In the current Winter Session, the Union government has listed the Atomic Energy Bill, 2025, among its top legislative priorities, framing it as part of a broader package of transformative reforms to be steered through in just 15 sittings. The Bill is intended to replace or substantially amend the existing framework governing atomic energy, aligning it with the budget announcement that nuclear power must expand towards 100 GW by 2047 to meet India’s energy transition goals.
Beyond the technicalities, the politics is about speed versus scrutiny. Opposition parties and independent experts have already flagged the compressed timelines and limited committee examination, warning that high‑stakes changes to nuclear liability, safety oversight, and private participation are being treated like routine economic legislation rather than long‑term risk governance.
At the heart of the Atomic Energy Bill is a structural shift, i.e. opening the civil nuclear power sector to private capital and allowing companies to finance and build plants, particularly small modular reactors (SMRs), while NPCIL retains operational control. This would overturn India’s long‑standing model where central PSUs dominate everything from project development to plant operation, with the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 effectively excluding both state governments and private firms.
The Bill also sits alongside proposed changes to the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, which foreign and domestic suppliers have long criticised as too onerous and out of step with international compensation norms. How far the government goes in limiting supplier liability will shape whether global vendors and Indian conglomerates actually invest or stay wary of long‑tail legal and reputational risk in the event of an accident. The Bill is expected to be tabled within the next 10 days.
In the geopolitical arena, Putin’s December visit coincided with the first fuel loading consignment for Kudankulam Unit‑3 and fresh political signalling that all six VVER units at the site will be taken to full capacity, turning the project into India’s largest single nuclear complex. Moscow also used the visit to pitch SMRs, floating plants, and localisation of Russian designs in India, positioning itself as a ready‑to‑deploy technology provider just as New Delhi is rewriting its domestic rules.
For India, the strategic challenge now is to leverage Russian depth without locking itself into a single‑supplier future at the very moment it is opening the door to private capital, new reactor types, and a more competitive nuclear ecosystem. Establishing other multilateral partnerships such as the ACITI is a welcome move in this direction.