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The other Pakistan: understanding the military—jihadi complex[a]

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Abstract

Pakistan is not one geopolitical entity, but two: the putative state (represented currently by a civilian government), and the military—jihadi complex that has captured the commanding heights of power. The inability to understand this duality of Pakistan has led to misplaced expectations, confounding outcomes and failed policies by states and international governments alike.

Policies towards Pakistan will continue to be ineffective unless the dominant of the two Pakistans i.e. this military—jihadi complex (MJC) is explicated with clarity and precision. This is exactly what this chapter will accomplish.

In this chapter, we deploy principles of Organisational Theory to decode what we mean by MJC. The chapter explains what the MJC comprises of, what the nodes of this complex are, what are the forces of cohesion and repulsion that affect the dynamics of this complex and finally, what are the operational processes deployed by the MJC to keep itself afloat.

This understanding of the MJC will help bridge the gap between expectations and outcomes of foreign policies towards Pakistan.

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Introduction

> "He [Obama] questioned why the US should avoid sending its forces into Pakistan to kill al-Qaeda leaders, and he privately questions why Pakistan, which he believes is a disastrously dysfunctional country, should be considered an ally of the US at all."
> —Jeffrey Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine, *The Atlantic*

These lines succinctly sum up the world's Pakistan conundrum. When the policy response of a two-term president of the world's most powerful nation-state towards a "disastrously dysfunctional" ally is merely restricted to "private questioning", that country merits special attention.

The enigma that is the Pakistani state continues to confound governments, policymakers and analysts alike. So much so that using constructs to define Pakistan is no longer just a cottage industry, but a mature, medium-scale enterprise in the field of geopolitics literature.

And yet, the Pakistani state continues to puzzle the world. Here's another illustration that reflects how Pakistan continues to be a perplexing case — "At a time when much of South Asia is harbouring visions of rapid economic growth and social mobility, the Pakistani state has little to offer its citizens beyond the rents accruing to it from its geopolitical location. And yet, Pakistan persists in its pursuit of patently unrealistic and disastrously costly policies towards India and Afghanistan. Even the US, principal patron and benefactor, is unable to get Pakistan to adopt policies that could benefit itself and the wider region" (Raghavan 2015, par. 1).

This does not mean that the constructs describing Pakistan have not been helpful in decoding the Pakistani state. Many seminal works on this topic have refined our understanding about Pakistan, each of them uncovering a previously incomprehensible aspect of the Pakistan problem.

For instance, Husain Haqqani's work (2005) postulated the three political choices underlying Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies in the preceding decades. These were: pursuit of religious nationalism, a near manic obsession for confrontation with India, and a determined lobbying to secure American support. Haqqani also contended that on numerous occasions, Islamist groups have acted as allies of the civil-military complex in ensuring its viceregal domination.

Other important studies have identified the Pakistan Army and its affiliates as the chief actor shaping the state's political outcomes. Mazhar Aziz (2008) explains that the military's thirst for power, directly or indirectly has left deep cleavages in the politics and society of the country, which successive civilian governments are unable to cope with. These cleavages have in turn helped military exploit the decision making space to further its commercial interests.

Christine Fair (2014) argues that Pakistan's persistent revisionism in the face of repeated defeats is not security driven but ideological. And it is the Pakistan Army that determines the frontiers of this ideology. She further claims that 'the strategic culture of the Pakistan Army is more or less interchangeable with that of the country because with few notable exceptions the army has set the country's key foreign and domestic policies (Fair 2014, 4).'

Other studies, particularly those by Aqil Shah, Stephen Cohen and Ayesha Siddiqa have dwelled further on the relation of the Pakistan Army with the society at large in order to explain political decision-making in Pakistan.

All these studies have greatly contributed towards a better understanding of how Pakistan impacts the world. However, these works have fallen a step short of unraveling the meta-structure, of which the army, jihadis, crime syndicates and financing networks are merely constituent parts.

For example, what explains the repeated "duplicity" of the Pakistani leadership when it comes to taking action against terrorist groups? How is it that there is a high substitutability of labor between the army and the jihadi groups, and between jihadi groups themselves? How is it that various forms of behaviour & outcome control methods have been ineffective in dealing with Pakistan? And finally what explains the fact that any efforts of peace talks between Pakistan and India are promptly followed by acts of violence, terror and intimidation from and within Pakistan?

We believe the answers to these questions lie in visualising the nexus between the army, jihadi groups, criminal syndicates, intelligence agencies and a few other groups in Pakistan as *one* entity, rather than attempts at looking at the components in isolation to each other. This chapter is an effort in this direction.

Central idea

The central idea of this chapter is that Pakistan is not one geopolitical entity, but two. The first is a **putative state**; currently represented by a civilian government and a civilian *de-facto* head of state, having its own flag and other paraphernalia that make it appear like a sovereign state. The competing entity is not just the military, as it is generally held. Instead, it is a dynamic syndicate of military, militant, radical Islamist and political-economic structures that pursues a set of domestic and foreign policies to ensure its own survival and relative dominance: the military—jihadi complex (MJC). We claim that policies towards Pakistan will continue to be ineffective unless the dominant of the two Pakistans ie the MJC is conceptualised and explicated as a whole.

The unique proposition of this study is that we analytically model the MJC using Organisation Theory (OT): a systematic study of organisations to identify the patterns and structures they use to solve problems, maximise efficiency and productivity, and meet the expectations of stakeholders (*Boundless* 2015).

The reason we employ this method is because the field of OT has well-developed literature that can help us decode complex structures like the MJC. Apart from explanatory power, OT also offers important clues on what makes organisations work and what makes them dissipate. Such prescriptions can be useful in framing policies towards Pakistan. On the other hand, these prescriptions will also help the putative Pakistani state to counter, subjugate or dismantle the MJC.

In taking this approach of using an analytical framework to describe Pakistan, we implicitly agree to the observation by Mazhar Aziz (2008, 36) on the need to shift the focus of scholarship on Pakistan away from explanations driven by class, religion and/or ethnicity based interpretations to the explanation proposed by an institutional frame of reference.

Where we differ from Aziz is that he restricts the theoretical frameworks of path dependency and historical institutionalism to the military alone, which he refers to as 'the most powerful institution in Pakistan' (Aziz 2008, 18). On the other hand, we argue that analysing the military alone in an institutional framework is inadequate — it needs to be comprehended as a node of a much larger structure called the MJC.

Like with any other analytical framework, we are aware that our abstraction will lead to a loss of detail. But as we demonstrate in this chapter, the benefits of visualising the MJC as an organisational entity far outweigh the costs of missing out on specific details. In any case, we firmly believe that a critique of this study will only help decode finer aspects of how the MJC operates.

Defining a Complex

To begin with, we first use existing theoretical concepts in Organisation Theory to understand what we mean by the term "complex".

The first such concept is an ***organisation,*** which can be defined as a consciously coordinated social unit, composed of two or more people, that functions on a relatively continuous basis to achieve a common goal or set of goals (Robbins 2005).

Organisations come in various forms and types. A company, an army, a jihadi group and a think tank are all examples of organisations. However, the classical conception of an organisation as a linear system with few variables weakly interacting with each other is insufficient to explain organisations like the MJC, which are characterised by a complex web of interlinks and interdependencies (*Tejas* 2009).

Instead, the more recent trend in organisation theory has been to apply insights from the complex systems approach to characterise organisations whose behaviours cannot be explained by breaking down the system into its component parts. Such an approach focuses on understanding (a) the variables determining the system's behaviour, (b) the patterns of interconnections among these variables, and (c) the fact that these patterns, and the strengths associated with each interconnection, may vary depending on the time scale relevant for the behaviour being studied (Svyantek & Brown 2000).

We interpret the term **'complex'** as a meta-organisation viewed through this lens of complex systems. More specifically, we define a complex as an organisation that fulfils these conditions of a complex system:

1. It is made up of a large number of constituent entities that interact with each other and also with its environment. (Gell-Mann 1995, Vol. 1, No. 1). These entities, called *nodes* are organisations in their own right, when seen in isolation.
2. It lies between an ordered system and a chaotic system. An ordered system constraints behaviour of its agents through both, formal and informal rules. In a chaotic system, agents are not restricted. Whereas in a complex, informal methods of control constrain agent behaviour.
3. The nodes of the complex have a going concern ie they work on a continuous basis towards a common goal or set of goals.
4. There is a high degree of connectivity and interdependence between its nodes.
5. Its nodes co-evolve. The evolution of one domain or entity is partially dependent on the evolution of other related domains or entities (Ehrlich & Raven 1964, Pianka 1994, Kauffman 1993 & 1995, McKelvey 1999a & b, Koza & Lewin 1998). These nodes share a common ecosystem and influence each other spontaneously.
6. It is self-similar: the different levels of hierarchy exhibit scaled versions of a common corporate culture.

An example of a complex is the Google Play Store ecosystem: the official store and portal for Android apps, games and other content. The complex comprises of a large number of nodes such as Google, Android developers, mobile advertisers and android phone users. These constituents are regulated by the key node: *Google Inc*. Beyond this regulation, the nodes co-evolve with each other. All nodes share a common goal—getting more value out an Android phone. Each node is heavily dependent on the other—developers need more users and advertisers, users need more developers and new upgrades, and Google needs more of all stakeholders. Actions by every node influence other nodes spontaneously.

Other examples of complexes may include political parties, multinational conglomerations and judicial systems — all social groups rooted in a particular corporate culture and ideology.

What is MJC? Can it be described as a complex?

Having understood the key characteristics of a complex, we now offer what we consider in Pakistan as a complex. The Pakistani military-jihadi complex (MJC) is a highly interconnected and interdependent organisation, comprising of a dynamic network of military, militant, radical Islamist and political-economic structures that pursues a set of domestic and foreign policies to ensure its own survival and relative dominance (Pai 2011). In this section, we describe how these seemingly disparate entities are part of an organisational whole.

Like any complex system, MJC comprises of a large number of co-evolving nodes. These nodes can very broadly be classified on the basis of the primary functions they seek to perform. Given below is a description of the nodes of this complex along with a few representative examples of organisations in each node.

The first and primary node comprises of the armed forces of Pakistan, tasked with defending the territory and people of Pakistan from conventional and non-conventional threats. This node comprises of several organisations: the service triad composing of the Pakistan Army, the Pakistan Navy and the Pakistan Air Force. The node also includes Pakistan's premier intelligence agency, the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI).

The second node of the MJC is comprised of a range of militant organisations, each with their own operational strategies, command structure, stated aims and geographies. Some examples of organisations in this node include Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI)[1].

The third node comprises of several socio-religious organisations and networks that are closely linked with the militant node of the complex, often as recruitment grounds or fronts for them. For instance, the Jamaat-ud-Dawaa, which continues to act as a front organisation of the LeT, was listed as a foreign terrorist organisation by the US Department of State in 2014 (*Al Jazeera* 2014). Similarly, the Tablighi Jamaat, an Islamist revivalist organisation has had links with the ISI and Harkat ul-Mujahideen. Members of militant groups often attend the Tablighi Jamaat's *Ijtima* (congregation) in Raiwind, where they hand out recruitment pamphlets (Howenstein 2006).

The fourth node comprises of organisations that are ostensibly setup as charity trusts but have deep connections with terrorist networks. Rabita Trust, Al-Akhtar Trust and Al-Rashid Trust are some examples of organisations in this node. All three have been listed as organisations linked with international terrorism by the US Department of State.

The fifth node comprises of organised crime syndicates that provide material and financial support to terrorists. Drug syndicates, trucking mafia and other syndicates such as the ones run by Dawood Ibrahim have provided financial support for terror groups and leased out their logistical supply chains for terrorist attacks. In the most recent terrorist attack on Pathankot Air Force base, there were strong indications that arms and ammunition used by the Pakistani terrorists were part of a drug consignment that was concealed by smugglers, and the group of terrorists entered separately using the same route (*Daily Mail* 2016).

The sixth node comprises of for-profit organisations such as the National Logistics Cell (NLC) and Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). The NLC, a trucking company wholly owned by the Pakistani military developed a symbiotic relationship with the Taliban, bringing weapons and material to Afghan guerrillas while funnelling out vast amounts of heroin (Peters 2009). BCCI on the other hand, was an international bank started by a Pakistani financier. The CIA in 1991 admitted that BCCI was involved in 'illicit activities, including money laundering and terrorism' (*New York Times* 1991).

Some political parties form the seventh node of the complex. The MJC has a history of backing new political formations to resist, oppose and degrade thee two dominant political parties of Pakistan, MJC's most prominent challengers. The *Islami Jamhoori Ittehad* (IJI) was one such formation created by the ISI (*Dawn* 2012). In recent times, the army has backed protests by formations such as *Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf* and *Pakistan Awami Tehreek* against the civilian government (*Daily Times* 2014).

What strings these disparate organisations together is the success factor behind MJC's dominance in Pakistan. Like an archetypal complex, all the constituent organisations together subscribe to a set of common minimum goals: one, to maintain the MJC at the apex of Pakistan's power structure by delegitimising civilian control. Two, hurting India's economic, political and social structures to justify MJC's vitality and capability.

Another striking characteristic that completes the MJC is a high degree of connectivity and interdependence between its nodes, which will be illustrated through a few case studies here. The case studies expose that these nodes interact with each other frequently, and exhibit a shared common culture. There are clearly identifiable rules of engagement and interaction that may/may not be formalised and yet are sustained across the nodes. There are also informal and formal methods of control to constrain the behaviour of the nodes, explained in subsequent sections of this chapter.

From an organisational point of view, the complex can be said to have a ***Functional Structure with Horizontal Linkages***. This means that nodes are broadly grouped on the basis of common function across the complex. OT reveals that such a structure is most effective when in-depth expertise is critical to meeting organisational goals, when an organisation needs to be controlled and coordinated through the vertical hierarchy, and when efficiency is important (Daft 2008, 104).

Such a structure, however suffers from high latency. To compensate for slow response times across nodes, the MJC has developed strong horizontal linkages. To demonstrate how the various nodes of the MJC interact with each other, a few case studies and profiles are given below:

> **Case 1**: Major (retired) Haroon Ashiq, a former Special Services Group (SSG) commando of the Pakistan Army left the forces in 2000. He then joined LeT, which he considered was an extension of the army (*The Express Tribune* 2011). Until 2003, he served as a close associate of Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi. After quitting the LeT over differences with Lakhvi, he joined the Harkatul Jihadul Islami (HuJI) under Commander Illyas Kashmiri and thus got closer to al Qaeda[2].
>
> Haroon has two major achievements to his credit— being charged (but finally acquitted by courts) for killing of retired Major General Amir Faisal Alvi who threatened to expose senior ISI officers of terror links, and, logistical planning of 26/11 Mumbai attacks.

Several other details, captured by the slain journalist Saleem Shahzad in his book *Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11* throw light on the horizontal linkages between the various nodes of the MJC. The case of Haroon Ashiq explains the **fungibility of labor** across the military and militant functional domains.

> **Case 2**: A number of investigative reports have suggested that the ISI diverted American money designated for fighting terrorism to the Taliban. According to a 2007 document released by WikiLeaks, US military interrogators at Guantánamo implicitly acknowledged this problem when they placed the ISI on an internal list of "terrorist and terrorist-support entities" (Wright 2011).

This case illustrates the formal methods of control that ISI employs over elements from other nodes.

Case 3: Pakistani Taliban (affiliated to Al Qaeda) carried out the attack on the naval base PNS Mehran after negotiations with the Navy for the release of officials, suspected of al-Qaeda links, had failed. According to Saleem Shahzad (again), it was clear the militants were receiving good inside information as they always knew where the suspects were being detained, indicating sizeable al-Qaeda infiltration within the navy's ranks. It was also alleged that there were some sympathisers of the Pakistani Taliban inside the military. This attack was similar to the one carried out on the General HQ in Islamabad in 2009. This case illustrates how closely the different nodes within the MJC are interconnected.

Case 4: A study of Illyas Kashmiri's terrorist career also shows the fungibility of actors across the militant organisations' functional structure. Nicknamed 'Commander', his 313 Brigade of the HuJI is alleged to have been raised by the ISI to fight in the Kashmir valley. After the ceasefire with India emasculated his stature, he shifted his focus to Afghanistan where ISI officers continued to maintain links with him and helped him to buy weapons (*Hindu* 2011). Ilyas Kashmiri also became an Al-Qaeda operative and served as the chief of its military operations.

Case 5: In 2013, LeT's Abdul Karim Tunda was arrested by the Indian security agencies. Investigations confirmed close links between the crime syndicates, the jihadi nodes and the ISI. It was even reported that ISI promised sanctuary to Dawood Ibrahim (on the wanted list of Interpol for cheating and criminal conspiracy), provided that he invested at least 30 percent of his earnings to fund terror activities (*Outlook* 2013). According to Indian security agencies, as the ISI found the influence of Indian Mujahideen (IM) and Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) waning, it took Dawood's help to establish newer terror modules (*Mail Today* 2013). Ibrahim's D-Company used earnings from its films DVD piracy racket transforming itself into an organisation 'not just passively supporting terrorists, but with close links to them' (*RAND* 2009). This case illustrates the close horizontal linkages between crime syndicates and terrorist networks in Pakistan.

Case 6: One of the most intriguing actors in the recent times in the intelligence circles is that of David Coleman Headley. A Pakistani-American national, he worked for multiple intelligence agencies and is one of the key accused by the Indian National Investigation Agency (NIA) in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Since 1999, he started training with the LeT. He acquainted with Sajid Mir, the foreign recruiter of LeT. He reportedly made seven trips to India collating intelligence through video filming and scouting targets for the attack. During investigation, he identified his ISI handlers as Majors "Ali" and "Iqbal". In a videoconference testimony to an Indian court in February 2016 from an undisclosed location in the US, he named Hafeez Saeed, Lakhvi, Kashmiri, Majors Iqbal and Ali as the chief conspirators.

What keeps this complex afloat?

From an objective viewpoint, it is admirable that the MJC continues to adapt to the changing environment. This section looks at the organisational processes that allow this complex to thrive. As a corollary, an understanding of these forces can also offer clues to processes that can cause the complex to break apart.

First, a **strong, shared culture** is a cornerstone of the complex. It is a powerful force that keeps the various nodes together. Organisation's culture is the underlying set of key values, beliefs, understandings, and norms shared by employees. These underlying values and norms may pertain to ethical behaviour, commitment to employees, efficiency, or customer service, and they provide the glue to hold organisation members together (Daft 2008, 18). The key features of this glue that holds the nodes of the MJC intact are:

1. A deep-seated antagonism towards India. All elements of MJC shared this view that India and Pakistan are locked in a zero-sum game. One can succeed only to the detriment of the other.
2. Islam as the ideological refuge.
3. A belief that Pakistan has been the victim of the international system.
4. An acceptance of all conventional and non-conventional methods of warfare against MJC's enemies.
5. A condescending attitude towards the putative civilian leadership because of its inability to protect ideological and territorial frontiers of Pakistan.

This set of beliefs is deeply cultivated, to varying degrees, in all the nodes of the MJC. Organisationally, this shared culture benefits the MJC in three ways. First, it inspires individuals across the nodes to perform beyond what can be controlled or monitored. It ensures commitment beyond compliance. Second, it promotes collaboration by creating a collective identity, critical for a diverse entity such as the MJC. And third, it controls the actions of individuals to align towards the common goal. Conversely, when any of these edifices on which the shared culture rests collapses, the internal stakeholders of the MJC can act against each other.

Second, a **mature socialisation process** glues the MJC. As an organisational process, socialisation helps reduce the problems of specialisation. Because the MJC comprises of several specialised nodes, an efficient mode of socialisation is necessary to uphold a common corporate culture amongst its various parts. This process helps reduce variability, increases predictability of responses, promotes co-ordination and minimises scope for discretion. In case of MJC, this socialisation is a cohesive force. For example, common socialisation processes allow retirees from the army to

establish horizontal linkages with other nodes for training or for working alongside each other on specific projects.

High levels of socialisation in the MJC are achieved in two ways. One, the literature used by the army and the militant groups are similar in that they both vilify the external *kufar* and glorify *jihad* as a means of eliminating the *kufar*. Two, as Fair (2015) shows, both the army and groups like the LeT share common recruiting grounds.

Third, a **high degree of legitimacy** in the Pakistani society keeps the MJC afloat. From an institutional perspective, legitimacy is defined as a general perception that an organisation's actions are desirable, proper, and appropriate within the environment's system of norms, values, and beliefs (Daft 2008, 193). The MJC continues to enjoy a high degree of legitimacy. A survey conducted by Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency in 2015 revealed that the respondents consider the Pakistan Army — the key node of the MJC, as the most trusted institution in the country (*Dawn* 2015). This perception of legitimacy is important for the MJC as a whole to challenge the putative state.

Conversely, a drop in legitimacy can fracture complexes and lead to breakdowns. For example, decisive defeats in war can delegitimise the army, thereby splitting the army and potentially breaking the MJC too. Aqil Shah (2014) observes that decisive defeats in war can erode a military's professional cohesion, undermine the morale, and badly tarnish its professional reputation. They can morally weaken the political influence of authoritarian militaries and open the way for their de-politicisation.

These three factors are critical for the sustenance of MJC.

Why does MJC exist?

The MJC is an institutional arrangement that leverages collective resources to achieve a specific objective— no reconciliation with India, which is a self-serving motive. Complexes need to create sustainable competitive advantage in order to survive and grow and that is what the MJC has done. By keeping India's actions tied to Pakistan's destiny, the MJC has continued to enjoy a comparative advantage over the putative state simply because it has successfully projected that "corrupt politicians" cannot be relied upon to handle a hostile India.

Being a co-evolving and interdependent network allows the MJC to pursue a wider range of strategies against India when compared to the putative state. "Jihad under the nuclear umbrella" is one such option that MJC has successfully deployed against India.

Organised as a complex, the MJC can resist pressures from external stakeholders better. Whenever India and US press the armed forces to act against terrorists, MJC is able to absorb this pressure effectively, not because the army is sympathetic to the terrorists, but because they are united in an institutional framework —a complex.

What is the relationship of the MJC with the external world?

An organisational environment is defined as all elements that exist outside the boundary of the organisation and have the potential to affect all or part of the organisation. Two essential ways in which the environment influences organisations is: (1) the need for information about the environment and (2) the need for resources from the environment. The environmental conditions of complexity and change create a greater need to gather information and to respond based on that information. The organisation also is concerned with scarce material and financial resources and with the need to ensure availability of resources. (Daft 2008, 144-145).

Being a geopolitical actor, MJC's external environment comprises of a large number of important external stakeholders. The extent of its activities means that it is dependent on the external environment for both, information needs and resource needs.

This relationship of the MJC with a few key stakeholders is summarised in Table 1.

External Stakeholder	What does the stakeholder want?	Extent and type of control over MJC	MJC's attitude towards stakeholder
The putative state of Pakistan	Regain suzerainty over Pakistan. This is possible only by displacing MJC.	No control over the MJC. The putative state is a weak competitor.	Meets MJC's resource and information needs. MJC cannibalizes on resources meant for the putative state. It also meets MJC's information needs by allowing MJC to buffer itself from other hostile external stakeholders.
US	Stability in the Af-Pak region, an Afghan government that is not hostile to US. Upholding US military, business and political interests in the Indian subcontinent.	An important financier of the Pakistani state, and hence that of MJC. Needs MJC to uphold US interests in Afghanistan.	MJC is supportive of US demands as long as it does not hurt the internal dynamics of MJC. MJC resists and blocks any attempts by US to take action against terrorist groups, criminal syndicates and all other nodes.
The People's Republic of China	Balancing India in the Indian Ocean Region. To prevent radicalization of restive Xinjiang through Afghanistan and Pakistan	An important financier of the Pakistani state, and hence that of MJC. Sees MJC as an important player in furthering its interests in Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia.	MJC sees China as meeting both resource needs as information needs. China's support at political forums and economic partnerships legitimizes MJC's dominance.
The Indian Republic	Peace along the Line of Control (LoC), maintain status quo on the question of Kashmir	Control over MJC through nuclear deterrence and superior response in case of conventional wars.	MJC's information needs are met through India. The MJC's legitimacy depends on being able to react aggressively to the prevailing environmental changes originating in India. Hence MJC thwarts any attempts of reconciliation between the putative Pakistani state and India.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Retain the House of Saud's control over Saudi Arabia. Balance Iran's power in the Middle East.	Meets finance needs of MJC. Needs MJC for strengthening KSA's nuclear and conventional war capabilities.	MJC depends on Saudi Arabia for money, oil and diplomatic backing. MJC sees itself as a mediator that can reduce tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. A successful mediation will enhance legitimacy of MJC in the eyes of all external stakeholders.

External Stakeholder	What does the stakeholder want?	Extent and type of control over MJC	MJC's attitude towards stakeholder
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	Peace along the Durand Line and decreasing the Taliban's power	Deters MJC by supporting Pashtun nationalism on Pakistan's western borders.	MJC seeks to dominate Afghanistan fearing Pakistan's dismemberment. MJC fears that a strong independent Afghanistan—like the one that existed up to the mid-1970s—will pursue an irredentist agenda, claiming the Pashtun areas of Pakistan. Hence the MJC interferes in Afghanistan.

Table 1: Relationship of the MJC with external stakeholders

The stakeholder map in Table 1 highlights MJC's dependence on the external environment. Conversely, it provides clues for developing strategies to resist MJC's control over Pakistan.

Operating dynamics of the MJC

In the final section of this chapter, we survey the MJC's operational tactics and strategies. Understanding operations allows external actors to identify strengths and weaknesses of an organisation.

The first operational strategy of the MJC is to **appropriate Pakistan's resources for itself**. Right from its inception, the perceived threat of war with India compelled the political leaders to subordinate the needs of society to that of the army (Shah, 2014, 4). Subsequently, this became the norm that the army's needs always came first vis-a-vis other expenditure like education, healthcare etc. In addition, the army always had a say on what was to be done with foreign assistance. For example, under President George W. Bush, the U.S. gave billions of dollars to Pakistan, most of it in unrestricted funds, to combat terrorism. Musharraf, who served as President between 1999 and 2007, admitted in 2009 that during his tenure he diverted many of those billions to arm Pakistan against its *bete noire*, India (Wright 2011). This illustrates how an overt transfer of funds by the US to fight terrorism was used covertly to bolster the strength of the MJC.

Post 9/11, the US had transferred more than $13 billion to Pakistan to fight Al Qaeda. A large part of it was again appropriated for strengthening the MJC. In fact, a Pentagon officer conceded that once money was transferred, the US had no mechanism to track the final outcomes (Goswami 2012, 191). Retired General Mahmud Durrani, the then Pakistani ambassador to US, justified the diversion of

funds by saying that as there was very little left for the army after counter terror operations, the money was used for subsidies for army.

Between 2005 and 2010, Pakistani military and civilian government entities made $290 million from allowing US and NATO transit to Afghanistan via Karachi port. The MJC again appropriated over half of this sum, all of it in terms of pure rent (*The Acorn* 2012).

The MJC also deploys **"rogue" operations** as an operational strategy. MJC is effectively able to deny the high degree of connectivity between its nodes. For instance, the ISI goes to great lengths to claim that militant groups act independently on their own. Bob Woodward reported that the previous director general of the ISI, Ahmed Shuja Pasha, acknowledged that persons connected to the ISI were involved in the Mumbai attacks but insisted that the operation was rogue (Fair 2015, 252).

More recently, following the Pathankot Air Base attacks, Pervez Musharraf conceded that the ISI trains Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists. At the same time he categorically denied Pakistan Army's role in training militants (*The Hindu* 2016).

The informal methods of control between the various nodes leave enough room for plausible deniability manoeuvres.

The MJC operates by **shielding itself from any accountability**. It is not held to any audit—whether operational, structural or accounts. The way Hamoodur Rahman Commission report was dealt with by the political-military class is a testimony.[3] Set up after the military debacle in 1971 and headed by the Chief Justice of Supreme Court, the report severely indicted the military's handling of East Pakistan crisis and its incompetence in surrendering to the Indian army. The Pakistan army was accused many atrocities like extra-judicial killings, purging of intellectuals, loot and rape. The report clearly indicated that involvement of senior officers in running the country since 1958 was the main reason for corruption and incompetence in the military. It recommended the court martial of several generals. Reportedly, Zia-ul-Haq after he overthrew Bhutto in a coup, wanted it to be destroyed (*Frontline* 2000). Eventually the report was declassified only in 2000 and no action was taken (*BBC* 2000).

Risk Diversification is another distinguishing operating strategy of the MJC. Like a multinational corporation, the ISI has multiple clients for outsourcing the proxy war. The terrorist node is especially diverse: with multiple groups focused on specific targets such as Lashkar-e-Omar to attack Americans in Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad focused on India, Sipah-e-Sahaba to mitigate Shiite influence in Pakistan, and Haqqani network and the Taliban to destabilise Afghanistan. Such a range of terrorist groups diversifies the risk by allowing the core node — Pakistan military to balance the power of jihadi nodes in the complex.

The MJC controls the **nuclear weapons of Pakistan**. Unlike other nuclear-armed countries like the US, Britain, India etc. where the nuclear command authority is firmly in civilian hands, the nuclear trigger is firmly in the hands of Pakistan army (though in theory, it is the Prime Minister). The unit responsible is named Strategic Plans Division headed by a retired general. With a stockpile of about 120 warheads and tactical nuclear weapons, the Pakistan army, and thus the MJC is in an enviable position to enforce a nuclear blackmail (*ICAN* 2015).

The MJC is fiercely anti-competition. It is vehemently opposed to a strong putative civilian state. The army's involvement in politics can be traced right back to Jinnah when he broke the chain of command and involved junior army officers in Kashmir operations. Ever since, army has become the guardian of Pakistan's identity as a state (Raghavan 2015, para 9). The army keeps a close watch on all the political parties and sees a threat when popular government gets elected. Any strengthening of democratic process is seen as its emasculation from the public memory and national identity.

History was created when for the first time, a civilian government completed its term in 2013. In an election held in May 2013, Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (PML (N)) was voted to power. Soon, the MJC swung into action. It was alleged that sections of the army played an active role when 70,000 protesters marched from Lahore to Islamabad in August 2014. Imran Khan who was alleged to have had the backing of the army led the protesters. It was reported that he was being advised by the then ISI chief Zaheerul Islam. The ISI even drafted an Islamic cleric Tahir-Ul-Qadri to lead the protests. In a press conference, Javed Hashmi, the President of Tehreek-e-Insaaf Party alleged that Imran Khan plotted with the army to overthrow Nawaz Sharif (*Telegraph* 2014). If politics make strange bedfellows, it can be said that politics with Pakistan army even seeks stranger bedfellows ranging from clerics to administrators and politicians of several hues and shades. The politicians themselves court the army to further their interests.

Conclusion

This chapter described how the military, crime syndicates, socio-religious organisations, businesses and jihadis in Pakistan are not independent institutions, but part of a superstructure — a complex called the military—jihadi complex.

A complex system like the MJC is characterised by a large number of interrelationships, making it inherently difficult for an external actor to comprehend the diverse actions of the constituent parts at the macro level. We tried to bridge this gap by detailing various aspects of MJC: what it comprises of, how it operates and what keeps it together.

This chapter provides a starting point for policies towards Pakistan. The existence of the MJC explains why powerful geopolitical entities like US have consistently failed to restrain the negative externalities emerging out of Pakistan. This concept also makes it clear why any overtures towards talking peace with India suffer setbacks with predictable accuracy. It also helps understand the seemingly "duplicitous" nature of the Pakistani leadership, when it comes to taking action against terrorist groups of all hues.

In the long run, it is hoped that viewing the MJC from an organisational perspective will provide a toolkit for all the agents outside the MJC to contain, resist or dismantle this complex.

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Notes

[1] The complete list of twelve domestic and 32 transnational militant organisations originating in Pakistan along with their operations, leadership structures and their interconnections is archived on the *South Asia Terrorism Portal* at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/group_list.htm

[2] For a complete account of Haroon's life, read http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NC21Df02.html

[3] The report can available at http://img.dunyanews.tv/images/docss/hamoodur_rahman_commission_report.pdf, accessed on February 24, 2016