In his latest press briefing on January 20, 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Moscow is working to revive the activities of the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral.
From Moscow’s perspective, the RIC’s revival makes sense for several reasons. For starters, RIC becomes an important trilateral in its diplomatic portfolio vis-à-vis Asia, where Beijing is rapidly wanting to consolidate absolute dominance. The sustained existence of RIC essentially means that Russia is not a pariah state, as defined by the West. Also, Russia could mobilise the RIC to coordinate the technical mechanisms of sanctions evasion, specifically the integration of payment systems (SPFS/CIPS/UPI) and the use of national currencies for energy trade.
But, as highlighted in Lavrov’s own statement from the news briefing, the idea of RIC was set in 1998 and has since been succeeded by BRICS, with which India continues to interact comfortably. In that sense, the geopolitical environment in 2026 differs radically from the unipolar moment that gave rise to the RIC. In an ideal world, RIC would flourish due to the converging interests of participants on issues such as the desire for global multipolarity, mutual benefit-seeking through market access and trade at reduced prices, and even the creation of a joint vision for Euro-Asia-Pacific security. In fact, before 2019, the RIC met regularly on the sidelines of the G20, with standalone summits in St. Petersburg (2006), Buenos Aires (2018), and Osaka (2019).
But the inherent, structural challenges of RIC consistently lead India to remain realistic and non-committal towards its revival.
Firstly, for example, India may not align with Russia and China’s interpretations on what RIC means. India does not wish to be associated with a values-based agenda that pits the RIC as a counter to the US and the West. Just on the issue of de-dollarisation, for example, India is strongly opposed, while China’s Renminbi internationalisation efforts may mean there is no unity within the RIC on the matter.
Secondly, while promoting cooperation in the RIC, China continues to aggressively undermine India’s security interests on the ground. China continues to support Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism by giving its military the tools to fight. This is also why the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Regional Anti-Terror Structure (RATS) faces hindrances. And so, if the RIC convenes and Beijing acts ever so carefully about condemning terrorism emanating from Pakistan or upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all actors involved, it would demoralise New Delhi from wanting to take the platform forward.
Finally, as India aims to balance ties between the US and Russia, actively seeking a formalised trilateral in the form of RIC is something New Delhi is unlikely to do.
If one looks at India-China and India-Russia bilateral ties separately, it is evident that New Delhi is finding ways to carry on with some business, despite disagreements on security or the vision for the regional order. Now that India has decided to withdraw from Chabahar, it may want to focus on reviving the INSTC with Russia. But fundamentally, that could clash with BRI projects and irk China. Similarly, India may want to de-risk oil trade with Russia to assuage some of the US’s concerns and seek tariff reprieve. But that would inherently push the Russia-China partnership closer. There is no easy way for the RIC to flourish together and establish common ground on grave issues, and for the moment, this seems to remain the situation. And as Lavrov argued, like Russia, India too believes in multipolarity - but it does not necessarily see RIC as the trilateral that will bring it about.
Going forward, the RIC may emerge in one of three (non-exhaustive) forms:
A. It can resume meetings at the Foreign Minister level and issue joint statements focusing on soft issues like digital currency standards and climate finance. However, no security cooperation is likely to occur, as the LAC remains tense, and India may use the forum merely to manage relations with China and appease Russia. This is the closest to how RIC exists today, and functioned up till 2019.
B. The US may formalise the ‘Core Five’ proposal, which, rumour has it, wishes to involve India, Japan, Russia, China and the US in a grouping and avert alternative centers of power emerging against the US. India and Japan may gravitate toward this new format, viewing it as more representative of their interests. The RIC will, in that scenario, lose its relevance and become effectively subsumed or sidelined.
C. A major crisis – such as a major global financial depression crisis, for example – may force the three powers to operationalise the RIC for crisis management. This could require a rapid and unexpected resolution of the India-China border dispute, which current diplomatic articulations or intelligence on troop deployments or dam construction indicate is highly improbable.
In scenarios 1 and 3, New Delhi’s political will to engage RIC shall both be brought to light, and tested. In the second scenario, New Delhi may achieve an optimal balance, but the geopolitical or geoeconomic benefits that a US-China rivalry creates for India, may become muted too. But till such a time as one of the three scenarios formally materialises, the RIC remains in a fledgling state.
This blog emerges from my contributions to a story on the RIC by Maria Siow of SCMP. The online link to the story is available here.