Delimitation in India and its Effect on Lok Sabha and Federalism
Published December 24, 2024 | This is a working paper presented at the Takshashila Institution Internal Conference on ‘Understanding the Delimitation Exercise’, November 2024
Authors
Introduction
Delimitation, the process of fixing limits or boundaries of territorial constituencies, is a crucial aspect of a democracy. It plays a significant role in maintaining equal representation and preserving the mandate of ‘one person-one vote’. The changing populations of constituencies make such an exercise essential, and doing it periodically assures the fairness of the electoral process. Independent India successfully implemented delimitations of Lok Sabha (LS) seats based on the censuses of 1951, 1961 and 1971. The seats in the lower house of Parliament increased to 494, 522 and 543, respectively, after each exercise. The average population per seat increased to 7.3 lakh, 8.4 lakh and 10.1 lakh, respectively. In 1961 and 1971, state assembly seats increased from 3,102 to 3,563 and then 3997, respectively. Minor reforms were also achieved, like abolishing two-member constituencies (1961).
Delimitation in India has been contentious since 1971. The Indira Gandhi government paused the exercise for thirty years in 1976 because it feared an imbalance of representation between states, driven by differences in fertility rates. The issue was taken up again in 2001. Then, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government chose not to alter the number of seats in LS but adjusted the borders of constituencies within states to try and match the population per MP ratio. It also decided to reserve seats for Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) candidates based on the 2001 census. This second pause will be lifted soon, with the next delimitation scheduled to take place based on the first census conducted after 2026. This paper discusses two main problems related to population and seat sharing in LS - the high population per MP ratio and the variation among states. It also discusses the unanticipated problems and proposes solutions for the representation to the LS and to maintain federalism.
Problems with delimitation
India’s large population is the reason behind both problems. In 1971, one LS MP represented about 10 lakh people on average. This figure is slightly less than 20 lakh (author’s calculations). This means MPs represent almost twice the amount of people now than they did in 2021. It also violates Article 81 of the Constitution, which says that an MP shouldn’t represent less than 500,000 and more than 750,000 people. However, this has been disregarded to adhere to another provision, which limits the number of seats both houses must have (331 in the Rajya Sabha (RS) and 500 in the LS).
India’s average population per MP is markedly high compared to other countries. For instance, in the US, a member of the House of Representatives represents about 7.4 lakh people. In the UK, the equivalent number is close to 1.2 lakh.
There have been substantive debates on this issue of representation, although there are no conclusive studies about whether a larger parliament leads to better governance. Studies like Gamberi et al. estimate the optimal size of a parliament based on the network’s modularity. Modularity refers to the cohesiveness and connectedness of a population. They theorise that a country should benefit from its inherent networks to find the optimum size. However, in the Indian case, the fact that the constitution specifies the number of people an MP should represent suggests that effective representation is important for a democracy. It could be argued that for an average person to be adequately represented, a lower population/MP ratio will be helpful. That is hence, the first problem.
The other problem is the variation in this ratio across states. In Sikkim, one MP represents about 6,77,000 people, while in Rajasthan, one represents 31,71,240. Hence, the average voter in Sikkim has 4.5 times more say in choosing an MP than one in Rajasthan. However, union territories and small states like Sikkim need at atleast one seat, even if their population is less than the average ratio. MPs in Kerala represent the least number of people (excluding small states and UTs), 17,74,450. An average voter in Kerala has 1.7 times more say in choosing an MP than one in Rajasthan. This gap needs to be addressed.
Chart 1: Change in people represented by MP in select states over the years. Source: Author’s calculations are based on population estimates.
States that saw low population growth and a fall in fertility rates saw their constituents being overrepresented, and states that saw high population growth saw their constituents being underrepresented. Some of India’s wealthiest states, such as Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana, fall in the former category. Generally, more affluent areas see falling fertility and population growth rates, which also seems true. (Maharashtra is the exception that proves the rule, in a way). This means that the reason delimitation was paused in 1976 was never achieved. The gap widened, as subsequent sections will show.
If the new delimitation exercise awards seats based on population, southern (and more affluent) states, which effectively controlled population, would get far fewer seats than northern (and poorer) states, which were not effective in population control. Meanwhile, if seats aren’t allocated based on population so as to not punish states that controlled growth rates, one would end up violating the basic notion of “one person, one vote” and representation in parliament, enshrined in the constitution. In other words, any solution will have to confront difficult trade-offs. Below is a list of some of the most prominent suggestions to address the challenges related to delimitation, along with an explicit assessment of the trade-offs they entail and their political feasibility.
Chart 2: New seats per state in LS based on the 1971 ratio (~10 lakh people/MP). Source: Author’s calculation (based on 2021 population estimates)
Solutions to high population/MP ratio
1. Increasing Lok Sabha seats
The most obvious and probable solution will be to increase the number of seats in the Lok Sabha. The ratio should ideally be what the constitution has proposed (5 lakh to 7.5 lakh), but this would be very difficult to accommodate. Let’s take the average ratio from 1971, which, according to a report, is 10.1 lakh per MP. My estimate, using population data, comes to about 10.4 lakhs. If this ratio is followed in all states, the lower house must expand to 1875 members. The number of seats that every state will have is shown in chart 2 (blue line). Uttar Pradesh (UP) will have the highest number of seats, 318, constituting 16% of the LS. The New Parliament building has a capacity of 880. The orange line in chart 2 shows how members would be distributed, totalling 880. There is a gradual rise in seats, with UP getting 149. Vaishnav and Hinston show that using McMillan’s calculation method, according to 2026 estimates, if no state is to lose a seat, then the LS should be expanded to 848 members, and UP would have 143 members. This would be the better solution because dividing the current number of seats will mean that some states will have less than 0 seats, which, when rounded off to 1, will introduce malapportionment again.
The Parliament would need to change the cap on LS seats in Article 81, which shouldn’t prove too difficult. One problem that will arise is how the LS will function with a sudden increase in members. This comes at a time when the efficacy of MPs is already being questioned. Southern states might still find this unacceptable at this solution because their representation will be reduced. This can then be tied up into a bargain, like giving states a higher share of tax revenue collected by the central government. This can be done by the Finance Commission using fertility rates in its calculation of how much states will receive. However, poorer states might view this as a move against them because poor states tend to have higher fertility rates. Hence, just more money devolved into all states can be a solution, which has been proposed before.
This solution has the highest political feasibility because it will be very hard to not adhere to the ‘one-person, one-vote’ principle. All our solutions today will be challenging to enact, but not adhering to the ‘one-person, one-vote’ principle would be the hardest. It does involve the centre having to ‘let go’ of money it could spend, but a glide path can be worked out to do this slowly.
2. Increasing Vidhan Sabha seats
If proportional representation is a problem, it can also be looked at the state level. State-level delimitations have been done, notably in 2001, when constituencies were re-adjusted intra-state. Vidhan Sabhas across India offer better representation, with smaller constituencies and greater access for citizens. The difference between the population/MP and population/MLA ratios is stark, as shown by chart 3.
Chart 3: Population represented by an MP and MLA (avg) in states
An MLA in Sikkim represents only 25,500 people on average. The number, close to 5 lakh, is highest for UP. The MLA representation ratio is consistent across the country, barring the smaller states like Sikkim, Goa, Manipur, etc. This representation can be increased further, but even the current situation is acceptable. The all-important question is again about resources that states can spend. This solution needs to come with greater devolution of fiscal resources to states.
The feasibility of this solution is difficult to assess. On the one hand, it will be difficult for any government not to give states equal proportional representation nationally. More representation in states coupled with more resources can alleviate the concerns of southern states. Hence, this will not be a solution on its own since it depends on more power and finances being transferred to the states (which is difficult), but and it can be used with something else.
Solutions to malapportionment between states
1. Redraw constituencies according to population
There doesn’t seem to be any way to avoid redrawing constituencies according to size. Chart 1 shows the divergence between the ratio of population/MP over the years in different states. Vaishnav & Hintson, and Rajagopalan have carried out similar estimations. All the estimates come to a similar result. The difference between doing so for solving malapportionment is that the strength of the LS will be changed. It’ll still be equitable if the government chooses to allocate the current 543 constituencies or the maximum allowed 550 among the states based on population. It wouldn’t solve the ratio problem, though. The number of constituencies must be increased and divided based on population to solve for both.
However, this also needs to come with some sort of bargain with the states that will lose their share in the Lok Sabha. These will be similar to the complementary solutions with the first solution. The political feasibility is also high, as governments want to align constituencies based on population.
Solving political capture by high-population states
Once constituencies are divided based on population, some states with a higher population will see an increase in their allocated seats in the Lok Sabha. This might lead to political capture by certain states that could exert greater voting power. A regional party, dominant in just one state could still be more likely to capture many seats in the country, leading to political capture again. Hence, maintaining a balance between states is recommended. Let’s discuss a few possible solutions.
1. Splitting big states
The most obvious solution is to split big states. Currently, the top 5 states in the country have more than 45% share of total seats. Suppose constituencies are re-arranged based on the current population (calculated using 2021 estimates), this number will increase to 48%. That doesn’t bode well for federalism. UP currently has a 14% vote share. This would likely increase to 16% after delimitation, which allows it to retain its status as the most significant state politically and in terms of legislative influence. There have been multiple calls to split UP. The reasons cited for this include its overbearing share in the Lok Sabha and other factors like weak governance and underdevelopment. In terms of seat share,rUP is followed by Maharashtra and Bihar, with 9% each. The next three are West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh and about 7% and 6%, respectively. Out of the top 10 states (after constituencies are apportioned based on population), Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal will lose some share in the Lok Sabha.
Table 1: % share in seats of top 10 states currently and after delimitation
A quick calculation shows that when three new states were created in 2001, they got better representation in the Lok Sabha than their consolidated states had before and also would have had if they had not split. This can be a more solid argument for splitting states as part of delimitation, other than the usual political reasons. Whether smaller states actually lead to better governance is an unanswered question. Studies show that the effect on development parameters depends on the original state. Smaller states can lead to better decentralisation, but lesser economies of scale, for example. The effect of smaller states on the functioning of Lok Sabha is interesting. It can lead to the proliferation of local political parties winning more seats, greater competition for resources, better voice for constituents etc. This however, has many ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’.
Chart 4: Representation ratio of split and consolidated UP
However, splitting states is not the most straightforward task. Take the example of UP. The State Reorganisation Commission recommended splitting UP in 1955. In 2009, erstwhile Chief Minister Mayawati wanted to split it into four smaller states, but that didn’t happen. There needs to be a strong bottom-up demand for a new state, like in the case of Telangana. The BJP, which is in power at the state and Union levels, also has a strong base in the state and might not be open to splitting it. Other than that, there have also been calls to carve out the state of Vidarbha from Maharashtra, mainly because much of the eastern part has faced governance neglect, and economic activity is concentrated in the western region. However, these calls dissipated recently.
2. Cap on maximum seats in the Lok Sabha
Another option is limiting the number of seats one state can have in the Lok Sabha. The Constitution has imposed a limit on the total number of seats in the lower house but not a cap or limit on how many can be allocated to one state. An example cited by KM Panikkar in the State Reorganization Committee report was of Germany under Bismarck, which gave the province of Prussia reduced representation in parliament because of its high population and economic power at the time. This protected united Germany from being dominated by Prussia.
The obvious drawback of this idea is that MPs from the chosen state will represent more people than the rest of the country. However, as stated earlier, India’s constitution allows for a band for the population MPs will represent. This band will need to be altered, such that larger states stand at the higher end of the spectrum and all the others on the lower end. This might lead to an outcry from the constituents of the state that will be affected. Another practical problem is that only UP has a significant share, and any upper limits are likely to affect only UP. If an upper limit is set to split states like Maharashtra and Bihar, then seats for UP will be severely malapportioned. Hence, striking a balance might prove to be a difficult task.
Another option is to reduce the population/MP ratio for states gradually. This will act as a diminishing marginal returns slope, where MPs from states with higher populations represent more people. This will be, in effect, a punishment for higher fertility rates. It can partly allay the fears of the southern states losing their share in Parliament. One more option is to offer larger states a choice: have a higher population/MP ratio or ask them to split the state. This way, the problem will be solved one way or another. States that accept migrants could also be given more seats, or allowed a lower ratio. Migration is touted as a solution that can reduce the inequality of population between states, since the poorer states are also the highly populated. But whether such criteria should be included is also a problem. The Delimitation Commission shouldn’t take them up, but they can be part of a grand bargain.The solution is complex and might induce bureaucratic delays. Also, whether the union government will want to implement such a hard choice is a question.
3. Reforming the Rajya Sabha
Many countries like the US, UK, Canada, Brazil etc have a bicameral parliamentary system, wherein one house has representatives based on the population of counties/states/provinces, and the other has a fixed number of members for every administrative unit. This serves a function of preserving federalism by allowing states to have equal voices in parliament, just because they are a state and not based on their population. In India, state governments currently nominate Rajya Sabha members, but the members don’t even have to be state residents, with the removal of the domicile requirement. This weakens federalism, as state governments, acting on behalf of their party leadership, can nominate anyone who doesn’t necessarily reflect the state's interests. The Rajya Sabha also represents the interests of those who might not get elected, e.g. women and minority communities. Another facet in which the Rajya Sabha has reduced relevance is that it doesn’t need to approve money bills for them to come into effect.
To solve this, many have proposed that the Rajya Sabha should have equal seats for all states instead of being divided based on population. This will give low-population states more say and make them relevant in the parliament. It becomes increasingly important to have this because the seats in the Lok Sabha will likely be divided based on population. To stay relevant, states must have a say on money bills. However, since the union government will lose their power over money bills by doing so, it won’t be very willing to make this change.
An even more drastic change was the one proposed by Rajagopalan, in which she said that the share of seats states get in the Rajya Sabha should be based on their share of tax revenue. Because in general, more prosperous states have seen a drop in fertility rates and poorer states haven’t, dividing constituencies by population in a way punishes the more prosperous states. Hence, allocating Rajya Sabha seats based on taxation will help regain that balance. This solution also works only if it is done periodically.
However, India’s two houses of parliament both have proportional representation, which is etched in the constitution in Article 81. The provisions of money bills are also written in the constitution in articles 109 and 110. Changing these will require two constitutional amendments; hence, it is not the easiest solution. However, many have called for it since it’s a popular way to balance power structures worldwide and one that might be difficult for political capture in the long run.
| Solution | What it Solves | Problems/Trade-offs | Who Implements | Political Feasibility | Impact on Centre-State Balance | What does it have to come with | Sustainability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Increase Lok Sabha Seats | High population/ representative ratio | MPs may become more ineffective | Parliament | Medium (requires infrastructure but preserves power) | Neutral - maintains current balance | More money to all states | Sustainable - can hold on for 30 more years - |
| Increase VS seats & strengthen local govt | High population/ representative ratio | Requires more funding to states. Ineffective if LS retains power- States may object to reduced parliamentary voice. | Centre and State govt | Low (reduces central control) | Strengthens states | More money and power to all states | sustainable |
| Redraw constituencies by population | Malapportionment between states | Needs grand bargain, especially financial- Changes power balance between states | Delimitation Commission with Parliamentary approval | High (most probable solution per notes) | Neutral - affect inter-state more than centre-state | some grand bargain with southern states - e.g. finances | sustainable |
| Cap maximum seats/diminishing ratio | Political capture risks from high-population states | May create representation deficit- Population-heavy states may object | Parliament | Low (faces opposition from high-population states) | Slightly strengthens the Union by limiting state influence | Can be offered to states as a choice with splitting states | Difficult to sustain in the long run |
| Reform Rajya Sabha (equal state seats) | Political capture risks from high-population states | A very radical overhaul - will need a lot of consideration | Constitutional amendment required | Low (significant structural change) | Significantly strengthens states | Solutions 1 and /or 3 | sustainable |
| Money bills through the Rajya Sabha | Political capture risks from high-population states | Risks the RS becoming political - was not what it�s original purpose was | Constitutional amendment required | Low (reduces Centre's financial control) | Significantly strengthens states | equal(er) representation in the RS | might be contentious |
Conclusion
There are many proposed and possible solutions for delimitation. To evaluate them, we should look at three main criteria: what problems they create, whether they are sustainable in the long term, and whether they are politically feasible. If solutions create more problems than they solve, then there is no use in pursuing them, however theoretically correct they might be. Solutions must be sustainable to solve this problem once and for all. This problem was created because timely solutions were not taken, and the can was just kicked down the road in 1975-76 and 2001—timely delimitations after this one, like those in 1951, 1961 and 1971.
Solutions must also be designed based on how they try to restore the balance between the states that will gain and lose seats. But this is more of a problem for the bunch of solutions as a whole, not for an individual solution. The best solution/set of solutions out of the ones I have written here would be to redraw constituencies by population, increase Lok Sabha seats, reform the Rajya Sabha by giving equal seats for all states and mandate that money bills also be passed through the Rajya Sabha. This set of solutions adheres to ‘one person-one vote’, strikes a balance between the states with higher and lower populations, reduces the population one MP represents, and gives states a say in the parliament and hence law-making.
There can be many more supplementary solutions. Devolving more money to the states is important because states spend more than the union government, but the union government gets more revenue. Splitting big states is also necessary. But they should be done on their own merits and not involved in delimitation. Making new states will require a lot of movement on the ground and shouldn’t be done with a top-down approach. Devolving more to states can be part of a grand bargain, but its political feasibility is low. Solutions that the Delimitation Commission will implement should also be restricted to its scope. But other bargaining chips in the ‘grand bargain’ often talked about might not be. For example, for southern states that will lose seats might be given more money through the Finance Commission.
There is no question that this will be an extraordinary exercise to watch unfold. India is now the world's most populated country, and how we choose to govern it will have significant consequences and will be watched by everyone. The exercise would also do well by initiating a mechanism in which periodical delimitations will occur to avoid a situation like the one we are in now.
