Narendra Modi’s ‘free hand’ to armed forces is misleading and problematic

When dealing with a nuclear-armed country, even the political leadership’s freedom to direct use of maximum force is curtailed.Treading discreetly, staying vigilant and having an unambiguous diplomatic goal may be better options to extract meaningful revenge. A ‘free hand’ is a hazardous approach that promises no happy endings.Read more

Nuclear No-First Use: Revisiting Hawks, Doves and Owls

Is it possible to consider no-first-use as a means of bridging trust deficits between nuclear states?The present international system is as dangerous as it was in 1953 – at the start of the nuclear arms race. At least that’s what the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists believes, as the Doomsday Clock remains at two minutes to midnight in the “new abnormal” of 2019. Central to this sense of heightened risk is the danger posed by nuclear weapons use, evident through weakening arms control efforts, duplicitous international commitments to non-proliferation, and emerging military doctrines that have the potential to erode the nuclear taboo.Integral to India’s nuclear doctrine is the idea of minimum credible deterrence, as well as a policy of nuclear no-first-use (NFU). NFU has been the subject of intense domestic debate between doves, hawks, and owls.Hawks see nuclear deterrence as a numbers game and advocate for the strengthening of arsenals to bolster deterrence. Doves prefer to avoid the use of force, seeking recourse to diplomacy or other kinds of incentives. Owls, however, present a “middle path.” They prefer a realistic approach to force but remain cautious about situations that heighten risks and increase the chance for accidents. NFU is very much an owl’s view – pragmatic, yet cautious.If this is the case, then why has NFU remained on the fringes of international security debates in this period of heightened risk?NFU remains on the marginsThe main reason is that NFU is quite difficult to operationalise. NFU succeeds in contexts where the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is only to deter a nuclear attack by a nuclear-armed adversary. Historically, however, it is the threat of nuclear force, even in a pre-emptive attack, that has remained the preferred grounds for maintaining deterrence. Proponents of this logic argue that fear of superior Soviet conventional forces led to US deployment of nuclear weapons through NATO in 1979.This deterred a Soviet invasion and maintained peace in Western Europe (the Soviet Union’s NFU pledge in 1982 is to be understood as mere rhetoric!) Interestingly, when the Soviet Union collapsed and NATO countries were momentarily at a conventional military advantage, Russia dropped her NFU pledge in 1993. In this historical pattern, the threat of first-use is the preferred deterrence posture for a weaker state, while NFU requires a secure state with a strong conventional capability.However, can NFU be considered more than just the end of the deterrence calculus? Is it possible to consider it a means of bridging trust deficits between nuclear states?Denuclearisation of the Korean PeninsulaThe Korean peninsula presents a compelling case for this question since it was one of the high-risk areas for nuclear miscalculation last year. With 2019 promising another big-ticket meeting between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump, the actual mechanisms by which denuclearisation will be achieved remain uncertain.For the United States, CVID (comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible, dismantling) has been the maximalist mantra. For North Korea, denuclearisation means withdrawal of threatening US forces from neighbouring South Korea’s borders, and possible withdrawal of the US nuclear umbrella over the region. These positions are untenable in practice, and acrimonious rhetoric from both parties notwithstanding, both sides have been urged to arrive at a compromise this year, by no less than Xi Jinping.Hawks will argue that Kim will be keen to avoid the fate of Muammar Gadaffi and Saddam Hussein. From the North Korean point of view, a nuclear arsenal remains the best insurance policy against invasion. Complete nuclear disarmament, though unlikely in the near term, is not entirely out of the picture. Doves might point to South Africa in 1989-91 or the Treaty of Tlatelolco signed in 1967 to imagine a non-zero-sum endgame to the stalemate on the peninsula.If the spectacle of the Singapore summit last year is anything to go by, the next meeting between the two leaders may well build on the high-visibility/vague-outcome template. Declaring the end of the Korean war and a North-South reconciliation with great fanfare seems to be the low hanging fruit (the Korean War was fought between 1950-1953 and ended with an armistice but no official peace treaty.) This will ensure a great show, but will also mean that in long-term North Korea will have no reasons at all to give up her nuclear arsenal – an outcome that will have far-reaching consequences in East Asia. The region may experience a “domino effect,” where Japan and South Korea are also compelled to go nuclear.An owl’s approachAn owl’s approach is to introduce an NFU pledge as part of the denuclearisation agenda. An NFU pledge would signal North Korean sincerity, and provide a “holding position” from which to explore further improvement in ties with South Korea and Japan or bargaining with the US. The pledge can function as the minimum concession Kim Jong-un can make towards ending nuclear sabre-rattling and threats, retaining a nuclear arsenal, while also advancing aims of “normalisation.” If the North Korean arsenal is indeed defensive, an NFU pledge is not outside the realm of possibility.North Korea as a conventionally weaker state might look to history to find no instance to substantiate the adoption of an NFU in this context. But then again, if history is going to be made, it ought to be in a manner that does not repeat the mistakes of the past. Cold War thinking in the current international system, will recreate the same instability.An interim position like NFU that signals defensive intentions is preferable to an indefinite position that relies on nuclear threats. In both cases, uncertainty remains, but the interim position is far more likely to lead to a practical negotiation and a discrete outcome that builds trust, while the indefinite position merely increases uncertainty at all levels. While the second may produce an uneasy and unreliable deterrence, it only the first that addresses the larger questions of regional order.If the world is as dangerous as it was back in 1953, perhaps an end to the Korean war can be the start of something new.Ram Ganesh Kamatham is an Associate Research Fellow at Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru. His research occurs at the intersection of culture and strategy. He holds double master's degrees in the Anthropology of Media from SOAS, and International Relations from RSIS, NTU. He can be followed on Twitter @RGKwriting

No first use, for us and for all

In my previous column "Towards global no-first-use"(November 20), I had argued that as India acquires a reliable nuclear triad — the ability to carry out retaliatory strikes by land, air, sea, and under-sea — we must adopt a new approach to our nuclear policy: “The completion of the triad calls for a profound review of India’s policy on nuclear weapons. Now that we are close to achieving credible second-strike capability, we must shift focus from negotiating our way through international nuclear weapons control regimes to shaping a world where these weapons of mass destruction are not used.”I go on to advocate that India persuade China and other nuclear powers and champion a “global no-first-use” (GNFU) policy, wherein all the world’s nuclear states declare that they won’t carry out first strikes. Obviously, this is going to be very hard. Obviously merely declaring no-first-use won’t be enough to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. Yet the GNFU is the only feasible first step in avoiding a nuclear catastrophe, intended or accidental.India is perhaps the only nuclear power that can credibly champion GNFU because we ourselves are doctrinally committed to NFU. If our commitment to NFU were to weaken, our ability to champion it globally would weaken even more. So it is with some concern that I read a very well-argued piece by Kunal Singh in Hindustan Times that drew attention to the new strains on India’s NFU doctrine.Singh gives three reasons why India’s NFU doctrine must be reviewed. First, India would need to rely on nuclear weapons to counter China’s growing conventional superiority. Second, that Pakistan’s acquisition of lower-yield battlefield nuclear weapons demands India neutralise them before they are used against our forces. Third, that India has access to technologies makes it easier to adopt a first-strike posture today, than 15 years ago, when the doctrine was first promulgated.Let’s examine each argument in turn. First, China’s conventional military advantage is real but can be countered without changing the nuclear doctrine. Not all of its firepower and forces can be concentrated against us — for it has other, stronger, strategic adversaries — so what concerns is the fraction it can dedicate in and around the Indian subcontinent. What this implies is that we must cooperate with China’s adversaries to ensure that it remains engaged in many places elsewhere. What it also implies is that we must take our own conventional military modernisation seriously: Fixing the dysfunctional procurement system and getting out of the fiscal hole of ballooning revenue expenditure ought to be top priorities.In my view, we can continue to manage China’s military preponderance in such ways.Also, let me be a little naughty here and say that the strategists in Beijing don’t entirely believe our solemn declarations that we won’t use nuclear weapons first. In an earlier column on nuclear doctrine, I had pointed out “any declaration of no first use by one side cannot avoid being seen by its adversary as a deception for a surprise first strike. It is the fear of unacceptable damage caused by being at the receiving end of a nuclear attack that prevents either side from using them first. This is the essence of nuclear deterrence.”Second, should we threaten first strikes to counter Pakistan’s well-advertised readiness to use battlefield nuclear weapons? There is no reason to believe that the Pakistani military-jihadi complex will be deterred from using cross-border terrorists should India adopt the first-strike posture.In fact, it would make terrorism a far more valuable instrument. If the space between a terrorist attack and a nuclear attack is reduced, the Pakistani establishment will find it much easier to blackmail us and scare the rest of the world. Instead of ending up in such a situation, it is far better to stick to our current position: That a nuclear attack will invite massive retaliation. It doesn’t matter if the Pakistanis call their weapons “tactical”, “theatre” or “battlefield”— if used against our territory or troops, they must expect certain massive retaliation.Third, the availability of new technology and the modernisation of India’s arsenal does not in itself call for a change of doctrine. Few proponents of first-use are conscious of the costs of a first-strike arsenal and the command and control infrastructure required to manage it. Fewer still are conscious of the arms race this will set off, without a commensurate increase in national security or planetary safety. The folly of American and Soviet nuclear strategy during the Cold War ought to warn us against getting onto a slippery slope where nuclear weapons will be abundant, but security scarce.Without a doubt, the Indian government must conduct regular, official reviews of its nuclear weapons policies. Academic debate on the merits of retaining or abandoning no-first-use is very important. At this time though, no fundamental change is warranted. On the contrary, it is far more in India’s interests to invest in the diplomacy that reduces the salience of nuclear weapons.This piece was originally published in Business Standard

All Roads Lead to the Middle Kingdom

In January 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stood at the podium in Davos defending economic globalisation. He argued that the world needed to “adapt to and guide economic globalisation, cushion its negative impact, and deliver its benefits to all countries and all nations.” And in this process, “China’s development is an opportunity for the world.” All of this was, of course, in the backdrop of the beginning of Donald Trump’s presidency in the US.Addressing deputies at the National People’s Congress in March 2018, Xi doubled down on that message: "China will contribute more Chinese wisdom, Chinese solutions, and Chinese strength to the world, to push for building an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity. Let the sunshine of a community with a shared future for humanity illuminate the world!"Both of those speeches reflected strength. The essential message they conveyed was that the world needed China. And under Xi, China now was surer about its destiny and keener than ever to play a larger international role. Yet as 2018 unfolded, this narrative came under severe strain. To assess how, we need to look at three dimensions: Xi’s status as the core of the Communist Party, the pushback against BRI, and the deepening competition with the US. It is the interplay of these three that is shaping China’s future.Read More...

India needs an action plan after US troops leave Afghanistan

Donald Trump is under heavy criticism for ordering a withdrawal of US troops from Syria and Afghanistan. Whatever you might say about the manner in which he made and announced his decisions, on Afghanistan at least, he is not wrong.If you look at it from an American perspective, it’s hard to explain why US troops are still in Afghanistan. Bin Laden is done, al-Qaeda has been nearly decimated, and an Afghan government the US midwife has been in power for several years now. The government controls only around 60 per cent of the country and the Taliban have been growing stronger over the past couple of years. The cultivation and export of narcotics have also been growing.No one, however, can credibly argue that if the US continues to remain in the country, the security situation will improve in the next three, five, or ten years. After 17 years, hundreds of lives lost, over a trillion dollars already spent, and an annual budget of hundreds of billions of dollars, the question is whether the cost of staying is worth the benefits. It is reasonable for a thoughtful American to conclude that now is a better time to pull troops out of Afghanistan than later.Read more

A Late Thanksgiving for Turkey

Over the last few months, after winning a closely-fought election, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has successfully manoeuvred Turkey into a position of influence by smartly using the cards he has been dealt. On the other hand, the country’s economy is almost certainly on the brink of recession because of his mismanagement. In the aftermath of Donald Trump’s announcement of an imminent withdrawal of US troops from Syria, it’s worth taking a step back to understand the geopolitical hurricane that Turkey is now in the eye of, and what its next move might be. Read more here:https://www.thinkpragati.com/world/6561/a-late-thanksgiving-for-turkey/

Indian Army must work on inducting women in combat roles

The presence of women in combat roles is a matter of mindset, and what better place to change it than the Indian Army?The issue for the Army to ponder is not whether women can be inducted into combat roles, but how to make it happen. Otherwise, it is a matter of time before India’s legal system forces the Army’s hand. It has already done so in the case of granting a permanent commission to women. Moreover, the IAF has already inducted three women fighter pilots and the Indian Navy recently confirmed that induction of women as sailors was under consideration.Arguably, the field conditions in the Army are much more rugged and proximity to comrades and adversary poses greater challenges. But the point is that if women volunteer despite these challenges, the Army should not resist. The cultural argument put forward by the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) that the rank and file, who are mostly of rural origin, may not be ready to accept a woman as their officer could be true but is surely not an immutable condition.Read more here:https://theprint.in/opinion/indian-army-must-work-on-inducting-women-in-combat-roles-or-court-may-force-its-hand/165252/

Towards global no-first use

While Modi government’s claims that India’s nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) carried out a deterrence patrol are exaggerated, it is a fact that we are getting closer to that milestone. The capability to launch nuclear-armed missiles from nuclear-powered submarines is widely regarded as the greatest form of deterrence a country can possess.Read more

Jamal Khashoggi’s murder an opportunity for Turkey to be Sunni powerhouse of Middle East

The murder of one-time Saudi regime insider and columnist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul has become riveting for many reasons. The mysterious circumstances around Khashoggi’s death inside the Saudi consulate, the gruesome manner in which he was done away with, the place w+here it all happened, and the key players in the aftermath and their potential fates are playing out in international affairs over the past two weeks. Added to these ingredients is the masterfully tantalising manner in which the Turkish government has played the narrative.Khashoggi’s murder may have started out as an extraordinarily miscalculated external move in Saudi domestic politics, but has already become – if Turkey’s president has his way – a pivotal moment, both in the regional tussle for dominance and the global play for leadership of the Islamic world.Read more

China’s big plan for AI domination is dazzling the world, but it has dangers built in. Here’s what India needs to watch out for.

In June, Niti Aayog published a discussion paper arguing that India has a significant stake in the artificial intelligence (AI) revolution and therefore needs to evolve a national AI strategy. The document examined policies and strategies issued by a number of countries that could inform the Indian approach.

China has been one of the early movers in the AI space, and evaluating its approach towards AI development can help identify important lessons for Indian policymakers and entrepreneurs.

In July 2017, China’s State Council published its AI plan, outlining the goal of becoming the world’s primary AI innovation centre by 2030. This is a comprehensive vision document, unlike “strategies” or “policies” put out by other key global players.

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Why there is an increasingly global pushback against China…

For some strange reason, many people in the world believe that China’s leaders are astute but inscrutable strategists, with an unusual ability to both think long-term and do long-term. Why do I say strange? Well, look at the scorecard as it stands today.

First, from well before the global financial crisis of 2008, China had begun deliberately antagonising every single one of its large neighbours and bullying the smaller ones. This pushed countries from as far as North America, Australia, the Western Pacific, and the Indian subcontinent together into a closer embrace. Now, these happen to include the world’s strongest military, economic and technological powers.

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In its sixth decade, R&AW needs to look at the world outside terrorism

Without HUMINT assets, it will gradually become only a collection agency and not an anticipatory agency

The Research & Analysis Wing, the department I served in for 37 years, is 50. It came into being on September 21, 1968, following a realisation that intelligence had been inadequate during the 1962 Indo-China conflict. This year is also the 100th year of the birth of its first chief, the legendary R N Kao.It was one of the first such post-Independence structures created for a specific need, much like the nuclear establishment and ISRO. It owes much to the vision of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who recognised that a modern state needed an agency for external intelligence.Indira Gandhi chose Kao, then in the Intelligence Bureau (IB), to set up a specialised and independent organisation. V Balachandran, in his excellent commentary on the R&AW on its 50th anniversary (‘Struggling to preserve ‘Kaoboys’ legacy’, The Tribune, September 30, 2018), writes ‘Kao told me that the only advice Indira Gandhi gave him in 1968 was not to structure the new organisation as a Central Police Organisation (CPO). In this she did not mean to deride police work but that foreign intelligence needed something more than police skills. Police is a hierarchical and transparent organisation, accountable to law and society for their actions’..….whereas foreign intelligence often operates outside the law.Read more here>

The Indian soldier feels let down by Army brass, Supreme Court and politicians

India’s geopolitical situation is crying out for a sharpened and relevant military instrument at a time when it is besotted by a host of issues regarding lack of political guidance, acquisition and equipping, civil-military relations, defence budget, inter alia.Read more

The Fallout of US Tariffs

However, if the current trend of protectionism in the US extends to other goods such as pharmaceuticals, or to services such as software, the US faces the prospect of losing this support base. Further, if the US were to lose the support from the south, the India-US relationship will again be seen largely from the prism of the Pakistan factor and the economic partnership will have to take a backseat.

The India—US defence partnership will also be weakened if trade barriers hinder the relationship between the two countries. Purchasing defence equipment is a strategic decision, not a transactional one for India. The risk of being overly dependent on foreign powers can be mitigated if we procure military equipment from countries with which we have extensive economic ties. However, if general trade between the US and India suffers due to increasing tariffs, defense procurement from the US would no longer serve a strategic purpose and India will lose the strategic leverage that comes from being able to favour a country that can give us something more than just military equipment.

Finally, tariffs will also affect business and investment decisions. Given the particular state of global finance, with increasing inflation in the US (partially caused by increased import costs) and higher interest rates as a result, the flow of portfolio and direct investment from the US to India will reduce. With India’s banking sector facing a severe crunch due to the high amount of non-performing assets, the need for private sources of funding for Indian companies will be acute. Simultaneously, China is continuously looking for opportunities to invest abroad, as witnessed by its aggressive buying of assets in other countries. The void that will be left by the US will be readily filled by China, and that is an outcome that neither the US nor India will be too keen to witness.

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Modi has done the smart thing refusing UAE’s aid for Kerala. Stop the politics over it

The ongoing public debate on whether India should accept foreign aid to help Kerala recover after the flood disaster reminds me of an incident that occurred in December 2004.A couple of days after the devastating tsunami had ravaged India’s coastlines leaving hundreds of thousands displaced, I sought a meeting with Alok Prasad, India’s high commissioner to Singapore at that time. Several of my friends in the city-state were in the process of setting up collection points for relief materials, and I offered to help the high commission to use the internet to coordinate such efforts.Prasad’s response angered me. He said it wouldn’t be necessary and that the high commission would not encourage the NRI community to send relief material. Instead, he suggested that I direct people to donate to the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund (which, in the event, many of us did). I recall Indian banks waived the usual remittance charges for such contributions.Read more

Trump's gamble, China's gain

Trump's unilateralism in East Asia increasingly benefits China.

On his way home from the Singapore summit, US President Donald Trump announced in an interview for Fox News that he would be taking strong action on trade, saying that China was likely to be "a little bit upset". And indeed, three days later his administration slapped Chinese goods with a 25-percent tariff, provoking a sharp reaction from Beijing.That was despite China's support and assistance with the North Korea issue in the lead-up to the Singapore summit. For Trump, trade disputes, multilateral engagement, and the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula appear to be distinct, unrelated issues. In his unilateral world, there is little connection between geoeconomics and geopolitics.Chinese President Xi Jinping has adopted a completely different approach to global politics and economy, which seems to be paying off with every unilateral action Trump takes on the international arena. This seems to be the case with the US engagement of North Korea as well.Read more here>

MoD has politicised security for electoral reasons. Opening of cantonment roads shows that

While the MoD must be cognizant of the demands of civil society, its primary concern is the defence of India. It should, therefore, review the closure/opening of roads from a security perspective and also attempt to assuage the difficulties of citizens.Read more

Indian military must remind politicians that it’s loyal to the Constitution – not the party in power

The military need not seek the limelight. Instead, it should carry out its duties quietly, contain its views and disagreements on politically sensitive subjects to closed-door sessions and let its actions speak for themselves.Read more

No, The World Isn’t Heading Towards a Cold War

The Cold War construct is neither sufficient nor instructive in understanding the changes that are afoot in the international order.

Walking into the foreign ministry press conference on December 19th last year, Hua Chunying was her stoic self. As she stood before the crowd of reporters, with the blue and white map of the world depicting China at its center behind her, she spelt out Beijing’s position on the US administration’s new National Security Strategy. The document had identified China, along with Russia, as a “competitor,” “rival” and “revisionist power.” This marked a significant shift in Washington’s strategic posture as it pertains to Beijing. In response, America, Hua said, must “abandon outdated notions such as a Cold War mentality.”Alas, the Cold War is in vogue these days. A quick internet search will lead to a plethora of pieces, from alarmist to analytical, discussing the contours of an emerging Cold War between China and the US.^[1]The meat of such analyses is the understanding that China’s rapid rise coupled with the relative decline of the West is leading to tectonic changes in the world order.This is manifesting in China becoming more authoritarian internally and assertive globally, via growing business and investment ties, deepening socio-political linkages across countries, expanding hard power capacity and projecting its system as an alternative governance model vis-a-vis liberal democracy. All of this is occurring at a time when the West is still struggling economically while suffering from a crisis of faith, with fundamental values, such as free trade, respect for human rights, international cooperation and commitment to multiculturalism under pressure from conservative and right wing forces.Read more here>

The toll of revenge

The alarming frequency of ceasefire violations, inflicting a mounting loss of life and property on both sides of the LoC, begs the question: What is the political purpose of force application? The question is valid as without political purpose the exchange of fire and cross-border raids would be guided by an independent military logic that could be described as senseless violence trapped in a cycle of revenge. Images in the media of reciprocal devastation portray the retribution that has been inflicted, stirring nationalistic instincts with mourning the dead, accusing the other of unprovoked ceasefire violations and swearing greater revenge. Therefore, it is assumed that the leadership of both India and Pakistan has calculated that the politico-military benefits outweigh the costs of devastation and death.

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