China’s Vision for Global Security: Sentiments from Shangri-La Dialogue 2024
At a time when the world is in great flux due to many interconnected conflicts with spillovers in both military and socio-economic domains, leaders met in Singapore for the annual Shangri-La Dialogue between May 31 and June 2, 2024. Representing China, Defence Minister Dong Jun and former vice foreign minister Cui Tiankai, participated in deliberations to make a case for China’s vision for the global order. The stark differences in the positions they presented, as well as the questions they were prompted to answer, indicate two things about Chinese narratives on security issues – one, that there is an intense internal debate, and two, that they are becoming increasingly unconvincing and unpopular.
Dong Jun’s war of words
As a plenary speaker at the SLD, Admiral Dong Jun made 35-minute remarks on how China perceives global security and where its priorities lie. His primary argument revolved around the ironic position that while “dialogue and consultation have always been [China’s] favourite choice for resolving differences and disagreements,” it is the US that interferes in the Asia-Pacific order. Generalising for what he otherwise acknowledged was quite a diverse set of cultures and social systems, Dong further added that the “people” of the region have come to despise countries that “take orders from hegemonic powers [like the US].”
The most striking feature of Dong’s remarks, in this regard, was his excessive emphasis on harmony and solidarity among regional countries. It furthered the Chinese conception of common, comprehensive and indivisible security, which refers to the interlinkage between security priorities of all countries. This forceful abstraction of China’s threat perception vis-à-vis the US aims to shape the perception that the US is a challenge to all countries in the region, and not just China. Ironically enough, Dong also said in his speech that China “has never coerced others into taking sides,” all the while propagating the concepts such as “shared future,” “common development,” and “unity” of militaries.
During both his plenary remarks and audience engagement, Dong vehemently emphasised how the Taiwan issue is core to China’s interests. So much so, that even though he was asked five questions on issues ranging from cybersecurity and the South China Sea, to the nature of the newly established PLA information support force, in his cumulative response, all Dong talked about was reunification with Taiwan. And it seemed from his almost rehearsed answer on the Taiwan question, that Dong was setting the record straight, both internationally, and domestically.
Given that in the context of Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te’s recent inauguration, the Taiwan issue has become an important bone of contention between China and the US, Dong felt it right to use the spotlight to elaborate the Communist Party’s long-held position on the matter. And domestically, it seemed as if he was attempting to impress Xi Jinping himself, at a time when Xi has not shied away from acting against his loyalists and removing them from coveted positions, especially for political or ideological transgressions. Since one of the most recent victims of Xi’s anti-graft campaign is Dong’s predecessor, Li Shangfu, his evident approach to what he addressed or left out seems deliberate in that light.
Cui’s beliefs on deterrence
On one hand, Dong presented an incoherent but incendiary vision of the security architecture China envisions for the region and the world. On the other hand, Cui Tiankai, former Chinese Ambassador to the US and Vice Foreign Minister, had a different idea to present altogether.
In his panel on ‘Deterrence and Reassurance in the Asia-Pacific’, Cui remarked China does not perceive great power relations as a zero-sum game, and rather seeks cooperation with the US on key contemporary security issues. Differing starkly from Dong, Cui expressed support for common, cooperative and sustainable, but not indivisible security. He also shirked the idea that deterrence was a necessity; instead, he made the case that if countries could cull out the potential for cooperation from otherwise contentious or rivalrous relationships, there would be no need for deterrence. He even argued that a threatening posture cannot be coupled with assurances of peace, thereby calling out the hypocrisy in some actors’ approaches to security.
Cui’s relatively moderate approach is indicative of the internal debate between current and former Chinese party-state officials on security issues. While Cui has previously acknowledged that the Taiwan issue is a non-negotiable red line for the Chinese, in his SLD remarks, he made no mention of Taiwan, and issued no warnings to “external powers” against regional interference. Chinese participants were visibly disconcerted, which is why during the Q&A for his panel, Zhou Bou, retired PLA Colonel and Tsinghua University Senior Fellow, remarked about how he now “worries more about Taiwan,” given that US aircraft and naval vessels conduct regular sorties in the region.
Why Chinese Narrative is Falling Apart
While unanswered, the nature of the questions Dong Jun was asked speaks to the reality that Chinese narrative is becoming increasingly unconvincing and unsustainable. He was called out on the fact that he advocated for peaceful resolution of disputes, but in reality, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy continues to be aggressive with Philippines’ vessels in the South China Sea. He was also pushed twice to talk about the “immediate and concrete” actions China is willing to take to bring peace to Ukraine, but to no avail. And with the PLA’s latest “punishment” drills following Lai’s inaugural speech fresh in the minds of participants, Dong was also questioned on China’s idea of “peaceful” reunification.
Because the format of the SLD is one where diverse regional and global views are presented without granting either the US or China a heavy hand, questions are unprepared and impromptu. Such a format can be especially disconcerting for Chinese officials, who are used to rehearsed press conferences. Hence, at the 2024 SLD, other Chinese officials present adopted their own measures to make the CPC’s case on the sidelines.
For example, to elaborate on China’s position on Taiwan, Lt. Gen. Jing Jianfeng, Deputy Chief of the Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department, held a press conference in a booked room at the Shangri-La hotel, just a few hours after US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin’s speech at the Dialogue. He invited a selection of 50 journalists to this press conference, and quite literally warned the room in Mandarin that “Taiwan independence” means war. He also took jabs at the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which Austin had propounded in his remarks, and in a usual manner, also blamed the US for enabling “Cold War mentality” through “exclusive military clubs” like NATO and the Quad.
A similar press conference was held by Lt. Gen. He Lei of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences in the same room at the start of the SLD. There, he talked about how the PLA Eastern Theater Command’s recent exercises in the Taiwan Strait meant to simulate conditions that “came close to real war.” It was clear that where China felt it did not have the final say, it created its own stage, rounded up its own audience, and made them listen to the country’s vision for regional security in Mandarin. This could also be a sign that while the 21st century may be an Asian one, people have heard enough of what China has to say.
Conclusion
Overall, the show Chinese representatives put up at the SLD was frenzied and incoherent. The Taiwan issue emerged as more important than ever as compared to previous SLD iterations, with more officials elaborating on it either during their remarks, or during the Q&A and press conferences. However, this time, other countries and participants’ responses to China were much more firm, in large part because Dong Jun failed in passing on a constructive message of cooperation. In doing so, he projected the image of a China that will not negotiate or accommodate, even if he meant otherwise. And Cui’s remarks, though balanced, would be perceived as less significant, given that he is retired from active political service. And so if the takeaway for most SLD participants is that China won’t listen, we may just see China struggle much more to gather listeners for its own cause.
This blog is a follow-up from the previous edition on analysing Chinese posture at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue. The 2023 post can be found here.
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