Indian PM has sought to make a grand gesture that will “solve” the Pakistan problem, only to be stalled by the next terrorist attack orchestrated by the MJC. So, demoting the engagement with Pakistan from the prime ministerial level to the foreign secretary and national security adviser-levels will be a good start. This will allow India to calibrate its response towards Pakistan without having to risk huge political capital. India is better off putting a grand rapprochement on the back burner, while expending available political capital to launch economic reforms and get the country on the train to prosperity.
Kra and caution: Business Standard
This article appeared in Business StandardFive years ago, Wang Jing, a tycoon with close links to the Chinese government and Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua’s president announced a $50 billion plan to cut a 278-km long canal in the Central American isthmus. Despite the scale of environmental damage it would cause, Ortega’s government quickly cleared the decks for the project, and counted on China’s reputation for rapid execution of big infrastructure projects to have the canal ready by 2020. Well, not a single shovel of Nicaraguan sand has been dug out of the ground. On the other hand, Wang’s infrastructure company quietly moved out of its glamorous office in Hong Kong’s tallest skyscraper last year, without even leaving a forwarding address. Ortega’s government ran out of money in 2017 after a political crisis in Venezuela, its long time benefactor, closed the tap. He cut social security payments to Nicaraguans, triggering nationwide protests. A brutal crackdown put down the “Tropical Spring”, but Nicaragua now finds in the doghouse after the United States imposed sanctions on the Ortega regime. Ironically, the only respite came from Taiwan — in the form of a $100 million loan and port call by a Taiwanese warship — because Nicaragua is among the few countries that still recognise it as the real China.The Nicaraguan canal project is dead. In the meantime, China and Panama are getting along famously after the latter ditched Taiwan for Beijing. An unspecified amount of “non-reimbursible aid” was announced during Xi Jinping’s visit in December 2018, and Chinese firms are now building a port, a bridges and a convention centre in Panama. Like many other Caribbean and Central American countries, Panama has found Chinese presence and assistance a useful hedge against US dominance.Was the Nicaraguan canal project a stratagem to win Panama over? It is hard to be sure. Note that Wang’s venture with Ortega was shrouded in mystery. He is now in financial trouble, but certainly has connections to the Chinese government. In recent years, he has tried to buy a port in Crimea, an satellite company in Israel and a key manufacturer of aircraft engines in the Ukraine. Beijing, however, can plausibly claim that he was a private entrepreneur and his projects are his own. The prospect of a China-supported competitor in Nicaragua would certainly have weighed on the minds of the Panamanian authorities, contributing to their decision to switch to Beijing’s side.The question closer to home is whether a similar game is afoot in Thailand, where there is renewed interest in building a canal across the Isthmus of Kra, creating a direct passage between the Andaman Sea and the South China Sea. Like the Nicaraguan canal, the Thai canal is an alternative to an existing route that is both congested and not politically under Chinese influence. The economic case for the Thai canal is at best marginal — for the largest ships on long haul voyages, if fuel prices are high, if transit fees are low and if the Straits of Malacca are congested, then the canal route makes sense. The Thai proponents like it because the canal project will be accompanied by special economic zones that will boost the local economy. Like in the case of Nicaragua, the Chinese investor is a private company, that will invest over $28 billion over ten years and bring in 30,000 Chinese workers.While such a canal would have dealt a severe blow to the Singapore economy even five decades ago, it will at worst merely shave off some of its market share in ports and maritime sector today. Malaysia’s ports might lose a bigger share, but the Thai canal is no longer an existential threat for the two economies. Indeed, if the sovereign wealth funds of the two countries acquire stakes in the Thai Canal, they will be able to offset some of the losses from the lost marine traffic. Yet, to the extent that Singapore and Malaysia would want to avoid the competition they, like Panama, will be ready to please China. Beijing can squeeze concessions from Singapore and Malaysia instead of building the canal.What would a Thai Canal mean for India? From an economic perspective, having an alternate route — even one managed by Chinese operators — to the Pacific Ocean is a good thing.Concerns arise from the strategic perspective. Chinese firms will have a vantage point in the Bay of Bengal and the PLA Navy will have a faster, friendlier route into the Indian Ocean. Yet India is also suitably placed, literally, to manage them by making appropriate investments in the Andamans. Given the convergence of interests, Singapore and even Malaysia will be even more interested in engaging us. Similarly, the United States, Japan and Australia will have stronger reasons to co-operate with us in the Bay of Bengal region.No canal project can move forward until Thai politics gains stability. And after observing what happened to Ortega and Nicaragua, Thailand’s political leaders are bound to be more careful than enthusiastic.So, should we be worried? Only to the extent that we are unable to make use of the opportunities that the Thai Canal presents.
Are Pakistan’s Battlefield Nuclear Weapons a Mirage?
In April 2011, Pakistan conducted the first test of its short-range Hatf-IX or Nasr rocket. The test was interpreted as marking a shift in Pakistan’s nuclear posture to “full-spectrum deterrence,” which envisages a complete range of “strategic, operational and tactical” nuclear weapons that would give India “no place to hide.” More specifically, Pakistan claimed the Nasr was intended to “pour cold water over Cold Start,” the name given to the Indian Army’s doctrine, which involves the rapid mobilization of division-sized integrated battle groups making shallow incursions into Pakistani territory.Read More
Ten Takeaways from the Recent India-Pakistan Escalation
As the fog of war between India and Pakistan clears, here’s an assessment of the strategic consequences that go beyond immediate tactical gains and losses.
Read the full article on ThePrint.
Is Opposition justified in seeking Balakot evidence or shouldn’t politicise national security?
Pranay's reply to this question for ThePrint's #TalkPoint of 4th March 2019The opposition parties are justified in seeking evidence to the extent that the government’s spokespersons insist with their boastful claim that 250-300 terrorists were killed in the Balakot air strikes by the Indian Air Force.In the broader scheme of things, the strategic consequences of the air strikes remain the same irrespective of the casualty figure. It’s not as if the Jaish-e-Mohammed will stop terrorism just because the air strikes hit their facility and killed some of its operatives.But the Pakistani military-jihadi complex, spearheaded by the Pakistani army, will definitely remember that India struck on its sovereign territory in response to a terror attack by an outfit operating from its soil. So, the strikes are a dent on the Pakistani army – the self-proclaimed ideological and territorial defenders of Pakistan.This is the real strategic victory for India. Any physical damage to the JeM facility and its leadership is a bonus. Hence the government and the opposition both should desist from exploiting this successful operation for their own partisan propaganda. We as a society are on the wrong track if Pakistan and its terrorists become an important issue in the upcoming elections.Read more on ThePrint.
To war or not to war with Pakistan: Strategy, not public mood, should drive Modi govt
More than fear and insecurity, it is the outrage that is driving public opinion after the terrorist attack on a CRPF convoy in Pulwama. There is widespread expectation that the Narendra Modi government retaliate using military force and further, conversationally at least, many people want to go to war with PakistanTo the extent that such a state of public opinion allows the government greater leeway in terms of options, it’s a good thing. On the flip side, to the extent that it compels the government to respond to the popular mood, it is dangerous. Politics might almost always be a popularity contest, but statecraft is not. If India must retaliate against Pakistan, it must be for reasons of strategy, not to assuage outraged public opinion.The strategic reason for India to retaliate is to impose costs on the Pakistani military-jihadi complex so as to deter further attacks to the extent possible. If an attack on India goes without punishment, the military-jihadi complex will be encouraged to carry out more. Retaliation is also necessary to persuade the Pakistani military establishment that it cannot use its nuclear shield and Chinese political cover to attack India with impunity.Read More