Moneycontrol | India gains semiconductor momentum but the policy mix can be even better

On February 29, the Indian government approved three semiconductor units worth Rs 1.26 lakh crore including a fabrication plant by Tata Electronics Private Limited (TEPL) in partnership with Taiwan’s Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (PSMC) in Dholera. The other two units include Assembly Testing Marking & Packaging (ATMP) plants to be set up by Tata Semiconductor Assembly and Test Private Limited (TSAT) in Morigaon and CG Powers in Sanand. The Cabinet’s clearance of the three projects demonstrates its commitment to integration into the semiconductor Global Value Chain (GVC). The hitherto hesitant private sector has also exhibited the resolve to venture into an unfamiliar manufacturing segment that hasn't historically been India’s forte. Together with the US-headquartered Micron’s ATMP unit in Gujarat, these announcements herald a new era in India's semiconductor strategy. Read the full article here.

ASPI - The Strategist | India-Australia collaboration on digital public infrastructure in the Pacific

The deployment of population-scale digital public infrastructure (DPI) is gaining traction worldwide and is acknowledged as a necessary and cost-effective intervention to fast-track sustainable development. The G20 also endorsed the ‘Framework for Systems of Digital Public Infrastructure’, a voluntary plan for the development, deployment, and governance of DPI. India has developed state-of-the-art DPI for various purposes, and Australia is the biggest development partner for Pacific Island countries. Together, they are well positioned to make state-of-the-art DPI accessible to small island developing states (PSIDS) there to help fast-track developmental outcomes. Read the full article here.

CASI | Building the Yard: Policy Considerations for AI in India

Artificial intelligence (AI) has immense potential to enhance human capabilities and drive growth in several industries. It is projected to greatly improve governance, healthcare, and education outcomes. However, this potential may not be realized if the building blocks of AI remain concentrated in the hands of a few dominant companies or the countries in which they are located. Read the full article here.

Economic & Political Weekly | On Regulating AI

The article titled “India’s Approach towards Regulation of Artificial Intelligence: Utilising the International Experience” by Jawahar Bhagwat and S Y Boldyreva (EPW, 30 December 2023)identifies three primary concerns regarding the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in India: job displacement, proliferation of misinformation, and preservation of research integrity. While legitimate, these are not necessarily the top concerns with respect to AI. The article lacks comprehensiveness and portrays AI in a predominantly negative light. The proposed recommendations are likely to substantially impede India’s contributions to the development of AI and severely restrict its ability to use AI for its benefit. Read the full article here.

Moneycontrol | GoI’s Rs 10,000 crore plan for a ‘sovereign AI’ computing infrastructure needs a rethink

The union government has recently announced plans for an ambitious Artificial Intelligence (AI) computing mission with a budget of Rs 10,000 crore. This initiative seeks to create a ‘sovereign AI’ computing infrastructure that can provide computing resources as a service to Indian startups, particularly in the sectors of agriculture, healthcare, and education. AI is undeniably a technology of immense transformative potential with many applications. However, the government's strategy to build the necessary computational infrastructure is not the best use of public funds. The aim of harnessing the benefits of AI for Indians will be better served if the government concentrates its efforts and resources on areas that are not typically addressed by the private sector. Read the full article here.

Le Grand Continent | The Future of the Sino-Indian Rivalry

“China+1: this is the name given to the diversification strategy adopted by a number of countries and companies to reduce their dependence on China as a single manufacturing or supply center. This approach involves exploring alternative locations beyond China to transform the geography of supply chains and minimize the risks associated with over-reliance on a single supplier. It reflects a broader effort by countries and businesses to counterbalance China's economic dominance and adapt to changes in global power relations. Analyzes of trade and investment data over the past three years indicate that the European Union, Mexico, Taiwan, Malaysia and Vietnam have become the main beneficiaries of the China+1 strategy in sectors such as machine tools, automobiles, transportation equipment and electrical equipment.

India is also seeking to capitalize on concern over China's dominance of global supply chains by reforming its economic and regulatory framework with a view to boosting its attractiveness. India's strategy thus includes three components: reducing its dependence on China, attracting investments from those seeking to diversify their trade relations and adopting a protectionist policy by introducing customs duties on imports.”

This article was originally published in French, Italian and Spanish by the Le Grand Continent. The unedited English version of the article can be found here.

The Hindu | The need to overhaul a semiconductor scheme

The mid-term appraisal of the semiconductor Design-Linked Incentive (DLI) scheme is due soon. Since its announcement, the DLI scheme has approved only seven start-ups, markedly short of its target of supporting 100 over five years. This impact assessment, therefore, presents an opportunity for policymakers to appraise and revamp the scheme. India’s $10 billion Semicon India Program has had mixed results, at best. There are three goals of India’s semiconductor strategy. The first is to reduce dependence on semiconductor imports, particularly from China, and especially in strategic and emerging sectors, ranging from defence applications to Artificial Intelligence development. The second is to build supply chain resilience by integrating into the semiconductor global value chain (GVC). The third is to double down on India’s comparative advantage: India already plays host to the design houses of every major global semiconductor industry player and Indian chip design engineers are an indispensable part of the semiconductor GVC. Read the full article here.

Takshashila Blog | A Potential Strategy to Navigate a Fractured RISC-V Ecosystem

In the rapidly evolving world of semiconductor geopolitics, a new fault line is emerging, one that could have far-reaching implications for countries like India. The United States, in its strategic tussle with China, could be contemplating imposing export controls on (Reduced Instruction Set Computer or RISC-V technology.

Developed at the University of California, Berkeley, RISC-V is an open-source instruction set architecture (ISA), a set of basic instructions and functions that allows companies to develop microprocessors based on this specification.  Read the full blog here.

Scroll.in | A new book examines how India can set up new and world-class semiconductor facilities

India only has a few fabrication facilities owned and operated by the government for critical infrastructure needs in space and defence. Prior attempts to attract private investments in these fields have failed due to cost disadvantages and uncertainty of the investment climate. These challenges remain. Combining these barriers with the fact that nearly every major chip-producing country when the chips are down is aggressively trying to localise leading-edge fabrication facilities, India is on a weak wicket. Read the full article here.

CASI | Chandrayaan and Chips: Space Lessons for India’s Semiconductor Program?

From a technology policy lens, the success of the Chandrayaan-3 mission in 2023—which saw India become the fourth country to land a rover on the moon and the first to do so near the Lunar south pole—brings up a pertinent question: If largely government-run efforts could make India a bonafide space power, can some of those learnings help India become a semiconductor power? Geopolitical competition between the US and China, as well as a perceived overreliance on a seemingly vulnerable Taiwan for the vast majority of advanced chips, has made the semiconductor manufacturing sector the focus of intense industrial policy efforts over the last few years, after decades of it being the poster child of globalization. Read the full article here.

ThePrint | US & other nations will push for tripling nuclear power by 2050 during COP28. India must join in

The agenda for the United Nations’ upcoming 28th Climate Change Conference of the Parties promises more than the usual climate discussions. This time, the spotlight will also fall on nuclear energy, and India must take advantage. Scheduled from 30 November to 12 December in the United Arab Emirates, the COP28 to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is particularly important. It marks the conclusion of the first global stocktake, a five-year assessment of progress made toward Paris Agreement goals. Apart from the usual business, nuclear energy will be a central talking point during the summit. The US is reportedly set to lead the effort to advocate for significantly increasing nuclear power globally, with the aim of least tripling worldwide capacity by 2050. Read the full article here.

Moneycontrol | Growing US-China chip rivalry presents India with its geopolitical moment

In the US-China geopolitical tussle, 2022 was a watershed moment. In August, Washington unveiled the CHIPS and Science Act and followed it up with chip export controls in October, setting the tone for an intense rivalry in emerging and critical technologies with semiconductors at the forefront. The CHIPS and Science Act had but one objective: reshoring chip manufacturing back in the US from East Asia, where 85 percent of the current global fabrication capacity is concentrated. The export controls aimed to restrict China's access to advanced semiconductors and keep Chinese chip manufacturing capabilities behind the US by at least a decade. The controls also imposed restrictions on foreign companies operating in China, which relied on technology and capital sourced from the US. Read the full article here.

The Hindu | The signals from this ‘Made in China’ smartphone story

Huawei, the Chinese smartphone giant, has created ripples within the strategic and business community with its newly unveiled Mate 60 Pro which houses the Kirin 9000 processor. The chipset reportedly used Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp (SMIC)’s second-generation 7nm fabrication technique, thereby demonstrating China’s capability to manufacture a 7nm chip. Read the full article here.

Nikkei Asia | India can get more out of nuclear power with private sector help

India needs a way to generate a lot more power to keep up with rapidly rising demand without adding to its already severe pollution woes. For India, nuclear energy is the obvious solution. On Aug. 31, a new unit of the Kakrapar Nuclear Power Plant -- the largest to be designed in India -- began full operations in Gujarat state. At their meeting in New Delhi on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Joe Biden discussed how the two countries could collaborate on developing next-generation small modular reactor technologies. A few weeks before, Modi talked to French President Emmanuel Macron about joint work on another emerging technology, advanced modular reactors. Read the full article here.

Mint | How to govern the AI industry must be accorded high priority

The manner in which the world’s big artificial intelligence (AI) companies are scaring the world’s governments and asking for regulation reminds me of how incumbent telcos used to push ‘Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt’ (FUD) 20 years ago. We should suspect that the motives are similar: to use regulation to slam the gates shut for new entrants and use incumbency to acquire greater power over public policy. If OpenAI and Google are really worried that their products are dangerous and pose severe, unpredictable risks to public safety, they could stop developing them. It is reasonable, therefore, to suspect that their calls for regulation of so-called foundation models are partly motivated by the desire to lock-in their dominant market positions. Read the full article here.

The Hindu | Learning from the CHIPS Act of the U.S.

The United States’ Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act of 2022 (CHIPS Act) completes one year as a law today (August 9). The Act authorises $52.7 billion over five years to boost American competitiveness, innovation and national security in semiconductors. While the jury is still out on the long-term effectiveness of the Act, what is important from an Indian perspective is to observe and learn from its implementation. As industrial policy has become a default policy of choice for nation-states, the Act provides a clear window into the capabilities and structures needed to execute such policies. Read the full article here.

Hindustan Times | In the chip war, US has the edge over China

As a countermeasure to a series of US-led tech restrictions, China’s ministry of commerce and general administration of customs recently announced export controls on industrial products and materials containing two critical elements — Gallium (Ga) and Germanium (Ge). The export of these elements will now be subject to governmental clearance. The ministry justified the restriction on national security grounds, owing to the elements’ dual-use nature. Read the full article here.

Centre on Asia and Globalisation | Confronting Trade-offs for India’s Electronics Manufacturing Success

The improving performance of India’s electronics manufacturing sector has been a topic of intense policy interest in the country. Electronics exports saw a spectacular growth of almost 50 percent in FY23, reaching $25.3 billion. Electronics is now India’s sixth largest merchandise export, overtaking readymade garments. Encouraged by these successes, the Indian government is confident of achieving its target of $140 billion in electronics exports and 1 million new jobs by FY26. This sector’s success is now portrayed as a vindication of the Indian government’s flagship industrial policy instrument: the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme. Policy debates surrounding the PLI have primarily focused on its design, effectiveness, and potential pitfalls. But the elephant in the room is the crucial role of Chinese companies in India’s electronics manufacturing story. Read the full article here.

Moneycontrol | India mustn’t miss this chance to supercharge its electronic goods industry

India is caught up in a quarrel over tariffs on information and communication technology (ICT) goods. The EU filed a WTO dispute that India has applied tariffs up to 20 percent on certain ICT goods, such as mobile phones and accessories, which is against the Information Technology Agreement-1 (ITA-1), to which India is a signatory. Signatories to ITA-1 are obliged to levy a maximum tariff of zero percent on a set of pre-agreed ICT goods. India claims that the goods on which it levies a tariff are not covered under ITA-1. Besides the EU, Japan and Taiwan also filed similar cases against India. The WTO has ruled against India in all three disputes. Read the full article here.

Mint | Our PLI schemes are in need of a coherent trade policy

The recent spat between former Reserve Bank of India governor Raghuram Rajan and electronics and information technology minister Ashwini Vaishnaw over the former’s criticism of the production-linked incentive (PLI) scheme for semiconductors and other manufacturing sectors is part of an ongoing debate on India’s manufacturing policies. Rajan argues that PLI schemes alone do not add value to electronics and semiconductors, even though value addition is a key objective of the ministry’s 2022 vision document. It aims to increase India’s electronics exports to $300 billion by 2025-26 from $25.3 billion in 2022-23, and deepen integration with global value chains (GVCs). Read the full article here.