The MBT is Not Dead Yet

Authors

MBTs may be expensive, but they are far from outdated.

This paper makes a compelling argument that Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) have become irrelevant in the Indian context based on three factors.

  • Doctrinal limitations imposed by the nuclear threat on ‘punitive incursions’.
  • Constricted terrain negates their manoeuvre advantage.
  • The emerging threat paradigm of a modern battlefield renders it ineffective.

I would like to follow a more balanced approach, which argues that the relevance of any platform or arm lies in its ability to adapt to the battlefield milieu.

Are punitive incursions limited due to nuclear overhang?

Deep thrusts are not an end in itself, they are relative to value objectives and the strategic advantage these bring. There are adequate options at varying spatial depths on both fronts, which can serve as leverage in an opening offensive or in a quid pro quo (QPQ) scenario.

Humans are terrestrial and therefore the psychological impact of loss of territory far outweighs the bean count of material losses, i.e. manpower, manned platforms, unmanned platforms in that order.For example, as of Oct 2025, Russia holds 114,500- 117000 sq km (larger than Bihar or West Bengal) of Ukraine’s territory (19-20%). All territory was captured and is being held by combined arms formations, predominantly mechanised forces. In response, despite spectacular First Person View (FPV) drone operations, Ukraine has recaptured a mere 140-160 sq km of lost territory in the interim, using combined arms equipped with drones, artillery and precision weapons, but not bereft of mechanised forces. Any negotiated end to the ongoing conflict will have territory at its focal point.

In the context of India’s neighbourhood, the absence of deep thrusts results from the deterrence (by denial) value that the comparable ability to execute deep thrusts brings to military strategies. The non-occurrence of these is not a guarantee of their unlikelihood. A testimony to this is the ’CAB’isation (Combined Arms Brigades) by PLA, the Armour modernisation program of Pakistan, and the contemporary Tank modernisation programmes of leading Armies.

Does constricted terrain negate their manoeuvre advantage?

An MBT brings to the battlefield the ability to temporarily exercise control over territory through manoeuvre and firepower while enjoying relative protection (ERA, Active protection suite, NBS protection suite etc). Control of territory is either by observation (which ISR provides), denial (which long-range fires supported by ISR provide) and by occupation/capture(which Armour/Infantry provide, supported by all arms & services). While no amount of latent control can replace physical control, operational plans require the flexibility to exercise temporary and latent control to further their objectives.

The battlefield has three dimensions- Time, Space, and Force. Armour, as part of a combined arms manoeuvre, allows temporary control of space in an early timeframe before an appropriate force (infantry) can establish a more permanent control only if required. Why can’t any one arm/ platform totally replace all the others? Warfighting relies on denying the enemy its capabilities while exploiting one’s own to create leverage points rapidly. This is done by exploiting tech and counter-tech through evolving adaptive Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). Therefore, to assume the advantages of precision munitions, loiter munitions, ATGMs, drones, and long-range artillery to be stacked against the MBT in isolation is like situating an argument. These advantages will be incorporated into any future MBT design, and employment philosophies will evolve accordingly.

What challenges the MBT’s relevance and compels a reassessment of their employment.

  • Cost-effective counter-tech such as drones, loiter ammunition and autonomous systems.
  • Vulnerable logistics.
  • Operational inertia owing to Deterrence by denial.

What will keep an MBT relevant?

  • Devastating onboard accurate firepower.
  • Modular upgradability for battlefield efficiency in projectile design, active protection systems and networked C4ISR.
  • Its flexibility due to its ability to plug and play in a networked environment.
  • Its scalable survivability achieved by co-opting countermeasures onto and around the platform in agile all-arms combat groupings.
  • It has irreplaceable flexible control over the battle space, which it brings to bear through its mobility, firepower, and protection.

Therefore, an adaptive approach outweighs a transformative one, even at the peril of low cost-effectiveness. The journey to a futuristic battlefield cannot isolate itself from the intervening contemporary threats. The devastation an MBT can still exert on an adversary in physical and cognitive sense counts for more than nothing.