How Emerging Technologies Are Driving China’s Readiness For Modern Warfare

In this year’s annual session of the National People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang presented a finance report with an estimated 1.45 trillion yuan (US$230 billion) set aside for defence spending in 2022. Although that figure is an increase on last year, it is still less than the US military budget, which is expected to top US$770 billion. This translates into a significant gap in US and Chinese military power. As a result, China’s military modernisation and efforts to leverage technology in warfare have so far been directed to reduce this gap. Thus, Beijing is working to incorporate modern technology into the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). With the development of space and electronic warfare capabilities over the past two decades, China’s armed forces have started to embrace critical and emerging technologies.

India’s Aloof Response to the Ukraine Crisis

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By: Artyom Lukin, Far Eastern Federal University and Aditya Pareek, Takshashila Institution

Moscow’s decision to recognise the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics and then launch a ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine has created a tricky balancing act for India. Delhi’s immediate reaction to the crisis has been restrained, neutral and focused on ensuring the safety of its nationals inside Ukraine.
Several hours after Russian military action was underway, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Modi urged that all violence should be ceased immediately and reiterated India’s emphasis on diplomacy and ‘honest and sincere dialogue’ between Russia and NATO.

On 26 February 2022, the United Nations Security Council held a vote on a resolution demanding that Moscow immediately stop its attack on Ukraine and withdraw all troops. India was among the three countries to abstain, along with China and the United Arab Emirates. India’s UN envoy expressed his ‘regret that the path of diplomacy was given up’. India also abstained on a procedural resolution to call for an emergency session of the UN General Assembly.

Modi also held a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in which he expressed ‘his deep anguish about the loss of lives and properties’ but refrained from directly criticising Russia.

The India–Russia relationship is officially characterised as a ‘special and privileged strategic partnership’. The entente between Moscow and Delhi dates back decades. Though the bond is no longer the de facto alliance it once was in the 1970s and 1980s, Moscow remains Delhi’s an important strategic partner, on par with the United States. The two nations don’t have any significant areas of disagreement and both share a fundamental interest in a multipolar balance of power in Eurasia.

India relies on Russia for the majority of its imported military equipment, nuclear submarine technology and some vital space faring technology. A highlight of India–Russian defence cooperation has been the US$5.43 billion deal for the S-400 air defence system, which Russia began delivering in December 2021. Russian-made weapons are critical to India’s ability to counter its main external threat — China.

There are also perhaps ideational factors behind India’s reluctance to censure Russian actions toward Ukraine. The conflict over Ukraine may have some parallels with India’s historic traumas. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union that led to the birth of an independent Ukraine was not dissimilar to the partition of the British Raj, which produced India and Pakistan, two culturally close but still antagonistic entities. Putin characterises the modern state of Ukraine in antagonistic terms as an ‘anti-Russia’ project.

Western powers portray the conflict as a struggle between an imperialistic autocracy and a young democracy, but Delhi may not buy this narrative. India has always been somewhat sceptical about the US-led discourse on liberal democracy. This remains the case despite the Westernisation of Indian elites. Under Modi, India has been evolving in an illiberal and ethno-nationalistic direction. It is an open secret that India wants to maintain its sphere of influence in parts of South Asia.

India does not have many significant security interests in Europe, which helps explain its relative aloofness to the Ukraine crisis. But Delhi does have some stakes in Ukraine. For instance, the Indian Space Research Organisation’s semi cryogenic engine is being developed based on Ukrainian supplied RD-810 designs and many Indian navy warships depend on Ukrainian gas turbines, including those under construction at Russian shipyards. So India has a national security stake in not alienating Ukraine.

Another reason for India’s repeated calls for the cessation of violence, de-escalation and resolving the situation through diplomacy is high energy prices, which may negatively affect India’s stressed economy.

Cutting Russia Off SWIFT Could Accelerate Beijing-Moscow Alternative Payments System

On February 24, the United Kingdom (UK) announced its “largest-ever” economic sanctions on Russia, and so did the United States (US). As the sanctions get stricter, shared economic interests and geopolitical considerations are likely to deepen economic relations between Beijing and Moscow, including the prospect of building an alternative financial system.

The signs of deepening Russia-China economic relations are evident. In an interview with a Russian newspaper amidst Russia’s recognition of rebel-held regions in Eastern Ukraine, China’s ambassador to Russia, Zhang Hanhui, spoke about possibilities of furthering cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, especially in energy, space, financial cooperation, and high-tech weapons systems. These are also the sectors targeted in the recent round of sanctions by the UK and the US. This is explicit signalling by Beijing of its support for Moscow.

US Indo-Pacific Strategy geared for Great Power Competition

The US recently came out with the latest iteration of its Indo-Pacific Strategy. The document has a clear imprint of the ongoing great-power competition across political, ideological and military-technical domains between US and its allies on one side and China and Russia on the other. The document has a realist tone, admitting that the US seeks “a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable” to it. It is no coincidence that Russia and China take issue with the US rhetoric on a “rules-based order” that would only be advantageous to US and countries closely aligned to it. 

Understanding China’s High Tech Espionage Efforts To Modernise The Military

The Department of Defense (DoD) under the United States government recently released its yearly report on the military and security developments in China. This report, acronymised as the DoD report, gives a comprehensive understanding of the progress made by the Chinese armed forces over the year along with elucidating the future plans of the Chinese military. One of the interesting aspects of last year’s DoD report was the focus on China’s industrial espionage efforts on certain advanced technologies which the government thinks holds the key to enhancing the quality of their military systems.

Why China is Talking about a 1952 Pact and ‘Equal Negotiations’ with Sri Lanka

On January 9, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi concluded his five-nation Indian Ocean trip with his departure from Sri Lanka. During a 24-hour visit to Colombo, Wang launched the celebrations for the 65th anniversary of China-Sri Lanka relations by inaugurating the promenade of the Colombo Port City, a flagship Belt and Road project. Wang’s talks with the Sri Lankan leaders took place in the backdrop of possibly the worst foreign exchange crisis in the Island’s history. Thus, Foreign Minister G.L. Peiris commenced the talks by reminding the visitor that the proverb “a friend in need is a friend indeed, is the eternal theme of bilateral relations”. Similarly, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa thanked China for “always lending a helping hand” during Sri Lanka’s time of urgent need.

China’s Bare-Chested Turn To Sri-Lankan Tamils Is India’s New Headache

The arrest of more than 60 Indian fishermen by the Sri Lankan Navy last month created a political stir in Tamil Nadu. The state’s fishermen are continuing their indefinite strike from 19 December, with a plan to stage a ‘massive rail roko’ agitation if all the arrested fishermen are not released. Writing to External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, the state’s chief minister M.K. Stalin has also asked the Narendra Modi government to ensure “fishermen’s safety and the right to livelihood” from the intimidatory tactics of the Sri Lankan Navy.

What’s Behind China’s New National Standardization Outline Document?

China’s “Standards 2035” project gained headlines in April 2020 at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. October 2021 saw the release of the National Standardization Development (NSD) outline document as the first official document detailing China’s ambitions in the coming decade in the realm of technical standardization processes. The NSD visualizes a standardized system that promotes high-tech innovation and “opening up” of the technology sector, while also leading to high-quality development. The core points covered in the document provide a glimpse into the Chinese state’s strategic approach toward technical standards.

Behind Beijng’s proposal to regulate military applications of AI

China recently submitted a position paper on regulating the military applications of artificial intelligence to the sixth review conference of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).The takeaway from this position paper is that countries should debate, discuss, and perhaps eschew the weaponization of AI. By initiating a discussion on regulating military applications of AI, Beijing wants to project itself as a responsible international player.

Has China achieved its leap to ‘Quantum Supremacy’?

The quantum race is heating up. Last month, the US and Australia signed an official agreement on quantum technology and information science, emphasising the exchange of skills and development in the field for the protection of intellectual property as well as building safe and secure research environments.

Lessons for India From China’s Technical Standardisation Strategy

China recently released the National Standardisation Development (NSD) Outline, which serves as the first major document in the public domain on the standardisation strategy of the state in the coming years. This serves as a potential road map for the Chinese government and provides a glimpse into its intentions of utilising technical standards as an economic and strategic tool to further advance its interests.The standardisation strategy envisioned by the Chinese government can also serve as a model for India to increase its presence in the international technical standards domain. China’s pursuit offers India an opportunity to emulate its neighbour in simultaneously strengthening its domestic standardisation schemes while improving its leverage in international standards developing organisations. The NSD outline document provides India with a few pointers on the path it can take to influence technical standards-setting at the international level.

Quantum computing: China ahead, US plays catch-up

The shadow of geopolitical competition with China looms large over the recent cooperation agreement on Quantum Science and Technology between Australia and the US. The joint statement identifies Quantum technologies as a “critical emerging technology” while reiterating commitment to “democratic institutions” and “to an open, inclusive and resilient Indo-Pacific region.” The statement also says that the two sides resolve to protect sensitive technologies with implications for national security, a reference to the alleged theft of IP and tech espionage by China.

Three Reasons Why China’s Tech Prowess is Overhyped

If one were to judge the technological prowess of a nation-state on the basis of daily news, China comes across as heads and shoulders above the rest. Hardly any day passes by without reports reminding us that China is well on its path to creating a self-reliant technology industry. While China’s technological progress is quite real, I want to list three caveats to make you recalibrate exponential growth projections and over-optimistic predictions about China’s tech ecosystem.

The Implications of Mutual Assured Vulnerability for the Indo-Pacific Region

China’s nuclear modernisation might establish stability in the US-China nuclear dyad. However, it would have a cascading effect on the nuclear and conventional competition in the Indo-Pacific region

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has undertaken the qualitative and quantitative modernisation of its nuclear arsenal. In the past two years, China has constructed around 250-300 missile silos, tested a new hypersonic missile system, fielded at least two brigades of its road-mobile DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), handed over two Jin-class submarines to the People’s Liberation Army — one of which (Changzheng 18) was commissioned to enter service in April 2021, and continued deploying more road-mobile DF-31 AG launchers and dual-use DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).

Iran-Pakistan Rivalry In Afghanistan Works for India

The Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan held in New Delhi on November 10 marks India’s re-entry into the contested landscape of Af-Pak geopolitics. However, due to the regional states’ differing focus on the terrorism threat, refugee crisis, regional stability etc, Indian concerns about the repercussions of ISI activities in Afghanistan will likely remain a low priority for most regional powers, except Iran. It’s Iran that has both the interest and resources to resist Pakistan’s domination in Afghanistan.

Delhi declaration marks India’s return to Afghanistan

On November 10, India hosted the third Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan in New Delhi. Unlike the past two iterations sponsored by Iran, the Delhi Meet was conspicuous by the absence of Afghan officials from the dialogue. The new Afghan regime dominated by the Haqqani Network was not invited to the meeting, whereas its prime backer, Pakistan, was invited but refused to attend, calling India a “spoiler” to the peace in Afghanistan. Beijing, a close ally of Islamabad, also opted out of the meeting, citing “scheduling difficulties”.Yet, the meeting in New Delhi led by NSA Ajit Doval remains vital to the geopolitical developments in the region. The meeting was attended by top security officials of Russia, Iran and the five Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.What came out of the Delhi Declaration? The deterioration of regional security due to the emerging threats of terrorism, radicalisation and drug trafficking emanating from political stability in Afghanistan remained the focus of the meeting. In the Delhi Declaration, the common concerns of the participants came out prominently with their reiteration of “strong support” for stability in Afghanistan and a call for “non-interference in its internal affairs”. They also emphasised that Afghanistan’s territory should not be used for “sheltering, training, planning or financing any terrorist acts” against the neighbours and reaffirmed their “firm commitment to combat terrorism in all its form and manifestations”.While Pakistan was not named, the Iranian concerns with the ISI domination in Afghanistan came into the forefront with the participants’ stress upon forming an “open and truly inclusive government” that includes all the “major ethno-political forces in the country”. It is important to note that ever since the Taliban victory in August 2015, Iran has consistently raised the issue of the exclusion of Persian/Dari speaking minority groups from the government. Mainly, the role of the ISI in imposing a Haqqani Network dominated government in Afghanistan had elicited strong reactions in Tehran. Though the Taliban had subsequently included some members from northern Afghanistan, it is clear that Iran would continue to focus on securing its allies’ interests in Afghanistan.The importance given to “providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan” in the Delhi Declaration also high- lighted India’s concerns. From the Indian point of view, the participant countries’ support for humanitarian assistance to be provided in an “unimpeded, direct and assured manner to Afghanistan” was a gesture of support for New Delhi’s efforts to send aid to Afghanistan. It also underlines the regional opposition to Islamabad’s obstructive tactics in refusing to allow transit permission to the trucks waiting on the Indian side of the border. Similarly, the Declaration’s mention of the “central role” of the UN in Afghanistan was tacit approval of the UNSC resolution 2593, which prohibits safe havens to terror outfits like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, passed during India’s presidency of the Security Council in August this year.Has India got its focus back on Afghanistan? Ever since the Taliban victory, New Delhi has struggled to remain relevant to the developments in Kabul. On the other hand, having secured its strategic depth on its western border, Pakistan’s determination to not let India play any major role in Afghanistan is a geographic reality that remains difficult to overcome.In this regard, making a common cause with other regional powers is the only feasible solution for New Delhi. By hosting a regional security meeting on Afghanistan, India has belatedly underscored its security concerns with the regional developments. While the prospects of the Taliban-Pakistan fallout remain high until the ISI’s domination generates domestic backlash in Afghanistan, a concerted effort with like-minded regional powers is the only option for regional stability.This article was published in Newstrail newspaper on November 12, 2021.

China’s hypersonic missile test got US, India racing. It exposes BMD vulnerability

China has carried out a test of a new space capability with a hypersonic missile, as reported first by The Financial Times. The test was supposedly carried out secretly in August 2021. The report relied on experts of the US intelligence community and could be a deliberate leak. It managed to touch the most sensitive cord of any nation’s strategic community—potential vulnerability.

A barrage of commentaries soon littered the information landscape. It mattered little that the development did not create a vulnerability in the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) of the US or any other nation that is deploying it. The vulnerability already existed, and all the efforts of creating a BMD system have been chasing their tail since 2001—when the US had unleashed the BMD arms race as it withdrew from the 1972 Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty with the Soviet Union. The Financial Times report indicated that the US has now been disadvantaged by China’s technological progress. It sits easily with the larger narrative of Beijing’s growing technological and military capability.

Read the full article in ThePrint

Why China’s Quest to Dominate Global Tech Standards Looks Far-fetched

The rise of China’s technological growth has created ripples in the world technology ecosystem.

The global tech markets, which were generally dominated by the West have come under immense geopolitical and geoeconomic pressure due to China’s rapid growth in developing emerging technologies. The Chinese government has created a vision for the State to dominate the global tech supply chains and eventually concentrate geopolitical power. At the heart of this vision lies technical standards and the role they play in determining the balance of power between technologically adept states.

Ideology in Xi’s China: The role of nationalism

Through the decades of reform and opening up, the impulse of nationalism dominated popular ideological discourse. It, along with economic performance, served as the key pillars shoring-up the Party’s legitimacy. Two events were decisive in shaping this direction. The first was the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989, which threatened the Party’s ruling legitimacy. The second was Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 Southern Tour, which signalled an end to internal jostling over the direction of economic policy. Growth at any cost would now become the primary policy driver for the Party. This subsequent patriotic education campaign, of course, had a key role to play in this process too, along with key domestic and international developments.Read the full article in Hindustan Times.

The role of ideology in Xi Jinping’s China

There is an increasing sense around the world that under Xi Jinping, the Communist Party of China has doubled down on ideology. This is seen as a distinct turn away from the pragmatism that Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up had engendered. The argument goes that emerging from the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the subsequent chaos of the Cultural Revolution, Deng reoriented the Party’s mission away from class warfare and revolution towards economic prosperity. In this quest, he restructured the Party’s organisational system and redefined its relationship with the state, capital and society, loosening controls. Policies through the decades of reform and opening up, for many, had implied that China had begun transitioning to a post-ideological society, where ideological discourse provided a rhetorical connection to communism and socialism but lacked substance. This is the trend that has seemingly regressed or been rectified, depending on one’s viewpoint, with the emergence of Xi Jinping Thought as China’s guiding ideology after the 19th Party Congress in 2017.There are, of course, fundamental changes that are taking place in China under Xi Jinping. For instance, there is indeed greater discussion about inheriting red genes, the vitality of socialism and the superiority of the socialist system, and the goal of common prosperity. These are certainly also impacting policies with regard to the Party organisation, the role of private capital, approach to economic reform and social security policies. However, the argument that there is a return of ideology is epistemologically on shaky ground. Such an assessment, in fact, is a fundamental misinterpretation of the political evolution of the Chinese Party-state system. In part, this misinterpretation has been the product of the manner in which observers have approached the concept of ideology, and in part, it is a product of misreading the essential impulses that shape the Party’s ideology.Read the full article here in Hindustan Times