China’s muted response to the pre-emptive military strike launched by the US and Israel against Iran, as well as the latter’s literally ballistic retaliation, is notable in highlighting the gap between Asian power’s global ambitions and limited warfighting capabilities.
The Context
On February 28, 2026, Israel and the US launched a coordinated pre-emptive military strike against Iran. In retaliation, Iran launched ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones targeting Israeli military assets and US bases stationed across the Middle East. The Chinese Foreign Ministry “strongly condemned the strikes,” with Foreign Minister Wang Yi characterising the “assassination” of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as a “blatant killing of a sovereign leader, a severe violation of international law, and an unacceptable attempt at regime change.” Beijing also urged that all sides immediate halt military operations, and advised its citizens to evacuate Iran.
But what are China’s actual stakes in the conflict?
The defence relationship between China and Iran is perhaps the most vital exchange between the two countries, aside from the fact that China absorbs ~80% of Iran’s oil exports.
While China has historically been cautious about flagrantly violating international arms embargoes, the expiration of UN restrictions and the geopolitical tensions emerging in West Asia following the June 2025 ‘12-Day War’ between Israel and Iran, have led to a surge in Sino-Iranian military cooperation. For Beijing, arming Tehran kills two birds with one stone - it helps in securing a steady flow of discounted crude oil, and in creating a persistent distraction for the US in West Asia without committing Chinese troops on ground.
What is the composition of Iran’s defence imports from China?
Tehran has recently purchased and deployed advanced Chinese surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, including the HQ-9, HQ-16, and the highly mobile HQ-17AE short-range air defence systems. These systems have so far provided little help in defending Iran’s nuclear facilities and leadership compounds from American-Israeli strikes. Conversely, China’s YLC-8B anti-stealth radars have, so far, performed better, though much more hindsight is necessary. Their low-frequency operation reportedly allowed Iranian commanders to track incoming stealth assets further out than previous Russian-made systems, though they ultimately failed to prevent some significant fatalities.
Beyond defensive systems, Iran’s acquisitions from China have recently expanded to include offensive systems. Most notably, recent reports indicate that Iran is finalising a deal to purchase Chinese CM-302 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. Boasting a range of nearly 290 kilometers and the ability to fly low and fast to evade ship-borne radar, the CM-302 can target US aircraft carriers and naval vessels in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. Additionally, Beijing has stepped in to fill supply chain gaps left by a strained Russian defence industry, delivering loitering munitions (kamikaze drones) to Tehran to restock its depleted drone fleets for retaliatory strikes.
Nonetheless, Beijing’s strategy in the Middle East is fundamentally risk-averse. China has benefitted from the region’s status quo and is aware of the tremendous costs the US has borne in its entanglements with MENA. Consequently, while Beijing values Iran as a defence partner and a crucial node for energy security, it neither seems to officially support Tehran’s nuclear armament programme, nor does it aim to go to war over Iran.