Commentary
Find our newspaper columns, blogs, and other commentary pieces in this section. Our research focuses on Advanced Biology, High-Tech Geopolitics, Strategic Studies, Indo-Pacific Studies & Economic Policy
‘Gray zone’ intrigue may derail Russia-Japan cooperation
Read the Full Text of the Article on Asia Times Rightly or wrongly, Moscow may interpret recent events as ‘war by other means’ waged by US ally JapanRussia and its adversaries are equally obsessed with a full spectrum of “gray zone” activities, including high-tech military, industrial and corporate espionage. While Russia does not see Japan as an adversary, it feels uncomfortable with Japan’s close ties to the US.The contemporary Russia-Japan relationship is complicated, with worrying trends signaling possible derailment of their bilateral ties in some fields.While the direction of great-power relations is rightly gauged from policy moves and summits, the shadowy world of espionage and spies, while overtly aligned with policy and polity, covertly operates to secure national interests, making no concessions, even to allies.Over the past few weeks, a curious case of alleged espionage has been grabbing headlines in Japan. Kazuo Miyasaka, the 70-year-old former owner of a technical research firm, was reportedly apprehended by the police for allegedly passing on high-tech military secrets to a member of the Russian trade representative mission in Japan.Miyasaka is believed to have betrayed secrets related to the US Space Force’s unmanned X-37B spacecraft, among other advanced systems.Read the Full Text of the Article on Asia Times All views are personal and do not reflect the recommendations of the Takshashila Institution
Should India Worry About China's Naval Fleet in Indian Ocean?
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) of the 21st century represents a geopolitical hotspot. Power politics is gaining traction in the region, with China attempting to form a leading presence in the vast waters surrounding the Indian subcontinent. In the context of (i) strategic identity, (ii) naval modernization and (iii) limitation in power, this article attempts to understand Chinese ambitions in the Indian ocean and argues that although the IOR will remain an Indian dominated region for the present, we cannot ignore the aggressive approach from China as a result of its highly ambitious foreign policy and increasing activities there.This article originally appeared in The Quint. You can read the full article here.
Cyber Threats now sit alongside Nuclear Ones
The US-Russian meeting in Geneva on 15 June signified an attempt by both sides to arrest the pace of a worsening relationship. The US, as the aggrieved party, accused the Russians of cyberattacks. US President Joe Biden handed over a list of 16 ‘critical infrastructure’ entities and warned that if they were attacked, the US will respond in a ‘cyber way’. Russian President Vladimir Putin denied culpability for any attacks and held the US responsible for several malicious cyber campaigns in Russia. Both parties have, however, agreed to the creation of working groups for urgent arms control and cyber issues.
Cyber now sits alongside nuclear threats, and it is definitely a promotion in the value chain of strategic affairs. The US is concerned and there are good reasons for it. India should be too.
The Pandemic has shown how Dysfunctional our World Order is
The Galwan Valley One Year On: What's Changed with China and the PLA?
This month marks the first anniversary of the Galwan Valley clash between China and India, which resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian and at least four PLA soldiers. It also marks the first fatalities on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in over 45 years resulting from China’s attempts to change the status quo forcefully in Ladakh. The initial Chinese incursion was located at four points — Pangong Tso, the approach roads to the Depsang Plain, Gogra and Hotspring areas and Galwan Valley — which both China and India consider to be on their side of the LAC but were previously controlled by New Delhi. The Galwan Valley clash on the night of 15 June 2020 shattered three decades of trust and confidence established by five pacts signed between 1993 and 2012. In the days that followed, both sides deployed over two army divisions, battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers and surface to air missiles to Ladakh. Both sides also deployed fighter, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and drones at forward bases near the border. In August 2020, India carried out a “pre-emptive” operation on Pangong Tso’s south bank to strengthen its on-ground position and create leverage while negotiating a Chinese withdrawal.
Today, after thirteen months of friction, eleven rounds of Corps Commander-level meetings, seven Work Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) meetings and at least two known interactions between India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the two sides have only disengaged at Galwan and Pangong Tso. The stand-off in Ladakh continues at other friction points. In his recent interview, India’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen MM. Naravane highlighted that India continues to maintain a significant troop presence along the entire border. Heightened tensions and a forward Sino-Indian military presence on the LAC seem to be the new status quo. But four specific developments on the Chinese side since the Galwan incident could further impact the LAC dispute in the future. Some are a direct result of the ongoing military stand-off, while others are a part of the broader PLA restructuring and China’s evolving military strategy.
This was originally published on 9Dashline, please read the whole article using the link.
Govt owes Indians an Explanation. Or its Gag Order & Pension Rule can be seen as Blackmail
Gag orders are increasingly being issued globally in this information age and becoming fashionable even in democracies. India is also in this race. Former US President Donald Trump’s gag orders were directed at serving government officials and deemed illegal. India seems to be a step ahead of the US, as its latest gag orders have a particular category of retired officials as their target. The Union government’s new order bars retired civil servants who worked in India’s security and intelligence bodies from publishing “details involving the affairs of the organisation without clearance from the head of the organisation”. Violation of procedure will lead to stoppage of pension.
The gag order was issued on 31 May through a notification by the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) that is directly under the PMO. The notification inserts an amendment to the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, and is applicable only to the central services cadre, including the Indian Foreign Service. It is not applicable to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS) and Indian Forest Service (IFS) because they belong to the All India Services. It also does not include the armed forces.Read the full article in ThePrint
Don’t rush into Sainik School public-private partnership. It can dilute and corrupt
Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, in her 2021-22 Budget speech, announced the Narendra Modi government’s intention of setting up an additional 100 Sainik Schools in partnership with NGOs, private schools and states. The move was received positively. There is, however, a need for caution and further introspection.
The initiative renews India’s involvement with schools established with the intent to provide future military leaders. The first wave began in 1922 with the setting up of the Royal Indian Military College (RIMC), Dehradun, and was followed up by the five Royal Indian Military Schools (RMS). It was part of an effort to Indianise the officer cadre of the British Indian Army. The British believed that public school education would make them suitable for the rigours and self-discipline of Army life. These schools are now controlled, financed and administered by the Army.
India’s gamble on China failed in Ladakh. But there’s a new risk worth taking
The deadlock on military de-escalation in Ladakh continues. It might turn out to be another example of China’s perfidy. India has had sufficient historical experience with China’s use of agreements for buying time and deceiving us. The 2018 agreement for defusing the crisis in Doklam and its subsequent military occupation of the rest of the Doklam plateau is fresh in memory. It should have warned us about the dangers of China getting India to withdraw from a tactically advantageous position at the Kailash Range in Ladakh and then using delay tactics to keep India under pressure.
China’s strategic behaviour can only be interpreted if one views the military moves in Ladakh in the broader perspective of China-US geopolitical rivalry. China’s ambitions that generate its geopolitical compulsions are no longer being concealed. Xi Jinping is claiming that the US and China are now virtually equal powers and it is only a matter of time before China surpasses America economically and, if some Chinese claims are to be believed, even technologically. At the same time, China believes India can be an impediment to its ambitions. But only if India’s partnership with the US exploits a geographic reality steeped in the maritime domain and threatens China’s dreams of predominance at the global and regional geopolitical table.Read the full article in ThePrint
India and Vietnam should improve their defence ties
India and Vietnam held their second maritime security dialogue recently. A press release by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) stated that both countries discussed developments in the domain of “maritime security, regional cooperation activities and opportunities for cooperation between the two countries.” Multiple such discussions have taken place between India and Vietnam in recent years. But, the underlying question is - to what extent have these promises been turned into reality? Both India and Vietnam have highlighted the need to work towards achieving a peaceful, stable, secure, free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region. It is crucial to look into what has been achieved to date and how India can elevate this relationship to promise a better security future for both nations.
A common threat
India and Vietnam both have long-standing territorial disputes with China. And Beijing’s increasing aggressive posture with regard to these is a concern for both countries. For instance, the ongoing standoff in Eastern Ladakh is an example of the tense relationship between Beijing and New Delhi. With complete disengagement and de-escalation unlikely in the near terms, India’s focus should be equally directed towards protecting its maritime domain and, more importantly, upholding its vision of a rule-based, free, open and secure region.
Similarly, conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS) have been a point of contention between Vietnam and China for a long time. It is only accelerating as Beijing is becoming more aggressive in its approaches and claims of sovereignty. The recent controversy surrounding Chinese vessels present in the Whitsun Reef is an example of this. Chinese vessels are increasing activity in other islands too. A spokesperson from Hanoi recently said, “The activities of Chinese vessels within the territorial sea around of Sinh Ton Dong in Vietnams Truong Sa Islands violate Vietnams sovereignty and the provisions of UNCLOS”. Vietnam was sharply critical of Chinese actions in this regard. For India, the SCS is also an important trading route. About $200 billion worth of trade passes through the region with many citizens working and investing in ASEAN countries, like China and Japan. Any aggression by Beijing in the region directly impacts India’s economic interests. This necessitates India to work with partners in the region like Vietnam.
Naval and security cooperation has seen positive success
India and Vietnam have made significant progress on agreements related to elevating defence and naval cooperation. Yet, more needs to be done to materialise these goals. Since upgrading their partnership to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ (CSP) in 2016, a wide range of institutionalised dialogues have taken place, with many agreements being signed. Some include; the 7th Strategic Dialogue held in April 2018 and the first India-Vietnam Maritime Security Dialogue held in March 2019. A recent summit in December 2020 was noteworthy, as both Prime Ministers signed a Plan of Action for 2021-2023. In their joint statement, the two leaders expressed satisfaction over the successful implementation of the High-Speed Guard Boat (HSGB) Manufacturing Project for Vietnam Border Guard Command under the US$ 100 million Defence Line of Credit extended by the Government of India to Vietnam.
Naval cooperation in the form of joint exercises, training and friendly port visits has seen considerable progress. In December 2020, the navies of India and Vietnam commenced a series of exercises in the South China Sea to develop maritime interoperability. Vietnamese ships have participated in multilateral naval exercises hosted by India, such as MILAN and the Indian Navy hosted an international fleet review held in Visakhapatnam in 2016. Furthermore, coastguards and naval officers from both sides have been in regular dialogue over the years and continue to do so.
Limitations in the supply of defence equipment
In terms of defence procurements, the two countries are faced with some level of ambiguity. In 2014, India offered the BrahMos, an anti-ship cruise missile to Vietnam. But no real progress has been seen since then, apart from intermittent talks. Lack of funding has been stated as a reason for the deal not being materialised. Another reason being speculated is a fear of Beijing. In the wake of China strengthening ties with India’s adversaries, like Pakistan, the latter seems to be hesitant to accelerate equipment supply to immediate neighbourhood countries. However, the latest hurdle comes with the US’s Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions or CAATSA, which can halt sales through arbitrary embargoes. As the BrahMos cruise missiles are locally manufactured in collaboration with Russia, it depends on Moscow’s critical components, liable to sanctions under CAATSA. Such sanctions could halt the Indian governments move of a fast-track export of such missiles to the recipient countries, namely Vietnam. India needs to effectively deal with such obstacles if it wants to boost its material exports fivefold to $5 billion by 2025.
Since 2016, Vietnam and India have been in talks regarding the potential sale of the Varunastra Torpedo. Finally, in 2018, the anti-submarine torpedo was inducted into the Indian Navy. Still, the development process took more time than expected, according to the Navy chief admiral Sunil Lamba and DRDO chief S Christopher. "We need to work towards a reasonable time-frame from concept to realisation to address our capability gap in time,’’ the former said. Several other reasons listed for the delay included the availability of ships and submarines to test numerous aspects of technology. When Vietnam will receive the vessel is still unclear, though.
The Indian government must carefully overlook such lapses and effectively carry out defence exports if it intends to strengthen its defence partnership with Vietnam to the fullest. With China ramping up its Belt and Road Initiative, it is time for India to maintain a coherent export policy with Asia to transform its ‘Act East Policy’.
A top Army doctor transferred in middle of pandemic says a lot about India’s civil-military ties
In India’s military history, sacking a field commander during the course of a battle has been rare. Even if done, it is usually the judgement call of the top military leadership and not of a politician. That norm has now been shaken in a different type of war – by the sudden removal of Major General Vasu Vardhan, the Commandant of Delhi’s Army Base Hospital, who was a critical field commander in the military’s battle against the Covid-19 pandemic.
The authority to take such a decision rests with the defence minister. The official justification that it is a routine transfer and merely a part of a larger human resource management exercise will not fool anyone and is an insult to basic intelligence. The medical pedigree of Maj. Gen. Vardhan is impeccable. He is the topmost pulmonologist in the Army, a branch of medicine at the forefront of the war against the pandemic. His professional competence was not in question and he had only three more months to go before retirement. Some attempts are being made on social media to tarnish the image of Maj. Gen. Vardhan by questioning his administrative abilities.
From my personal interaction with several recovered Covid patients, it is clear that the Base Hospital’s handling of this challenging situation has been commendable. The performance of the hard-pressed staff has been widely praised.There is definitely more than what meets the eye.
What about military ethics?
It is well known that the Commandant was faced with a severe shortage of beds, medical support facilities and staff. It is possible that the Commandant’s transfer was provoked by his resistance to accommodate non-entitled persons or provide critical medicines in short supply to persons not authorised but who perhaps were being sent by the Ministry of Defence with the Directorate General of Armed Forces Medical Service (DGAFMS) acting as a conduit. Such unreasonable demands could also have been made by the military. Whatever the actual detail, Maj. Gen. Vardhan stood his moral ground when asked to carry out actions that were unauthorised and violated ethical and professional standards.The Commandant could have crossed paths with the Army brass, the political leadership, or both. If it was only with the Army, the Ministry of Defence would have certainly questioned the removal, and the file would never have been processed and cleared with such speed. Postings of Major Generals and above require the defence minister’s signature. Even if the Army leadership had objected to the move, they must have been overruled. But the military’s top leadership can be exculpated, only if they have put their objections in writing and tried to hold the hand of a subordinate who has taken an ethical stand. If the military has not objected in writing or the Ministry of Defence has decided despite written objections, then the matter suggests a certain degree of politicisation of the military and exposes the merging of military ethics with that of the civil society.It can be reasonably assumed that after being Commandant of the Army Base Hospital for 18 months and with only three months to retire, it is a punishment posting. A tool that is well known and used to put people in their place, and which politicians routinely use to keep the civil services in check. Percolation of such practices into the armed forces would be severely harmful to its institutional culture, which is on a different plane altogether.If the above explanation is indeed true, the Ministry of Defence’s actions are ethically questionable and bring to the fore the pathologies that afflict India’s civil-military relations.
An ethical failure
As explained in my column last week, the danger wrought by politicisation of India’s military is not so much of a coup, but one in which the constitutional gap between the military and party in power is narrowed and misused. Parenthetically, the medical component of the armed forces under the DGAFMS is placed directly under the defence secretary in the Department of Defence and all attempts to place it under the Integrated Defence Staff have been successfully thwarted. It is an open secret that due to structural proximity, over a period of time, the higher military medical fraternity has established a reciprocal and cosy relationship with the civilian power centres in the Ministry of Defence. The civilians are believed to be provided mostly unauthorised access to medical care especially in the premier Research & Referral (R&R) Hospital in Delhi. Reciprocally, postings, promotions and approval for premature retirement are taken care of.
The structural relationship of the medical services exposes the pathologies of the proximity and control in civil-military interactions. The recently created Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and induction of uniformed personnel in integrated civil organisations like the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) could be similarly infected if lessons learnt from the medical services experience is ignored. For, eventually, the ethical fibre of the uniform should not fray when blended with civilian moral values, which are far less stringent.The Ministry of Defence has taken an action and is hiding behind a body of seeming falsehoods. Since the official reason is that it is a routine move, the file contents can be known through RTI. If the Army has not objected and the Ministry of Defence has also not questioned the move, the falsehood stands exposed. It also exposed if the Army has objected and the Ministry of Defence has overruled. Agreeably, once the defence minister has authorised the posting, the Armed Forces have no option but to implement it. Regrettably, it seems that the military leadership has opted to be part of the cover-up and this is reflected in its detailed official statement. The defence ministry and the Army’s reaction to the transfer of Maj. Gen. Vasu Vardhan signals to all others the price that they will have to pay if they do not bend even though their stand upholds the highest and precious value of the uniform – its ethical rectitude. The politico-military reaction is an ethical failure, the resonance of which will reverberate down the line.
Between obedience and conformity
The ultimate strength of India’s armed forces is its spirit of sacrifice, and of unfailingly placing the nation before self. While soldiers on the front line are duty-bound to risk their lives, the military leadership is expected to play a role as exemplars who protect the military institution from the negotiable morals that are frequently observed to be the normal fare in our society. It finally boils down to their willingness to sacrifice personal gain in terms of promotions and postings, which the civilians control.The heart of the problem is the growing ability of politico-bureaucratic authorities to bend the rules and the simultaneous failure of the military leadership to stand their moral ground. Though Maj. Gen. Vardhan’s case can easily be dismissed as sui generis even as the official explanation passes it off as a routine HR move, the warning signs may be ominous. Over a period of time, such signals from the top hierarchy can only weaken the military’s ethical fabric leading to the moral factor losing its weight to reflect in personal behaviour. What requires to be understood is that obedience to authority and conforming to questionable morals are two entirely different things.The potential toxic combination is of the political leadership’s inappropriate actions being supported by the ethical frailty of the higher military leadership. The combination could be dealt with by appointing a defence minister with a military background who is known for their ethical credentials and professional competence. In the existing ambience, the civil-military module requires political support to deliver quick and effective results. Fortuitously, unlike the dynamics of civil society, military’s special legal provisions and disciplined character make it feasible to rein in ethical weakness that could have seeped into its institutional culture. All it requires is for the higher military leadership to set an example and ruthlessly implement it.There is indeed a fine line between obedience and conformity in civil-military relations. Obedience is mandatory but conformity by the military to the ethical value system of civil society could be deleterious to India.Lt Gen Prakash Menon (retd) is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution, and former military adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. Views are personal. This article first appeared in ThePrint
Finnish intel review sheds light on relations with Russia
Finland is wary of a possible Russian clash with NATO in the Baltic region
Read the full text at Asia Times
A defence minister with military background — a risk India needs to take
In December 2019, a long-pending and critical evolutionary process of structural reforms in defence was unleashed by the Narendra Modi government. It was a commendable PMO-driven initiative. It encompassed the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff, triple hatted as military adviser to the defence minister, the permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the head of the newly created Department of Military Affairs. Notably, the position has mandated the CDS to establish the Theatre/Joint Commands.
The fact that defence reforms were required to be driven by the PMO reflects the platitude that India requires a strong PMO to override narrow interests of individual central ministries and state governments in order to serve national objectives. It is never the ideal solution, but has been found to be an effective method in a diverse and complex country inhabited by a plethora of domestic power centres. Post-Kargil, the creation of the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), directly under the PMO to act as the think tank for it, has strengthened its ability for policy formulation. However, the downside is the human proclivity to pander to perceived desires of strong prime ministers. Such a possibility will be perennial. In the case of this round of defence reforms under the Modi government, national security interests seem to be the predominant driver.Read the full article on ThePrint
In India’s Covid-19 challenge, China’s hopes and anxieties
The second wave of Covid-19 in India has been among the biggest international stories being covered across the Chinese media. The coverage reflects a sense of anxiety and opportunity.In terms of the former, there is concern about the spread of the so-called double mutant, or B.1.617 strain of the virus across the region and into China. A fresh wave of domestic outbreaks would be deeply damaging for the Communist Party, which declared victory against the virus last year, and would take a toll on China’s economic recovery. Likewise, a massive public health crisis across the Indian subcontinent, at the minimum, would hurt Chinese commercial interests and investments. At worst, it could result in a humanitarian catastrophe with the potential to stoke socio-political instability along China’s periphery.At the same time, the situation in India presents opportunities for Beijing. At the bare minimum, there is a commercial opportunity, given the shortage of emergency supplies, equipment and therapeutics. But, at a deeper level, there are geopolitical opportunities. This is reflected in the Chinese media’s critical coverage of the delayed response by the Joe Biden administration, the emphasis on China’s manufacturing prowess and its centrality to key supply chains, and foreign minister Wang Yi’s summit with his South Asian counterparts, which focused on health supplies and vaccines.
How China’s Nuclear Ambiguity Affects India
What China’s nuclear ambiguity means for India is different from that for other nuclear powers such as the United States and Russia.
Ever since China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964, Beijing’s nuclear strategy has largely remained unchanged: it is based on achieving deterrence through assured retaliation. A crucial requirement for this is the survivability of its arsenal following a nuclear or conventional adversary’s first strike. But the improved technology and evolving security dynamics with the United States have compelled China to rethink its operational capabilities to achieve effective deterrence. China is rapidly attempting to modernize its conventional and nuclear arsenal and increase its nuclear ambiguity through subtle changes in the doctrine, force posture, and capabilities.
UK outlines global-focused defense strategy
Britain seeks to remain relevant in a world where it sees threats proliferating, while its finances are shrinking
The United Kingdom has outlined a vision for its defense and foreign-engagement priorities in its latest Integrated Review and Defense Command Paper.The paradigm of defense reviews in the UK goes back at least to the 1950s. The new document, published in March, has implications ranging from raising and appropriating defense spending to setting up new international bureaucratic structures and strategic nuclear signaling that nobody expected.It is no exaggeration to say that the document is Britain’s plan to remain relevant in a world where it sees threats proliferating, while its finances are shrinking.
Cummings couldn’t ‘cut’ it
Boris Johnson, the current British prime minister, promised an integrated review during his election campaign in 2019. However, at the time, Dominic Cummings, the technocratic chief adviser to the PM, was thought to be influencing the review. Until his exit from Downing Street in November last year, there was a lot of speculation on the review bringing a lot of cuts.Cummings was thought to prefer investment in high-tech solutions and wouldn’t shrink from cutting personnel and conventional security and war-fighting capabilities in the belief that they’d be obsolete in the very near future.
But in the end, in the final document, the cuts are not as severe as initially thought, though the focus on high-tech solutions and new war-fighting domains like cyber, artificial intelligence, space and information technology remain.In several places throughout the document, Russia has been identified as a major “active threat” to the UK and China as a “systemic competitor,” which broadly conforms to the general alignment and policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).In response, the Russian ambassador to the UK, Andrei Kelin, has said that the “political relationship between Moscow and London is nearly dead” – under the circumstances, not an unfair observation.Read the full article on Asia Times
In West Asia, where US and China’s interests intersect
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s recent six-nation tour of West Asia has sparked discussions about Beijing’s taking a more active approach in the region. In part, this is driven by China’s expanding interests; in part, it is a product of the China-United States (US) competition and geopolitical churn underway after Joe Biden’s election.Read the full article in the Hindustan Times.
Seventh Fleet move a reminder that Quad must remain a group of equals, not a US-led posse
The US Navy’s Seventh Fleet statement of 7 April 2021, after the freedom of navigation operation off Maldives in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone or the EEZ, even if legally valid, and watered down later by the Pentagon Spokesman, was unwarranted and seems indifferent to the sensitive phase in India-US relations. Post the statement, it is understood that China’s defence attaché in New Delhi went to town pointing out the US’ treatment of India as a rebuke of a subordinate. The possibility of this poke in India’s strategic eye being a lower level gaffe cannot be ruled out. But if it was earlier sanctioned by the US Secretary of Defence, then one can surmise that it was meant to convey who is the boss. That would be unfortunate for India-US relations because a reluctant New Delhi has now finally shed its inhibitions with regards to the Quad. The US seems to have misunderstood India’s political stance, especially New Delhi’s understanding of the nature of Quad.
In India’s view, the resurrected Quad is a platform that has four partners at its core with others being invited to participate, depending on common interests. Therefore, the specific issues that relate to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, Vietnam, Philippines or any effected country, could be potentially co-opted. Such flexibility can be a fruitful method for the Quad to adopt.
Gender parity in the Indian Army
What's behind China's Wolf Warrior Diplomacy?
China’s imposition of punitive sanctions on EU institutions and individuals over Xinjiang, its attacks on the West’s colonial past when discussing human rights and the recent outburst by Yang Jiechi during the dialogue in Anchorage have all re-ignited discussions over Beijing’s assertive diplomacy. In fact, throughout the past year, there has been much debate about the increasing abrasiveness of Chinese diplomats.
Russia-Japan relations and why the Kurils matter
While there are signs of pragmatism in both Moscow and Tokyo, this last barrier to concluding WW2 remains
The Kuril Islands, or the Northern Territories as Japan likes to call them, are at the center of an uneasy relationship between Russia and Japan.The USSR occupied the islands between August and September 1945. Since the end of World War II, the disputed territory and related issues are the primary subject of engagement between the two countries.The contention over the ownership of the Kurils is also the main hurdle for the conclusion of World War II between the two nations. Over the decades, the diplomatic efforts by Japan have been unsuccessful in getting the islands back.In recent times there has been considerable cause to suggest that the Russian side has taken or has been compelled to take an icy approach to settling the Kuril Islands dispute because of public opinion.Laws in the new constitution adopted by Russia in July 2020 criminalize any alienation of Russian territories or advocacy for territorial concessions. These laws apply equally to every part of Russia, including those with some controversy around them, such as the Kuril Islands, Crimea and Kaliningrad.Read the full article on Asia Times