China has commissioned its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, on 5 November 2025. It boasts two main technological incorporations, which make it the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s most advanced carrier. The first, are the catapult launches and arrested landings of aircraft using an electromagnetic system, instead of conventional steam catapults. The second, is that it is designed specifically to carry the PLAN’s four most advanced aircraft - the J-15DH, J-15DT, J-35, and J-15T.
When were these developments announced? First, in September 2025, a report in the PLA Daily spoke about an interesting demonstration with the navy’s “carrier swords” – the J-15T, J-35, and KJ-600 aircraft – completing their first catapult launches and arrested landings aboard the Fujian.
The KJ-600 is now being increasingly seen in demonstrations. It is China’s first domestically developed fixed-wing carrier-borne early-warning aircraft, and even during the September 3 military parade, the KJ was shown as escorted by four J-15T carrier fighters adapted for electromagnetic catapults.
Reporters speaking of the demonstration with the carrier and jets set the scene a little something like this:
From the island superstructure, the electromagnetic catapult track gleamed with a steely sheen in the sunlight. At the launch signal, each carrier aircraft shot skyward like an arrow from the string. Turning to the arresting-wire area, aircraft streaked in like lightning, dragging the arresting cables into “V” shapes as they came to a halt on deck.
This marked the Fujian demonstrating full electromagnetic catapult and recovery capability. Chinese commentators hailed it as a “breakthrough” in aircraft carrier development and “naval transformation.” Secondly, in this single demonstration, there were multiple test and training missions conducted, wherein navy pilots flew these three aircraft types, taking off and landing on Fujian and “proving” that China’s fully self-developed electromagnetic catapult and arresting systems are well matched to multiple carrier aircraft. This also meant that the Fujian has achieved initial full-deck operational capacity. As Chinese commentators believe, this “[laid] a solid foundation” for integrating all types of carrier aircraft into the carrier strike group.
It also seems that the transition from single sorties to continual launch cycles is achieved with Fujian. Further, since its first sea trials in May 2024, the Fujian has steadily carried out planned maritime tests, advancing equipment calibration and overall operational stability evaluations.
In the past, the Liaoning set numerous “first-battle, first-victory” records in China’s carrier history, breaking some single-day and single-wave sortie records. This is even though its ski-jump take-off is very basic, and it was the first time a decade ago that a the “Flying Shark” J-15 aircraft first took off there. The Shandong shortened the time to full combat capability of any of China’s CSGs. It overcame tech hurdles which restricted it to shore-based operations and catapult launchers. Now, the Fujian seems to have refined both launch and ship-based capabilities.
As for the carrier’s fighter jets, the indigenously developed heavy carrier-based fighter J-15T is designed for electromagnetic catapult launch systems and possesses both catapult and ski-jump launch capabilities. The J-15DH is China’s domestically developed carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft. The J-15DT is a domestically developed catapult-ski-jump compatible carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft. The J-35, China’s newly developed stealth carrier-based fighter jet, was meant to indicate Beijing’s blue water ambitions (from near-shore interests to far-away sea ambitions).
The big picture for India is this: China has rapidly developed three aircraft carriers, and plans to construct a fourth one. In fact, when the Fujian was first announced in 2022, China commented that it is looking to operationalise 5 carriers total in the next few years. And so, PLAN Carrier Battle Group (CBG)s may, in the next five years, have the capability to be deployed in three or four core maritime theaters, including the Indian Ocean Rregion (IOR). While Chinese doctrine currently places the IOR relatively low on the list of priorities for naval deployment, with increasing capabilities, Chinese CBGs may experiment with semi-permanent deployments in the IOR, and India may have to respond in kind.