Commentary
Find our newspaper columns, blogs, and other commentary pieces in this section. Our research focuses on Advanced Biology, High-Tech Geopolitics, Strategic Studies, Indo-Pacific Studies & Economic Policy
What's behind China's Wolf Warrior Diplomacy?
China’s imposition of punitive sanctions on EU institutions and individuals over Xinjiang, its attacks on the West’s colonial past when discussing human rights and the recent outburst by Yang Jiechi during the dialogue in Anchorage have all re-ignited discussions over Beijing’s assertive diplomacy. In fact, throughout the past year, there has been much debate about the increasing abrasiveness of Chinese diplomats.
Russia-Japan relations and why the Kurils matter
While there are signs of pragmatism in both Moscow and Tokyo, this last barrier to concluding WW2 remains
The Kuril Islands, or the Northern Territories as Japan likes to call them, are at the center of an uneasy relationship between Russia and Japan.The USSR occupied the islands between August and September 1945. Since the end of World War II, the disputed territory and related issues are the primary subject of engagement between the two countries.The contention over the ownership of the Kurils is also the main hurdle for the conclusion of World War II between the two nations. Over the decades, the diplomatic efforts by Japan have been unsuccessful in getting the islands back.In recent times there has been considerable cause to suggest that the Russian side has taken or has been compelled to take an icy approach to settling the Kuril Islands dispute because of public opinion.Laws in the new constitution adopted by Russia in July 2020 criminalize any alienation of Russian territories or advocacy for territorial concessions. These laws apply equally to every part of Russia, including those with some controversy around them, such as the Kuril Islands, Crimea and Kaliningrad.Read the full article on Asia Times
India’s recognition of Taliban should just be tactical, not let it rule Afghanistan again
This article was first published in ThePrint.Afghanistan is living proof that technological superiority in warfare is an insufficient condition for winning wars. The political outcomes of wars are hostage to success on the political table of diplomatic parleys. How else can one explain that the most powerful nation in the world, equipped with state-of-the-art technology and after having expended a great deal of blood and costly resources, has been unable to achieve favourable political outcomes. Yes, the US has so far prevented the Taliban from coming back to power in Kabul. But even that accomplishment was, for all practical purposes, undermined when the Donald Trump administration negotiated a peace deal with the Taliban in February 2020 and conceded that the militants can share power with the Afghan government as long as Afghanistan is not utilised as a base to launch terrorist attacks against the US. A peace deal that was done without the concurrence of the democratically elected government of Ashraf Ghani. Dumping allies has never troubled the US too much.
The peace process had envisaged the withdrawal of all American troops by 1 May 2021. But with Joe Biden as president now, the deal seems to be in jeopardy, because the US has serious concerns of a Taliban takeover once the withdrawal takes place without a power-sharing agreement between the Ashraf Ghani government and the Taliban. The US is pressuring the Ghani government for an agreement and is, in all probability, pushing Pakistan to get the Taliban to make concessions including the continued presence of US troops. Pakistan’s supposed change of stance was publicly projected through a tweet on what the DG ISPR said on 25 February: “Today’s Afghanistan is not the country it was in the nineties, whose state structure collapsed easily. Pakistan has also changed. It is not possible for [the] Taliban to take over Kabul and for Pakistan to support them. That will never happen.”
Meanwhile, the US leverage with Pakistan has strengthened somewhat due to the latter’s dire economic status and weakened support from its traditional Arab friends.
The Intra-Afghan negotiations are expected to discuss the ceasefire; agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan; the rights of women, free speech, and changes to the country’s constitution. The talks would also have to chalk out the fate of Taliban fighters as well as all the armed militias. This is a tall order to meet before the 1 May deadline.
Missing the wood for the trees
The Biden administration is backing several meetings between high-level Afghan government and Taliban officials. One such was hosted in Moscow in mid-March, which was also attended by US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, and representatives of Iran, India, China and Pakistan. The next one is to follow in Turkey in April. Afghanistan was the focus at the Heart of Asia Conference held in Tajikistan on 30 March and India was represented by foreign minister S. Jaishankar who stated: “India has been supportive of all the efforts being made to accelerate the dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban, including intra-Afghan negotiations”. He also declared India’s support for a regional process to be convened under the aegis of the United Nations.The conventional wisdom in India has always been that withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan will be detrimental to New Delhi’s interests as the Taliban could come to power and that would halt India’s aspirations to access Central Asia through the Chabahar Port. Also, a Taliban in power may provide the impetus of breeding terrorists that Pakistan would channelise towards India. These concerns are valid. But this view may be missing the wood for the trees.The real battle involving force in Afghanistan has been between a US-backed Afghan government and the Pakistan-backed Taliban. The US is no longer willing to pay the price for its continued backing of the government. It is desperate for an honourable exit. There is now an increased likelihood that the US will first try with the help of Pakistan to get the Taliban to agree to an extension of the withdrawal date. Broadly, three scenarios could now unfold.
Three options for Afghanistan
Scenario One. The Intra-Afghan talks fail, and the Taliban starts an offensive and takes control of key road communication links weakening the Afghan government’s ability to govern its provinces. The US stays put and further Intra-Afghan talks are stalled. Violence spikes and the civil war deepens endlessly.
Scenario Two. The Intra-Afghan talks fail. The US exits. Taliban launches a major offensive with Pakistan support and Kabul falls. Pakistan recognises the Taliban government. Former Afghan forces consolidate in northern Afghanistan bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Some forces are given shelter in Iran. Taliban establishes an ideologically extremist State.
Scenario Three. Intra-Afghan talks succeed. The Taliban shares power. The US exits. A fragile peace prevails for a year or two but is followed by a civil war with Pakistan backing the Taliban. The global community’s attention to violence receives a resigned acknowledgement. Russia, Iran, China and India take sides and provide support in various forms. Pakistan evades US pressure and that pushes it deeper into China’s embrace.
US must leave, Afghans must decide
None of these scenarios has a happy ending. However, the complex web of actors in Afghanistan tends to distract attention from the primary issue that must be resolved even if it has to be done through the currency of violence. It is about the rejection or acceptance by the Afghan people of the Taliban as an extremist religious entity. Decades of foreign interference has only prolonged the long and tortuous journey to peace. Afghans themselves must be left to resolve this ideological war. The US must exit with or without progress on Intra-Afghan talks and most importantly, all international actors, preferably through the UN Security Council, must mutually agree to non-interference and only provide humanitarian aid and developmental assistance. Pakistan’s public change of posture enunciated by its DG ISPR is encouraging, but it will require both the US and China to help Islamabad keep its word.India’s recent tacit recognition of the Taliban should at best be a tactical move. Strategically, the Taliban in power in Afghanistan is detrimental to India’s interest. India must not waver from its stand on the ideological front even as it leaves it to the Afghans to resolve the resultant imbroglio. The exit of the US will deny the Taliban the narrative of pushing its ideology in the garb of fighting the foreigners and will be a strategic blow for them. For India, Pakistan will lose leverage with the US and that can only be to our benefit. A US exit can only do good. Prolonging its stay also deepens the misery of the Afghan people without an end in sight.Lt Gen Prakash Menon is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution, Bangalore and former Military Adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. Views are personal.
How a new rail line in China will pose a security challenge to India
The article was originally published in the Hindustan Times. Cover Image Source: China Discovery
Ladakh didn’t work out for China. It will now drive a wedge between Quad partners
This article originally appeared in ThePrint. You can read it here.In the contemporary global geopolitical landscape, China has evoked more fear than hope. It has displayed an impressive capacity for political organisation to pursue its objectives. After nearly three decades of resting hopes on a China that will be a responsible power in the international system, there is now an increased consensus among most Western and Asian powers that a collective approach is necessary to tackle it.
China’s justification for its strategic behaviour rests on a historical argument of recapturing its rightful place in the world that was earlier displaced by Western imperialism. This is a historically revisionist argument that is factually correct but would also be the case for many nations of the world. This argument was earlier used for incorporating Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. As China has grown progressively stronger, it has been embarking on its other questionable historical territorial claims that particularly involve India, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia. China has also created artificial islands in the South China Sea on at least seven reefs and islets and built military infrastructure on them, which includes three airfields.
China’s economic heft as the manufacturing hub of the world, coupled with its Belt and Road Initiative, has been mobilised to create a web of dependencies and influence. Thus, several nations are vulnerable to exploitation and eventual subordination. The success of this project entails progress towards a historically imagined Middle Kingdom. Combined with its growing military power, China is on a neo-colonial path and on the lookout for converting more and more nations into vassal states. Asian powers are facing the brunt of it and one of the major areas in contention is understandably the geographical space that is the lifeblood of China’s economic power – the Indo-Pacific.
The Quad pushback
The recent version of Quad, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, as a cooperative strategic visualisation, has an expanded concept of security to include several other areas. It signifies the pushback to China’s rise and the consequent aggressive behaviour. The Quad finally came to acquire political ballast in February 2021 after more than a decade in limbo. For long, both India and Australia were uncomfortable being viewed as part of any cooperative venture ostensibly aimed at China. But the concurrent turn of events in both the countries has combined with the change of administration in the US to conclude that the time for Quad had arrived. India’s hesitancy was cast aside by China’s Ladakh aggression. Australia faced the brunt of China’s economic antipathy.China is certain, now, to attempt to rearrange its pieces on the global geopolitical chessboard. Xi Jinping ought to avoid major risky ventures in an ambience where the winds of anti-China sentiments are gathering steam and greater possibilities exists of the US catalysing opposition against it. This could herald the deepening of China’s strategic nightmare regarding a combined opposition to its rise, coming home to roost. China has already foreseen this possibility and pulled Russia into its fold, a realignment that was hastened by the worsening of US-Russia relations. The support for the Quad from other European powers like France, UK, Germany and some Asean nations like Vietnam should also give pause to China. However, China will continue to pressurise the Asean from taking sides. Its plans of governing military bases and increased access in the Indian Ocean Region will remain unaffected with strengthening of the Pakistan Navy. What then are the implications for India?
China after Ladakh
India should have to brace itself for China flexing its military and economic muscles, and could be the prime target to drive a wedge in Quad. China will show little restraint in keeping India contained within the subcontinent, a geo-strategy that it has followed for long. Earlier, it was mostly Pakistan that was useful to slow down India’s economic progress, create internal instability and channel its political and diplomatic energy in diverse directions. Now, Nepal and Sri Lanka have been added to that list with varying degrees of success.Militarily, the Ladakh tensions have temporarily eased. But further progress of disengagement and de-escalation awaited. China would have hopefully learnt the lessons on limitations of military power against adversaries whose stakes are higher and may be willing to risk escalation. If China’s Ladakh objective was related to warning India against a US tilt, the main strategic outcome has certainly worked against it and instead energised the Quad. But it also means that Beijing will strengthen its military efforts to redirect India’s resources towards the defence of the northern border so as to slow us down from emerging as a powerful maritime entity. Small doses of military tensions coupled with actions aimed to debilitate the economy, should be expected.The other prong of containment are India’s neighbours. Despite the ceasefire on the Line of Control, Pakistan’s support for terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir is likely to continue. With the US withdrawal from Afghanistan hanging in the balance, Pakistan’s Afghanistan engagement may deepen. China’s recent political machinations in Nepal have not followed its script but its presence and ability to create trouble for India through Nepal will endure. China’s efforts with Bhutan and Bangladesh have not met with much success. But Sri Lanka is vulnerable and would require continued engagement. The coup in Myanmar requires deft handling and has the potential for slowing down the execution of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor. Overall, India has geographic proximity, historical and cultural affiliations on its side. But it has various unresolved issues with each of its neighbours, and capability for assistance is now impacted by a weakened economy. China is the outsider with economic clout but cultural affinity is low. Also, our neighbours can be expected to play both sides. It is not going to be easy for India, at all.
India needs domestic stability, resilient economy
India’s ability to deal with China’s multiple prongs in the subcontinent is intimately connected to the goings on in its domestic polity. With a neutered opposition, the ruling elite now enjoys unbridled power. However, the Hindu majoritarian impulse in the populace has deepened communal polarisation. Several key institutions that have to act as constitutional safeguards have been deliberately weakened by depriving them of power for independent functioning. Key constitutional pillars of democracy and federal structure of the nation are being undermined, with the latest being the attempts by the central government to render the Delhi UT government ineffectual. Coupled with the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and large scale unemployment, the evolving cocktail for possible internal discord could seriously hinder India’s capacity to contest China’s influence on the neighbouring nations. This factor may act as a primary drag, even if other foreign policy measures succeed.In many ways, the Quad may mark an important strategic milestone in contemporary global affairs. However, India would also require more economic and technological support from Quad partners. In this pursuit, strategic autonomy will be stressed. Also, the Quad’s effectiveness would be enhanced if other powers are incorporated, depending on the issue being tackled and interests involved. It might increase options of many other nations from being overwhelmed by China’s coercion. China’s reactions can be expected to increase probability of varying forms of conflicts at global and regional level. India, now having come to realise the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), must not waste time in determining its strategic trajectory.The global geopolitical chess game is moving fast. For India, there is no better way than internal consolidation, accompanied by increased cooperation with nations across the globe and with its immediate neighbours being a top priority area. Strategic tide is turning and India’s domestic political motor will be on test.
Why did India close Jalalabad consulate?
India dives into Quad waters
Chinese Communist Party has goals. India needs to have its own, not just respond to aggression
This article was originally published in ThePrintThere are glaring dissimilarities in India’s foreign policy stances towards China post the military disengagement in Doklam 2017 and the ongoing one in Ladakh. The former was followed by a reset that resembled closeness and acquiescence through informal summits in Wuhan and Mamallapuram while the latter seems to have prompted a distancing from China that was exemplified in the elevation of the Quad meeting to the level of political leadership on 12 March 2021 wherein Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that “members of the Quad will be closer than ever before”. Remarkably, for the first time, a joint statement was issued which was followed up by a joint article by the Quad leaders was also published in The Washington Post and China’s reaction is awaited. Meanwhile, it was not surprising that China was stalling the disengagement process in Ladakh.
While one can endlessly speculate on China’s motives in Doklam and Ladakh, what matters ultimately is the strategic effect of Chinese military aggression on India. Loss of trust cannot be cranked up impetuously. In any case, the Wuhan and Mamallapuram facade has perished and the reality of China’s perennial perfidy should forewarn and prepare us to exercise greater circumspection and watchfulness.
Why China is the Kautilya of international politics
This article was first published in ThePrintThe gameplay on the chessboard of global politics continues to cast its shadow on India’s relationships with the United States, China, nations of the sub-continent, and within its own federal units. For the skeptics of Kautilya’s continued relevance, the contemporary geopolitical chessboard underlines the chief tenets of Kautilyan rajamandala, or ‘circle of states’ – a concentric, geopolitical conception of the inter-state realm typifying friend-foe relationships.
Ironically, if there is one country that eminently exemplifies the Kautilyan template in international conduct, it is China – who was till the Ladakh episode, the quintessential madhyama (middle king) of the inter-state realm. A middle king is defined as “one with territory immediately proximate to those of the Ari (enemy) and the conqueror (hypothetically Pakistan and India respectively), capable of helping them when they are united or disunited and of suppressing them when they are disunited.” True to this definition, China had skilfully calibrated its dynamics with Pakistan and India. It had entered into a negotiated agreement (samdhi) with India (roughly co-equal then) through the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993 and several other agreements of 1996, 2003 and 2012, at a time when a stable neighbourhood was vital for its economic growth.
The problem with China’s new coastguard law
Unless China changes thinking, any border agreement is a perishable good
It should not come as a surprise that the Narendra Modi government and some in the media and strategic community have projected the military agreement to disengage on both banks of the Pangong Tso in Ladakh as a triumph. The footage of Chinese forces dismantling their forward stations and retreating behind the agreed positions supports this contention.
It should also not come as a surprise that the Opposition has criticised the agreement as a defeat, with Congress’ Rahul Gandhi accusing the prime minister of “ceding” territory to the Chinese. The fact that Indian troops can no longer patrol the areas between Fingers 4 and 8 — that the Chinese previously recognised as outside their claim, and that the Indian Army used to regularly patrol before the 2020 standoff — lends credence to this criticism.
In its centenary year, the CCP’s revisionist history
In July, the Communist Party of China (CCP) will celebrate its centenary. This is the most important event in the CCP’s political calendar. It presents an opportunity for the leadership to highlight developmental achievements, which are seen as critical to its legitimacy. Economic development, however, is one of many factors that feed the algorithm of legitimacy. Viewing the question of legitimacy simply from a transactional prism of the party ensuring developmental outcomes in exchange for obedience is reductive, resulting in a misunderstanding of what sustains CCP rule in China. History, or more precisely, building and guiding a supportive historical narrative is crucial too.Read the full article in Hindustan Times here.
Responding to Southeast Asian concerns will raise our influence
An annual survey of Southeast Asia’s policy elite throws up three striking findings. First, despite being both the most influential power in Southeast Asia and providing the most help to ASEAN countries during the covid pandemic, China is increasingly distrusted in the region. Second, despite its insignificant political, strategic and economic influence in the region and posing little threat to any country, most respondents do not have confidence that India will “do the right thing" to contribute to peace, security, prosperity and governance. Third, a mere change of guard in Washington has turned around the region’s view of the United States, which is now looked towards with greater confidence and positivity.Read the full article on The Mint
India shouldn’t worry, Myanmar needs us more to prevent China domination
International reactions to military coups fall into two broad categories — “we demand the immediate restoration of democracy” or “the generals might be bastards, but they are our bastards”. The two responses appear mutually exclusive, but to astute practitioners of statecraft, they are not. One way to accomplish this is to say one thing and do the other. A more sophisticated way is to say and do both things simultaneously. If we were to employ such methods in our personal and domestic lives, it would be rightly considered duplicitous, hypocritical, and immoral. In the amoral world of international relations, however, the same value judgements don’t readily apply. What matters is how well you secure your national interest.Read the full article on ThePrint
The race to map the ocean deep
India is falling behind efforts to map the undersea environment of the Indo-Pacific regionMajor powers are investing time and money deploying UUVs in these waters because of the valuable oceanographic and hydrographic data they provide. Oceanography is the study of the physical and biological aspects of the oceans. Hydrography is the process by which the ocean bed is surveyed and navigation aids and charts are produced, providing ships the maritime equivalent of roadmaps and road signs.Oceanography and hydrography have clear civilian applications: scientific research into climate and marine ecology, surveying the ocean floors to ensure safer navigation of merchant vessels, and collecting information for oil and gas or other seabed mining activities.However, there are also equally clear naval applications: Hydrographic data ease the movement of naval surface ships. More important, they provide crucial information for submarines and for those tasked with hunting them. Over the coming years, the study of the oceans and the seabed is likely to become a source of power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region.Read the full article on Asia Times
Jack Ma story: China’s deep strategic ambition
Earlier this month, the Chinese tech tycoon, Jack Ma, made his first public appearance ever since the suspension of Ant Group’s $37 billion IPO in November. Ant is an affiliate company of Alibaba, the e-commerce giant that he co-founded. The crackdown on Ant followed Jack Ma’s comments in late October during a public event in Shanghai. He had then criticised Chinese regulators for harbouring a “pawnshop mentality,” focusing on pledges and collaterals when it came to finance.
Weaning away foreign investment from China
Over the past few years, there has been much discussion about India attracting firms that might be seeking to exit China. Initially, these conversations were driven by changes in the Chinese economy, such as rising labour costs, shifting focus towards new technologies and declining productivity. There was a sense that these changes, coupled with improving infrastructure and ease of doing business in India, would make India an attractive option.
America’s strategic rivalry with China won’t change under Biden
The United States’ Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, an extant policy document declassified and published last week by the outgoing Donald Trump administration, is mostly music to New Delhi’s ears. Assuming that “a strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance [to] China", one of Washington’s objectives is to “accelerate India’s rise and capacity to serve as a net provider of security and Major Defense Partner" and “solidify an enduring strategic partnership with India underpinned by a strong Indian military able to effectively collaborate with the United States and our partners in the region to address shared interests." Becoming India’s preferred partner on security issues is one of the desired ends of the United States’ policy. Much of this has already been stated by US officials over the past two decades. But mere talk is cheap. The cold hard print of an apex policy document ought to make Washington’s intentions a lot more credible in New Delhi.Read the full article on The Mint
India, China and the Proverbial 13-year gap that is widening
Decoding the DC-Brussels-Beijing geopolitical triangle
Joe Biden’s election as the United States (US) president has led to talk of greater coordination between Washington and Brussels over China. In early November, European Union (EU) foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell was quick to call for “a coherent and robust China stance” between the transatlantic allies. Biden, meanwhile, has promised to consult traditional allies to “develop a coherent strategy” on China.Read the full article in Hindustan Times.