Mint | America is not yet declining but appears willing to let itself down

I spent the mid-2000s arguing why Indian foreign policy must make a decisive shift towards the United States. The shadow of the Cold War had not yet dissolved and memories of US support for Pakistan’s proxy war were still alive in the minds of the country’s strategic establishment. The Vajpayee government had initiated a shift in thinking after the 1998 nuclear tests and prime minister Manmohan Singh was pushing for a major breakthrough in the form of a nuclear deal. Read the full article here.

Hindustan Times | When India and China speak for Global South

The Global South is a vague term – it is supposed to capture a diverse group of 130-odd countries, encapsulating two-thirds of the world’s population, and covers Africa, the Middle East, Asia, the Pacific Islands, Latin America, and the Caribbean. But it seems to possess extraordinary political and diplomatic purchases for both India and China. Both are increasingly positioning themselves as leaders of the Global South. What utility such leadership implies for each, however, reveals differences. Delhi appears to view the Global South through the lens of shared interests and hopes to function as a bridge between the Global North and Global South. Meanwhile, Beijing’s outreach to the Global South is driven by an agenda to tilt the scales in its favour in terms of its strategic competition with the United States (US).

India needs a Holistic and Effective ‘Techplomacy’ Strategy

Technological advancements in the 21st Century have heightened the role of technology in the diplomacy arena. Technically adept nation-states are developing their own strategies to integrate technology with their foreign policy and diplomatic initiatives. But how can technology be used as a credible diplomatic plank by the Indian State to further its national and geopolitical interests? The Indian state needs to address the ability to utilise technology as a credible foreign policy and diplomacy tool.

Indians Don’t Believe in a China-led, Multipolar World

As the war continues to rage in Europe, India is maintaining an unrelenting focus on its Indo-Pacific engagements. Thus, on March 19, Prime Minister Modi hosted his Japanese counterpart Fumio Kishida for the latter’s first bilateral visit since assuming charge in October 2021. In the joint statement released after the meeting, both sides affirmed the “commitment to promoting peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific”. Even the mention of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine occurred in the context of war’s “broader implications” for the Indo-Pacific region.

Similarly, though the joint statement released after a virtual meeting of the Indian and Australian Prime Ministers on March 21 mentioned the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, the emphasis remained on “broader implications for the Indo-Pacific.” Following the virtual summit, the Indian Foreign Secretary confirmed in the press meet that the two countries agreed that the Ukraine crisis should not divert the Quad’s attention away from the Indo-Pacific region.

India’s Aloof Response to the Ukraine Crisis

Read the Full Text on East Asia Forum

By: Artyom Lukin, Far Eastern Federal University and Aditya Pareek, Takshashila Institution

Moscow’s decision to recognise the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics and then launch a ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine has created a tricky balancing act for India. Delhi’s immediate reaction to the crisis has been restrained, neutral and focused on ensuring the safety of its nationals inside Ukraine.
Several hours after Russian military action was underway, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Modi urged that all violence should be ceased immediately and reiterated India’s emphasis on diplomacy and ‘honest and sincere dialogue’ between Russia and NATO.

On 26 February 2022, the United Nations Security Council held a vote on a resolution demanding that Moscow immediately stop its attack on Ukraine and withdraw all troops. India was among the three countries to abstain, along with China and the United Arab Emirates. India’s UN envoy expressed his ‘regret that the path of diplomacy was given up’. India also abstained on a procedural resolution to call for an emergency session of the UN General Assembly.

Modi also held a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in which he expressed ‘his deep anguish about the loss of lives and properties’ but refrained from directly criticising Russia.

The India–Russia relationship is officially characterised as a ‘special and privileged strategic partnership’. The entente between Moscow and Delhi dates back decades. Though the bond is no longer the de facto alliance it once was in the 1970s and 1980s, Moscow remains Delhi’s an important strategic partner, on par with the United States. The two nations don’t have any significant areas of disagreement and both share a fundamental interest in a multipolar balance of power in Eurasia.

India relies on Russia for the majority of its imported military equipment, nuclear submarine technology and some vital space faring technology. A highlight of India–Russian defence cooperation has been the US$5.43 billion deal for the S-400 air defence system, which Russia began delivering in December 2021. Russian-made weapons are critical to India’s ability to counter its main external threat — China.

There are also perhaps ideational factors behind India’s reluctance to censure Russian actions toward Ukraine. The conflict over Ukraine may have some parallels with India’s historic traumas. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union that led to the birth of an independent Ukraine was not dissimilar to the partition of the British Raj, which produced India and Pakistan, two culturally close but still antagonistic entities. Putin characterises the modern state of Ukraine in antagonistic terms as an ‘anti-Russia’ project.

Western powers portray the conflict as a struggle between an imperialistic autocracy and a young democracy, but Delhi may not buy this narrative. India has always been somewhat sceptical about the US-led discourse on liberal democracy. This remains the case despite the Westernisation of Indian elites. Under Modi, India has been evolving in an illiberal and ethno-nationalistic direction. It is an open secret that India wants to maintain its sphere of influence in parts of South Asia.

India does not have many significant security interests in Europe, which helps explain its relative aloofness to the Ukraine crisis. But Delhi does have some stakes in Ukraine. For instance, the Indian Space Research Organisation’s semi cryogenic engine is being developed based on Ukrainian supplied RD-810 designs and many Indian navy warships depend on Ukrainian gas turbines, including those under construction at Russian shipyards. So India has a national security stake in not alienating Ukraine.

Another reason for India’s repeated calls for the cessation of violence, de-escalation and resolving the situation through diplomacy is high energy prices, which may negatively affect India’s stressed economy.

A front-footed approach to the world calls for a strong economy

The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World is an interesting book because it is written by four authors: a scholar of international relations, a career diplomat, a serving foreign minister, and a member of Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party. It so happens that they are all named S. Jaishankar. Almost every paragraph in the book is an exercise in balance between four perspectives: of the scholar reading the past and the present in realist terms, the long-serving diplomat totalling up the successes and failings of India’s foreign policy over the past four decades, the cabinet minister outlining the incumbent government’s policy positions, and the BJP member connecting the book’s narrative with his party’s. The tension between the four Jaishankars is not always apparent, and I suspect is visible only to keener students of international relations who in any case tend to connect dots into shapes they wish to see.Read more

India’s Australia Signal| Delhi’s horizontal escalation

For India, the announcement of Australia’s participation in the annual Malabar naval exercises of 2020 is a deliberate horizontal escalation of the continental border crisis whose present centre of gravity is Ladakh. The Malabar exercises began as an Indo-US bilateral exercise in 1992. In 2015, Japan joined in and India has now overcome its reticence about annoying China and opened the door for Australia. The connection with China’s rise and its strategic misbehaviour is obvious and is part of a larger global countervailing move for stability and balance. For India, the burning question is, what difference can this make to China’s threats on its continental borders.Read more

India is good in the Arab world now. But Delhi must quickly move to contain Turkey’s Erdogan

It came as a surprise but it is not surprising. When the United Arab Emirates and Israel announced that they would establish normal relations with each other, in a US-brokered agreement last week, they publicly accepted what has been obvious for several years now — that the national interests of the Emirates along with those of Saudi Arabia and many other Arab states were converging with those of Israel.

The triangular contest in the Middle East — with Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia vying for regional dominance — is a modern replay of older rivalries between the Persians, Ottomans and Arabs. With Israel perceiving an existential threat from Iran and being wary of once-friendly but increasingly threatening Turkey, realist logic would expect Tel Aviv to gravitate towards the Arab nations. The thorny Palestinian question long prevented an alliance between Israel and the Arab powers. Set that aside and Israel and the Arab nations become co-travellers on the road to prevent Iranian and Turkish hegemony over the Middle East.Read More.