What India Should Make of China’s Pitch at the G20

Manoj Kewalramani & Anushka Saxena

China put up quite a show at the recently concluded G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Chinese President Xi Jinping pitched the ‘China model’ for poverty and hunger alleviation to the developing world, arguing that “if China can make it, other developing countries can too.” Further, to back China’s claims of being the most pertinent developmental partner for G20 member states, Xi also launched an ‘Initiative on International Cooperation in Open Science’ and joined the ‘Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty’.

But beyond the rhetoric about the country’s leading role in the developing world and its commitment to building a “community for a shared future for mankind,” Beijing sent signals at the Summit that spell causes for concern for those reading between the lines. More specifically, from the Indian perspective, China’s pitch at the G20 seemed competitive, highlighting structural differences between the Indian and Chinese worldviews.

Xi’s Overshadowing Appearance

In the aftermath of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in 2023, there was a lot of speculation that Xi’s absence was a sign that Beijing had downgraded the diplomatic value of the grouping. But Xi’s proactive presence at the 2024 Summit in Brazil indicates otherwise. Xi’s remarks in Rio emphasised varied aspects of the partnership between China and other Global South countries, such as in climate change, zero-tariff trade, open science, and anti-corruption. This makes it clear that the G20 as a platform remains essential to a China that seeks to leverage its position as a major power and cultivate influence within capitals around the world. This also sheds light on the simple fact that Xi’s absence from the Delhi Summit was not a product of a diplomatic downgrading of the platform, but a deliberate choice in light of bilateral ties with India.

Moreover, through the 2024 Summit, Xi hoped to mobilise partners in the developing world to support China-centered global projects. Though there were no major financial commitments under the Belt & Road Initiative, Xi did emphasise that China is seeking to invest US$20 billion in projects across Global South countries as part of his flagship ‘Global Development Initiative’ (GDI).

Further, in his bilateral meetings with leaders of Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, France, Argentina, and Germany, Xi iterated China’s “win-win” economic formulae, and implored deeper cooperation in areas ranging from agriculture and mining to electric vehicles and digitalisation. Specifically, during the meeting between Xi and President Lula, the two sides also elevated their relationship to a “China-Brazil community with a shared future for a more just world and a more sustainable planet.” From India’s perspective, these changes imply deeper convergences between its most prominent competitor and a close friend in the Global South.

Wang’s Message

Bilaterally, too, the meeting between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the Rio Summit had important takeaways for India-China relations. In the aftermath of the conclusion of the October 21 patrolling deal along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), some have expressed optimism about the trajectory of the relationship. However, the readouts from the two sides post the Wang-Jaishankar meeting indicated the need to temper such optimism.

To begin with, the two sides projected widely differing perceptions of the India-China relationship itself. As per Wang, the “specific differences” in the relationship, namely the border issue, were not the whole picture of the overall ties and should not define the relationship. From Jaishankar’s perspective, “maintenance of peace and tranquility” on the border was a top-most priority for the overall relationship to operate smoothly. Similarly, on one hand, the Chinese readout called for easing visa processes, exchanging journalists and resuming direct flights. It, however, did not mention the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra pilgrimage and data sharing on trans-border rivers, which the India readout mentioned. These discrepancies reflect differences in the priorities of the two sides.

On broader worldviews, China’s proposition was that the two neighbours collaborate to create a multipolar world. This lends legitimacy to the idea that the US’s unipolar moment is over and China, along with other emerging powers, are becoming important actors. India’s proposition was, however, the creation of a multipolar world order is to be predicated on a multipolar Asia, where both India and China can co-exist as important poles. The fact that China’s worldview is tinted with the hues of its competition with the US was evident in its readout, while India made it clear that it does not view its relationships through the prism of other nations.

Conclusion

In this context, it is vital that India take away the noteworthy signals in China’s approach to the G20, the Global South, and the bilateral relationship, and develop counter-narratives of its own. India’s membership in groupings including China, like the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (in addition to the G20), should provide it the necessary leverage to shape the narrative on developmental cooperation that is truly inclusive and comes with no strings attached. And on the bilateral front, optimism should be cautious – even though there is a brief thaw on the LAC, fundamental differences remain.

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