Are we ‘arming without aiming’?
The first set of drones entered service with the Indian armed forces in the late 1990s and early 2000s and these were the high-tech, high-end Searcher Mk I, II, and Herons. Leveraged for ISR at the operational level during the Kargil conflict (1999) and for the domination of the rugged Line of Control (LC) with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, these sensor platforms were a centrally controlled resource, coordinated at the level of Command Headquarters, on a user-generated demand-based operations protocol.
Proliferation of drone technology has diffused battlefield autonomy of tactical commanders, concurrently expanding their areas of interest and influence.This has been amply demonstrated in the contemporary battlefields of this decade in Russo-Ukraine, Israel- Gaza/Iran, as well as Operation Sindoor.
Indian armed forces are also doubling down on absorbing this technology at the tactical level. Budgetary support is a fair indicator of priorities, and a substantial share of the Rupees 40,000 crores sanctioned for Emergency Procurement (EP) in the follow-up to operation Sindoor is earmarked for the procurement of surveillance drones, kamikaze drones and loitering munitions.
Organisational structures are being tweaked to maximise the impact of these systems. The man-machine mix required to optimise the battlefield effects of drone technology can be achieved through adaptive Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) woven into the employment philosophy of these newly christened units. From bottom to top, the following organisational restructuring has been implemented at the tactical level, without any manpower accretions in infantry, artillery, and the armoured corps.
-Ashni Platoons. A platoon has beenincorporated into all 385 infantry battalions, equipped with ten drones- four for surveillance and six for loitering munitions.
-Bhairav Battalions. A total of 25 battalions, with approximately 250 personnel each (including personnel from air defence, artillery, and signals co-opted to integrate multifaceted skill sets), are planned to be raised to fill the capability gap between regular infantry battalions and Para (Special Forces) for employment in hybrid operations. One such battalion per infantry regiment will be affiliated with the operational corps deployed in the Northern and Western theaters. Each such battalion will also have an Ashni platoon that will integrate drone technology.
-Divyastra Batteries. As a fusion of precision-strike capability with massed artillery, five regiments are planned by re-organising existing Gun batteries, integrating traditional guns with drones and loitering munitions for hybrid precision attacks.
-Shaktiban Regiments. In contrast to the Divyastra batteries, which plan on an optimising mix of precision targeting and saturation firepower, these regiments plan to maximise the battlefield impact of drones’ and loiter munitions’ unmanned precision-strike capability . Three such regiments are planned, presumably forming a part of the Artillery divisions.
-Rudra Brigade. These are all arms formations at the cusp of tactical and operational levels of the battlefield. The high-tempo employment philosophy of these formations rides on leveraging combat and combat support integration to enhance manoeuvrability, afforded by tech infusion through the employment of modern C4ISR enablers as a system beyond aggregation of platforms. Three such brigades have already been operationally validated through operational level exercises with troops.
Formalising the Structures is an Imperative.
These organisational restructurings have been done in a ‘save and raise’ mode by optimising, upskilling and rightsizing existing units. While it is understood that the organisational tweaks to tactical level units is going to be an iterative process with continuous refinements through institutional feedback loops.The abject danger is in failing to formalise these tweaks into revised war establishments, rendering them vulnerable to redundancy over time.These tweaks are riding on technologies and counter-technologies with rapid evolutionary cycles which can cause obsolescence within operational life. Therefore a formalised structure will ensure institutional and budgetary support to maintain, replenish and upgrade inventories which are at the core of these organisational tweaks.
Recommendations.
The three things that the armed forces can do to mitigate the above stated challenges are.
-Accelerate feedback loops with the stakeholders- users,developers and manufacturers, to stay on top of the tech evolution cycle.
-Evolve stable budgetary support beyond Emergency Procurement (EP) for inventory management.
-Formalise structured training for upskilling of manpower feeding these sub-units and align the cadre management in terms of rank profile as well as trades accordingly within units and cross staffing between units.