India’s recognition of Taliban should just be tactical, not let it rule Afghanistan again

This article was first published in ThePrint.Afghanistan is living proof that technological superiority in warfare is an insufficient condition for winning wars. The political outcomes of wars are hostage to success on the political table of diplomatic parleys. How else can one explain that the most powerful nation in the world, equipped with state-of-the-art technology and after having expended a great deal of blood and costly resources, has been unable to achieve favourable political outcomes. Yes, the US has so far prevented the Taliban from coming back to power in Kabul. But even that accomplishment was, for all practical purposes, undermined when the Donald Trump administration negotiated a peace deal with the Taliban in February 2020 and conceded that the militants can share power with the Afghan government as long as Afghanistan is not utilised as a base to launch terrorist attacks against the US. A peace deal that was done without the concurrence of the democratically elected government of Ashraf Ghani. Dumping allies has never troubled the US too much.

The peace process had envisaged the withdrawal of all American troops by 1 May 2021. But with Joe Biden as president now, the deal seems to be in jeopardy, because the US has serious concerns of a Taliban takeover once the withdrawal takes place without a power-sharing agreement between the Ashraf Ghani government and the Taliban. The US is pressuring the Ghani government for an agreement and is, in all probability, pushing Pakistan to get the Taliban to make concessions including the continued presence of US troops. Pakistan’s supposed change of stance was publicly projected through a tweet on what the DG ISPR said on 25 February: “Today’s Afghanistan is not the country it was in the nineties, whose state structure collapsed easily. Pakistan has also changed. It is not possible for [the] Taliban to take over Kabul and for Pakistan to support them. That will never happen.”

Meanwhile, the US leverage with Pakistan has strengthened somewhat due to the latter’s dire economic status and weakened support from its traditional Arab friends.

The Intra-Afghan negotiations are expected to discuss the ceasefire; agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan; the rights of women, free speech, and changes to the country’s constitution. The talks would also have to chalk out the fate of Taliban fighters as well as all the armed militias. This is a tall order to meet before the 1 May deadline.

Missing the wood for the trees

The Biden administration is backing several meetings between high-level Afghan government and Taliban officials. One such was hosted in Moscow in mid-March, which was also attended by US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, and representatives of Iran, India, China and Pakistan. The next one is to follow in Turkey in April. Afghanistan was the focus at the Heart of Asia Conference held in Tajikistan on 30 March and India was represented by foreign minister S. Jaishankar who stated: “India has been supportive of all the efforts being made to accelerate the dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban, including intra-Afghan negotiations”. He also declared India’s support for a regional process to be convened under the aegis of the United Nations.The conventional wisdom in India has always been that withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan will be detrimental to New Delhi’s interests as the Taliban could come to power and that would halt India’s aspirations to access Central Asia through the Chabahar Port. Also, a Taliban in power may provide the impetus of breeding terrorists that Pakistan would channelise towards India. These concerns are valid. But this view may be missing the wood for the trees.The real battle involving force in Afghanistan has been between a US-backed Afghan government and the Pakistan-backed Taliban. The US is no longer willing to pay the price for its continued backing of the government. It is desperate for an honourable exit. There is now an increased likelihood that the US will first try with the help of Pakistan to get the Taliban to agree to an extension of the withdrawal date. Broadly, three scenarios could now unfold.

Three options for Afghanistan

Scenario One. The Intra-Afghan talks fail, and the Taliban starts an offensive and takes control of key road communication links weakening the Afghan government’s ability to govern its provinces. The US stays put and further Intra-Afghan talks are stalled. Violence spikes and the civil war deepens endlessly.

Scenario Two. The Intra-Afghan talks fail. The US exits. Taliban launches a major offensive with Pakistan support and Kabul falls. Pakistan recognises the Taliban government. Former Afghan forces consolidate in northern Afghanistan bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Some forces are given shelter in Iran. Taliban establishes an ideologically extremist State.

Scenario Three. Intra-Afghan talks succeed. The Taliban shares power. The US exits. A fragile peace prevails for a year or two but is followed by a civil war with Pakistan backing the Taliban. The global community’s attention to violence receives a resigned acknowledgement. Russia, Iran, China and India take sides and provide support in various forms. Pakistan evades US pressure and that pushes it deeper into China’s embrace.

US must leave, Afghans must decide

None of these scenarios has a happy ending. However, the complex web of actors in Afghanistan tends to distract attention from the primary issue that must be resolved even if it has to be done through the currency of violence. It is about the rejection or acceptance by the Afghan people of the Taliban as an extremist religious entity. Decades of foreign interference has only prolonged the long and tortuous journey to peace. Afghans themselves must be left to resolve this ideological war. The US must exit with or without progress on Intra-Afghan talks and most importantly, all international actors, preferably through the UN Security Council, must mutually agree to non-interference and only provide humanitarian aid and developmental assistance. Pakistan’s public change of posture enunciated by its DG ISPR is encouraging, but it will require both the US and China to help Islamabad keep its word.India’s recent tacit recognition of the Taliban should at best be a tactical move. Strategically, the Taliban in power in Afghanistan is detrimental to India’s interest. India must not waver from its stand on the ideological front even as it leaves it to the Afghans to resolve the resultant imbroglio. The exit of the US will deny the Taliban the narrative of pushing its ideology in the garb of fighting the foreigners and will be a strategic blow for them. For India, Pakistan will lose leverage with the US and that can only be to our benefit. A US exit can only do good. Prolonging its stay also deepens the misery of the Afghan people without an end in sight.Lt Gen Prakash Menon is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution, Bangalore and former Military Adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. Views are personal.  

How a new rail line in China will pose a security challenge to India

The Sichuan-Tibet rail link will help China mobilise the 77th Group Army and consolidate its hold on the border defence villages along the Sino-Indian border

China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, approved in the recent National People’s Congress’s (NPC) annual session, outlines the Sichuan-Tibet railway line near the China-India border as a key strategic priority.

The 1,629km Sichuan–Tibet high-elevation railway line will connect Chengdu, Sichuan province’s capital, to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). The 14th Five-Year plan reportedly highlighted this railway’s central section, from Ya’an in Sichuan to Nyingchi in Tibet, as a key infrastructure project. In November 2020, the Communist Party of China’s general secretary and China’s president, Xi Jinping, said that this railway line’s work is extremely challenging due to the complex geological and climatic conditions and the region’s sensitive environment.

The article was originally published in the Hindustan Times. Cover Image Source: China Discovery

Ladakh didn’t work out for China. It will now drive a wedge between Quad partners

This article originally appeared in ThePrint. You can read it here.In the contemporary global geopolitical landscape, China has evoked more fear than hope. It has displayed an impressive capacity for political organisation to pursue its objectives. After nearly three decades of resting hopes on a China that will be a responsible power in the international system, there is now an increased consensus among most Western and Asian powers that a collective approach is necessary to tackle it.

China’s justification for its strategic behaviour rests on a historical argument of recapturing its rightful place in the world that was earlier displaced by Western imperialism. This is a historically revisionist argument that is factually correct but would also be the case for many nations of the world. This argument was earlier used for incorporating Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. As China has grown progressively stronger, it has been embarking on its other questionable historical territorial claims that particularly involve India, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia. China has also created artificial islands in the South China Sea on at least seven reefs and islets and built military infrastructure on them, which includes three airfields.

China’s economic heft as the manufacturing hub of the world, coupled with its Belt and Road Initiative, has been mobilised to create a web of dependencies and influence. Thus, several nations are vulnerable to exploitation and eventual subordination. The success of this project entails progress towards a historically imagined Middle Kingdom. Combined with its growing military power, China is on a neo-colonial path and on the lookout for converting more and more nations into vassal states. Asian powers are facing the brunt of it and one of the major areas in contention is understandably the geographical space that is the lifeblood of China’s economic power – the Indo-Pacific.

The Quad pushback

The recent version of Quad, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, as a cooperative strategic visualisation, has an expanded concept of security to include several other areas. It signifies the pushback to China’s rise and the consequent aggressive behaviour. The Quad finally came to acquire political ballast in February 2021 after more than a decade in limbo. For long, both India and Australia were uncomfortable being viewed as part of any cooperative venture ostensibly aimed at China. But the concurrent turn of events in both the countries has combined with the change of administration in the US to conclude that the time for Quad had arrived. India’s hesitancy was cast aside by China’s Ladakh aggression. Australia faced the brunt of China’s economic antipathy.China is certain, now, to attempt to rearrange its pieces on the global geopolitical chessboard. Xi Jinping ought to avoid major risky ventures in an ambience where the winds of anti-China sentiments are gathering steam and greater possibilities exists of the US catalysing opposition against it. This could herald the deepening of China’s strategic nightmare regarding a combined opposition to its rise, coming home to roost. China has already foreseen this possibility and pulled Russia into its fold, a realignment that was hastened by the worsening of US-Russia relations. The support for the Quad from other European powers like France, UK, Germany and some Asean nations like Vietnam should also give pause to China. However, China will continue to pressurise the Asean from taking sides. Its plans of governing military bases and increased access in the Indian Ocean Region will remain unaffected with strengthening of the Pakistan Navy. What then are the implications for India?

China after Ladakh

India should have to brace itself for China flexing its military and economic muscles, and could be the prime target to drive a wedge in Quad. China will show little restraint in keeping India contained within the subcontinent, a geo-strategy that it has followed for long. Earlier, it was mostly Pakistan that was useful to slow down India’s economic progress, create internal instability and channel its political and diplomatic energy in diverse directions. Now, Nepal and Sri Lanka have been added to that list with varying degrees of success.Militarily, the Ladakh tensions have temporarily eased. But further progress of disengagement and de-escalation awaited. China would have hopefully learnt the lessons on limitations of military power against adversaries whose stakes are higher and may be willing to risk escalation. If China’s Ladakh objective was related to warning India against a US tilt, the main strategic outcome has certainly worked against it and instead energised the Quad. But it also means that Beijing will strengthen its military efforts to redirect India’s resources towards the defence of the northern border so as to slow us down from emerging as a powerful maritime entity. Small doses of military tensions coupled with actions aimed to debilitate the economy, should be expected.The other prong of containment are India’s neighbours. Despite the ceasefire on the Line of Control, Pakistan’s support for terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir is likely to continue. With the US withdrawal from Afghanistan hanging in the balance, Pakistan’s Afghanistan engagement may deepen. China’s recent political machinations in Nepal have not followed its script but its presence and ability to create trouble for India through Nepal will endure. China’s efforts with Bhutan and Bangladesh have not met with much success. But Sri Lanka is vulnerable and would require continued engagement. The coup in Myanmar requires deft handling and has the potential for slowing down the execution of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor. Overall, India has geographic proximity, historical and cultural affiliations on its side. But it has various unresolved issues with each of its neighbours, and capability for assistance is now impacted by a weakened economy. China is the outsider with economic clout but cultural affinity is low. Also, our neighbours can be expected to play both sides. It is not going to be easy for India, at all.

India needs domestic stability, resilient economy

India’s ability to deal with China’s multiple prongs in the subcontinent is intimately connected to the goings on in its domestic polity. With a neutered opposition, the ruling elite now enjoys unbridled power. However, the Hindu majoritarian impulse in the populace has deepened communal polarisation. Several key institutions that have to act as constitutional safeguards have been deliberately weakened by depriving them of power for independent functioning. Key constitutional pillars of democracy and federal structure of the nation are being undermined, with the latest being the attempts by the central government to render the Delhi UT government ineffectual. Coupled with the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and large scale unemployment, the evolving cocktail for possible internal discord could seriously hinder India’s capacity to contest China’s influence on the neighbouring nations. This factor may act as a primary drag, even if other foreign policy measures succeed.In many ways, the Quad may mark an important strategic milestone in contemporary global affairs. However, India would also require more economic and technological support from Quad partners. In this pursuit, strategic autonomy will be stressed. Also, the Quad’s effectiveness would be enhanced if other powers are incorporated, depending on the issue being tackled and interests involved. It might increase options of many other nations from being overwhelmed by China’s coercion. China’s reactions can be expected to increase probability of varying forms of conflicts at global and regional level. India, now having come to realise the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), must not waste time in determining its strategic trajectory.The global geopolitical chess game is moving fast. For India, there is no better way than internal consolidation, accompanied by increased cooperation with nations across the globe and with its immediate neighbours being a top priority area. Strategic tide is turning and India’s domestic political motor will be on test. 

Why did India close Jalalabad consulate?

This article was first published in Deccan Herald.

In a sudden and surprising development in March last year, India closed its consulates in Jalalabad and Herat. Jalalabad is 65 km from the Torkham border crossing with Pakistan, and Herat about 120 km from Iran. Though there was no official statement, one newspaper reported that a high-level security group had recommended closure over heightened security threats and Covid-related concerns. The closure was said to be temporary, and reopening would await a review. India has had consulates at these cities even in the years when fighting raged.

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Northern Sea Route: hopes and challenges

The feasibility of a year-around Arctic transshipment route, a longtime dream of Russia, is still unclear

Media reports and commentaries are hailing the Russian LNG (liquefied natural gas) carrier Christophe de Margerie’s latest voyage along the Northern Sea Route as a watershed. The voyage has brought Moscow’s dream of year-around access to the NSR into the limelight again, and speculation is rife about whether the prospect is closer to reality than previously thought.However, a few less-reported aspects can shed more light on the NSR’s feasibility as a transshipment route.

Sister ship didn’t emerge unscathed

The Nikolay Yevgenov, another LNG carrier and sister ship of the Christophe de Margerie, departed a day later on the same route but suffered damage to its propulsion system. The ship took a detour through the Suez Canal and is in dry dock in France for repairs. The incident has diminished the sensational claims that the Arctic is now open for year-around safe voyages without heavy icebreakers clearing the way.Read the full article on Asia Times

India dives into Quad waters

This article first appeared in Deccan Herald

Several strands of strategic vectors may have been generated from the geostrategic moves signified by the first ever summit, albeit virtual, of the Quad leaders, Joe Biden, Narendra Modi, Yoshide Suga and Scott Morrison on March 12, 2020. In a first for the Quad, a joint statement was released that serves as a declaration broadly conveying the goals and areas of focus of the group. China is not mentioned and that silence is deafening.

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Chinese Communist Party has goals. India needs to have its own, not just respond to aggression

This article was originally published in ThePrintThere are glaring dissimilarities in India’s foreign policy stances towards China post the military disengagement in Doklam 2017 and the ongoing one in Ladakh. The former was followed by a reset that resembled closeness and acquiescence through informal summits in Wuhan and Mamallapuram while the latter seems to have prompted a distancing from China that was exemplified in the elevation of the Quad meeting to the level of political leadership on 12 March 2021 wherein Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that “members of the Quad will be closer than ever before”. Remarkably, for the first time, a joint statement was issued which was followed up by a joint article by the Quad leaders was also published in The Washington Post and China’s reaction is awaited. Meanwhile, it was not surprising that China was stalling the disengagement process in Ladakh.

While one can endlessly speculate on China’s motives in Doklam and Ladakh, what matters ultimately is the strategic effect of Chinese military aggression on India. Loss of trust cannot be cranked up impetuously. In any case, the Wuhan and Mamallapuram facade has perished and the reality of China’s perennial perfidy should forewarn and prepare us to exercise greater circumspection and watchfulness.

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Fukushima's lesson is the need for effective nuclear regulation

This article was first published in The MintIt has been a decade since 11 March 2011, when the most powerful earthquake recorded in Japan triggered a tsunami and killed over 19,500 people and displaced over 230,000. It was the country’s worst natural disaster since 1995. The ‘Great East Japan Earthquake’ or ‘Great Tohoku Earthquake’ is better known as the ‘Fukushima nuclear disaster’ and often cited as Exhibit A in the case against nuclear energy. Yes, the quake and tsunami caused a catastrophic failure of three reactors at Fukushima Daiichi power plant, leaving a contained radioactive mess that will take decades to clean up, and triggered a mass evacuation during which 2,313 people died. Yet, for all the horror stories, the actual number of deaths or cases of radiation sickness due to the accident is—take a deep breath—zero. Coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the disaster, a United Nations scientific committee confirmed findings that there have been no adverse health effects linked to radiation exposure. Nobody died and no one fell sick due to the reactor accident.

That’s not all. The popular narrative often neglects to mention that there were 11 operational reactors—including the three at Fukushima Daiichi—at four nuclear power plants in the region. All of them shut down automatically, but the three at Fukushima failed to complete the process. Sixty kilometres away, three reactors at Onagawa were undamaged and shut down safely, despite being closer to the epicentre and suffering a more powerful tsunami. None of this is to downplay the human, environmental and economic damage that the Fukushima accident caused, or indeed the risks arising from nuclear power plants; only to put it in perspective. What we have is a case for greater attention to safety and governance, not a knee jerk rejection of nuclear energy as we saw in many Western countries soon after the incident.A dispassionate assessment of technology and economics suggests that nuclear energy has to be part of the civilizational response to climate change. In its latest report, the International Energy Agency points out that while wind and solar power are already competitive compared to fossil-fuels, nuclear “remains the dispatchable low-carbon technology with the lowest expected costs in 2025." The cost structure for renewable energy must include that of energy storage systems if it is to replace coal and gas for base-load capacity. Even if, in line with current expectations, the economics of renewable energy become more attractive over time, nuclear will remain an important source of low-carbon diversity. As a country dependent on fuel imports, India must invest in renewable energy, but cannot afford to ignore nuclear.Vaclav Smil, one of the world’s most thoughtful energy analysts, calls nuclear energy “a successful failure" for its inability to gather public support despite its ability to deliver. Despite the facts, ‘Fukushima’ is a one-word argument made around the world to silence any debate on building new nuclear power stations.The derogation of nuclear energy is not a failure of technology or economics. It is a failure of public policy. In that sense, India’s 2010 civil liability law is not unique in preventing greater investment, innovation and development of nuclear energy. It is a nearly global phenomenon. Other than Russia and China that have used the decade since the Fukushima accident to become global leaders in the field, almost every other country has adopted statutes and policies that strangle the development of the nuclear industry.India has done well to remain invested in nuclear despite the adverse global sentiment, but the pace has been slower than estimated, and, more importantly, the industry governance structure remains unreformed. Against the promise of producing 20,000MW of nuclear power by 2020, India currently has operational capacity of 6,780MW, constituting only 2.4% of the electricity generated. In addition to the eight under construction, the government has approved 12 more reactors, targeting 22,480MW by 2031.In a reply to a Lok Sabha question, the government stated that it has no plans to promote domestic and foreign investment in the sector.This makes Fukushima’s lesson especially relevant for India. The causes of that accident were traced to a poor safety culture arising from regulatory capture and poor oversight. Investigators blamed a “mindset that emphasises hierarchy and acquiescence and discourages asking questions."If India’s nuclear industry is government-run for the foreseeable future, then it is all the more important to restructure its governance. The case for an industry regulator and safety auditor independent of the India’s atomic energy establishment has been clear since 1995, a point re-iterated in a 2015 review by an independent international expert group.The Narendra Modi government should restructure the civilian nuclear energy establishment in the manner it did the space sector last year: structurally separate the policymaker, regulator, research and development, and commercial operators. Safety requires more, timely and better information. Not everything needs to be in the public domain, but an effective governance structure will give the government better-quality information on the state of affairs in the sector.

Why China is the Kautilya of international politics

This article was first published in ThePrintThe gameplay on the chessboard of global politics continues to cast its shadow on India’s relationships with the United States, China, nations of the sub-continent, and within its own federal units. For the skeptics of Kautilya’s continued relevance, the contemporary geopolitical chessboard underlines the chief tenets of Kautilyan rajamandala, or ‘circle of states’ – a concentric, geopolitical conception of the inter-state realm typifying friend-foe relationships.

Ironically, if there is one country that eminently exemplifies the Kautilyan template in international conduct, it is China – who was till the Ladakh episode, the quintessential madhyama (middle king) of the inter-state realm. A middle king is defined as “one with territory immediately proximate to those of the Ari (enemy) and the conqueror (hypothetically Pakistan and India respectively), capable of helping them when they are united or disunited and of suppressing them when they are disunited.” True to this definition, China had skilfully calibrated its dynamics with Pakistan and India. It had entered into a negotiated agreement (samdhi) with India (roughly co-equal then) through the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993 and several other agreements of 1996, 2003 and 2012, at a time when a stable neighbourhood was vital for its economic growth.

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LAC Row: Strategic options, post-Ladakh

The disengagement process in Ladakh is hopefully the concluding scene of another military episode in India-China relations. Political and strategic relationships, especially those involving neighbours with whom we have disputes, are in reality an unending mind game, with the parties concerned competing for advantages aimed to protect, preserve and promote their vital interests. In this episode, China threatened India’s territorial integrity, India reacted firmly, and if the disengagement goes according to plan, India would seem to have quite successfully defended its interests for the time being.A deepened military mind game can be expected to endure in the form of military preparations. The scene now shifts to where it finally matters the most – in the minds of the opposing political leaderships, which will be reflected in the future politico-diplomatic manoeuvres.China’s military aggressiveness in the Himalayas must be viewed as part of the big picture of the larger global geopolitical contestation. A rising China that is economically buoyant, politically authoritarian, assertive and aggressive, is being increasingly opposed by the US, which is slipping from its status as the lone Superpower.Read the full article in ThePrint

House defence panel must ask 4 key questions — from lower expenditure to pension bill

When the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence meets this week to discuss the Budget allocations made by Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, we hope to get some clarity on the provisions made towards India’s national security. That’s because on defence, the Union Budget for FY2021-22 hides more than it reveals. Not only was ‘defence’ conspicuous by its absence in the finance minister’s Budget speech for the second consecutive year, the component-wise budgetary allocation also raises more questions than answers.

As the Committee examines the Demand for Grants of the defence ministry, we believe there are at least four important questions that the panel should ask.Read the full article on ThePrint

The race to map the ocean deep

India is falling behind efforts to map the undersea environment of the Indo-Pacific regionMajor powers are investing time and money deploying UUVs in these waters because of the valuable oceanographic and hydrographic data they provide. Oceanography is the study of the physical and biological aspects of the oceans. Hydrography is the process by which the ocean bed is surveyed and navigation aids and charts are produced, providing ships the maritime equivalent of roadmaps and road signs.Oceanography and hydrography have clear civilian applications: scientific research into climate and marine ecology, surveying the ocean floors to ensure safer navigation of merchant vessels, and collecting information for oil and gas or other seabed mining activities.However, there are also equally clear naval applications: Hydrographic data ease the movement of naval surface ships. More important, they provide crucial information for submarines and for those tasked with hunting them. Over the coming years, the study of the oceans and the seabed is likely to become a source of power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region.Read the full article on Asia Times

Does the budget meet India’s Defence requirements?

Until 2019, defence spending made headlines around just two events in a year. The first was when the Union budget was tabled in Parliament, and the second was when the Swedish thinktank, SIPRI, released its formidable comparative military expenditure report. That scenario changed in FY 2020-21. China’s incursions in Ladakh highlighted the urgent and long-term need to prioritise defence. It brought home the point that the central focus of military planning should be China, not Pakistan. This need for prioritisation came even as the pandemic caused a drop in both economic activity and government revenue. Given this backdrop, the government had a challenging task on its hands. There are four key takeaways from the Union Budget 2021-22 for defence.Read the full article on Hindustan Times

Weaning away foreign investment from China

Over the past few years, there has been much discussion about India attracting firms that might be seeking to exit China. Initially, these conversations were driven by changes in the Chinese economy, such as rising labour costs, shifting focus towards new technologies and declining productivity. There was a sense that these changes, coupled with improving infrastructure and ease of doing business in India, would make India an attractive option.

Read the full article in the Hindustan Times here.

America’s strategic rivalry with China won’t change under Biden

The United States’ Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, an extant policy document declassified and published last week by the outgoing Donald Trump administration, is mostly music to New Delhi’s ears. Assuming that “a strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance [to] China", one of Washington’s objectives is to “accelerate India’s rise and capacity to serve as a net provider of security and Major Defense Partner" and “solidify an enduring strategic partnership with India underpinned by a strong Indian military able to effectively collaborate with the United States and our partners in the region to address shared interests." Becoming India’s preferred partner on security issues is one of the desired ends of the United States’ policy. Much of this has already been stated by US officials over the past two decades. But mere talk is cheap. The cold hard print of an apex policy document ought to make Washington’s intentions a lot more credible in New Delhi.Read the full article on The Mint

The big convergence challenge that we face in this new decade

We enter the third decade of this millennium amid rising doubts, risks and worries about technology, markets, nationalism, democracy and the world order. The unqualified enthusiasm for them that we saw in the past two decades has given way to concerns about what their right dosage is, and what, if any, are the antidotes should we have willy-nilly overdosed on any of them. This is good. Societies that try to answer them truthfully and thoughtfully can expect to emerge stronger and more successful in 2030. For public policy, as for investors and value creators, the opportunities and risks lie at the intersection of technology, health, society and geopolitics.Read the full article in The Mint

Why India needs two maritime theatres of command, not one

Without doubt, the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff and the decision to reorganise the armed forces into joint theatre commands are the most significant defence reforms in independent India. The defence ministry and the top military leadership deserve commendation for moving to implement the changes quickly, in the face of multiple challenges: a pandemic, confrontation with China, upsurge in conflict along the western boundaries and a tightening fiscal position. This reorganisation is an extremely rare opportunity to put in place structures, processes and organisational cultures necessary to defend India in the 21st century — for that reason, it is vital to get it all right. As Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of Navy Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, told me “there will not be a second chance”.Read the full article on ThePrint

Decoding the DC-Brussels-Beijing geopolitical triangle

Joe Biden’s election as the United States (US) president has led to talk of greater coordination between Washington and Brussels over China. In early November, European Union (EU) foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell was quick to call for “a coherent and robust China stance” between the transatlantic allies. Biden, meanwhile, has promised to consult traditional allies to “develop a coherent strategy” on China.Read the full article in Hindustan Times.

Indians debate too much democracy. But there’s not a whimper for ‘too little republic’

The debate that Niti Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant unwittingly triggered over the extent of democracy in India was passionate, lively and largely beside the point. What is of utmost and urgent importance at this time is the plummeting level of rule-of-law and rule-by-law in the country. We have ‘too little republic’ amid growing, even competing majoritarianisms among the population and populisms among its leaders. In fact, I would venture that while a large number of adults in India understand and accept democracy as an important political value, the number of people who know what a republic is and ought to be is much smaller. We celebrate Republic Day with a big military parade in New Delhi and patriotic songs in schools and neighbourhoods, with little realisation of why exactly it is different from, say, Independence Day.Read the full article on ThePrint

The world is changing. India needs to get its priorities right

With Covid-19, the most common phrase in every webinar on geopolitics is the “new world order”. This phrase is used to describe periods of history with dramatic change in balance of power between nation-states. In its most recent avatar, the new world order has been on the anvil since 2007. China’s hostile and rapid rise, the economic aftermath of the global financial crisis, networked politics over the internet, and most recently the pandemic, together are transforming international politics.Read More at Hindustan Times