Adaptive Tech Strategies and the US-China Tech Rivalry
Nations are navigating the pressures of the US-China tech rivalry with an adaptive approach of capacity building and tech partnerships
Authors
At the G20 Summit in Johannesburg, Chinese Premier Li Qiang reportedly committed to “promote mutually beneficial cooperation and peaceful use of key minerals” and that China would “safeguard the interests of developing countries.”
This shortly followed China’s October 2025 sweeping restrictions on export of rare earths, ahead of the bilateral between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan. While the bilateral in South Korea led to Beijing agreeing to “suspend the global implementation of the expansive new export controls on rare earths and related measures”, it nevertheless underscored China’s willingness to weaponize its outsized dominance in production and refining of critical minerals.
The potential impact on global supply chains and manufacturing operations has been concerning, as China’s October 2025 announcement sought to build on its April 2025 actions, which mandated licenses for export of rare earth alloys, mixtures, and magnets. Moreover, the global scope of implications has been clear, as these two announcements went well beyond China’s December 2024 export ban (on Gallium, Germanium, and Antimony), which was aimed at the US alone.
Such pressures of regulatory compliance and sourcing impediments are prompting other nations to explore adaptive strategies for grappling with the implications of the US-China tech rivalry.
Global risks
To impede China’s access to American tech components, the Trump administration has built on the precedents of the Biden administration (2021-25), which in turn drew from the previous Trump administration’s (2017-21) use of export controls, and investment screenings. This Trump-Biden-Trump continuity has included a focus on inbound and outbound investments in key tech sectors, limiting China’s access to tech with military applications, addressing the fallout of China’s overcapacity in clean tech, and restricting China’s access to semiconductors for AI applications.
These efforts recently led to Singapore and Malaysia announcing their own regulatory efforts to curb transhipment of US tech components to China. Similarly, in January 2025, Japan and the Netherlands aligned their own export regulations with American mandates on limiting China’s access to chip-making equipment.
Moreover, the Trump administration’s decision to scrap Biden’s tiered approach (i.e. the ‘AI Diffusion Rule’) has led to scramble (under an informal country-by-country approach) among nations seeking American semiconductors.
This approach was apparent during Trump’s visit to the Gulf region in May 2025. During which, Saudi Arabia and the UAE finalised sourcing and investment partnerships with US tech companies, for their own respective AI ambitions.
Whereas, the compliance risks also apply to nations that are seeking to explore alternatives to American technologies. For instance, China’s Huawei Technologies has been exploring export deals (for its Ascend chips) with little success. In May 2025, the Trump administration warned against the use of Huawei’s Ascend 910B and 910C processors, which it deemed to be under existing American export controls as they were “designed or manufactured using US-origin technology.”
Compliance and resistance
However, a closer review of these varied cases of nations navigating the pressures of the US-China tech rivalry reveal a confluence of responses.
In Singapore’s case, its measures to address transshipment of American tech components followed an extensive probe into multiple reports on the role of Singapore-based entities and their links with China. Moreover, Singapore’s compliance came with some caveats, as officials noted that the country had no “legal obligation to enforce the unilateral export controls of other countries” and that it expects businesses to take relevant regulations into account.
Similarly, in the case of Japan and the Netherlands, their announcements to mirror some American export controls only came once Trump assumed office in January 2025. Whereas, last year, the Dutch for instance, reached “a handshake agreement” with Biden officials on limiting maintenance services for chip-making equipment, but reportedly “demurred” after Trump’s election victory.
In the Gulf, American support has been linked to curbing some hedging behavior. For instance, the 2024 partnership between the UAE’s G42 and Microsoft materialized only after “behind-the-scenes negotiations” between the Biden administration and G42, and the Emirati firm divesting from TikTok-parent ByteDance and severing links with Chinese hardware suppliers.
Similarly, the October 2025 approval of Nvidia chips for the UAE followed Trump’s May 2025 visit to Abu Dhabi, which involved an Emirati commitment to safeguard AI technologies “by implementing stringent measures to prevent its diversion”.
Adaptive playbook
Beyond such cases that reflect a confluence of responses, nations are also pursuing an adaptive playbook to overtime reduce import dependencies.
This includes initiatives for domestic capacity building and interlinking innovation ecosystems with likeminded partner nations.
Such an approach is apparent in India’s recent decisions to bolster domestic production and refining capacities for critical minerals. This includes India’s decision to revise royalty rates for key critical minerals (like Graphite), to boost domestic mining. Similarly, New Delhi has approved the USD 815 million, seven-year incentive programme for rare earth magnets.
Such efforts are aimed at harnessing untapped potential, with India reportedly holding the third-largest reserves of rare earths (around 8% of global reserves) – and yet contributing just under 1% of the world’s total mining output. Moreover, these efforts to propel India into the processing and refining realms of the global rare earths value chain are coupled with tech partnerships.
For instance, during PM Narendra Modi’s August 2025 visit to Japan, the two sides finalised the India-Japan Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Mineral Resources, for jointly developing processing technologies and investing in exploration, mining and stockpiling critical minerals.
This shortly followed India’s June 2025 endorsement of the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan. In recent weeks, India has also agreed with Canada to explore supply chain partnerships for critical minerals, and announced a trilateral partnership (with Australia and Canada) on resilient supply chains for critical minerals.
De-risking over the horizon
In addition, nations are focusing on cross-pollination between innovation ecosystems to build shared capacities for next-gen technologies.
For instance, the European Union (EU) recently identified avenues for deepening its tech linkages with India. Its Joint Communication on redefining the India-EU agenda seeks to elevate “Technology and Innovation” as a dedicated cooperation track; redefine priority areas under the India-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) to focus on semiconductors and green technologies; and proposes “EU-India Innovation Hubs” and “Blue Valleys” as multi-stakeholder platforms for investment facilitation and cross-sectoral collaboration.
Such a collaborative push was also apparent during UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s October 2025 visit to India. During which, the two sides announced the India–UK Connectivity and Innovation Centre for next-gen telecom propositions and the India–UK Joint Centre for AI for jointly exploring AI propositions in health, climate and fintech.
While such capacity-building and collaborative efforts underscore the realities of the multipolar world, they also highlight an adaptive approach on navigating the implications of the US-China tech rivalry.
Amid pressures of compliance and sourcing impediments that risk solidifying a binary choice between American and Chinese tech propositions, nations are therefore exploring tech partnerships to collectively de-risk over the long term.
Kashish Parpiani is the co-author of ‘America and the Indo-Pacific - Trump and Beyond’ (Routledge, 2021). He is also part of the 2025-26 cohort of the Network for Advanced Study of Technology Geopolitics (NAST) Fellowship at the Takshashila Institution.