Takshashila Discussion Document - Open RAN: Challenges and Pathways for Adoption
Published September 24, 2023
Executive Summary
Open RAN began as a mobile network operator (MNO) initiative to reduce lock-in, increase competition and improve vendor diversity in the radio access network (RAN) market. A few big companies dominate this market, and with bans on Chinese vendors by many states, the vendor pool has become even more concentrated. Consequently, what started as an MNO initiative has now acquired geopolitical significance. In addition to addressing concerns around the market power of vendors, it is now expected to enhance network security, reliability, and supply chain resilience.
There are some apprehensions regarding Open RAN's ability to meet these lofty expectations. These doubts arise due to multiple challenges. The new interfaces, disaggregated components, and adoption of open-source software are expected to increase the threat surface of the network. These concerns are further exacerbated by the increased complexity of integrating various components and the current stage of relatively limited deployment maturity.
Market trends suggest the enduring presence of Open RAN, necessitating a reassuring approach to adoption that effectively mitigates these concerns.
Regulators must be adept in evaluating Open RAN solutions due to complexity and security concerns, while operators need to master operation and maintenance skills. As global Open RAN deployments increase, investing in training becomes crucial. Initiatives like the USAID Asia O-RAN Academy, involving stakeholders from academics to operators, can effectively equip participants for new roles.
Open RAN commitments under the ambit of the Critical and Emerging Technologies initiative (iCET) and Quad should be realised to demonstrate the scalability of the technology. This includes setting up a joint task force on Open RAN and pilot deployments to demonstrate the scalability of the technology. This can foster confidence and broader adoption by capitalising on economies of scale.
Lastly, Open RAN deployments can help balance the cost-effectiveness of Chinese components while mitigating security risks. Incorporating specific non-intelligent components from Chinese suppliers might not present a significant danger to national security. One possible candidate is the radio unit, deployed in vast numbers at every cell site. Selectively sourcing non-intelligent components from Chinese vendors can be a strategy to deescalate the critical vulnerability to an economic dependence that is manageable.
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