NDTV World | Greater Expectations: Why China Is Going Nuclear 'Faster Than Ever'

Recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that the world's nuclear powers are continuing to expand investment in strengthening their arsenals. While the total number of warheads around the world is declining, the number of operational nuclear warheads is increasing. The US and Russia, of course, account for an overwhelming majority of nuclear warheads. Read the full article here.

Nikkei Asia | Xi Jinping's vision of war seen in creation of 'Information Force'

The latest restructuring of China's People's Liberation Army has put a spotlight on President Xi Jinping's concept of information as a central element of modern warfare. The reorganization, unveiled on April 19, has broken up the PLA's Strategic Support Force (SSF), formed only eight years ago, into an Aerospace Force, a Cyberspace Force and a new Information Support Force (ISF). Read the full article here.

Firstpost | What SSF’s disbandment tells us about Chinese policymaking under Xi Jinping

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s concentration of power over the past decade has heightened concerns about the efficiency and flexibility of policymaking in China. Three questions have been key to this discourse. First, has concentration of power and centralisation of decision-making enabled breaking through bureaucratic and vested interests to enact changes? Second, what has been the impact of centralisation on the flow of information within the system, particularly to the top leader? Third, has centralisation of power led to greater rigidity in policy thinking and implementation, resulting in the persistence of evidently adverse choices? The recent decision to disband the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF) and create three specialised arms offers an interesting case study in this context. Read the full article here.

The Diplomat | India Has Good Reason to Be Concerned About China’s Maritime Research Vessels

In September 2019, the Indian Navy drove away the Shiyan 1, a Chinese research vessel that had been caught operating without authorization in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the coast of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. This move was undertaken in line with Article 246 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which prohibits any country from conducting marine scientific research in the EEZ of a coastal state without consent. It also stipulates that such consent should be ideally granted in “normal circumstances.” But given the context – China’s research activities in the South China Sea, as well as the larger Chinese strategy of military-civil fusion, which has blurred the line between the scientific and military-related activities of its vessels – the circumstances were hardly normal. Read the full article here.

Bharat Shakti | Drones Unleashed: China’s PLA Masters Swarming Techniques For Military Dominance

Technological reforms in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have ushered in an era of integration of weapons systems with new technologies and modular capabilities. Doctrinally, too, the PLA is adapting to new, collaborative and multi-domain techniques for fighting wars. One of the techniques that the PLA is now increasingly working with is drone swarming, which encompasses synchronisation and coordinated operation of multiple drones for the purpose of achieving a single objective. Read the full article here.

Xi’S Power Base in the Communist Party Central Committee

Mao's often-quoted expression “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” remains as critical to understanding the dynamics of power in China today as it was in the late 1920s. Xi Jinping, soon after assuming the position of Party General Secretary in late 2012, moved quickly to exert his control over the ‘gun’ — i.e., the People's Liberation Army (PLA). He has spent the past decade reshaping the PLA and forging loyalty, from the military-political work conference in Gutian in 2014 and an anti-corruption campaign (which targeted some of the highest-ranking PLA officials), to initiating major structural reforms.

Explained: The Implications of China’s Ever Increasing Defence Budget for India

China announced its annual defence budget of RMB 1.45 trillion (approximately $229.6 billion) in March 2022, a 7.1 per cent year-on-year increase over its 2021 budget of RMB 1.36 trillion ($209.2 billion). In 2020, China had increased its defence budget by 6.6 per cent to 1.27 trillion yuan (US$178 billion).

How Emerging Technologies Are Driving China’s Readiness For Modern Warfare

In this year’s annual session of the National People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang presented a finance report with an estimated 1.45 trillion yuan (US$230 billion) set aside for defence spending in 2022. Although that figure is an increase on last year, it is still less than the US military budget, which is expected to top US$770 billion. This translates into a significant gap in US and Chinese military power. As a result, China’s military modernisation and efforts to leverage technology in warfare have so far been directed to reduce this gap. Thus, Beijing is working to incorporate modern technology into the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). With the development of space and electronic warfare capabilities over the past two decades, China’s armed forces have started to embrace critical and emerging technologies.

Understanding China’s High Tech Espionage Efforts To Modernise The Military

The Department of Defense (DoD) under the United States government recently released its yearly report on the military and security developments in China. This report, acronymised as the DoD report, gives a comprehensive understanding of the progress made by the Chinese armed forces over the year along with elucidating the future plans of the Chinese military. One of the interesting aspects of last year’s DoD report was the focus on China’s industrial espionage efforts on certain advanced technologies which the government thinks holds the key to enhancing the quality of their military systems.

Behind Beijng’s proposal to regulate military applications of AI

China recently submitted a position paper on regulating the military applications of artificial intelligence to the sixth review conference of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).The takeaway from this position paper is that countries should debate, discuss, and perhaps eschew the weaponization of AI. By initiating a discussion on regulating military applications of AI, Beijing wants to project itself as a responsible international player.

Flashpoints on the Periphery: Understanding China’s Neighborhood Opportunism

How is China taking advantage of the pandemic to pursue its foreign policy goals?

Tensions in China’s periphery have increased dramatically over the past few months as Beijing stepped up the use of military and diplomatic tools within its neighborhood. The frequency of the events involving Chinese actors, especially in the second half of March, increased as normalcy started returning to the mainland after the COVID-19 pandemic’s outbreak.This raises a few questions. First, is this evidence of China’s opportunism at a time when the United States is struggling to maintain its presence in the East and Southeast Asian regions? Second, has Beijing adopted a more aggressive approach for the post-pandemic period? Third, would the recent spike in activities impact the regional order?Read more

This article was originally published in The Diplomat.

Coronavirus economic crisis squeezes China’s plans to expand its navy as it marks 71st anniversary

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy marks its 71st anniversary today. It comes amid intensified drills in the near seas and Western Pacific, along with deepening tensions in the South China Sea. The navy has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s military reforms.Driven by great power ambitions, Chinese naval shipbuilders have been churning out warships at a record pace over the past few years. Consequently, the Chinese navy today has the world’s largest deployable fleet of vessels. The irony, however, is that in the post-Covid-19 world, this expansion could prove to be the navy’s Achilles' heel.Read the full article in South China Morning Post

4 Lessons for India From China’s October 2019 Military Parade

With the People’s Republic of China (PRC) marking its 70th founding anniversary on October 1, the grand military parade at Tiananmen Square was the highlight of the celebrations. It showcased China’s newer arms, ammunition, and technology. Over 15,000 personnel, 160 aircraft, and 580 pieces of military equipment participated in the military parade, including sophisticated weaponry such as hypersonic missiles, intercontinental-range land and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, stealth combat and high-speed reconnaissance drones, and fifth-generation fighter jets.China intended to address both domestic and international audiences through this parade. At home, the leadership hoped that the parade would stir up feelings of nationalism. Internationally, the display of force was intended as a warning to the United States and China’s neighbors. Further, the parade reflected the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) progress toward becoming a “world-class military” by 2050.Although policymakers and military leaders across the world were keeping a close eye on China’s military display, perhaps those in India should have been paying the most attention. The parade was not directed at India, but New Delhi can learn a lot from China’s use of military modernization and its ongoing defense reforms. Here are four key lessons New Delhi can take from China’s 2019 military parade. Read more...

The PLA Insight: Issue no 29

I. The Big Story: PLA in Hong KongThe People’s Liberation Army soldiers were spotted cleaning-up the Hong Kong’s streets last week. Their presence raised concerns in China’s autonomous region. Social media feeds showed men in green and black uniforms with Chinese flags on their shoulders, “voluntarily clearing the streets.” Although several thousands of the PLA soldiers are located in Hong Kong’s PLA Garrison, they are rarely seen outside their barracks. Hong Kong government stated that it had not requested the Garrison’s assistance. The Chinese soldiers’ efforts to clear the roadblocks were “purely a voluntary community activity initiated by themselves.” The clean-up came after one of the most intense weeks of the anti-government protests. Read more...

Why Xi won’t be sending the PLA to quell Hong Kong protests

The eleven-week-long protest movement in Hong Kong has reached a critical phase. Earlier this week, thousands of protesters converged on the city’s airport, paralysing operations and disrupting nearly 1,000 flights. The airport was finally cleared on Thursday after clashes between riot police and the protesters. The scenes of chaos played out as the top leadership of the Communist Party of China met for its annual conclave at the beachside town of Beidaihe.The situation in Hong Kong undoubtedly must have been on top of the agenda. The protests, which initially focussed on an extradition bill put forward by the city’s government, have now evolved into a larger battle for autonomy from Beijing’s tightening grip. In the process, peaceful demonstrations have given way to anger and violence.These turns of events indicate an increasing sense of unease that Beijing is now seriously contemplating the use of force. This, of course, remains a possibility. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region empowers local authorities to request Beijing for such assistance. The PLA, in fact, already has troops stationed at a garrison in Hong Kong. However, given the current scenario, it is highly unlikely that Xi will deploy the armed forces to quell the protests.Read the full article published in The Hindu

What does China’s new defence strategy mean?

China on Wednesday published its first defence white paper in four years, outlining the strategic military guideline for what it terms as a new era. The document offers an insight into Beijing’s view of the changes in the international security situation. It discusses China’s defence policy objectives, along with the reform, missions and tasks that its armed forces are undertaking. Further, it elaborates on the role of the armed forces in the broader Chinese geopolitical objective of establishing a community with a shared future for mankind. Here are five key takeaways from the white paper. The line taken by the document indicates a generally positive outlook towards India. Nevertheless, there are certain potential points of impact to be noted from the perspective of Indian interests.Shifting Balance of PowerThe white paper begins with an assessment of the changes in the international security environment. It argues that the world is increasingly heading towards multipolarity. But, it isn't yet a “tranquil place,” with strategic competition on the rise. Beijing’s diagnosis is that “the configuration of strategic power is becoming more balanced,” with the strength of emerging markets and developing countries growing. The big threat to this is the change in American policy, i.e., “growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism”.This necessitates a reinforcement of the UN’s role in global security, strengthening new regional security arrangements, establishing security partnerships (with Russia, for instance), investments in better weapons and technological upgrades and bolstering arms control and non-proliferation regimes. For New Delhi, which has been working on getting Beijing to yield on its admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the white paper’s assessment of the international non-proliferation regime as “compromised by pragmatism and double standards” is likely to be troubling.The Asia-Pacific ContestThe document observes that while the Asia-Pacific region is “generally stable”, there is increased “major country competition”. Essentially, it perceives the dynamics in the region within the framework of U.S.-China. frictions. The U.S., it argues, “is strengthening its Asia-Pacific military alliances and reinforcing military deployment and intervention”. The key partners for Washington that it identifies are South Korea, Japan and Australia. Despite that, the document largely assesses Chinese neighbourhood policy as having been successful.“Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly aware that they are members of a community with shared destiny”, it reads, hinting at the rapid emergence of a China-led security architecture. The constituents of this Sinosphere are structures like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, CICA, China’s expanding dominance in the South China Sea, dialogues with ASEAN members, regional counter-terror action and increasing bilateral military-to-military diplomacy. Interestingly, China views South Asia also as “generally stable,” although “conflicts between India and Pakistan flare up from time to time.” This suggests that Beijing is rather confident about its ability to manage tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.BRI's Military ComponentEver since Xi Jinping launched, in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there has been much debate about the security implications of Chinese investments around the world. The white paper tells us that protecting China’s overseas interests is a strategic objective for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It states that “one of the missions of China’s armed forces is to effectively protect the security and legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese people, organisations and institutions”. In order to do so, the document says that the PLA is building “far seas forces”, “overseas logistical facilities”, and capabilities for “diversified military tasks”. That’s followed by a glowing evaluation of the PLA’s Logistics Support Base in Djibouti, which was set up in 2017. This is perhaps the clearest admission of the emerging military component of the BRI. But that’s not all. Beijing is also likely to continue to invest in and focus on participation in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief operations internationally. This is couched within the rhetoric of providing international public goods. But such activities allow for the enhancement of Chinese forces’ operational skills and experience and normalises their presence in far-flung regions of the world.Resilient ChinaThe 2015 Chinese defence white paper had argued that “China faces a formidable task to maintain political security and social stability” while discussing Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. In 2019, there’s a mention of “external separatist forces” with regard to Tibet and Xinjiang. But the forces seeking Taiwan’s “independence” are identified as the “gravest immediate threat”, with the use of force not being ruled out. Despite that, generally, the domestic security environment is assessed to have improved considerably. “China continues to enjoy political stability, ethnic unity and social stability. There has been a notable increase in China’s overall national strength, global influence, and resilience to risks,” the white paper says. However, it is also worth noting that “safeguarding national political security” and political work in the armed forces to uphold Xi Jinping’s status as the core of the Party-state system remain priorities.Quality and Efficiency

Arguably one of the most important components of the reforms that Xi has pursued has been the restructuring of the country’s armed forces. The white paper encapsulates this as the PLA striving to transform itself from a quantity-and-scale model to that of quality and efficiency. This entails a shift in focus from manpower to firepower and from personnel-intensive to science and technology-intensive forces, according to the white paper. The impact of this overarching shift in approach has meant organisational restructuring. That has involved a shift in the balance of different forces. Over the past few years, there has been a reduction in personnel numbers, particularly from the ground forces. The Second Artillery Force has been reconstituted as the PLA Rocket Force. New strategic support and logistics forces have been established. Greater attention has been paid to safeguarding interests in outer space, electromagnetic space and cyberspace. The white paper, in fact, identifies this as one of the nine fundamental goals of the PLA going forward. Its equipment-development policy and approach to combat, therefore, are evolving from mechanisation to “intelligentised warfare” and “informatisation”. That has led to a reassessment of training methods to ensure greater interoperability among forces. These are developments that New Delhi should be watching closely and factoring into its defence planning, given that they have a direct impact on India’s security interests.

This article was first published in The Hindu. Views are personal.