Commentary
Find our newspaper columns, blogs, and other commentary pieces in this section. Our research focuses on Advanced Biology, High-Tech Geopolitics, Strategic Studies, Indo-Pacific Studies & Economic Policy
One Year On, Assessing the Ban on Chinese Apps
For CCP, the Era of Seeking Strength
On July 1, even as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) marks its centenary, it has sought to use the moment to catalyse the march towards the goals of “socialist modernisation” and “national rejuvenation”. According to the Party’s, and indeed Xi Jinping’s, historical narrative, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) entered a new era after the 19th Party Congress in 2017. If earlier periods were marked by efforts to “stand up” and then “grow rich”, the new era is marked by the country “becoming strong”. Examining Xi’s speeches, Party regulations, the government’s economic policies and official media discourse, one can identify some of the key features that characterise this era of seeking strength.Read the full article in Hindustan Times. Views are personal
‘Gray zone’ intrigue may derail Russia-Japan cooperation
Read the Full Text of the Article on Asia Times Rightly or wrongly, Moscow may interpret recent events as ‘war by other means’ waged by US ally JapanRussia and its adversaries are equally obsessed with a full spectrum of “gray zone” activities, including high-tech military, industrial and corporate espionage. While Russia does not see Japan as an adversary, it feels uncomfortable with Japan’s close ties to the US.The contemporary Russia-Japan relationship is complicated, with worrying trends signaling possible derailment of their bilateral ties in some fields.While the direction of great-power relations is rightly gauged from policy moves and summits, the shadowy world of espionage and spies, while overtly aligned with policy and polity, covertly operates to secure national interests, making no concessions, even to allies.Over the past few weeks, a curious case of alleged espionage has been grabbing headlines in Japan. Kazuo Miyasaka, the 70-year-old former owner of a technical research firm, was reportedly apprehended by the police for allegedly passing on high-tech military secrets to a member of the Russian trade representative mission in Japan.Miyasaka is believed to have betrayed secrets related to the US Space Force’s unmanned X-37B spacecraft, among other advanced systems.Read the Full Text of the Article on Asia Times All views are personal and do not reflect the recommendations of the Takshashila Institution
Should India Worry About China's Naval Fleet in Indian Ocean?
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) of the 21st century represents a geopolitical hotspot. Power politics is gaining traction in the region, with China attempting to form a leading presence in the vast waters surrounding the Indian subcontinent. In the context of (i) strategic identity, (ii) naval modernization and (iii) limitation in power, this article attempts to understand Chinese ambitions in the Indian ocean and argues that although the IOR will remain an Indian dominated region for the present, we cannot ignore the aggressive approach from China as a result of its highly ambitious foreign policy and increasing activities there.This article originally appeared in The Quint. You can read the full article here.
How to Beat China in the High-Tech Race
The near-daily cadence of reports highlighting China's growing technology prowess has set the cat among the pigeons in many democracies. In response, these countries are now offering higher subsidies and fatter incentives to increase the competitiveness of their own technology industries.
The US Senate, for instance, passed a $250 billion Innovation and Competition bill on 8th June aimed at outpacing China. The Indian government, since last year, has launched Product Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes for 13 sectors worth ₹2 trillion, some of them targeted at high-tech industries such as semiconductors, telecom, and networking. Earlier this month, a draft growth strategy of the Japanese government also promised generous financial incentives to attract cutting-edge chip-making facilities. Not to be left behind, the EU, too, has announced a €145 billion plan to upgrade its semiconductor and electronics manufacturing.
While the intent is encouraging, it's interesting to note that all these plans are qualitatively quite similar to China's 'Made in China 2025' — a state-led industrial policy for technology. Released in 2015, it was labelled as a threat to global trade for channelling state subsidies to achieve import substitution. But now, many countries seem to be following a similar approach. Of course, China's subsidies are often discriminatory and place extreme restrictions on foreign investment. Even so, all these policies mirror China's at their core — they are all about using old-style industrial policy instruments such as subsidies and incentives to achieve high-tech self-sufficiency.Read the full article in Times of India. Views are personal
The Galwan Valley One Year On: What's Changed with China and the PLA?
This month marks the first anniversary of the Galwan Valley clash between China and India, which resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian and at least four PLA soldiers. It also marks the first fatalities on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in over 45 years resulting from China’s attempts to change the status quo forcefully in Ladakh. The initial Chinese incursion was located at four points — Pangong Tso, the approach roads to the Depsang Plain, Gogra and Hotspring areas and Galwan Valley — which both China and India consider to be on their side of the LAC but were previously controlled by New Delhi. The Galwan Valley clash on the night of 15 June 2020 shattered three decades of trust and confidence established by five pacts signed between 1993 and 2012. In the days that followed, both sides deployed over two army divisions, battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers and surface to air missiles to Ladakh. Both sides also deployed fighter, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and drones at forward bases near the border. In August 2020, India carried out a “pre-emptive” operation on Pangong Tso’s south bank to strengthen its on-ground position and create leverage while negotiating a Chinese withdrawal.
Today, after thirteen months of friction, eleven rounds of Corps Commander-level meetings, seven Work Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) meetings and at least two known interactions between India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the two sides have only disengaged at Galwan and Pangong Tso. The stand-off in Ladakh continues at other friction points. In his recent interview, India’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen MM. Naravane highlighted that India continues to maintain a significant troop presence along the entire border. Heightened tensions and a forward Sino-Indian military presence on the LAC seem to be the new status quo. But four specific developments on the Chinese side since the Galwan incident could further impact the LAC dispute in the future. Some are a direct result of the ongoing military stand-off, while others are a part of the broader PLA restructuring and China’s evolving military strategy.
This was originally published on 9Dashline, please read the whole article using the link.
High time Indian Foreign Policy jettisons ‘don’t annoy China’ notion & Supports Virus Probe
Of late, Covid-19 has been getting a geopolitical boost from the tailwinds of political and scientific narratives originating primarily from the US. In May, US President Joe Biden ordered an intelligence probe into the origins of the novel coronavirus or SARS-CoV-2. The fact that it originated in China is undisputed. Scientific suspicions that the virus is an artificial creation and probably leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology have now received a booster dose. Anthony Fauci, the Chief Medical Adviser to the US President, stated that he never played down the possibility of the lab leak in China for political reasons. In the last few weeks, a slew of scientific papers have reinforced the lab leak theory, with the G7 and the European Union adding political traction to the call for concerted action to uncover the truth. International politics has now inserted itself into the investigative process and is gaining momentum within the spaces of scientific doubts regarding the origin of the virus. In the long run, the scientific quest for facts draped in political free play could eventually be the information missile that could do a lot of damage to China.In the case of Covid-19, science, geography and politics could create a potent brew in the information age. In global geopolitics, this could become deadly for China. For China’s detractors, it might provide informational fuel and create the psychological effect that can, at the global level, drive popular anger directed against the country. It is an anger that has the potential to sustain because of the colossal damage caused by Covid to lives and livelihood.Read the full article in ThePrint
Five Trends in India-China Ties a Year after the Galwan Valley clash
The June 2020 clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers in the Galwan Valley has frequently been termed as a watershed moment in the history of bilateral relations. The incident marked the first loss of life in conflict along the boundary between the two countries in over four decades. A year later, while some equations have shifted, there has not been a sudden break — rather, ties appear to be drifting towards greater contestation with a certain ambivalence evident on both sides. This is underscored by five key trends.Read the full article in the Quint here.
The banal geopolitical fallout of the laboratory leak hypothesis
On 11 September 2001, the US suffered four coordinated terrorist attacks that claimed nearly 3,000 lives, injured over 25,000 people and caused at least $10 billion in property damage. Within hours, the US National Security Agency had intercepted phone calls that led them to suspect Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda of having planned and carried out the attacks. On that same evening, the CIA director confirmed this assessment to the US president. In two weeks, the FBI identified the specific attackers, and by the end of the month had published photographs and nationalities of all 19 terrorists who carried out the attacks. Of them were 15 Saudis, two Emiratis, a Lebanese and an Egyptian. Bin Laden himself was a Saudi national and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, a key conspirator, was Pakistani. The US authorities knew Bin Laden and his outfit quite well, for they had together fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, along with the Saudi and Pakistani intelligence agencies. So it is fair to say that one would have to have one’s head firmly buried in the sand to miss the glaring Saudi and Pakistani links to—and possible complicity in—the attacks.Read the full article in The Mint
US shifting its Tibet stance. When will India end its silence?
The Dalai Lama’s succession may be stirring the pot of Buddhism at the global geopolitical table. China’s sensitivity to Tibetan issues has long been viewed by some nations as having a high potential for leverage in the conduct of relations with it. But Donald Trump shook up the Tibetan pot in December 2020 when he signed into law the Tibetan Policy and Support Act 2020 or TPSA and changed the contours of the earlier US policy, which under the Barack Obama administration had sacrificed the region’s interests in order to foster better US-China relations.
The TPSA declares that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan Buddhist leaders are religious matters and all decisions pertaining to reincarnations rest solely with the Tibetan Buddhist faith community based on the instructions of the 14th Dalai Lama and without interference by the government of the People’s Republic of China. The law also acknowledges the Central Tibetan Administration (the Government in Exile in Dharamshala) that is committed to peacefully negotiating its status as an autonomous entity within China. Last month, the Biden administration opted to continue the Trump policy.Read the full article in ThePrint
India’s gamble on China failed in Ladakh. But there’s a new risk worth taking
The deadlock on military de-escalation in Ladakh continues. It might turn out to be another example of China’s perfidy. India has had sufficient historical experience with China’s use of agreements for buying time and deceiving us. The 2018 agreement for defusing the crisis in Doklam and its subsequent military occupation of the rest of the Doklam plateau is fresh in memory. It should have warned us about the dangers of China getting India to withdraw from a tactically advantageous position at the Kailash Range in Ladakh and then using delay tactics to keep India under pressure.
China’s strategic behaviour can only be interpreted if one views the military moves in Ladakh in the broader perspective of China-US geopolitical rivalry. China’s ambitions that generate its geopolitical compulsions are no longer being concealed. Xi Jinping is claiming that the US and China are now virtually equal powers and it is only a matter of time before China surpasses America economically and, if some Chinese claims are to be believed, even technologically. At the same time, China believes India can be an impediment to its ambitions. But only if India’s partnership with the US exploits a geographic reality steeped in the maritime domain and threatens China’s dreams of predominance at the global and regional geopolitical table.Read the full article in ThePrint
In India’s Covid-19 challenge, China’s hopes and anxieties
The second wave of Covid-19 in India has been among the biggest international stories being covered across the Chinese media. The coverage reflects a sense of anxiety and opportunity.In terms of the former, there is concern about the spread of the so-called double mutant, or B.1.617 strain of the virus across the region and into China. A fresh wave of domestic outbreaks would be deeply damaging for the Communist Party, which declared victory against the virus last year, and would take a toll on China’s economic recovery. Likewise, a massive public health crisis across the Indian subcontinent, at the minimum, would hurt Chinese commercial interests and investments. At worst, it could result in a humanitarian catastrophe with the potential to stoke socio-political instability along China’s periphery.At the same time, the situation in India presents opportunities for Beijing. At the bare minimum, there is a commercial opportunity, given the shortage of emergency supplies, equipment and therapeutics. But, at a deeper level, there are geopolitical opportunities. This is reflected in the Chinese media’s critical coverage of the delayed response by the Joe Biden administration, the emphasis on China’s manufacturing prowess and its centrality to key supply chains, and foreign minister Wang Yi’s summit with his South Asian counterparts, which focused on health supplies and vaccines.
How China’s Nuclear Ambiguity Affects India
What China’s nuclear ambiguity means for India is different from that for other nuclear powers such as the United States and Russia.
Ever since China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964, Beijing’s nuclear strategy has largely remained unchanged: it is based on achieving deterrence through assured retaliation. A crucial requirement for this is the survivability of its arsenal following a nuclear or conventional adversary’s first strike. But the improved technology and evolving security dynamics with the United States have compelled China to rethink its operational capabilities to achieve effective deterrence. China is rapidly attempting to modernize its conventional and nuclear arsenal and increase its nuclear ambiguity through subtle changes in the doctrine, force posture, and capabilities.
UK outlines global-focused defense strategy
Britain seeks to remain relevant in a world where it sees threats proliferating, while its finances are shrinking
The United Kingdom has outlined a vision for its defense and foreign-engagement priorities in its latest Integrated Review and Defense Command Paper.The paradigm of defense reviews in the UK goes back at least to the 1950s. The new document, published in March, has implications ranging from raising and appropriating defense spending to setting up new international bureaucratic structures and strategic nuclear signaling that nobody expected.It is no exaggeration to say that the document is Britain’s plan to remain relevant in a world where it sees threats proliferating, while its finances are shrinking.
Cummings couldn’t ‘cut’ it
Boris Johnson, the current British prime minister, promised an integrated review during his election campaign in 2019. However, at the time, Dominic Cummings, the technocratic chief adviser to the PM, was thought to be influencing the review. Until his exit from Downing Street in November last year, there was a lot of speculation on the review bringing a lot of cuts.Cummings was thought to prefer investment in high-tech solutions and wouldn’t shrink from cutting personnel and conventional security and war-fighting capabilities in the belief that they’d be obsolete in the very near future.
But in the end, in the final document, the cuts are not as severe as initially thought, though the focus on high-tech solutions and new war-fighting domains like cyber, artificial intelligence, space and information technology remain.In several places throughout the document, Russia has been identified as a major “active threat” to the UK and China as a “systemic competitor,” which broadly conforms to the general alignment and policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).In response, the Russian ambassador to the UK, Andrei Kelin, has said that the “political relationship between Moscow and London is nearly dead” – under the circumstances, not an unfair observation.Read the full article on Asia Times
In West Asia, where US and China’s interests intersect
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s recent six-nation tour of West Asia has sparked discussions about Beijing’s taking a more active approach in the region. In part, this is driven by China’s expanding interests; in part, it is a product of the China-United States (US) competition and geopolitical churn underway after Joe Biden’s election.Read the full article in the Hindustan Times.
Seventh Fleet move a reminder that Quad must remain a group of equals, not a US-led posse
The US Navy’s Seventh Fleet statement of 7 April 2021, after the freedom of navigation operation off Maldives in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone or the EEZ, even if legally valid, and watered down later by the Pentagon Spokesman, was unwarranted and seems indifferent to the sensitive phase in India-US relations. Post the statement, it is understood that China’s defence attaché in New Delhi went to town pointing out the US’ treatment of India as a rebuke of a subordinate. The possibility of this poke in India’s strategic eye being a lower level gaffe cannot be ruled out. But if it was earlier sanctioned by the US Secretary of Defence, then one can surmise that it was meant to convey who is the boss. That would be unfortunate for India-US relations because a reluctant New Delhi has now finally shed its inhibitions with regards to the Quad. The US seems to have misunderstood India’s political stance, especially New Delhi’s understanding of the nature of Quad.
In India’s view, the resurrected Quad is a platform that has four partners at its core with others being invited to participate, depending on common interests. Therefore, the specific issues that relate to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, Vietnam, Philippines or any effected country, could be potentially co-opted. Such flexibility can be a fruitful method for the Quad to adopt.
What's behind China's Wolf Warrior Diplomacy?
China’s imposition of punitive sanctions on EU institutions and individuals over Xinjiang, its attacks on the West’s colonial past when discussing human rights and the recent outburst by Yang Jiechi during the dialogue in Anchorage have all re-ignited discussions over Beijing’s assertive diplomacy. In fact, throughout the past year, there has been much debate about the increasing abrasiveness of Chinese diplomats.
Russia-Japan relations and why the Kurils matter
While there are signs of pragmatism in both Moscow and Tokyo, this last barrier to concluding WW2 remains
The Kuril Islands, or the Northern Territories as Japan likes to call them, are at the center of an uneasy relationship between Russia and Japan.The USSR occupied the islands between August and September 1945. Since the end of World War II, the disputed territory and related issues are the primary subject of engagement between the two countries.The contention over the ownership of the Kurils is also the main hurdle for the conclusion of World War II between the two nations. Over the decades, the diplomatic efforts by Japan have been unsuccessful in getting the islands back.In recent times there has been considerable cause to suggest that the Russian side has taken or has been compelled to take an icy approach to settling the Kuril Islands dispute because of public opinion.Laws in the new constitution adopted by Russia in July 2020 criminalize any alienation of Russian territories or advocacy for territorial concessions. These laws apply equally to every part of Russia, including those with some controversy around them, such as the Kuril Islands, Crimea and Kaliningrad.Read the full article on Asia Times
India’s recognition of Taliban should just be tactical, not let it rule Afghanistan again
This article was first published in ThePrint.Afghanistan is living proof that technological superiority in warfare is an insufficient condition for winning wars. The political outcomes of wars are hostage to success on the political table of diplomatic parleys. How else can one explain that the most powerful nation in the world, equipped with state-of-the-art technology and after having expended a great deal of blood and costly resources, has been unable to achieve favourable political outcomes. Yes, the US has so far prevented the Taliban from coming back to power in Kabul. But even that accomplishment was, for all practical purposes, undermined when the Donald Trump administration negotiated a peace deal with the Taliban in February 2020 and conceded that the militants can share power with the Afghan government as long as Afghanistan is not utilised as a base to launch terrorist attacks against the US. A peace deal that was done without the concurrence of the democratically elected government of Ashraf Ghani. Dumping allies has never troubled the US too much.
The peace process had envisaged the withdrawal of all American troops by 1 May 2021. But with Joe Biden as president now, the deal seems to be in jeopardy, because the US has serious concerns of a Taliban takeover once the withdrawal takes place without a power-sharing agreement between the Ashraf Ghani government and the Taliban. The US is pressuring the Ghani government for an agreement and is, in all probability, pushing Pakistan to get the Taliban to make concessions including the continued presence of US troops. Pakistan’s supposed change of stance was publicly projected through a tweet on what the DG ISPR said on 25 February: “Today’s Afghanistan is not the country it was in the nineties, whose state structure collapsed easily. Pakistan has also changed. It is not possible for [the] Taliban to take over Kabul and for Pakistan to support them. That will never happen.”
Meanwhile, the US leverage with Pakistan has strengthened somewhat due to the latter’s dire economic status and weakened support from its traditional Arab friends.
The Intra-Afghan negotiations are expected to discuss the ceasefire; agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan; the rights of women, free speech, and changes to the country’s constitution. The talks would also have to chalk out the fate of Taliban fighters as well as all the armed militias. This is a tall order to meet before the 1 May deadline.
Missing the wood for the trees
The Biden administration is backing several meetings between high-level Afghan government and Taliban officials. One such was hosted in Moscow in mid-March, which was also attended by US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, and representatives of Iran, India, China and Pakistan. The next one is to follow in Turkey in April. Afghanistan was the focus at the Heart of Asia Conference held in Tajikistan on 30 March and India was represented by foreign minister S. Jaishankar who stated: “India has been supportive of all the efforts being made to accelerate the dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban, including intra-Afghan negotiations”. He also declared India’s support for a regional process to be convened under the aegis of the United Nations.The conventional wisdom in India has always been that withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan will be detrimental to New Delhi’s interests as the Taliban could come to power and that would halt India’s aspirations to access Central Asia through the Chabahar Port. Also, a Taliban in power may provide the impetus of breeding terrorists that Pakistan would channelise towards India. These concerns are valid. But this view may be missing the wood for the trees.The real battle involving force in Afghanistan has been between a US-backed Afghan government and the Pakistan-backed Taliban. The US is no longer willing to pay the price for its continued backing of the government. It is desperate for an honourable exit. There is now an increased likelihood that the US will first try with the help of Pakistan to get the Taliban to agree to an extension of the withdrawal date. Broadly, three scenarios could now unfold.
Three options for Afghanistan
Scenario One. The Intra-Afghan talks fail, and the Taliban starts an offensive and takes control of key road communication links weakening the Afghan government’s ability to govern its provinces. The US stays put and further Intra-Afghan talks are stalled. Violence spikes and the civil war deepens endlessly.
Scenario Two. The Intra-Afghan talks fail. The US exits. Taliban launches a major offensive with Pakistan support and Kabul falls. Pakistan recognises the Taliban government. Former Afghan forces consolidate in northern Afghanistan bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Some forces are given shelter in Iran. Taliban establishes an ideologically extremist State.
Scenario Three. Intra-Afghan talks succeed. The Taliban shares power. The US exits. A fragile peace prevails for a year or two but is followed by a civil war with Pakistan backing the Taliban. The global community’s attention to violence receives a resigned acknowledgement. Russia, Iran, China and India take sides and provide support in various forms. Pakistan evades US pressure and that pushes it deeper into China’s embrace.
US must leave, Afghans must decide
None of these scenarios has a happy ending. However, the complex web of actors in Afghanistan tends to distract attention from the primary issue that must be resolved even if it has to be done through the currency of violence. It is about the rejection or acceptance by the Afghan people of the Taliban as an extremist religious entity. Decades of foreign interference has only prolonged the long and tortuous journey to peace. Afghans themselves must be left to resolve this ideological war. The US must exit with or without progress on Intra-Afghan talks and most importantly, all international actors, preferably through the UN Security Council, must mutually agree to non-interference and only provide humanitarian aid and developmental assistance. Pakistan’s public change of posture enunciated by its DG ISPR is encouraging, but it will require both the US and China to help Islamabad keep its word.India’s recent tacit recognition of the Taliban should at best be a tactical move. Strategically, the Taliban in power in Afghanistan is detrimental to India’s interest. India must not waver from its stand on the ideological front even as it leaves it to the Afghans to resolve the resultant imbroglio. The exit of the US will deny the Taliban the narrative of pushing its ideology in the garb of fighting the foreigners and will be a strategic blow for them. For India, Pakistan will lose leverage with the US and that can only be to our benefit. A US exit can only do good. Prolonging its stay also deepens the misery of the Afghan people without an end in sight.Lt Gen Prakash Menon is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution, Bangalore and former Military Adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. Views are personal.
How a new rail line in China will pose a security challenge to India
The article was originally published in the Hindustan Times. Cover Image Source: China Discovery