How Chinese Analysts View India’s Climate Change Diplomacy
Published October 15, 2024 | This brief explores Chinese analysts' perspectives on India's climate change diplomacy, highlighting the potential for cooperation and challenges.
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Executive Summary
This brief explores Chinese analysts' perspectives on India's climate change diplomacy, highlighting the potential for cooperation and challenges. At the official level, the 2009 Agreement on Cooperation on Addressing Climate Change between India and China established a framework for collaboration, emphasising the importance of joint efforts in mitigation, adaptation, and capacity building. As both nations navigate their roles within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and explore bilateral initiatives, understanding Chinese views on India’s climate strategies becomes essential. To achieve that objective, this paper discusses Chinese commentators’ perspectives on the economic, strategic, and geopolitical dimensions of India’s climate diplomacy.
The Context
As the world’s two most populous countries and significant greenhouse gas emitters, India and China face substantial threats from climate change, including ecological degradation, food and water scarcity, agricultural shifts, and health hazards. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that four billion people, nearly half of whom live in India and China, will experience severe water scarcity for at least one month per year in the future. Given their shared challenges as large developing nations, both countries have emerged as key players in international climate change negotiations. They have also sought to make common cause with a large number of developing countries, emphasising the issues of equity and justice when negotiating climate-related agreements.
A recent survey conducted by the China Center for Climate Change Communication (China4C) and the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication (YPCCC) revealed that over 90% of the Chinese public believes climate change is occurring. More than half of them agree that human activities are the primary cause of climate change, and over 60% say that they have personally experienced the effects of climate change. Dr. Binbin Wang, Principal Investigator of China4C, noted that while awareness is high in China, the challenge has been translating it into action. However, the survey indicates that the Chinese public is willing to learn more about climate change solutions, how it relates to their daily lives, and pay more for climate-friendly products. Similarly, the survey shows that in India, people increasingly perceive climate change as real and personal, worrying about worsening impacts. Despite potential added costs, Indians support ambitious policies and view climate action as good economics, with many willing to join citizens’ campaigns to encourage leaders to take action on climate change. Another 2023 study published in the Journal of Environmental Psychology reveals that climate change anxiety was higher in the Chinese and Indian populations when compared to Japanese and American populations. In this context, understanding Chinese perspectives on India’s climate change diplomacy becomes crucial for assessing the prospects for cooperation between the two countries and the broader trajectory of the global climate regime.
What are Chinese Analysts Arguing?
A close examination of Chinese discussions on India’s climate change diplomacy reveals seven recurring themes and arguments:
Dual Track Climate Diplomacy
Dr. Fuzou Wu, an expert on Indian and Chinese climate policies, who studied at Fudan University and is currently teaching at Aalborg University in Denmark, argues that as rising economic powers, both countries have been engaging in a dual-track approach to climate diplomacy. On one track, both strategically align to form new partnerships with developing countries in order to strengthen their bargaining position vis-a-vis developed countries in climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC framework. Simultaneously, both voluntarily bandwagon with developed countries, particularly the US and European states, in mini-multilateral and bilateral climate arrangements outside the UN framework. This dual-track diplomacy has made it less likely for a top-down, comprehensive global architecture to address climate change collectively, instead leading to a fragmented, ‘bottom-up’ regime, Wu argues. Moreover, she contends that by participating in non-UN climate arrangements, China and India have not only increased the scale and scope of fragmentation in global climate governance but also undercut the effectiveness, appropriateness, and legitimacy of the UNFCCC process.
Huang Zhengduo, Director of the Institute of Geopolitics Studies at Sichuan University, makes a similar argument. He notes that during the Cold War, India preferred bilateral exchanges and shunned multilateral approaches in its foreign policy. But today, India recognises the limitations of that approach and has “formed a multilateral diplomacy strategy with the United Nations at its heart, and focuses on regional multilateral organisations”. Huang adds that India responds to climate change, counter-terrorism and energy security through mechanisms such as the SCO, BASIC and the Five Major Developing Nations (China, Brazil, India, South Africa and Mexico).
2. Development Over Climate
Several Chinese media commentaries tend to argue that Indian policies prioritise development goals over addressing climate change-related challenges. In a December 2023 paper published by Peking University's Institute of Regional and Country Studies, researcher Xu Bo posited that India's commitments and positions in climate negotiations are ‘relatively flexible’ (直采取软硬兼施的策略), driven by its primary goals of poverty eradication and development. The article mentions that when confronted with criticism from other countries regarding India’s total emissions, the Indian government counters by presenting concrete data to demonstrate that India's contribution to climate change is relatively low, highlighting that despite being the world's third-largest greenhouse gas emitter, India's emissions in 2019 accounted for only 7% of global emissions while its population constitutes approximately 17% of the world's population.
The same article highlights that India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) commitment, which includes a 33-35% reduction in emissions intensity from 2005 levels by 2030, is a “parity” target, requiring almost no effort outside of existing policies. Although India updated its commitments in 2021, aiming for a 50% share of renewable energy by 2030 and net-zero emissions by 2070, it later changed the renewable energy target to 50% of cumulative installed power capacity from non-fossil fuel energy resources in 2022 to maintain flexibility in climate action. Finally, the article argues that India prioritises poverty eradication and development over climate change goals, as hundreds of millions of Indians still live without electricity, and access to energy is considered a basic human right and a necessary condition for achieving a high human development index. India's development indicators, such as child nutrition, child mortality, and female life expectancy, lag behind the world average. Furthermore, India's development demands will inevitably lead to an increase in energy intensity and greenhouse gas emissions, as countries cannot develop and decarbonise simultaneously. Consequently, India has adopted a climate governance approach that focuses on eliminating greenhouse gas emissions while ensuring development, as evidenced by its insistence on changing the wording of ‘gradually phasing out coal energy’ to ‘gradually reducing the use of coal energy’ in the COP26 negotiation agreement.
3. Hard & Soft Tactics in Climate Negotiations
Xu Bo also mentions that India employs a dual strategy of both hard and soft tactics in climate negotiations. In terms of hard tactics, they mention India highlighting its efforts in decarbonisation through policies to promote renewable energy, energy efficiency, and clean cooking fuels; low per capita emissions and lack of historical responsibility for climate change; and achievements in increasing forest cover. Xu Bo notes that Indian diplomacy pushes developed countries to fulfil their historical responsibilities and provide financial and technical support to developing nations as part of hard tactics. In terms of soft tactics, they discuss Indian efforts to enhance its global image and soft power by transforming from a “naysayer” to an active participant in climate negotiations. An example of this is initiatives like the ‘Lifestyle of Environmental Protection’ (LiFE). Huang Zhengduo notes, “On the issue of climate change, the ‘BASIC Four’ — including India — has played an important role in international climate negotiations, playing a vitally important role in safeguarding developing countries’ interests.”
4. Climate finance competition
India’s relationship with other developing countries regarding climate finance is characterised by both cooperation and competition. In this context, Xu Bo argues the lack of sufficient climate finance is the most significant barrier to India becoming a carbon-neutral country, as India does not have a dedicated budget for climate change mitigation and primarily relies on international climate finance negotiations to secure the necessary funds.
Xu Bo adds that India consistently emphasises that developed countries have ‘insufficient climate finance commitments’, such as providing $100 billion annually to developing countries. Yet, India supports the creation of a “loss and damage” fund to address the impact of climate change-related disasters on developing countries. India has opposed disproportionate benefits to other developing countries. For example, India proposed including ‘increasing forest carbon stocks’ in the United Nations Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) plan, which reshaped global REDD negotiations to provide more direct benefits to India rather than solely offering financial incentives to developing countries with high forest cover and deforestation rates.
5. Potential for Cooperation
One prominent theme in Chinese analyses is the recognition of the potential for China-India cooperation on climate change-related issues. At the Official level, the 2009 Agreement on Cooperation in Addressing Climate Change between China and India is often cited as the foundation for bilateral collaboration. Under this agreement, the two countries established a Partnership to Address Climate Change and a China-India Working Group on Climate Change to discuss issues in international negotiations and domestic policy measures. The 2015 Joint Statement between both countries recalls the 2009 agreement, and both sides “believe that their bilateral partnership on climate change is mutually beneficial and contributes to the global efforts to address Climate Change.” The 2022 Joint statement issued at the BRICS High-level meeting on Climate Change opposes the politicisation of climate change and all forms of unilateralism and protectionism. It also opposes any measures to restrict trade and investment and set up new green trade barriers under the pretext of addressing climate change. Lastly, as outlined in the 2024 Joint statement from the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, the environment ministers of these nations have reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening their collective leadership and breaking the inertia in climate action. Hu Weija, a reporter for the Global Times (a Chinese state-run media outlet), highlights the shared interests and challenges that China and India face as the world's two largest developing countries and major greenhouse gas emitters. Another article in the Global Times points to specific areas where China and India can work together, such as green technology development and transfer. The article notes that since China has the world’s largest photovoltaic power generation capacity and rich experience in renewable energy, it is seen as well-positioned to support India's efforts to transform its energy infrastructure. Zhang Yao, director at the Center for Maritime and Polar Region Studies of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies even suggests that climate change could open up new avenues for trilateral cooperation among China, India, and Russia, particularly in the Arctic region. However, they also acknowledge the short-term obstacles to such collaboration, including India’s perception of China as a competitor in the Arctic.
6. Economic Dimensions
Another key theme in Chinese analysis is the economic aspects of India’s climate policies and their implications for China-India relations. According to a Global Times article, potential synergies exist between China’s advanced clean energy technologies and India’s growing market needs. For example, former Chinese Ambassador to India Sun Weidong has argued that China and India should enhance cooperation in areas like electric vehicles (EVs), battery production, smart grid, and energy-saving technologies where Chinese capabilities align well with India's ambitions to develop its EV industry. However, Hu Weijia also expresses concerns about India’s protectionist policies and the challenges they pose for Chinese firms operating in the Indian market. Hu argues that India should adopt a more open attitude and reduce trade barriers in sectors like solar module production to boost cooperation. One recurring theme across Chinese state media outlets is the portrayal of India's “Make in India” initiative as an obstacle to and a failure in fostering China-India climate cooperation. For example, Yin Yeping, another writer for the Global Times, points out that China’a advanced production capabilities in electric vehicles (EVs) and related battery products are well-suited to meet the needs of India's emerging EV industry. This collaboration, Yin suggests, could be particularly beneficial given the “fruitlessness” of India's Make in India initiative, which has struggled to achieve its intended goals of boosting domestic manufacturing and reducing reliance on imports.
7. The U.S. is a divisive and unreliable partner
Another argument put forth in Chinese media is that India is facing setbacks in its green technology manufacturing sector due to the increasing protectionist measures imposed by the United States on its solar industry. This argument is that the US is targeting any “foreign industry that poses a threat to U.S. interests or competes with U.S. industries”, irrespective of the country of origin. The aim of this proposition is to place actions taken by the US against China within the broader context of the adverse effects of American protectionism on all major economies. In that context, the article advises India to “diversify its export markets and seek more opportunities in the Asian industrial chain by strengthening cooperation with regional countries…” Huang Zhengduo asserts that emerging economies face immense pressure from Western nations, particularly the US, during climate change negotiations. This was evident in 2008 when the Us directly confronted India on agricultural subsidies, leading to an impasse in reaching a final compromise. Furthermore, Huang suggests that Western countries employ divisive tactics, such as threatening certain developing nations within multilateral mechanisms, to undermine their unity and weaken these mechanisms. Despite attempts to include India in discussions, Western nations are reluctant to treat it as an equal partner in the negotiations.
Conclusion
Chinese analysts view India's climate change diplomacy as a complex interplay of cooperation and competition, reflecting both opportunities and challenges for bilateral cooperation. At the official level, the narrative is largely cooperative, with the 2009 Agreement on Cooperation on Addressing Climate Change between both countries being seen as a foundational framework for collaboration. Chinese analysts recognise India’s flexible commitments in climate negotiations, driven by its priorities of poverty eradication and development, but also note the competitive dynamics in securing climate finance vis-a-vis other developing countries. Despite these challenges, there is a recognition of the potential for China-India cooperation, particularly in green technology and renewable energy, where China’s capabilities align with India's market needs.
