India cannot expect the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to matter strategically if it remains structurally under-resourced. The Indian Ocean Region covers approximately 1/5th of the world’s surface and is home to more than one-third of the human population. As a result of this, the region is vital to global trade, with more than half of the world’s container traffic travelling through the Indian Ocean, and an even higher percentage of energy trade.
As a result of the vital nature of this region, the IORA was launched in 1997 following dialogue between India and South Africa primarily to focus on economic cooperation, among a broader six announced priority areas. The organisation now consists of 23 states that border the Indian Ocean, and another 12 dialogue partners including global powers like the USA, China, and even the European Union.
Yet, despite this growing significance of the region, the IORA remains chronically underfunded, limiting its capability to transform its ambitions into deliverable outcomes. The IORA’s Secretariat operates on a modest budget derived from member state contributions, supplemented by voluntary donations to a Special Fund, which pales in comparison to the funding, and thus effectiveness, of another international organisation like ASEAN.
Here, India enters the frame. India has recently started its two-year role as the Chair of the IORA, and Sanjiv Ranjan, a distinguished Indian diplomat, is one year into his three-year term as the Secretary General of the IORA. India thus finds itself currently in a unique but temporary position of holding two of the most significant leadership roles in the IORA. If India truly holds aspirations to establish itself as the regional leader, as the geographic and historical centrepoint of the region which is even named after it, there is no better time to act.
The best way to do so is to significantly boost its own funding to the organisation, and encourage other states with the capacity to do so to join India in doing the same. The IORA comprises a number of wealthy states, including Australia, France, Singapore, and the UAE, who would all likely jump at the opportunity to strengthen the organisation through increased funding if there were adequate direction and deliverable purpose behind the increase in funds, so that such a boost did not result merely in expanding bureaucratic overhead. Funding from these member states, rather than a reliance on the financial strength of dialogue partners, would also work to legitimise the IORA as being truly IOR-focused by preventing any potential perceptions of the IORA being shaped by external actors.
However, it is also worth noting that the IORA consists of some of the poorest GDP-per-capita states in the world, such as Yemen, Mozambique, and Somalia. It is thus crucial that expectations of financial contribution are calibrated to members’ economic capacity, and that increased funding responsibilities fall primarily on wealthier states rather than being imposed uniformly across the association. A failure to recognise these disparities would risk exacerbating inequalities within the IORA, discouraging participation by smaller members, and undermining the organisation’s legitimacy as an inclusive regional forum.
Accordingly, India should utilise its unique and temporary leadership position in the IORA to pursue a gradual but substantial increase in funding for the organisation, aligning with India’s existing SAGAR framework, which emphasises “Security and Growth for All in the Region.” If India wants the IORA to be more than a diplomatic placeholder, it must be willing to pay the price of leadership.