Why Iran Is Unlikely to See Another 1979
The ongoing protests in Iran compel us to draw comparisons from the 1979 Iranian Revolution – both triggered by economic crises. In the late 1970s, declining oil revenues and inflation eventually derailed US-backed Shah Reza Pahlavi’s regime. Today, Iran’s currency collapse, inflation, economic mismanagement, and water shortages have pushed regular Iranians - the shopkeepers, the working class, and lower-middle class onto the streets. Similar to 1979, these protests were triggered by economic anxiety in December 2026, which snowballed into political demands. However, the repression today far surpasses the response under the Shah.
What Does the Islamic Republic Look Like Today?
Iran is neither a rigid dictatorship, nor a functioning republic. The system combines electoral institutions – a president, parliament, and Assembly of Experts – with a theocratic system at its core. Ultimately, the authority rests solely with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He holds veto powers over laws, appointments, and policy direction, while also directly controlling the judiciary, state media, and most importantly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). He is shielded by the Guardian Council, an unelected body that vets and disqualifies any candidate deemed insufficiently loyal.
The IRGC forms the backbone of the Iranian system. With deep roots in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, it has expanded into Iran’s economy, commanding vast resources, patronage networks, and privileged access to loans and rents. This loyalty is rooted less in ideology and more in material. As such, this model ensures that the security elite stay committed to the system, given their personal wealth is tied to the survival of the Islamic regime.
Despite widespread protests the regime today remains structurally intact. Its core base, comprising ideological hardliners and beneficiaries of the system. While this remains a minority, it is a decisive bloc, embedded across security and bureaucratic institutions. Crucially, despite protesters on the streets, there remains no significant split among the elites. Amid conversations of a regime change, here are some possibilities that emerge through analysis.
Who Could Take Over If the Regime Falls?
As of writing, there remains no clear successor. Iran’s opposition remains deeply fragmented.
Reza Pahlavi - Reza Pahlavi is the US-based son of Iran’s last Shah, overthrown in the 1979 revolution. He spent most of his life in exile, Pahlavi positions himself not explicitly as a monarch-in-waiting but as a proponent of secular democracy and a constitutional referendum. His support comes from a mix of the Iranian diaspora and growing ‘nostalgia-driven’ protesting youth in Iran who never lived under the Shah, however view this era as one of international claim and prosperity. His name is chanted in protests, primarily as a rejection of the Islamic Republic rather than an endorsement of monarchy. Pahlavi has participated in major global summits like the Munich Security Conference, gesturing support for him among Western governments. That said, supportive chants do not equate to a support base. He lacks organisational structure or institutional allies inside Iran. Notably, his close association with foreign governments, especially US and Israel will be seen as deeply problematic by Iranians.
Maryam Rajavi - She leads People’s Mojahedin Organisation (PMO), an exiled opposition group that initially supported the 1979 revolution before violently breaking with the clerical regime. Despite Rajavi’s 10-Point Plan for a secular, non-nuclear Iran, the group remains controversial. The organisation later aligned with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, a move that damaged its legitimacy in Iran. Like Pahlavi, Rajavi operates entirely from outside Iran. This strengthens perceptions that the PMO is irrelevant domestically, even if tactically useful to foreign actors seeking pressure on Tehran.
Hassan Rouhani: Rouhani is a centrist former Iranian President from 2013–2021, who represents the moderate wing of the current establishment. He is an insider who believes the system must reform to survive. He was the public face of Iran’s diplomatic outreach to the West, and successfully negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal, easing sanctions and stabilising Iran’s economy for a brief period. He also became the first Iranian leader to speak directly with a US President, Barack Obama. However, since the collapse of the nuclear deal, Rouhani faces pushback from the hardliners, who argue that engagement with the US weakened Iran. He also lacks an independent power base and credibility with protesters demanding a regime change instead of reform.
What’s Next?
For a meaningful change or fall of the regime, it would need to lose the loyalty of key institutions, especially the security forces. Additionally, for any shift in the current system, the regime must experience fragmentation within the elite, possibly triggered by the death of the Supreme Leader or external foreign pressure. As of now, nothing seems imminent. While Iran faces what may seem like a second revolution, however the absence of an institutional collapse or a unified opposing force, will prevent the Islamic Republic from completely paralysing.