Would it be fair to say that a national level military doctrine should restrict itself to just laying out intent and not talk about the capabilities required to achieve it? This assumes that a publicly announced doctrine is directed more towards an external audience for purposes of deterrence. If that’s the assumption, communicating about capabilities doesn’t matter; that can be done at a strategy and tactical level, away from the public glare.
Of course, not possessing credible capabilities will blunt the effect of a doctrine, but having ambiguity on that count lingering in the minds of external entities is beneficial for a nation. The primary audience for a military doctrine document is international observers and not military planners. Deterrence primarily works on the simple idea that one persuades would-be aggressors that there would be consequences and costs for their actions. When viewed through this prism, there is no requirement for even high-level operational blueprints. Nuclear doctrines of various nations are an example.
Further, if the military strategy or, more narrowly, weapon, being discussed in a doctrine has massively destructive capabilities, like nuclear weapons, it becomes all the more important to have a publicly declared doctrine, not just for deterrence, but to indicate that one has a seriously thought-through policy; that one is responsible enough. Apart from this requirement, there doesn’t seem to be any reason to have a publicly declared military doctrine, because military doctrines are not for establishing accountability to the domestic public - military actions are by their very nature very secretive, and not much can be anyway revealed about them to the public; ergo there isn’t any meaningful public accountability that can be aimed for.
To take this line of thought further, if there is a part of a nation’s military strategy that the nation might want to always have plausible deniability for, like cyber offense, it flows that one wouldn’t want to publicise one’s strategy, beyond those parts of this strategy that are already acceptable (like cyber defence; also cyber attack when in a war). But a strategy of persistent cyber exploitation, even in peacetime, is better not publicised because that is not yet acceptable; unless, of course, the aim is to make it acceptable, because it is anyway being done by many nations. But once a nation does that, it also validates its enemies doing that, and doesn’t leave them any recourse to arguments of being harmed by such actions. Such capabilities are no doubt required, because these are not built in a vacuum, at short notice. You need to develop these capabilities, and what better way to test them than to try these out on your adversaries instead of in simulated environments?
However, if these are publicised as a national strategy, it opens up a can of worms. National strategic doctrines are generally about acceptable actions. Can a nation, for instance, have a national bioweapons usage strategy that lays out a continuous exploitation intent, even if the Biological Weapons Convention allowed usage of bioweapons as a defence measure, or as an attack measure when in war? On a sidenote, it is scary that usage of nuclear weapons has been normalised even as a defensive measure.
Moreover, the Overton Window hasn’t probably shifted enough to allow for offensive actions (atleast in public glare) in peacetime. So, any strategy of continuous military exploitation has to be wary of this. By its very nature, a continuous exploit has to happen even in peacetime. That is frowned upon, and will be for the foreseeable future (though this future might be a shorter one going by today’s geopolitical conditions).
So, in short, by all means, continue to do what you want; just don’t publicise it just yet.