Diplomatic Waves: Navigating the India-Maldives Spat
The Maldives, often a tropical paradise in headlines, recently took a detour into the news for far less idyllic reasons. President Mohamed Muizzu's government has ruffled feathers in New Delhi by asking India to withdraw its military personnel by March 15, 2024, during their recent high-level core group meeting to deliberate upon a “mutually workable solution”.
Malé scrapped a key pact involving a water survey, and Muizzu chose China for one of his first overseas visits after becoming President. There, he signed 20 agreements, including one on tourism cooperation. The situation escalated with undiplomatic language from Muizzu's cabinet members directed at Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Malé contained the damage by suspending the three leaders. The strained relations have led to growing calls in India to boycott the Maldives as a tourist destination.
The current situation puts at stake the diplomatic and political relationship between India and the Maldives, which has been meticulously cultivated over six decades. Since the British relinquished control of the islands in 1965, India initiated diplomatic ties, establishing an ambassadorial representative in 1980. In 1988, Operation Cactus underscored India's commitment to preserving stability in the Maldives. Over the years, India has invested significant effort in networking with the local population, establishing itself as the preferred destination for many Maldivians, especially for education and medical purposes. Recognising the significant dependency of many Maldivians on Indian healthcare and education, preserving a robust relationship is crucial, and efforts to boost domestic tourism should not compromise the strong ties with the Maldives
The Maldives depends on India for its everyday essentials, such as rice, spices, fruits, vegetables, and critical medicines. India contributes to Maldives' infrastructure development, too, by providing construction material, and significant projects like the 300-bed Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital. India is the primary source of higher education for Maldivian students through scholarships and enrollment in Indian institutions. Besides, Maldives relies heavily on India for its trade (India is its fifth-largest trading partner). For example, in 2021, India exported goods worth $416 million to Maldives; mainly refined petroleum, packaged medicaments, and rice. Between 1995 and 2021, India’s exports to Maldives grew at an annualised rate of 10.4%, from $31.6M to $416M. In the same year (2021), Maldives exported goods worth $48.8 million to India; primarily petroleum gas, scrap iron, and petroleum coke. Between 1995 and 2021, Maldivian exports to India rose at an annualised rate of 22.9%, from $230,000 to $48.8 million. In times of crisis, India emerges both as a crucial ally and a reliable partner, aiding during disasters such as the 2004 tsunami, the 2014 drinking water crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic.
At the same time, India needs the Maldives for strategic and maritime security due to its proximity, barely 70 nautical miles from the island of Minicoy in Lakshadweep and 300 nautical miles from the mainland's western coast. Its location in commercial sea lanes running through the Indian Ocean gives it significant strategic importance. The Maldives also plays a crucial role in India's defence calculus, with approximately 70% of the Maldivian defence training conducted by India. This collaboration includes training over 1,500 Maldivian National Defence Force personnel and providing aircraft and helicopters for aerial surveillance.
As seen through investments and infrastructure projects associated with the Belt and Road Initiative, India's interest is heightened by concerns about China's expanding influence in the Maldives. The big question is whether China's military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), will have a steady presence in the Maldives. President Muizzu says sending Indian troops back doesn't mean getting soldiers from another country, but even if he does let PLA in, there’s little India can do about it.
The Sri Lankan precedent serves as a cautionary tale for Maldives, revealing the perils of economic dependence on China. India needs to step up its military presence in the Indian Ocean to protect its national interests, with or without friends. The imperative lies in actively implementing the Maritime Security Strategy 2015 recommendations.
A constructive way forward could entail reducing tensions and recognising that diplomatic relationships are shaped by permanent interests rather than permanent friends or foes, or, in this case, disparaging Twitter posts. As the Maldivian opposition leader, Fayyaz Ismail, suggested, the government should take proactive steps to mend ties with India. India's significant economic influence as the Maldives' fifth-largest trade partner in 2021 is apparent. However, China's deep pockets dampen the potential for India to leverage this economic capacity for coercive purposes. China holds over 60 per cent of Maldives' sovereign debt, and an intentional economic withdrawal by India might trigger a backlash, potentially pushing the Maldives to depend more on China. It would also likely alienate the local population, thereby reducing the influence of political elites that favour closer ties with India.
Positioned along key regional shipping routes, the Maldives is a vital Indian Ocean foothold. Overlooking this strategic relationship poses the risk of driving the Maldives into increased economic dependence on China—an outcome India cannot afford, given the broader geopolitical implications and regional stability concerns.
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