NDTV World | Greater Expectations: Why China Is Going Nuclear 'Faster Than Ever'

Recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that the world's nuclear powers are continuing to expand investment in strengthening their arsenals. While the total number of warheads around the world is declining, the number of operational nuclear warheads is increasing. The US and Russia, of course, account for an overwhelming majority of nuclear warheads. Read the full article here.

The Hindu | China’s ‘grey-zone’ warfare tactics against Taiwan

The story so far: Since the new Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te has assumed office, all eyes have been on the rocky start to his tenure. While China’s belligerent response to Mr. Lai’s “pro-independence” and “secessionist” statements was striking, it has now resorted to a sophisticated ploy to respond to Mr. Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This is often referred to as ‘grey-zone’ warfare, which comprises elements that frustrate Taiwan in a sustained manner. Read the full article here.

The Diplomat | Zelenskyy Finally Calls out China’s Role in Russia’s War on Ukraine

For far too long, Ukraine has treaded carefully around China’s role in the ongoing war with Russia. Despite mounting evidence of Beijing’s support for Moscow, both materially and diplomatically, Kyiv has been reluctant to criticize China directly. However, during the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy finally broke his silence, openly accusing China of aiding Russia in undermining peace efforts.  Read the full article here.

CSIS Interpret | The Belt and Road Initiative at 10: Regional Perspectives on China’s Evolving Approach

No official Indian delegation attended the 2023 Belt and Road Forum, which was held in Beijing in October. This has been the pattern since the first forum was held in 2017 to expand cooperation around China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, unlike the past two events, Beijing did not extend an invitation to New Delhi this time around. This offers a glimpse into the state of the bilateral relationship, which has been on a downward spiral since 2017. Read the full article here.

Nikkei Asia | Xi Jinping's vision of war seen in creation of 'Information Force'

The latest restructuring of China's People's Liberation Army has put a spotlight on President Xi Jinping's concept of information as a central element of modern warfare. The reorganization, unveiled on April 19, has broken up the PLA's Strategic Support Force (SSF), formed only eight years ago, into an Aerospace Force, a Cyberspace Force and a new Information Support Force (ISF). Read the full article here.

The Quint | How Ma-Xi's Meeting Serves the Chinese Supremo More Than the Cross-Straits Ties

In January 2024, Taiwan witnessed one of its most important presidential and parliamentary elections, with many calling it a choice between war and peace. The election results also spoke to the divided nature of political opinion. Lai Ching-Te, the candidate of the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won the presidential election, while the majority in the legislative yuan was won by the primary opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT). Read the full article here.

Foreign Policy | The Hidden Dangers in China’s GDP Numbers

China’s recently announced GDP target for 2024  remains unchanged from last year, at 5 percent. But even if the country hits that number, its economic problems run deep. In January, China published economic data for the last quarter of 2023 which put its annual GDP growth rate at 5.2 percent, beating the government target. Yet, to put things in perspective, China’s real GDP growth rate from 2011 to 2019 averaged 7.3 percent while 2001-10 saw average growth of 10.5 percent. Read the full article here.

Moneycontrol - Biden-Xi Summit: Challenge is to continue US-China engagements despite tensions

Leaders of the United States and China are expected to hold their first bilateral meeting in a year at the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in San Francisco today. The fact that this meeting is taking place is in itself a significant achievement for diplomats on both sides. It also underscores that despite the intense nature of Sino-US strategic competition and heated rhetoric, achieving some sort of stability is a shared interest. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi captured this in outlining the “Five Musts” for the two countries during his recent visit to the US. Read the full article here.

The Wire China | How China’s Global Initiatives Aim to Change the Way the World is Run

In 2013, in a speech in Moscow, Xi Jinping floated the idea of mankind being a community of shared future or common destiny. In the decade that has followed, this phrase began to shift from being a description of the world’s interconnected nature to underpinning the idea of a more proactive foreign policy that aims to shape a favourable external environment for China.  Since 2021, however, with the launch of the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI), the concept of mankind being a community of common destiny has been fleshed out as Beijing’s key proposition to reform global governance. Read the full article here.

Xi Jinping’s CCP is daring to go where even Taliban wouldn’t — separate kids from smartphones

The strongest of the four fundamental forces known to modern physics is called, well, the strong force. At the same distance it is 137 times stronger than electromagnetism and 1038 times more powerful than gravity. The strong force keeps sub-atomic particles attached to each other.

Modern physicists who are also modern parents know better. The strongest force in nature is the one that keeps teenagers attached to smartphones.

Xi’S Power Base in the Communist Party Central Committee

Mao's often-quoted expression “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” remains as critical to understanding the dynamics of power in China today as it was in the late 1920s. Xi Jinping, soon after assuming the position of Party General Secretary in late 2012, moved quickly to exert his control over the ‘gun’ — i.e., the People's Liberation Army (PLA). He has spent the past decade reshaping the PLA and forging loyalty, from the military-political work conference in Gutian in 2014 and an anti-corruption campaign (which targeted some of the highest-ranking PLA officials), to initiating major structural reforms.

Science and State Power in China

In May 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping placed an ambitious proposition before the leaders of the country’s scientific community. He called on them to “aim for the frontiers of science and technology” and emerge as the “vanguards in innovation in the new era.” The overarching objective, he said, was for China to become a “major world centre for science and innovation.” This, for Xi, is one of the “responsibilities bestowed by history” upon China’s scientific community. For him, the development of science and technology is a strategic imperative. It’s what will drive future growth and ensure China’s security, overall competitiveness and global standing.At the heart of Xi’s emphasis on and investment in science and technology, therefore, is the goal of enhancing state power. This perspective is not exclusive to the current Chinese leadership. It is the product of historical debate over the role of science and technology in Chinese society. The origins of this conversation can be dated back to the last few decades of the Qing Dynasty, which ended in 1912. Since then, while strengthening state power has remained the core objective of the pursuit of scientific advancement, each generation of leaders has adopted a different pathway. [Read More...]

Xi’s new approach to Tibet will affect India

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent remarks at the seventh Central Symposium on Tibet Work indicate that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is doubling down on its hardline approach in the region, which evolved gradually after the 2008 protests.The strategy for the next few years that Xi outlined entails a mix of persuasion, development, connectivity, indoctrination and coercion. This will not only have serious implications for ordinary Tibetans but will also impinge on the Sino-Indian boundary question, particularly in the context of China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh.Read the full article in Hindustan Times.

What is driving China’s aggression?

There has been growing debate in recent times in India and other countries about China’s aggression. What’s driving Beijing to engage in contests on multiple fronts, be it Hong Kong, the near seas, or India, particularly amid a pandemic and economic weakness? Is it opportunism? Is it hubris? Is internal turmoil and insecurity leading to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) lashing out? Or are there structural factors that one must consider?Read the full article in The Hindustan Times.

India’s road to RCEP laden with China-related obstacles

Ten years ago, the question was whether India and China should sign a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). Today, it is whether India should join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). There are two different but interconnected issues: the dominance of Chinese manufacturers in the export of goods; and the impenetrability of the Chinese market to Indian and other foreign companies. On the other hand, joining the RCEP might compel New Delhi to launch the second-generation economic reforms.Read more

What can Modi-Xi agree on to call their Mamallapuram meeting a success?

The Print’s daily roundtable TalkPoint posed a question connected to the Narendra Modi-Xi Jinping informal summit in Mamallapuram: What can Modi-Xi agree on to call their Mamallapuram meeting a success?Manoj Kewalramani, Fellow-China Studies at The Takshashila Institution, was among the discussants. Manoj argued:My expectations from the Modi-Xi summit are very low for mainly two reasons. First, it is essentially an informal summit with no clearly-defined agenda, therefore, there will be only a few concrete outcomes from the meet. Second relates to the situation between the two countries on fundamental issues in the last 6-8 months.China has been very slow to move on issues important to India such as membership in the United Nations Security Council or the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And it also took the Kashmir issue to the UN where it has zero locus standi. Even trade relations between India and China have been strained. So, the current environment is not conducive to this summit. However, it is always a good idea to keep engaging in dialogue.To call this meeting a success, Modi and Xi must arrive at the conclusion that both India and China are rising powers and not let their differences turn into disputes. Regarding the border issue, the best-case scenario would be a discussion on new confidence-building measures between the militaries of both countries to maintain peace and tranquillity. I see no concrete direction on trade besides the broad rhetoric on the matter. What one can also expect is people-to-people contact and talk about fostering a cultural relationship between the two ancient civilisations to ensure that India-China relations are organic as opposed to only being diplomatically driven by leaders at the top.Read the entire discussion on ThePrint.in website here.

Modi-Xi Summit: Don't expect a major breakthrough

While India and China will hold the second informal summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping today and tomorrow, events over the past few weeks have dampened the prospects of forward movement on the boundary dispute. The first informal summit between Xi and Modi in Wuhan in 2018 had provided a tentative new template for first stabilising and then advancing the bilateral relationship, which had come under increasing strain.Read the full article in Deccan Herald here

Why Xi won’t be sending the PLA to quell Hong Kong protests

The eleven-week-long protest movement in Hong Kong has reached a critical phase. Earlier this week, thousands of protesters converged on the city’s airport, paralysing operations and disrupting nearly 1,000 flights. The airport was finally cleared on Thursday after clashes between riot police and the protesters. The scenes of chaos played out as the top leadership of the Communist Party of China met for its annual conclave at the beachside town of Beidaihe.The situation in Hong Kong undoubtedly must have been on top of the agenda. The protests, which initially focussed on an extradition bill put forward by the city’s government, have now evolved into a larger battle for autonomy from Beijing’s tightening grip. In the process, peaceful demonstrations have given way to anger and violence.These turns of events indicate an increasing sense of unease that Beijing is now seriously contemplating the use of force. This, of course, remains a possibility. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region empowers local authorities to request Beijing for such assistance. The PLA, in fact, already has troops stationed at a garrison in Hong Kong. However, given the current scenario, it is highly unlikely that Xi will deploy the armed forces to quell the protests.Read the full article published in The Hindu

What does China’s new defence strategy mean?

China on Wednesday published its first defence white paper in four years, outlining the strategic military guideline for what it terms as a new era. The document offers an insight into Beijing’s view of the changes in the international security situation. It discusses China’s defence policy objectives, along with the reform, missions and tasks that its armed forces are undertaking. Further, it elaborates on the role of the armed forces in the broader Chinese geopolitical objective of establishing a community with a shared future for mankind. Here are five key takeaways from the white paper. The line taken by the document indicates a generally positive outlook towards India. Nevertheless, there are certain potential points of impact to be noted from the perspective of Indian interests.Shifting Balance of PowerThe white paper begins with an assessment of the changes in the international security environment. It argues that the world is increasingly heading towards multipolarity. But, it isn't yet a “tranquil place,” with strategic competition on the rise. Beijing’s diagnosis is that “the configuration of strategic power is becoming more balanced,” with the strength of emerging markets and developing countries growing. The big threat to this is the change in American policy, i.e., “growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism”.This necessitates a reinforcement of the UN’s role in global security, strengthening new regional security arrangements, establishing security partnerships (with Russia, for instance), investments in better weapons and technological upgrades and bolstering arms control and non-proliferation regimes. For New Delhi, which has been working on getting Beijing to yield on its admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the white paper’s assessment of the international non-proliferation regime as “compromised by pragmatism and double standards” is likely to be troubling.The Asia-Pacific ContestThe document observes that while the Asia-Pacific region is “generally stable”, there is increased “major country competition”. Essentially, it perceives the dynamics in the region within the framework of U.S.-China. frictions. The U.S., it argues, “is strengthening its Asia-Pacific military alliances and reinforcing military deployment and intervention”. The key partners for Washington that it identifies are South Korea, Japan and Australia. Despite that, the document largely assesses Chinese neighbourhood policy as having been successful.“Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly aware that they are members of a community with shared destiny”, it reads, hinting at the rapid emergence of a China-led security architecture. The constituents of this Sinosphere are structures like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, CICA, China’s expanding dominance in the South China Sea, dialogues with ASEAN members, regional counter-terror action and increasing bilateral military-to-military diplomacy. Interestingly, China views South Asia also as “generally stable,” although “conflicts between India and Pakistan flare up from time to time.” This suggests that Beijing is rather confident about its ability to manage tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.BRI's Military ComponentEver since Xi Jinping launched, in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there has been much debate about the security implications of Chinese investments around the world. The white paper tells us that protecting China’s overseas interests is a strategic objective for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It states that “one of the missions of China’s armed forces is to effectively protect the security and legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese people, organisations and institutions”. In order to do so, the document says that the PLA is building “far seas forces”, “overseas logistical facilities”, and capabilities for “diversified military tasks”. That’s followed by a glowing evaluation of the PLA’s Logistics Support Base in Djibouti, which was set up in 2017. This is perhaps the clearest admission of the emerging military component of the BRI. But that’s not all. Beijing is also likely to continue to invest in and focus on participation in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief operations internationally. This is couched within the rhetoric of providing international public goods. But such activities allow for the enhancement of Chinese forces’ operational skills and experience and normalises their presence in far-flung regions of the world.Resilient ChinaThe 2015 Chinese defence white paper had argued that “China faces a formidable task to maintain political security and social stability” while discussing Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. In 2019, there’s a mention of “external separatist forces” with regard to Tibet and Xinjiang. But the forces seeking Taiwan’s “independence” are identified as the “gravest immediate threat”, with the use of force not being ruled out. Despite that, generally, the domestic security environment is assessed to have improved considerably. “China continues to enjoy political stability, ethnic unity and social stability. There has been a notable increase in China’s overall national strength, global influence, and resilience to risks,” the white paper says. However, it is also worth noting that “safeguarding national political security” and political work in the armed forces to uphold Xi Jinping’s status as the core of the Party-state system remain priorities.Quality and Efficiency

Arguably one of the most important components of the reforms that Xi has pursued has been the restructuring of the country’s armed forces. The white paper encapsulates this as the PLA striving to transform itself from a quantity-and-scale model to that of quality and efficiency. This entails a shift in focus from manpower to firepower and from personnel-intensive to science and technology-intensive forces, according to the white paper. The impact of this overarching shift in approach has meant organisational restructuring. That has involved a shift in the balance of different forces. Over the past few years, there has been a reduction in personnel numbers, particularly from the ground forces. The Second Artillery Force has been reconstituted as the PLA Rocket Force. New strategic support and logistics forces have been established. Greater attention has been paid to safeguarding interests in outer space, electromagnetic space and cyberspace. The white paper, in fact, identifies this as one of the nine fundamental goals of the PLA going forward. Its equipment-development policy and approach to combat, therefore, are evolving from mechanisation to “intelligentised warfare” and “informatisation”. That has led to a reassessment of training methods to ensure greater interoperability among forces. These are developments that New Delhi should be watching closely and factoring into its defence planning, given that they have a direct impact on India’s security interests.

This article was first published in The Hindu. Views are personal.

The three elements of China’s innovation model

In November 2018, the New York Times published a series that began with a story titled, The Land that Failed to Fail. The central argument of the piece is that defying Western expectations, the Communist Party has maintained its control in China while adopting elements of capitalism, eschewing political liberalisation, and pursuing innovation. The last of these three — innovation — is the subject of this piece.What drives innovation in China? This is not merely a question about the mechanics of policy, the might of capital, the determination of dogged entrepreneurs, or the brilliance that is conjured up in university dormitories. Increasingly, it is a question that has acquired geopolitical significance, not just in the context of power politics but also in the debate over fundamental values about the political and economic organisation. In other words, the question that China’s march towards becoming a “country of innovators” raises is whether a political system that prioritises control can foster genuine innovation.Answering this requires an understanding of the key elements of the Chinese model of innovation. To my mind, there are three key components of this model—state support, a systems approach towards the development of new technologies and businesses, and building an effective “bird-cage.” There are, of course, other factors like the pursuit of prestige, the desire to rebalance the economy, the need to enhance the effectiveness of governance, and the size of the consumer market, which supports innovation. But it is the first three components that form the key pillars of China’s innovation model.Read More...