The Quint | Is Trust a Foregone Conclusion in India-Russia Relations? It's All About China

Of late, observers in India have expressed growing concern regarding Russia’s continued drift toward Beijing, especially following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Moscow visit where he met Russian President Vladimir Putin in late March. For instance, former foreign secretary Shyam Saran recently opined that Russia’s vulnerable position vis-a-vis China empowers the latter to restrict the former’s engagement with India. While the possibility of such a prospect should certainly inform Indian policymakers, the issue is slightly more complex than what is highlighted.

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The Quint | A Gap in Strategic Planning: Why India Needs a National Security Doctrine

Japan’s National Security Strategy (NSS), released in December 2022, defied convention and chose to identify China and Russia by name as strategic threats. It also recommended that the country double its defence budget. Several other major powers, such as the United States, France, and Russia, also release similar documents. However, despite being the second most populous country, the fifth largest economy, and a nuclear power with one of the world’s most powerful militaries, India does not publish any such document.

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Analysing China’s threat perception of India-United States relations

As India and China are engaged in continued dialogue on resolving the boundary issue, including through the recently conducted high-level meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, China faces a challenging theatre in its neighbourhood — the India-US alliance. Due to its threat perception of increasing proximity between India and the US, China inflates narratives of discord between the two countries, while also hyping up the nature of the challenge it faces, in order to arm-twist India into maintaining a more autonomous policy.

CPC’s tryst with private regulatory interventionism

The ‘Two Sessions’—China’s annual plenary sessions with close to 3,000 delegates participating in meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—have recently come to an end, and reports from the event carry significant implications for Chinese economic policy in the months to come.

India's Policy Towards China Must Leverage Latter's Two-Front Situation

While a ‘two-front’ dilemma has posed a critical security challenge to India for quite some time, China fears a similar situation, which hasn’t received enough attention within Indian strategic circles. China first grew anxious about a developing two-front threat in the early 1950s. After the Communist Party of China won the civil war against the Guomindang (GMD) nationalist government and forced the latter to flee to Taiwan in 1949, it feared a US-backed GMD invasion from the east. On its western front along the Himalayas, China was wary of Indian interference in Tibet and accused it of colluding with the US to instigate secessionist tendencies during the 1950s and early 1960s.

‘Two Sessions’ Later, How China's Contradictory Policies Will Impact India

China’s ‘two sessions’ – the congregation of its two topmost deliberative bodies namely, the National People’s Congress (NPC), the country’s top legislature, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the top advisory body, recently concluded in Beijing.

China Is Eager To Change Its Diplomatic Tone To Launch A Charm Offensive

The primary aim of Chinese foreign policy in the months to come will be to “reset its economy and win back friends.” The immediate focus of this appears to be European countries.

From Beijing’s perspective, this is essential given the backlash it has faced both internally and from governments of the West over its zero-COVID policy, and the Communist Party of China (CPC’s) crackdown on the private sector which caused the bursting of its property market bubble and ripple effects for real estate and big technology firms across the globe.

Deccan Herald | Quad partners can boost India’s biomanufacturing policy

Biotechnology is going to revolutionise the global economy and many countries recognise the need to optimally develop bioresources. According to an OECD report, more than 50 countries have adopted specific policies designed to shape their bio-economies.

In the recent past, the United States and China have also published plans for spurring their bio-economies. India’s Department of Biotechnology has released the 2021-2025 National Biotechnology Development Strategy, which envisions India as a global biomanufacturing hub by 2025.

Taiwan Strait: Are US-China gambling or guardrailing?

At a press conference on 11 January 2023, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan was not imminent. The statement conforms to a pattern where China and the US are prioritising engagement to dial down the heat. But at the same time, given that the US and China are locked in a security dilemma over Taiwan, a new modus vivendi between the two sides appears unlikely. 

India's PLI vs China’s PLA: Can Delhi’s Strategic Use of Trade Thwart Beijing?

The past three years have witnessed the emergence of a new pattern in the India-China relationship. With tensions along the disputed boundary escalating, New Delhi has increasingly chosen to respond with actions in the economic domain.

For instance, even before the standoff began in Eastern Ladakh in April 2020, the Indian government made prior approval mandatory for investments from the countries sharing land borders with India. Following the Galwan Valley clash, decisions were taken to ban Chinese apps on national security grounds and exclude Chinese vendors from India’s 5G ecosystem, and there has also been an intensification of investigations into Chinese enterprises.

Pain & gain: Deterring China requires us to change Xi’s cost-benefit calculations

This month’s clash between Chinese and Indian troops at Tawang is yet another reminder that New Delhi must ratchet up military, diplomatic and geopolitical pressure on Beijing until it changes its strategic calculations. At this time the Xi Jinping regime’s calculation runs something like this: the global balance of power is such that China can change the territorial status quo in its neighbourhood on its own terms through the use of military force. This approach succeeded in the South China Sea, and to some extent in Doklam and Galwan.

Quad Needs a More Near-Term, Outcomes-Focussed Approach

Ever since its revitalisation, the Quad grouping, comprising India, the US, Japan and Australia, has evolved an ambitious agenda. Over the past two years, the Quad has established six leader-level working groups, covering domains like the COVID-19 Response and Global Health Security, Climate, Critical and Emerging Technologies, Cyber, Space, and Infrastructure. These are long-term agenda items that have primarily focussed on establishing frameworks and standards, boosting sharing of information and best practices, identifying vulnerabilities and discussing pathways to address them. The two most visible products of the Quad’s engagement so far have been the COVID-19 vaccine partnership and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA). These also underscore a desire to be near-term outcomes-focussed, while working on longer term challenges.

Red China blues by Dikotter: an account of the country’s developments during Xi Jinping era

Ensuring strict control over the historical narrative is a key aspect of the Communist Party of China (CPC) toolkit to maintain legitimacy. One way in which the party has done this is through the adoption of official resolutions, which argue that “both the facts of history and the reality of today prove that without the CPC, there would be no new China and no national rejuvenation”. 

Frank Dikotter’s China After Mao: The Rise of a Superpower, however, punctures this narrative. The book offers a granular and engrossing account of the key economic and political developments in China, starting from 1976 till the era of Xi Jinping. In telling the story of over four decades of tumult, the author primarily relies on over 600 documents from China’s municipal and provincial archives along with newspaper reports and unpublished memoirs of key party members, such as the diary of Mao’s personal secretary Li Rui.

What unrest and anger in China’s cities reveal

Cities across China have witnessed protests over the past week, as people have demonstrated their anger and frustration with the persistence and costs of the zero-Covid policy. What triggered the protests was an apartment fire in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which led to the death of 10 people. Reports of the Covid-19 lockdown in the city hampering rescue efforts ignited widespread anger on social media. Soon, this anger, fuelled further by official denials and online censorship, spilled onto the streets of major cities in the country. In Shanghai, hundreds gathered along Wulumuqi Road, named after Urumqi, demanded the lifting of lockdowns and basic human rights, and carried blank pieces of paper to protest the lack of freedom of expression. Similar protests have since been seen in cities such as Wuhan, Chengdu, Beijing, and Nanjing, among others. In some instances, protesters have gone beyond simply demanding an end to lockdowns and mass testing to call for freedom, respect for universal values, and for Xi Jinping to step down.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s biggest strength lies in its weakness. That’s tempting for army

On 3 November 2022, when I first heard that Imran Khan had been shot, my instinctive conclusion was that the Pakistan Army must have orchestrated it. When it was quickly followed up by an assurance that he had suffered only minor bullet injuries to his leg, my instincts discounted the involvement of the Pakistan Army as the attempt did not reflect its professional competence in such matters. Later, as details trickled in, the attempt seemed amateurish. Accusations toward the Shehbaz Sharif government and the Inter-Services intelligence by Khan and his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, followed, while a few in the ruling coalition described the incident as staged.

Results of the US midterm elections and what it means for India

With only a few seats left to be declared, the 2022 US midterm election is like the cliffhanger scene from the penultimate episode of a thrilling whodunnit. The predicted red wave did not lash America, but the Republicans did manage a ripple, and flipped some seats in the US House of Representatives, the lower house of the American Congress.

Should India look closely at these elections from a foreign policy lens? Not generally, but there will be some specific impact as we shall see in a while.

The future as foretold by Xi: Chinese citizens have to brace themselves for tough times, Indians for a more aggressive PLA

In many ways, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China has been a somewhat anticlimactic event. Prior to the quinquennial meeting, there was a general sense among scholars and watchers of China that the congress would largely signal political and policy continuity. It has indeed largely reaffirmed the direction in which China was already heading. That said, the past week has shed greater light on what we can expect going ahead.

China lowered the gun for Modi-Xi Uzbekistan meet. India can’t take its eyes off the barrel yet

Breaking the military deadlock at Gogra-Hot Springs in Ladakh has been touted as paving the way for the Narendra Modi-Xi Jinping meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit scheduled in Uzbekistan on 15-16 September. The military commanders had probably arrived at a consensus when they met for the 16th round of negotiations on 17 July. But political approval by both sides seems to have taken nearly two months. The delay conceals more than it reveals about the contemporary dynamics of China-India relations and the role of the military confrontation on India’s northern border in the context of power shifts leading to geopolitical competition at the global level.

The Coming Battle for Taiwan

A very good way to get a handle on the geopolitical developments in the Indo Pacific—and the current Taiwan crisis—is to pay attention to what the Communist Party of China’s leaders have been declaring for decades. They want to reunify the country both to recover from two centuries of humiliation by Western powers and to finish the civil war that started nearly a hundred years ago. China will then retake its rightful place as a global power. Presumably, this will be within an international order where it is the peerless Middle Kingdom surrounded by tributaries whose fortunes depend on Beijing’s goodwill.

Xi’S Power Base in the Communist Party Central Committee

Mao's often-quoted expression “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” remains as critical to understanding the dynamics of power in China today as it was in the late 1920s. Xi Jinping, soon after assuming the position of Party General Secretary in late 2012, moved quickly to exert his control over the ‘gun’ — i.e., the People's Liberation Army (PLA). He has spent the past decade reshaping the PLA and forging loyalty, from the military-political work conference in Gutian in 2014 and an anti-corruption campaign (which targeted some of the highest-ranking PLA officials), to initiating major structural reforms.