As China prepares for its 2027 military modernisation milestone, a recent commentary by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Dalian Naval Academy instructor Zhang Xinsheng explains how Beijing is preparing its armed forces for potential conflict. The ket takeaway of the author’s assessment is that for a force aiming to become “world-class” by 2049, military training isn’t just important - it is the “most direct preparation for military struggle” (or actual war).
In the past few years, Chinese President and Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping has crystallised the idea that military training must be the armed forces’ “routine central task.” With China having not fought a war since 1979, the PLA definitely faces the ‘peace disease’ dilemma - building a force capable of modern combat without recent battlefield experience. Training, in this context, becomes the bridge between peacetime preparation and wartime performance.
Zhang reiterates Xi’s sentiments by arguing:
“Soldiers become brave through training; battles are won through training. The PLA must forge itself into elite troops capable of fighting and winning.”
Three Pillars of Purpose
Zhang further articulates the importance of military training through three interconnected lenses:
First, training is positioned as essential for winning “modern wars.” The article emphasises how warfare has transformed through informatisation and intelligentisation, which are buzzwords that pervade PLA doctrine and practice. Chinese strategists recognise that future conflicts will be decided by “multidimensional expansion of battlefield space” and “intelligent dominance of victory mechanisms.” Hence, integrated operations in new and emerging domains of warfighting (especially those that are non-kinetic and technologically-oriented) will, in Zhang and the PLA’s understanding, secure battle victories.
Second, training directly supports the formation of “strategic capabilities.” These could refer to information and aerospace dominance, or even offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. Recent Pentagon assessments note China’s accelerated timeline, with 2027 marking a critical near-term capability threshold. In this regard, training serves as the mechanism to transform abstract modernisation plans into practical, testable abilities.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, training forges “elite forces” with the “confidence to prevail over all adversaries.” This likely speaks about cultivating the psychological edge and combat resilience that China’s leadership believes will be decisive in high-intensity conflict.
What’s striking…
…About Zhang’s approach is the emphasis on human factors despite China’s technological aspirations. The article dedicates substantial attention to developing three qualities in personnel: command acumen, operational skills, and combat style. The focus on commanders is particularly noteworthy/ PLA leadership has long worried about whether its officers, most of whom are promoted during peacetime, possess the thinking and battlefield decision-making ability needed for actual war. Zhang’s call for commanders to “understand operations, know how to command, be adept at organizing training” reflects ongoing concerns about leadership readiness, especially given recent high-level corruption purges within the PLA.
Finally, Zhang outlines four training approaches that align with broader PLA modernisation efforts:
- Realistic combat training emphasizes training under conditions that mirror actual warfare;
- Joint training, involving coordination across services, support arms, and systems to enable China’s victory in what it calls “system-versus-system confrontation”;
- Science and technology-enabled training, using simulation, networking, and big data to approximate future combat and accelerate the translation of technological advancement into battlefield capability; and
- Law-based training management to ensure everyone - from the commander to the foot soldier - follows training regulations and combat manuals.