MoD and IDSA No Longer Separate

At the recently concluded annual general body meeting of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), the flavour of the discussion was the think tank’s autonomy. The meeting discussed the resolution on renaming the institute, by affixing Manohar Parrikar to its existing nomenclature. The Narendra Modi government had changed the name last year itself without consulting the institute’s executive council. Later, the government left it to the general body to take the final call.

Since its inception in 1965, the IDSA has had a tenuous relationship with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that has suzerainty over the institute, but at the same time is expected to respect its autonomy. By the end of the annual general meeting (AGM) on 15 July, its autonomy might have taken a body blow by the decisions of the very members who are supposed to protect it. The soul of late K. Subrahmanyam, the architect of the IDSA’s structural relationship with the MoD, could be restless over the changes thrust upon his brainchild.

Read the full article in ThePrint

How India can guard its Interests should Kabul fall to the Taliban

As the prospect of Taliban bands fighting their way to Kabul becomes more likely with the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, there is a growing perception in New Delhi that, as a newspaper editorial put it, for India the situation “holds no glad tidings, good options or even a silver lining." The concern is that if the Taliban regain power, not only will India lose influence, but also that battle-hardened Islamist militants will turn their attentions to Kashmir, just as they did 30 years ago after the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan.

Well, as much as these fears and concerns are genuine, they are also overblown. International politics is vastly different today from what it was in 1991 or even 2001. The return of the Taliban will be terrible for the people of their unfortunate country, but it does not automatically follow that they will pose the same kind of threat to India as they did in the 1990s. Even then, their hostility towards India was found to be driven more by the agenda of the Pakistani military-jihadi complex and less by any intrinsic animosity towards us. In recent times, their adversarial position towards New Delhi has been in response to India’s support for the Afghan government and, until recently, the refusal to talk to them.Read the full article in The Mint

Army must ditch ‘superiority’ mindset. Distrust, Animosity will only hamper Military Reforms

It would be naïve to expect that anything good would emerge from the public spat between Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat and Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria on the politically mandated creation of the Theatre Command System. There is nothing wrong in professional disagreements but to air them in public is unacceptable to the military ethos. Worse, it comes at a time when threats to national security are assuming ominous proportions.

In all probability, both Gen Rawat and ACM Bhadauria would have got the political pipe down messages and one can expect that things will settle down. India’s military image would have temporarily taken a beating. But certain good things can come out of this unbecoming episode, if the next moves by the political leadership are appropriately and speedily managed.

Read the full article in ThePrint

Mint | Why liberal democracies have a distinct edge on cyber capability

According to a recent report on the cyber capabilities of 15 countries, the US is the world’s only cyber superpower. China is the leading power in the next tier, along with Russia, the UK, Israel, France, Australia and Canada. India is placed in the third tier, alongside Iran, Japan, Malaysia, North Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia. The International Institute of Strategic Studies net assessment of Cyber Capabilities and National Power compares countries across seven dimensions ranging from doctrines to offensive capabilities, and concludes that China and Russia are much farther behind the US than popular media reports would suggest. Read the full article here.

One Year On, Assessing the Ban on Chinese Apps

In June last year, the Indian government’s decision to block 59 Chinese apps was greeted with much fanfare in the media.The official rationale behind this, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology had explained then, was that these products were “prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state and public order.”Following this, there were three more rounds of such bans targeting Chinese apps, taking the total number of apps banned to 267. Earlier this year, reports indicated that the government had asked companies like ByteDance, Tencent and Alibaba to respond to a list of queries. Not satisfied with their response, it has persisted with the ban.Read the full article in the Quint.

For CCP, the Era of Seeking Strength

On July 1, even as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) marks its centenary, it has sought to use the moment to catalyse the march towards the goals of “socialist modernisation” and “national rejuvenation”. According to the Party’s, and indeed Xi Jinping’s, historical narrative, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) entered a new era after the 19th Party Congress in 2017. If earlier periods were marked by efforts to “stand up” and then “grow rich”, the new era is marked by the country “becoming strong”. Examining Xi’s speeches, Party regulations, the government’s economic policies and official media discourse, one can identify some of the key features that characterise this era of seeking strength.Read the full article in Hindustan Times. Views are personal

‘Gray zone’ intrigue may derail Russia-Japan cooperation

Read the Full Text of the Article on Asia Times Rightly or wrongly, Moscow may interpret recent events as ‘war by other means’ waged by US ally JapanRussia and its adversaries are equally obsessed with a full spectrum of “gray zone” activities, including high-tech military, industrial and corporate espionage. While Russia does not see Japan as an adversary, it feels uncomfortable with Japan’s close ties to the US.The contemporary Russia-Japan relationship is complicated, with worrying trends signaling possible derailment of their bilateral ties in some fields.While the direction of great-power relations is rightly gauged from policy moves and summits, the shadowy world of espionage and spies, while overtly aligned with policy and polity, covertly operates to secure national interests, making no concessions, even to allies.Over the past few weeks, a curious case of alleged espionage has been grabbing headlines in Japan. Kazuo Miyasaka, the 70-year-old former owner of a technical research firm, was reportedly apprehended by the police for allegedly passing on high-tech military secrets to a member of the Russian trade representative mission in Japan.Miyasaka is believed to have betrayed secrets related to the US Space Force’s unmanned X-37B spacecraft, among other advanced systems.Read the Full Text of the Article on Asia Times All views are personal and do not reflect the recommendations of the Takshashila Institution 

Should India Worry About China's Naval Fleet in Indian Ocean?

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) of the 21st century represents a geopolitical hotspot. Power politics is gaining traction in the region, with China attempting to form a leading presence in the vast waters surrounding the Indian subcontinent. In the context of (i) strategic identity, (ii) naval modernization and (iii) limitation in power, this article attempts to understand Chinese ambitions in the Indian ocean and argues that although the IOR will remain an Indian dominated region for the present, we cannot ignore the aggressive approach from China as a result of its highly ambitious foreign policy and increasing activities there.This article originally appeared in The Quint. You can read the full article here.

How to Beat China in the High-Tech Race

The near-daily cadence of reports highlighting China's growing technology prowess has set the cat among the pigeons in many democracies. In response, these countries are now offering higher subsidies and fatter incentives to increase the competitiveness of their own technology industries.

The US Senate, for instance, passed a $250 billion Innovation and Competition bill on 8th June aimed at outpacing China. The Indian government, since last year, has launched Product Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes for 13 sectors worth ₹2 trillion, some of them targeted at high-tech industries such as semiconductors, telecom, and networking. Earlier this month, a draft growth strategy of the Japanese government also promised generous financial incentives to attract cutting-edge chip-making facilities. Not to be left behind, the EU, too, has announced a €145 billion plan to upgrade its semiconductor and electronics manufacturing.

While the intent is encouraging, it's interesting to note that all these plans are qualitatively quite similar to China's 'Made in China 2025' — a state-led industrial policy for technology. Released in 2015, it was labelled as a threat to global trade for channelling state subsidies to achieve import substitution. But now, many countries seem to be following a similar approach. Of course, China's subsidies are often discriminatory and place extreme restrictions on foreign investment. Even so, all these policies mirror China's at their core — they are all about using old-style industrial policy instruments such as subsidies and incentives to achieve high-tech self-sufficiency.Read the full article in Times of India. Views are personal

Cyber Threats now sit alongside Nuclear Ones

The US-Russian meeting in Geneva on 15 June signified an attempt by both sides to arrest the pace of a worsening relationship. The US, as the aggrieved party, accused the Russians of cyberattacks. US President Joe Biden handed over a list of 16 ‘critical infrastructure’ entities and warned that if they were attacked, the US will respond in a ‘cyber way’. Russian President Vladimir Putin denied culpability for any attacks and held the US responsible for several malicious cyber campaigns in Russia. Both parties have, however, agreed to the creation of working groups for urgent arms control and cyber issues.

Cyber now sits alongside nuclear threats, and it is definitely a promotion in the value chain of strategic affairs. The US is concerned and there are good reasons for it. India should be too.

Read the full article in ThePrint

The Pandemic has shown how Dysfunctional our World Order is

What is the best way to fight a pandemic in an era of intense globalization? The answer, clearly, is for humanity to throw its combined resources against its common adversary. Since no one is safe until everyone is safe, the longer it takes for the world’s population to acquire immunity against the coronavirus, the greater the risk that whatever protection immunized populations currently enjoy will be broken by new variants.

And what would a common global response to a common threat look like? Here too the answer is clear: temporarily suspend intellectual property rights restrictions, lift export controls, remove trade barriers and eliminate regulatory friction on vaccine supply chains. Essential drugs and medical equipment should flow unrestricted to wherever they are necessary. Amid a firefight with a common enemy, it makes no sense to demand payment from an ally who urgently needs bullets.Read the full article in The Mint

The Galwan Valley One Year On: What's Changed with China and the PLA?

This month marks the first anniversary of the Galwan Valley clash between China and India, which resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian and at least four PLA soldiers. It also marks the first fatalities on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in over 45 years resulting from China’s attempts to change the status quo forcefully in Ladakh. The initial Chinese incursion was located at four points — Pangong Tso, the approach roads to the Depsang Plain, Gogra and Hotspring areas and Galwan Valley — which both China and India consider to be on their side of the LAC but were previously controlled by New Delhi. The Galwan Valley clash on the night of 15 June 2020 shattered three decades of trust and confidence established by five pacts signed between 1993 and 2012. In the days that followed, both sides deployed over two army divisions, battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers and surface to air missiles to Ladakh. Both sides also deployed fighter, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and drones at forward bases near the border. In August 2020, India carried out a “pre-emptive” operation on Pangong Tso’s south bank to strengthen its on-ground position and create leverage while negotiating a Chinese withdrawal.

Today, after thirteen months of friction, eleven rounds of Corps Commander-level meetings, seven Work Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) meetings and at least two known interactions between India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the two sides have only disengaged at Galwan and Pangong Tso. The stand-off in Ladakh continues at other friction points. In his recent interview, India’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen MM. Naravane highlighted that India continues to maintain a significant troop presence along the entire border. Heightened tensions and a forward Sino-Indian military presence on the LAC seem to be the new status quo. But four specific developments on the Chinese side since the Galwan incident could further impact the LAC dispute in the future. Some are a direct result of the ongoing military stand-off, while others are a part of the broader PLA restructuring and China’s evolving military strategy.

This was originally published on 9Dashline, please read the whole article using the link.

High time Indian Foreign Policy jettisons ‘don’t annoy China’ notion & Supports Virus Probe

Of late, Covid-19 has been getting a geopolitical boost from the tailwinds of political and scientific narratives originating primarily from the US. In May,  US President Joe Biden ordered an intelligence probe into the origins of the novel coronavirus or SARS-CoV-2. The fact that it originated in China is undisputed. Scientific suspicions that the virus is an artificial creation and probably leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology have now received a booster dose. Anthony Fauci, the Chief Medical Adviser to the US President, stated that he never played down the possibility of the lab leak in China for political reasons. In the last few weeks, a slew of scientific papers have reinforced the lab leak theory, with the G7 and the European Union adding political traction to the call for concerted action to uncover the truth. International politics has now inserted itself into the investigative process and is gaining momentum within the spaces of scientific doubts regarding the origin of the virus. In the long run, the scientific quest for facts draped in political free play could eventually be the information missile that could do a lot of damage to China.In the case of Covid-19, science, geography and politics could create a potent brew in the information age. In global geopolitics, this could become deadly for China. For China’s detractors, it might provide informational fuel and create the psychological effect that can, at the global level, drive popular anger directed against the country. It is an anger that has the potential to sustain because of the colossal damage caused by Covid to lives and livelihood.Read the full article in ThePrint

Five Trends in India-China Ties a Year after the Galwan Valley clash

The June 2020 clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers in the Galwan Valley has frequently been termed as a watershed moment in the history of bilateral relations. The incident marked the first loss of life in conflict along the boundary between the two countries in over four decades. A year later, while some equations have shifted, there has not been a sudden break — rather, ties appear to be drifting towards greater contestation with a certain ambivalence evident on both sides. This is underscored by five key trends.Read the full article in the Quint here.

What the COVID-19 Second Wave tells us about Twitter

The Covid-19 pandemic has given us several painful images in the last two years. During the first wave, the image that stayed with us was of migrant workers walking inhuman distances in the wake of an arbitrary national lockdown.During the second wave, the enduring image has been that of our social media feeds awash with desperate calls for help. Yet, amidst the shortage of critical medical equipment and the overflowing of cremation grounds, one cannot help but be struck by the great altruism and activism of thousands of regular social media users.Read the full article on Indian Express

Govt owes Indians an Explanation. Or its Gag Order & Pension Rule can be seen as Blackmail

Gag orders are increasingly being issued globally in this information age and becoming fashionable even in democracies. India is also in this race. Former US President Donald Trump’s gag orders were directed at serving government officials and deemed illegal. India seems to be a step ahead of the US, as its latest gag orders have a particular category of retired officials as their target. The Union government’s new order bars retired civil servants who worked in India’s security and intelligence bodies from publishing “details involving the affairs of the organisation without clearance from the head of the organisation”. Violation of procedure will lead to stoppage of pension.

The gag order was issued on 31 May through a notification by the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) that is directly under the PMO. The notification inserts an amendment to the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, and is applicable only to the central services cadre, including the Indian Foreign Service. It is not applicable to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS) and Indian Forest Service (IFS) because they belong to the All India Services. It also does not include the armed forces.Read the full article in ThePrint

Don’t rush into Sainik School public-private partnership. It can dilute and corrupt

Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, in her 2021-22 Budget speech, announced the Narendra Modi government’s intention of setting up an additional 100 Sainik Schools in partnership with NGOs, private schools and states. The move was received positively. There is, however, a need for caution and further introspection.

The initiative renews India’s involvement with schools established with the intent to provide future military leaders. The first wave began in 1922 with the setting up of the Royal Indian Military College (RIMC), Dehradun, and was followed up by the five Royal Indian Military Schools (RMS). It was part of an effort to Indianise the officer cadre of the British Indian Army. The British believed that public school education would make them suitable for the rigours and self-discipline of Army life. These schools are now controlled, financed and administered by the Army.

Read the full article on ThePrint 

The banal geopolitical fallout of the laboratory leak hypothesis

On 11 September 2001, the US suffered four coordinated terrorist attacks that claimed nearly 3,000 lives, injured over 25,000 people and caused at least $10 billion in property damage. Within hours, the US National Security Agency had intercepted phone calls that led them to suspect Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda of having planned and carried out the attacks. On that same evening, the CIA director confirmed this assessment to the US president. In two weeks, the FBI identified the specific attackers, and by the end of the month had published photographs and nationalities of all 19 terrorists who carried out the attacks. Of them were 15 Saudis, two Emiratis, a Lebanese and an Egyptian. Bin Laden himself was a Saudi national and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, a key conspirator, was Pakistani. The US authorities knew Bin Laden and his outfit quite well, for they had together fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, along with the Saudi and Pakistani intelligence agencies. So it is fair to say that one would have to have one’s head firmly buried in the sand to miss the glaring Saudi and Pakistani links to—and possible complicity in—the attacks.Read the full article in The Mint

Preparing for the waves

Just over a hundred years ago, the Spanish Flu pandemic devastated many parts of the world. An estimated 100 million people died; India accounted for 15-18 million of them. It was the second wave that was deadly. So far, the official death toll in India due to Covid-19 is over 330,000, and one can reasonably assume that the figure is undercounted. But it is, for sure, still a long way from the Spanish Flu figures.

With Covid-19, we don’t know for certain how many waves and types there will be. But looking at the devastation already wrought, we must prepare for more waves even as we deal with this one. We should have been doing far better than we have with the second wave. The State must identify and initiate the requisite measures to meet the disaster as a national emergency. Most importantly, this national disaster demands that crisis managers be not overly rule-bound and needlessly procedural.

Read the full article in Deccan Herald

US shifting its Tibet stance. When will India end its silence?

The Dalai Lama’s succession may be stirring the pot of Buddhism at the global geopolitical table. China’s sensitivity to Tibetan issues has long been viewed by some nations as having a high potential for leverage in the conduct of relations with it. But Donald Trump shook up the Tibetan pot in December 2020 when he signed into law the Tibetan Policy and Support Act 2020 or TPSA and changed the contours of the earlier US policy, which under the Barack Obama administration had sacrificed the region’s interests in order to foster better US-China relations.

The TPSA declares that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan Buddhist leaders are religious matters and all decisions pertaining to reincarnations rest solely with the Tibetan Buddhist faith community based on the instructions of the 14^th Dalai Lama and without interference by the government of the People’s Republic of China. The law also acknowledges the Central Tibetan Administration (the Government in Exile in Dharamshala) that is committed to peacefully negotiating its status as an autonomous entity within China. Last month, the Biden administration opted to continue the Trump policy.Read the full article in ThePrint