From Delhi to Kabul: Navigating Indo-Afghan Relations
Published October 23, 2024 | This is a working paper presented at the Takshashila Institution Internal Conference on ‘India’s Neighbourhood’, September 2024
Authors
I. Introduction
Since ancient trade routes and cultural exchanges, indo-Afghan relations have come a long way. The Silk Route connected the two regions, and those connections were solidified through trade and invasions. The Mughal empire’s origins lay in present-day Afghanistan, and the coming of the Mughals to the Indian subcontinent brought with them a hoard of Afghan practices and influences. In recent years, after India’s independence in 1947, the relationship has gone through many phases. During the Cold War, while both countries’ official stance was non-alignment, India supported the Afghan government, which was pro-Soviet, adding to its already strained relationship with a pro-United States, Pakistan. Post the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, India remained non-interventionist during the 80s. The 90s saw the rise of the Taliban, and India actively supported anti-Taliban forces, in part due to a fear of the Taliban’s close ties with Pakistan. After the United States' foray into Afghanistan in 2001, India took on a more active role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. It extended monetary and diplomatic aid, as reflected in projects like the new parliament. With the return of the Taliban in 2021, the relationship has undergone yet another wave of changes. India has historically opposed the Taliban but did reopen its embassy in Kabul in 2022 under security assurances from the Taliban government.
In the current climate, India is faced with the need to strike a delicate balance while focusing on their interests vis-a-vis Afghanistan while also maintaining a certain distance due to concerns about terrorism and instability as well as the Taliban’s own human rights violations.Trade Interests
II. India’s Interests in Afghanistan
Trade Interests
India's economic interests in Afghanistan are minimal. India’s exports to Afghanistan majorly consist of items like raw sugar, packaged medicament, clothes, etc., provided as aid. Other exports like iron structures have been part of the export basket but not more than 10% over the last five years.
India's exports to Afghanistan have steadily increased over the last few years until 2019, when they were the highest at $1.4B. Subsequently, they dropped steadily and stabilised, reducing to $480 million in 2022, $451 million in 2023, and $457 million in 2024. This might be due to reduced aid given to the country because of disagreements with the Taliban, more minor issues on the border and a blockade at the Torkham port. The budget for 2024-25 also reduced allocations to Afghanistan, along with Myanmar, Maldives, and Bangladesh.
India-Afghanistan Exports
Source: OEC
Afghanistan's economy is practically in shambles and doesn't produce many exportable goods.
Afghanistan's exports to India have consisted almost entirely of seasonal crops like tropical fruits, nuts, dates, apples and pears, and other agricultural products such as insect resins and spices. This has been consistent over the last few years, and the value has slightly varied.
Indian exports to Afghanistan in 2022 - mainly consist of aid items. Source: OEC
Some reports describe India's economic interests in Afghanistan's natural resources. Resources like crude oil, iron ore and rare earth materials like lanthanum, cerium, and neodymium are present in the country. However, China has already made significant strides in mining oil and possibly starting work on rare earth materials. One report says that Afghanistan would be well served with India mining their rare earth minerals instead of China, looking at China’s record of debt-trap investments worldwide. This could also be good for India, which, like many countries in the world, depends on China for its supply of such minerals. All of this, however, seems distant and difficult.
India's actual trade interests in Afghanistan may lie beyond Afghanistan. India considers the country a possible way to access the Central Eurasian region. India's plans include the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). These former Soviet countries might also look at India favourably to diversify their export basket, which is currently heavily dependent on China. Much of this trade could occur through Iran's Chabahar port, as India called for in February's regional economic dialogue in Bishkek. Some of this trade could go through Afghanistan, which depends on the security situation in Afghanistan. Hence, the Taliban’s commitment to security in their country is crucial to future engagement.
The Chabahar port, connected to major cities in Afghanistan by the Delaram highway (which India helped to build), was a good way for India to counter China's influence in the region, especially the Gwadar port in Pakistan, which the Chinese built. But relations with Afghanistan, security concerns and blockades of the Chabahar port meant this project never fulfilled its promise.
Security Interests
India's security interests in Afghanistan deepened with the rise of the Taliban. In the 1990s and 2000s, India supported the governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, which, with the support of many other countries like the US, were fighting against the Taliban. When the Taliban came back to power in 2021, it was viewed as a significant loss in New Delhi.
There were reports about weapons worth $7.2 billion left back by the US being used by the Taliban and being sold to different countries, possibly to militant groups. There were fears about increased militant activity in the country, like in Pakistan, by different groups being harboured by the Taliban. The Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) also attacked some Taliban-affiliated groups in Afghanistan, degrading the security in the whole region.
The Taliban's rise in 2021 only exacerbated India’s strategic insecurity about Kashmir. Some weapons left behind by the US were found in Kashmir as well, fuelling fears that Afghan territory might be used for terrorist activity in India.
The Taliban's relationship with Pakistan after taking control of Afghanistan has been complicated. The neighbours' relationship has been deteriorating over the years. There have been problems with the Durand line and fencing along the border, as it was crafted by the British to protect their interests and issues in trade and transit.
Taliban's rise to power in 2021 gave impetus to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which led to increased terrorist activity on their border with Pakistan. As a retaliatory move, the Pakistani government ordered illegal Afghan immigrants to move back or be deported immediately. The already struggling Afghan economy was further burdened by the influx of immigrants, which added to the economic strain.
India would like to keep the Taliban away from the control of the Pakistani deep state. There are mainly two reasons for this. Disagreeable security relations with Pakistan would mean decreased trade between the neighbours and increased opportunities for India. The second reason is that the threat to India's security would be lessened. India has also expressed interest in allowing the Taliban government to take control of Afghan embassies in India, a sign of warming relations. Some have theorised that India's hand might be in this souring relationship. This is because New Delhi has always seen good relations with Kabul as a means to prevent Pakistan from using Afghan territory for its anti-India designs. Notwithstanding, the souring relationship serves India's security and economic purposes.
India has also tried to assert its stance in the region when it provided monetary support for construction of the Shahtoot Dam, deemed by a US State Committee report as essential for water security in Afghanistan. It also achieved a smaller win on Pakistan, since construction of the dam over the Maidan river would reduce about 17% of the water Pakistan got from it.
Soft Power
Although India doesn't recognise the Taliban as a government in Afghanistan, the latter's embassies operate in India, mainly run by ex-diplomats. India, like most countries, doesn’t recognise the Taliban as the rightful government but engages with them in many ways.
New Delhi maintains that recognition of the Taliban as a government would hinge on the inclusivity of their government in Kabul and their commitment to human rights, including girls’ education and employment. This was also mentioned in the joint declaration at the SCO summit in Uzbekistan in September 2022.
India's strategy in the 90s with Afghanistan was to use aid projects and other goodwill to earn soft power with the country. This has also been described as the winning-hearts-and-minds (WHAM) strategy. India has invested over $3 billion in Afghanistan for various aid projects, including a parliament building, providing equipment like helicopters, the Salma Dam building, power lines, the Delaram highway, hospital infrastructure, etc.
India, though, continues to provide humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan, including assisting in food security and medical supplies, helping Afghan students with visas, continuing their scholarships, and providing support for drug addicts.
As of 2024, more than 13,000 Afghan students study in Indian universities, a significant part of the diaspora estimated to be close to 15,000 in 2021. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) provides scholarships to Indian universities for many foreign students, including Afghans. This year, it has announced online scholarships for 1000 Afghan students, which is a welcome but weird move because access to the internet in the country is intermittent and unreliable. Many students also saw their studies interrupted after the pandemic as colleges and universities moved classes permanently in person. Smoother coordination between the ICCR and the ministry will alleviate these issues.
In addition, the BCCI and the Indian government have supported the Afghanistan cricket team by providing them with grounds to play their matches. This is another example of the WHAM strategy.
III. A framework for evaluating different scenarios
The somewhat precarious relationship between India and Afghanistan lies hinged on various factors ranging from India and Afghanistan’s foreign policy objectives to the involvement of the United States in Afghanistan. However, one can consider two primary determinants while trying to understand the critical drivers of Indo-Afghan engagement. First is Afghanistan’s commitment to human rights and peace, which is reflected in the Taliban’s domestic actions as well as their external attitude towards conflict and terrorism. Second, is the nature of Pakistan and Afghanistan’s relationship – Indian policy towards Afghanistan is closely tied to the historically fraught Indo-Pak relationship and the issue of Kashmir. India’s involvement in Afghanistan is aligned with its regional objectives. Countering Pakistani influence in Afghanistan not only allows India to expand its sphere of influence but also allows it to take a more proactive role in ensuring that militant groups that are a threat to Indian sovereignty don’t take hold in Afghanistan. This is mainly contingent on a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan.
Additionally, for India to take a proactive role in Afghanistan, the state of affairs internally in Afghanistan has to be peaceful enough for Indian delegations to be assured of safety. Moreover, if the Taliban are committing civil and human rights violations, the international climate is unlikely to be in their favour, and India will align itself with the international community. Afghanistan is amongst a group of countries that fall at the bottom of the Global Peace Index, which indicates the state of affairs.
These two primary determinants can be examined through a two-by-two matrix, where each quadrant represents a possible scenario, to help map out the course of action India will likely take in every circumstance in its dealings with Afghanistan.
A framework for evaluating Indo-Afghan relations.
Scenario 1: One step forward, two steps back?
Co-operative Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship, commitment to peace
A favourable relationship with Pakistan could open Afghanistan to trade with China, potentially diminishing India's interests and complicating their relationship. From a security perspective, amicable Afghan-Pak relations may lead to security concerns for India’s borders, and India could reduce aid if cross-border terrorism increases. While the Taliban have not actively supported terrorist groups in Kashmir, Afghanistan, under their control, could still harbour them. Given this, India might continue providing aid without actively pursuing trade, possibly waiting for relations to deteriorate. Given Kabul's proximity to Islamabad, this scenario can have state-to-state engagement, but people-to-people engagement will be relatively low. With India attempting to leverage developmental aid to counter Pakistan’s sphere of influence, state-to-people engagement would also be possible.
Scenario 2: Ideal Scenario for India
Adversarial Afghan-Pakistan relationship, commitment to peace
A combination of these two factors would be the ideal scenario for India. It would pave the way for a more active involvement in the country. The security situation could also ease up, making everything easier.
India could increase aid, invest more in long-term infrastructure projects like dams and highways, and help establish agriculture in the country. Thus, by providing more aid, India could aggressively pursue the "Winning Hearts and Minds" (WHAM) strategy. India could also engage more in rebuilding the country, like investing in agriculture.
However, much of this would depend on the extent of the Taliban’s commitment to human rights. If they’re not willing to reform their stances on women’s and minority rights, the international community could backlash against India’s inclusion. Conversely, India could push the Taliban toward making positive changes.
This scenario would allow for maximum engagement in all spheres, with as many people-to-people interactions as the two countries want to engage in. The movement of students and civilians is likely to be high if India has a good relationship with peaceful Afghanistan. State-to-state interactions such as diplomatic and political visits are likely to be as frequent as possible with the assurance of safety from the Taliban. Collaborations and aid, if necessary, will not be hampered by Pakistan’s influence, and India can use the opportunity to cement their ties with Afghanistan.
Scenario 3: Lost Leverage
Rampant Instability, Cooperative Afghanistan-Pakistan Relationship
A scenario where a volatile Afghanistan maintains close ties with Islamabad is likely to be considered a risk for India, especially on its western border. Pakistan’s striving for strategic depth in Afghanistan would be enhanced, while its support for a regime that is indifferent to human rights would further sideline India. India’s development projects in Afghanistan, such as the Salma Dam, would struggle to yield political dividends due to the alignment of an unstable Kabul with Islamabad. Additionally, trade routes and diplomatic channels could bypass India due to Pakistan’s influence, limiting its access to central Asia.
On the security front, groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, who have historically operated out of Afghan territory, could become emboldened and give rise to security concerns. Islamabad could leverage this situation to ramp up militancy at the border with Kashmir, using Afghanistan’s instability to its advantage.
A situation like this would limit India’s interactions with Afghanistan– partially due to security concerns and partially due to Pakistan’s influence. In scenarios with concerns about extremist factions, people-to-people and people-to-state interactions would be limited. India would most likely be in a position where they would have to balance trying to maintain a relationship with Afghanistan on one hand and keep their distance from a volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan nucleus on the other.
Scenario 4: The looming threat of regional instability?
Rampant Instability, Adversarial Afghanistan-Pakistan Relationship
A turbulent relationship between Kabul and Islamabad– perhaps due to differing interests, coupled with the Taliban’s disregard for maintaining peace and human rights could create an unstable environment that could be potentially concerning for India’s security interests. The vacuum left by diminished Pakistani influence in Afghanistan could lead to the rise of non-state actors and extremist groups, and militant groups could exploit the environment.
However, the absence of Pakistani influence in Afghanistan could allow India to become a neutral partner. While its involvement would be limited due to the state of affairs in Afghanistan, it could still try to leverage its investments in Afghan infrastructure and democratic institutions to position itself as an ally that supports Afghan development.
While a scenario where Afghanistan is not committed to peace and stability would bring security risks, the absence of Pakistan’s presence in Kabul would allow India to try and establish and maintain a relationship with the Taliban. However, people-to-people and people-to-state interactions are unlikely to be frequent. India will most likely maintain a certain level of distance from Afghanistan due to the security risks it would pose to their national security if terrorist groups and extremist factions were to try and take hold.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This January, Indian representatives attended a meeting convened by the Taliban on regional issues despite the Indian government not formally acknowledging them as a government. This is a marked difference from 2021 when all Indians in Afghanistan were rapidly pulled out and diplomatic missions shut. There appears to be a thaw in the tensions between the two countries that were palpable in 2021, which is furthered by the strained relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan at present after the TTP (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan) ended a ceasefire with Pakistan. Over 1000 people were killed in 2023.
In light of current events, therefore, we propose the following recommendations for India’s engagement with Afghanistan (at present, the state of affairs is somewhere between the 2nd and fourth quadrants of the 2x2 matrix with a strained Afghan-Pak relationship, and while there is no firm commitment to peace, the Taliban are not in the international spotlight for rampant violations, having restrained their actions for a while now):
India should continue some diplomatic engagement without recognising the Taliban as the official Afghan government in the international arena. Additionally, it should not actively pursue trade interests until Afghanistan resembles a more democratic state.
Initiatives such as educational scholarships for Afghan students should continue– an investment in the relations between future Indian and Afghan citizens; this will also be seen as an investment in Afghanistan’s development.
India should engage with the Taliban and work together on putting measures in place to prevent Afghan territory from being used by insurgent groups that have the potential to destabilise the region.
India should continue prioritising investments in infrastructure that will benefit potential trade interests in the future to counter Chinese and Pakistani influence.
