Assessing Chinese Narratives at the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue: How did countries respond?

The proceedings of the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) concluded on June 4. The defence dialogue saw the participation of representatives from China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Quad countries, European countries such as the UK, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands and France, and island countries such as Timor Leste and Fiji. All the speeches made at the SLD pointed to the potentially drastic consequences of worsening US-China relations. They sounded the consensus that all countries will have to learn to live with the tensions, while also navigating through an uncertain world order using partnerships and alliances. China — one of the pre-eminent poles of this deliberation —presented strong narratives on its view of the current global security architecture, and what its role is in shaping it. Understanding China’s own perception of its security role in the region and beyond is significant for countries to be able to articulate effective strategies to navigate China’s rise.

A predictable discussion of the GSI

To begin with, Chinese Minister of National Defence Li Shangfu, who made a speech during the fifth plenary session of the SLD, reiterated the Global Security Initiative (GSI)’s vision for common comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. This vision was first broached by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2014, as part of his new ‘Asian Security Vision’, and was subsequently described in the GSI Concept Paper released in February 2023. 

Li then presented his four-point proposal on what the GSI aims to achieve. First, is to eliminate “bullying” and “hegemony” — a clear reference to the United States — so that no country places its interests above others and strategic autonomy prevails. Second, is to allow justice and fairness to transcend any coercive rule-making and prevent hegemonic rule-breaking. Third, is eliminating conflicts and confrontation through mutual trust and consultation. And fourth, is to be open and inclusive to all countries’ ideas and interests, so that there exists no bloc confrontation. 

The concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’, in Li’s words, is at the forefront of America’s bloc confrontation tactics, and a means for it to form exclusive military alliances against an “imagined threat”. Li, who rather preferred to use the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ for the geographic expanse in question, also warned that the imagined threat may become a reality and a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, if the US and its allies continue to escalate confrontation through such alliances. This warning also has implications for Indian national security interests, considering it is part of alliances such as the Quad, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), and the recently announced India-US defence technology alliance ‘INDUS-X’.

All of these are ideals China has regularly propagated in one form or another (while, ironically, also playing an active role in their subversion), in an attempt to undermine the US’s preponderance in the Indo-Pacific region, which China considers its backyard. China also prides itself in being a regional power, with no intentions to challenge or displace the US or the existing international order. 

However, it is unwilling to accept a challenge to its predominance in the region, and actively seeks from the US a recognition of its peer status. Accordingly, throughout their engagements at the SLD, Chinese officials attempted to undermine America’s regional positions and partnerships through counter-narratives and self-praise. 

The art of rhetoric, à la China

At the first plenary session of the SLD, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Senior Colonel Chi Zhang (an academic expert and military advisor from the PLA’s National Defence University) asked US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin if the US actually supports ASEAN centrality, and if its multilateral endeavours like AUKUS and the Quad contradict said centrality. To the dismay of the Colonel and those placing their bets on the defense secretary’s ability to retort, Austin conveyed his inability to understand the gist of the question and proceeded to answer tangentially. 

Subsequently, throughout his speech during the fifth plenary session, Li Shangfu emphasised the importance of Chinese exchanges and cooperation with ASEAN countries, may it be in trade and commerce, or military diplomacy and peacekeeping. 

He also mentioned by name bilateral and multilateral military exercises such as ‘Golden Dragon’ and ‘Aman Youyi’, which are part of China’s larger military diplomacy with the ASEAN, even as Austin’s speech mostly focused on America’s military alliances with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea. 

Another example is how Li presented emotion-laden narratives surrounding the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in enabling countries to have 24-hour access to drinking water, and about how PLA soldiers lay their lives down in peacekeeping initiatives in conflict areas. 

But the US had no counter to provide on how stalled or failed BRI projects have impacted regional economies, and what have been the successes of alternative infrastructure development projects such as the Bring Back Better World and the Blue Dot Network. Neither was there a counter surrounding the PLA’s so-called peacekeeping and non-combat operations in the East African country of Djibouti. In fact, most questions posed to Li, and later to former Chinese foreign affairs vice-minister Cui Tiankai, revolved around tensions in the South China Sea. 

While the curiosity surrounding Chinese activities in the SCS itself isn’t misplaced, there was much more to press and question the Chinese on. 

How did SLD member countries respond?

This is not to say that there was no pushback against the Chinese narratives. For example, after Li’s speech, Commodore Jay Tristan Tarriela of the Philippine Coast Guard asked him about the “apparent disconnect between China’s words and actions related to its maritime interaction with the Philippines,” pointing out that Li spoke about promoting dialogue over confrontation, but in reality, Philippine fishermen vessels have been “harassed and driven away by China Coast Guard.” 

Li was also asked multiple times to talk about the dangerous manoeuvres PLA warships and aircraft performed close to US vessels in international waters just a day before his speech, hinting at the irony that he emphasised rule of law and opposed hegemony of navigation in his remarks. 

Moreover, representatives from some other countries also took turns criticising China’s aggressive tactics in the region. For example, in what can be safely assumed was a clear dig at China, Japanese Defence Minister Hamada Yasukazu said that some countries have “normalised coercive military action” in the region, and have “acquired influence through economic coercion and through development finance with lacking transparency and fairness.” He also said that in the East and South China Sea, “foreign government vessels” are “repeatedly intruding in territorial sea.” 

Japan has accused China of sailing in its Exclusive Economic Zone in the past, and threatening its maritime interests. Through his speech, Hamada highlighted with hope that Japan is now working towards “establishing a ‘constructive and stable relationship’ with China.” 

Similarly, UK Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace regarded China’s rise as an “epoch-defining challenge,” while Canadian Defence Minister Anita Anand commented that, “China is an increasingly disruptive global power that increasingly disregards international rules and norms.”

However, ASEAN representatives were cautious about neither bolstering China’s rhetoric, nor outrightly opposing it. Their primary concern was instead the resolution of conflict between the US and China, so that they do not have to face the inevitable pressure to choose between the two. 

This sentiment was echoed first by Singaporean Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen, who quoted a ‘great power rivalry’ of the past as evidence to suggest that the US-China rivalry will have similar ‘devastating’ consequences for ASEAN countries. 

The Cambodian Minister of National Defence General Tea Banh even said that the ASEAN does not want to see either China or the US enter a decline. On a more positive note, Indonesian Minister of Defense Prabowo Subianto expressed hope that the two countries would be able to resolve their differences using “compromise, cooperation, and humanism.”

Conclusion
Overall, the Chinese message to the US in particular and all those present in general was three-fold: that the US is the real provocateur, that China will continue to push back against its interference, and that countries in the region can manage their security themselves. 

At the G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia last year, Xi Jinping spelled out ‘three noes’ China abides by, of which one was that it doesn’t interfere in the US’s internal affairs. It expects the US to do the same – may it be on the Taiwan issue, or on contentions between claimants in the South China Sea – which China considers part of a larger internal affair of regional countries. 

The abovementioned narratives, as well as the fact that Li Shangfu conducted 11 bilateral meetings with representatives from various countries but left Lloyd Austin with just a handshake, suggest that SLD could not provide for the thaw in US-China relations the international community was hoping for. 

However, it did serve as a primer on the nature of the conceptual and ideological divergence between the two sides, hopefully paving the way for targeted negotiations in the future.

It was also interesting to witness how countries responded to this divergence. While representatives from Japan and Canada were more outright in condemning Chinese rhetoric, ASEAN countries, who found themselves at the intersection of the US-China rivalry Venn diagram (especially since the dialogue was hosted in Singapore), expressed their wariness of the ‘new Cold War’ without taking any sides. 

All countries, however, seemed to agree that US-China relations were central to stability in the region, and required guard-railing at both ends.

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