Pegasus, the software that infamously hacked WhatsApp earlier this year, is a tool developed to help government intelligence and law enforcement agencies to battle cybercrime and terror. Once installed on a mobile device, it can collect contacts, files, and passwords. It can also ‘overcome’ encryption, and use GPS to pinpoint targets. More importantly, it is notoriously easy to install. It can be transmitted to your phone through a WhatsApp call from an unknown number (that does not need to be picked up), and does not require user permissions to get access to the phone’s camera or microphone. All of that makes it a near complete tool for snooping.
While Pegasus is able to hack most of your phone’s capabilities, the big news here is that it can ‘compromise’ end to end (E2E) encryption. The news comes at attesting time for encryption in India, as the government deliberates a crackdown on E2E encryption, a decision that we will all learn about more on Jan 15, 2020.
Before we look at how Pegasus was able to compromise E2E encryption, let’s look at how E2E encryption works and how it has developed a place for itself in human rights.
E2E is an example of how a bit of math, applied well, can secure communications better than all the guns in the world. The way it works on platforms such as WhatsApp is that once the user (sender) opens the app, the app generates 2 keys on the device, one public and one private. The private key remains with the sender and the public key is transmitted to the receiver via the company’s server. The important thing to note here is that the message is already encrypted by the public key before the message reaches the server. The server only relays the secure message and the receiver’s private key then decrypts it. End to end encryption differs from standard encryption because in services with standard encryption (think Gmail), along with the receiver, the service provider generally holds the keys, and thus, can also access the contents of the message.
Some encryptions are stronger than others. The strength of an encryption is measured through how large the size of the key is. Traditionally, WhatsApp uses a 128-bit key, which is standard. Here you can learn about current standards of encryption and how they have developed over the years. The thing to keep in mind is that it can take over billions of years to crack a secure encryption depending on the key size (not taking into account quantum computing):
Key Size Time to Crack
56-bit 399 Seconds
128-bit 1.02 x 1018 years
192-bit 1.872 x 1037 years
256-bit 3.31 x 1056 years
E2E encryption has had a complex history with human rights. One the one side, governments and law enforcement agencies see E2E encryption as a barrier when it comes to ensuring the human rights of its citizens. Examples of mob lynching being coordinated through WhatsApp, such as these, exist around the world.
On the other hand, security in communications and the anonymity it brings, has been a boon for people who might suffer harm if their conversations were not private. Think peaceful activists who utilize it to fight for democracy around the world, most recently, Hong Kong. Same goes for LGBTQ activists and whistleblowers. Even diplomats and government officials operate through the seamless secure connectivity offered by E2E encryption.
The general consensus in civil society is that E2E encryption is worth having as an increasing amount of digital human communications move online to platforms such as WhatsApp.
How does Pegasus fit in?
End to end encryption ensures that your messages are encrypted in transit and can only be decrypted by the devices that are involved in the conversation. However, once a device decrypts a message it receives, Pegasus can access that data which is at rest. So it is not the end to end encryption that is compromised, but your devices security. Once a phone is infected, Pegasus can mirror the device, literally record the keystrokes being typed by the user, browser history, contacts, files and so on.
The strength of end to end encryption lies in the fact that it encrypts data in transit well. So unless you have the key for decryption, it is impossible to trace the origin of messages as well as the content that is being transmitted. The weakness for end to end encryption here, as mentioned above, is that it does not apply to data at rest. If it were still encrypting data at rest, messages received by users would not be readable.
At this point, the question about how secure apps such as WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram really are, is widely debateable. While the encryption is not compromised, the larger system is, and that has the potential to make the encryption a moot point.
WhatsApp came out with an update that supposedly fixed the vulnerability earlier this year, seemingly protecting communications on the platform from Pegasus.
What does this mean for regulation against WhatsApp?
The Pegasus story comes at a critical time for the future of encryption on WhatsApp and on platforms in general. The fact that WhatsApp waited ~6 months to file the lawsuit against the NSO will not help the platforms credibility on the traceability and encryption debate. This also brings into question the standards for data protection Indian citizens and users should be subject to. The data protection bill is yet to become law. With the Pegasus hack putting privacy front and center, the onus should ideally be on making sure that Indian communications are secure against foreign and domestic surveillance efforts.